Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division; February 4, 2013; New Jersey; State Appellate Court
The court, represented by SAPP-PETERSON, J.A.D., granted William Ross a stay and permission to appeal the Family Part judge's January 13, 2012, interlocutory order, which denied Ross's motion to dismiss Beverly Maeker's palimony complaint and granted her $6,000 per month in pendente lite support. The judge ruled that Maeker's complaint was not barred by the 2010 amendment to the Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1—5(h), which requires written agreements for palimony and independent legal advice prior to such agreements. The court reversed this decision, stating that the amendment serves as enforcement legislation applicable regardless of when the claimed agreement was made.
Maeker and Ross began their relationship in 1998, cohabiting in various locations and relying on Ross for financial support while Maeker primarily managed the home. Their relationship ended when Ross moved out in July 2011. Maeker alleged that Ross made promises of lifetime support, executed a power of attorney naming her to manage his affairs, and created a will bequeathing his estate to her. She filed her initial complaint on July 8, 2011, covering several claims including palimony and unjust enrichment, and later amended it to assert an oral contract with partial performance, arguing it exempted her from the amendment's requirements.
Ross moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that any promise to support her would need to comply with the amendment's writing and legal advice conditions. The motion judge found that Maeker's allegations sufficiently stated a cause of action, noting that the amendment did not clarify its applicability to pre-existing agreements. Furthermore, the judge highlighted the absence of a grace period for filing actions after the amendment's enactment, which took effect immediately upon signing into law.
The judge determined it unreasonable to interpret the Legislature's intent as eliminating legitimate palimony claims accrued over the past thirty years through a legal mechanism that lacked the opportunity for affected parties to file an action. He interpreted the Legislature's phrase “no action shall be brought” to mean that actions based on oral agreements made after the Amendment's effective date are prohibited. This interpretation aligns with legal principles and legislative intent. The judge evaluated the plaintiff's cross-motion for pendente lite relief, finding it met the standards from *Crowe v. De Gioia*, acknowledging the plaintiff's age (54), her lack of employment for ten years, and the inequity of assuming future employment potential at this stage. He allowed the plaintiff to maintain her equitable claims, including support based on partial performance, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, quasi-contract, estoppel, specific performance, fraud/misrepresentation, and joint venture, without prejudice. Additionally, the judge ordered the defendant to advance $25,000 for pendente lite counsel fees and denied the defendant’s request for a stay pending appeal. The defendant subsequently filed for interlocutory review, raising several points for appeal, including claims of error in the trial judge's refusal to dismiss the amended palimony complaint, the viability of implied palimony claims, the award of pendente lite support, and the granting of counsel fees.
The key legal issue is whether N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) applies exclusively to palimony agreements made after the amendment's effective date. This is a legal question that warrants de novo review, meaning the appellate court will not defer to the motion judge's findings. The court's interpretation will begin with the statutory language to determine the Legislature's intent, focusing on the ordinary meaning of words. If the language is clear and unambiguous, the court will interpret it based solely on its plain meaning, without rewriting the statute or assuming different intent. However, should any ambiguity arise, the court may consider extrinsic evidence, including legislative history and the statute’s overall purpose, especially if a plain reading leads to an absurd outcome.
The amendment, effective January 18, 2010, states that no action can be brought on certain agreements, including promises of support in non-marital relationships, unless such promises are in writing and signed by the party to be charged, with independent legal advice for both parties. Since the amendment's enactment, only two cases have addressed it. In one case, Botis, the court upheld a trial court's conclusion that the amendment applies prospectively, affirming that the plaintiff's claim against her deceased partner's estate was governed by the new law.
In contractual discussions, the parties' relevant expectations at the time of agreement are emphasized, particularly regarding the enforceability of agreements without written documentation, despite later statutory amendments. The decedent, a putative palimony promisor, died before the new statutory requirements took effect, and the plaintiff filed her complaint shortly after his death and before the amendment's enactment. The trial judge highlighted that the decedent could not comply with the new requirements posthumously. Prior to the amendment, case law supported the expectation that such agreements were enforceable without a written document.
In Cavalli v. Arena, a court dismissed a case where the promise of support was made before the amendment took effect, citing that the language of the amendment barred the plaintiff's complaint. The court interpreted the Legislature's intent, as outlined in the Senate Judiciary Committee Statement, to favor applying the amendment to cases filed after its effective date, reflecting a policy against enforcing claims made under prior palimony interpretations.
The amendment mandates that any palimony contract must be in writing and signed by the promisor, with the requirement that both parties receive independent legal counsel. It broadens the scope of enforceable promises to include not only support but other considerations as well, clearly stating that such agreements must be documented to be valid, irrespective of when the original promise was made.
