Jose Antonio Rodriguez-Matos was indicted on four counts related to counterfeiting and assaulting a Secret Service agent. He was convicted of making, selling, and possessing counterfeit currency under 18 U.S.C. 471, 473, and 472, but was acquitted of the assault charge under 18 U.S.C. 111(a). During sentencing, the district court increased his offense level based on specific factors: two levels for possessing a firearm during the sale of counterfeit currency, three levels for the acquitted conduct of assaulting a law enforcement officer with a vehicle, and two levels for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death during his flight from the scene.
The case began when a confidential informant reported Matos to the Secret Service, leading to a monitored transaction where Matos sold sixty counterfeit $20 bills for $300. Secret Service agents observed the exchange and, when attempting to arrest Matos, he drove his vehicle towards Agent Edwardo Garcia, who had identified himself as law enforcement. Matos narrowly missed Garcia, prompting a police chase that ensued through Miami. The court affirmed the district court's sentencing decisions.
Matos engaged in reckless driving behavior, including running stop signs and driving against traffic at high speeds. During the pursuit, he discarded a semiautomatic pistol, which was later recovered along with seven live rounds. After being cornered by law enforcement in a cul-de-sac, Matos resisted arrest. A search of his residence uncovered equipment associated with counterfeiting, including a copier and counterfeit $20 bills, totaling $2,220 in counterfeit currency linked to him. Following his conviction on multiple counterfeiting charges, his base offense level was calculated at 15, with the probation officer recommending three enhancements: a two-level increase for firearm possession during the offense, a three-level increase for assaulting a Secret Service Agent, and a two-level increase for reckless driving. This raised his adjusted offense level to 22, which was then reduced to a final level of 19 due to his acceptance of responsibility. Matos admitted guilt for the counterfeiting charges and offered to plead guilty, but maintained his innocence regarding the assault charge, for which he was acquitted. The district court accepted the probation officer's recommendation for a reduction in offense level, recognizing that Matos demonstrated acceptance of responsibility despite going to trial, as outlined in the sentencing guidelines. This acceptance is applicable even when a defendant asserts their right to trial, provided their defense does not deny essential factual elements of guilt.
Determining a defendant's acceptance of responsibility primarily relies on pre-trial statements and conduct. Matos, categorized with a criminal history of I, faced a sentencing range of 30 to 37 months but received concurrent sentences of 37 months for each conviction after objecting to enhancements. On appeal, Matos contends that the district court improperly applied a firearm enhancement under 2B5.1(b)(3) and a reckless endangerment enhancement under 3C1.2, arguing that both enhancements constitute double counting. The court found no merit in the reckless endangerment claim and focused on the firearm enhancement issue.
Guideline 2B5.1 pertains to counterfeiting offenses, with a base offense level of 9. The relevant enhancement under 2B5.1(b)(3) increases the offense level by 2 if a dangerous weapon, including a firearm, is possessed in connection with the offense. The guideline lacks a clear definition of "in connection with," and no prior court decisions have clarified the necessary relationship between a firearm and a counterfeiting offense for this enhancement. Matos argues for an analogy to the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Fadipe, while the government supports reasoning by analogy to the Eleventh Circuit’s United States v. Young. The court finds the government’s reasoning more persuasive, referencing the factual background of Fadipe, where a firearm was found in a vehicle involved in fraudulent activity, highlighting the need for a specific connection between the firearm and the counterfeiting offense.
The defendant, convicted of bank fraud and unlawful possession of a firearm by an illegal alien, had his base offense level increased by 4 levels under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) due to the presence of a firearm in connection with his felony. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed this enhancement, ruling that the evidence did not establish that the firearm was used "in connection with" the bank fraud. The firearm was merely found in the defendant's vehicle alongside tools related to the fraud, with no indication it was intended for protection or use in the crime. The court distinguished this case from United States v. Condren, where a firearm was found in proximity to drugs, which justified an enhancement due to the inherent risk of violence in such scenarios. In contrast, the mere presence of a firearm near bank fraud instruments does not automatically elevate the danger of violence. The court noted that while Condren supports enhancements based on possession of a firearm in connection with any felony, the specifics of this case did not meet that threshold. The defendant Matos contends similarly that his firearm's presence during the delivery of counterfeit currency does not establish a sufficient connection to warrant an enhancement, as it lacks the same risk of violence associated with firearms and drugs.
Distinctions exist between the cases of Fadipe and Matos regarding the nature of their respective offenses and the relevance of firearm possession. In Fadipe, the conviction for bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) was completed upon submitting a fraudulent credit application, and the firearm found in Fadipe’s vehicle was not linked to this act. The Fifth Circuit determined it was unreasonable to assume Fadipe had the gun to protect against theft of checks sent to his address, as they contained identifying information.
