Jeffrey C. Harvey v. Daryl H. Hollenback Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen International Union International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, Local 9 International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen Central Michigan Administrative District Council, Afl-Cio

Citation: 113 F.3d 639Docket: 96-1035

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; June 19, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

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Jeffrey C. Harvey, a former local union official, filed a lawsuit against multiple labor unions and local union official Daryl H. Hollenback, alleging a violation of his right to freedom of expression under Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). Following discovery, the defendants sought summary judgment, while some filed a counterclaim against Harvey. In turn, Harvey requested sanctions against Hollenback and Local 9, claiming the counterclaim was intended to harass and confuse the issues. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants by granting summary judgment and denying Harvey's motion for sanctions.

In 1985, the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen (IU) initiated Project 2000 to create a national consolidation strategy, leading to the formation of the Central Michigan Administrative Council (CMAC) in April 1992. The CMAC was set up to manage functions previously handled by local unions and included a Director and an Executive Committee (EC), with Hollenback appointed as the first Director. In January 1993, Hollenback appointed Harvey, then President of Local 14, to fill a vacancy on the EC and also hired him as a union field representative. Shortly after, Harvey and other EC members accused Hollenback of misconduct, including altering EC minutes and misusing union resources in legal matters. They successfully removed Hollenback from office; however, the IU reinstated him pending an investigation, which ultimately found the charges to be unsubstantiated.

The CMAC faced financial difficulties due to declining membership, leading to the elimination of three field representative positions and a 20% pay cut for remaining representatives. In response, field representatives, including Harvey, sought a special convention to propose a dues increase, which Hollenback opposed, fearing it would burden struggling members. Following threats against Hollenback, including vandalism and a shooting incident, the IU intervened, postponing the convention to evaluate an alternative restructuring plan. The IU proceeded with merging local unions into Local 9, terminating CMAC and its representatives, while appointing Hollenback as President and retaining most former CMAC officers, excluding Harvey, who claimed his termination violated his freedom of expression under Title I of the LMRDA. Harvey's initial complaint sought various remedies, including reinstatement and election acceleration, but the district court ruled that the Department of Labor had jurisdiction over his claims and later dismissed them. After the defendants moved for summary judgment, the court found no evidence of interference with free speech rights. The appellate court upheld the district court's ruling, concluding that Harvey did not prove a violation of his LMRDA Title I rights.

The standard of review for a district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. Summary judgment is deemed appropriate when the opposing party fails to demonstrate the existence of an essential element for which they bear the burden of proof at trial. If the nonmoving party faces a heightened burden of proof, such as clear and convincing evidence, they must present evidence that, if credible, meets this higher standard.

Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) establishes rights for union members to freely express their views and assemble, aiming to ensure democratic governance within unions. However, these rights are restricted to members in their capacity as members, not as officers or employees. LMRDA Section 609 prohibits labor organizations from disciplining members for exercising their rights, with "discipline" defined as actions that diminish a member's rights or status. The Supreme Court in Finnegan v. Leu clarified that discharge from union employment does not violate these membership rights, indicating that the LMRDA does not guarantee job security for members who also hold positions as employees or officials.

The court maintains a clear distinction between an individual's rights as a union member and as an employee or appointed officer. In the case of Cehaich, the court ruled that an employee's termination did not impact his membership rights since he faced no disciplinary actions; thus, he could not pursue a claim against the union. In contrast, a different outcome occurred in Thompson, where a union representative was expelled along with his termination, allowing him to maintain a claim.

Harvey's case parallels Cehaich as he has not substantiated any claims that his dismissal directly affected his membership rights; he was neither expelled nor disciplined and continued to express his dissent. Consequently, he cannot pursue a claim under Section 609 of the LMRDA.

However, Harvey relies on Section 102, which permits members to seek remedies for infringements of their rights. The Supreme Court acknowledges this section may encompass broader claims, potentially including dismissals aimed at suppressing dissent. Harvey contends that the union's restructuring and election delays were efforts to undermine his leadership and silence dissent within the membership.

To succeed under Section 102, Harvey must demonstrate that his rights as a member were infringed independently of any job loss consequences. Although the Supreme Court has not detailed what constitutes a "purposeful and deliberate attempt" to stifle dissent, claims must align with the LMRDA’s goal of ensuring democratic governance within unions. Previous rulings indicate that union leaders may make personnel changes reflecting the majority's will, which complicates Harvey’s position.

An elected official's dismissal, as established in Lynn, can give rise to a cause of action under Section 102, as it potentially chills both the official's and their constituents' free speech rights. However, in this case, the relevant officials were never elected due to restructuring delays, complicating the identification of a faction likely to uphold democratic principles within the union. The plaintiff must demonstrate that their dismissal was part of a deliberate plan to undermine the democratic process in the labor organization, a challenging task as noted by the district court. The evidence reviewed indicates that the plaintiff, Harvey, failed to meet this burden, as he and his supporters were able to criticize union leadership without fear of retaliation. Notably, Harvey himself acknowledged feeling free to express his opinions at union meetings, and no other members reported experiencing retaliation. Furthermore, Harvey managed to run for a union position without facing allegations of improper conduct, contrasting with cases where dismissed employees faced significant restrictions. His claims rely on speculation regarding a conspiracy to oust him, lacking sufficient evidentiary support. Ultimately, the lawsuit centers on Harvey's job loss, with his damages calculated based on lost wages rather than any infringement of membership rights, which does not constitute a cause of action for wrongful termination under Title I of the LMRDA.

Harvey has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact indicating that the defendants intentionally suppressed dissent among union members, which would undermine the union's democratic processes. Consequently, the district court's decision is affirmed. Regarding sanctions related to certain defendants filing a counterclaim, the district judge's discretion is also upheld without the need for extensive detail. Although the Supreme Court clarified that there are various ways to establish a violation of Section 102, Harvey's claim relies on a specific formulation. Additionally, Harvey's argument for being treated as an elected official, due to his association with individuals appointed to the CMAC from local union organizations, is deemed meritless, as he was not elected to any position within the CMAC.