The motion judge supported the plaintiff's assertion that her palimony claim arose before the Amendment's effective date, believing that such claims accrue when the agreement is made. However, this interpretation was rejected, as palimony is based on contract principles, and the cause of action arises when the agreement is allegedly breached, not when the promise of support was made. The plaintiff's cause of action accrued on July 1, 2011, when the defendant allegedly abandoned her and broke his promise of support. The court distinguished this case from Botis, where the oral agreement was enforceable at the time of the complaint, and noted that the Amendment's timing during the proceedings played a critical role. The court emphasized that the reasonable expectations discussed in Botis did not apply here, as the parties could have reasonably executed a written agreement after the Amendment took effect but did not do so, as the defendant only executed a power of attorney and will.
The Amendment is found to be explicitly aimed at enforcement and the parties' ability to comply prior to the termination of their relationship, rendering an analysis of their reasonable expectations unnecessary. However, if such an analysis were conducted, it would reveal that the plaintiff failed to present a viable claim under Rule 4:6-2(e) based on the interactions between the Amendment's effective date and the relationship's conclusion. Plaintiff's actions indicate no expectation of lifetime support; instead, she was permitted to manage the defendant's affairs until the revocation of the Power of Attorney (POA), with the intention of being named as the residuary beneficiary upon his death. The two documents in question do not legally signify any commitment to lifetime support. The plaintiff's assertion that the palimony agreement was established through these documents lacks merit. The court does not accept the assumption that the absence of a written lifetime support agreement was due to the plaintiff's reliance on New Jersey case law, as her expectation stemmed from personal discussions and circumstances rather than legal understanding. The court declines to consider the plaintiff's argument regarding the Amendment's constitutionality due to her failure to raise this issue at the trial court level. The Amendment's applicability to pre-existing oral agreements does not present a jurisdictional issue, and while it may involve significant public interest, the constitutional concern pertains to the requirement for legal counsel in memorializing agreements, not the writing requirement itself. Since no written promise was made, the constitutionality of this requirement is not addressed. The trial judge's belief that Count Two of the plaintiff's complaint remains valid, despite the Amendment, is disputed. Count Two claims that the defendant made oral and written promises to the plaintiff, which were performed until the relationship ended; however, the defendant’s fulfillment of these promises precludes him from invoking a Statute of Frauds defense.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant supported her by covering living expenses, joint expenses, and costs related to her son and a Brooklyn property. The enforceability of an oral promise for lifetime support based on partial or full performance is uncertain following a legislative amendment aimed at overturning previous “palimony” rulings. Even if such a claim were a permissible exception to the amendment, the plaintiff's allegations do not warrant relief.
The referenced case, Klockner v. Green, involved a successful claim for specific performance based on extensive services rendered to a decedent, where the Supreme Court emphasized that such performance must be exceptional and not easily quantifiable. In contrast, the plaintiff here is seeking enforcement against the defendant, who allegedly provided the services, rather than the other way around. The services performed by the defendant lack exceptional characteristics, and the plaintiff has already benefited from them.
Additionally, the plaintiff claims unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, quasi-contract, and equitable estoppel. To prevail on unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant received a benefit unjustly retained without payment. For quantum meruit, the plaintiff must show good faith service performance, acceptance of those services, expectation of compensation, and the services' reasonable value.
To establish equitable estoppel, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct, either intentional or by inducing reliance, led to the plaintiff changing her position to her detriment (Knorr v. Smeal). New Jersey courts generally do not grant future support based on equitable theories. In Kozlowski, Justice Pashman suggested that quasi-contractual and equitable remedies could be available to unmarried parties without a formal agreement, aiming to prevent unjust enrichment. However, the majority did not address this due to the existence of an agreement in that case. The Chancery Division in Carney v. Hansell later declined to provide future support under equitable theories, emphasizing the absence of a contractual agreement for palimony. The court did acknowledge a potential claim for unjust enrichment regarding the defendant’s business interests, distinguishing it from the plaintiff's role as a homemaker. Subsequent cases have recognized that defendants can be unjustly enriched by contributions from plaintiffs beyond homemaking services. The Restatement Third of Restitution outlines a claim for restitution if one partner has made substantial contributions to specific assets owned by the other. However, in this case, the plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment are primarily tied to homemaking and companionship, lacking allegations of contributions to the defendant’s assets. Consequently, the plaintiff's equitable claims are essentially variations of her barred palimony claim. The court concluded that since the palimony claim is barred and the equitable claims are meritless, the plaintiff is not entitled to interim support or attorney fees. The judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint was reversed and remanded with prejudice. The defendant's claims regarding his mental state during the execution of the POA and allegations of a forged will were acknowledged but not adjudicated, as the appeal was assessed solely under the standards for motions to dismiss.