Conversely, Matos's offense of selling counterfeit currency (18 U.S.C. 473) was finalized upon delivering fake Federal Reserve notes to a confidential informant, with the notes lacking distinguishing features. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that Matos possessed the firearm to prevent the theft of these counterfeit notes.
The case of United States v. Young illustrates further legal principles. Young was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced as an armed career criminal under U.S.S.G. §4B1.4(b)(3)(A) after evidence showed he possessed a stolen rifle during a burglary. The court found sufficient evidence linking Young to the burglary, affirming that possession was "in connection with" the crime. The court adopted a broad interpretation of the phrase "in connection with," stating it was irrelevant whether the firearm was acquired during the crime or was simply possessed afterward. Young's appeal sought to apply a stricter "facilitation test" from other circuits, which stipulates that the firearm must serve a purpose related to the crime, rather than merely being present by coincidence.
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the phrase "in connection with" in the context of sentencing guidelines is deemed more accurate and relevant to the case at hand than interpretations from other circuits. Matos' possession of a firearm during a drug transaction is justified as a means of self-protection against a potentially dangerous partner in crime. The district court upheld the enhancement for firearm possession under § 2K2.1, agreeing with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning. Matos' claim of feeling threatened during the encounter further supports the court's findings.
Regarding double counting in sentencing, Matos challenges the application of both a three-level enhancement for assaulting an officer during flight and a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment, arguing that this constitutes impermissible double counting. Double counting is only inappropriate if one part of the guidelines already fully accounts for the harm considered by another part. The court reviews double counting claims de novo and maintains that the Sentencing Commission likely intended for separate guideline sections to be applied cumulatively. Matos cites commentary to § 3C1.2 to argue against the reckless endangerment enhancement; however, the court finds the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, which favors applying only the assault enhancement, unpersuasive and rejects it for this circuit.
The statement in question is categorized as dictum, as the district court in Sloley applied only guideline 3A1.2(b), leaving the Fourth Circuit without a need to resolve the potential for additional enhancements under 3C1.2. The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Swoape, criticized the Fourth Circuit's unnecessary pronouncement in Sloley as incorrect, emphasizing that the Sentencing Commission's interpretation of its guidelines, rather than a court's incomplete summary, holds authority. The critical issue for the court is whether enhancements under both 3A1.2(b) and 3C1.2 were applied to Matos based solely on the same conduct, which would constitute impermissible double counting. The district court did not address Matos’ objection to double counting during sentencing, and this court has not previously considered cumulative enhancements under these guideline sections. However, guidance can be found in decisions from four other circuits. Notably, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Hayes ruled that cumulative enhancements under 3A1.2(b) and 3C1.2 were impermissible double counting in a case involving similar circumstances. The court also highlighted that guidelines are binding for judges and courts in sentencing matters.
The legal analysis involves the application of sentencing enhancements under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant was assessed a two-level enhancement under §3A1.2(b) for assaulting Agent Hinton when his vehicle struck Hinton's car door, and an additional two-level enhancement under §3C1.2 for creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury to a young boy in his car during a police pursuit. The Sixth Circuit reversed the enhancements, stating that the same conduct—accelerating the car—was the basis for both, making it unreasonable to separate the risks posed to the officer and the child. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit upheld cumulative enhancements in United States v. Swoape for separate actions during a bank robbery and subsequent police chase that endangered multiple civilians. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits also supported separate enhancements for assaulting officers and creating risk during high-speed pursuits, establishing that distinct actions warrant cumulative adjustments without constituting double counting.
Punishment for the shots fired by the defendants during their escape was enhanced due to the official victim enhancement under § 3A1.2(b). This enhancement was applicable not only for the shooting incident but also for the defendants' actions during the high-speed chase. The case at hand is distinguished from Swoape and Alexander, where enhancements were specifically for assaulting officers. Matos’ case aligns more closely with Hayes, justifying the district court's decision to impose cumulative enhancements under both § 3A1.2(b) and § 3C1.2. Matos’ assault on Agent Garcia and his reckless driving were separate incidents, occurring both temporally and spatially apart, and did not constitute a single event. The court affirmed that the enhancements were appropriate, as they were not based solely on the same conduct. Additionally, the reckless endangerment provision under § 3C1.2 applied due to the dangers posed to civilians during the high-speed chase and the defendants' serious traffic violations, confirming that there was no double counting in the sentencing.
