Brian Gillespie Bown v. Gwinnett County School District, Zell Miller, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Georgia, Michael Bowers, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Georgia, George G. Thompson
Docket: 95-9595
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; May 6, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
Brian Gillespie Bown challenged Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act (O.C.G.A. 20-2-1050) in an appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, asserting that the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Act, effective July 1, 1994, mandates a brief period of quiet reflection (not exceeding 60 seconds) at the beginning of each school day, which is not intended to be a religious exercise. It allows for voluntary, nonsectarian student-initiated prayers but emphasizes a moment for silent reflection on daily activities. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants, concluding that the Act does not contravene the Establishment Clause, a decision that the appellate court affirmed. The Act's legislative intent was to provide students with an opportunity for reflection in a fast-paced society, and it includes a severability clause to maintain its enforceability if any part is deemed unconstitutional. Senator David Scott, a key proponent of the Act, introduced it in January 1994.
Senate Bill 396, introduced by Senator Scott, aims to reduce youth violence in Georgia by implementing a moment of silent reflection at the start of each school day. This initiative was inspired by student responses to school shootings, which included a moment of silence that appeared to provide comfort. After passing the Senate, the bill was amended by the House with the Johnson Amendment, which extended the silent period from 60 to 120 seconds, and the Davis Amendment, allowing religious clubs equal access to school property. A conference committee later removed these amendments and reverted to the Senate's original version, which was initially adopted by the Senate but rejected by the House. A second conference committee proposed this original version along with a part of the Davis Amendment and a severability clause, which both chambers ultimately passed, leading to the bill becoming law.
During House debates, concerns arose regarding potential implications for school prayer, with some members believing the bill could facilitate it, while others argued it did not have a religious purpose. Prior to the 1994-95 school year, teacher Bown expressed concerns about the law's implementation in a letter to Superintendent George Thompson, criticizing the perceived intrusion into classroom management and seeking clarity on how to handle potential student prayer during the silence. Bown feared legal liability and requested guidance on enforcing the law. In response, Administrative Assistant Steve Spellman sent Bown an Administrative Bulletin distributed to all school principals, addressing these concerns.
The Administrative Bulletin emphasizes that teachers and administrators should not influence students regarding the use of a designated moment of quiet reflection for prayer. Students are permitted to engage in silent prayer during this time, but audible prayer, whether individually or collectively, is prohibited. Coercion among students to pray is also not tolerated. The moment is intended solely for silent reflection on the day's activities and should not serve as a religious exercise. Following concerns raised by Bown regarding the Act, the school administration decided to uniformly announce the moment of quiet reflection each day. On August 22, 1994, Principal Hendrix announced the moment over the intercom, after which Bown continued his lesson without observing the moment. Although two students displayed Bibles and one bowed her head, there were no audible prayers. Subsequently, Bown was instructed by Superintendent Thompson to comply with the Act but chose to leave the campus instead. This led to his suspension and eventual termination from the Gwinnett County School District. Bown contends that the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which is evaluated using the Lemon test. This test requires the statute to have a secular purpose, not advance or inhibit religion, and avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. All three criteria must be met for the statute to withstand the Establishment Clause challenge.
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that a statute have a "clearly secular purpose" to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. While the purpose does not need to be exclusively secular, a statute is unconstitutional if it is primarily motivated by a religious purpose. Courts must assess the actual intent behind the statute, looking to its language, legislative history, and the sequence of events leading to its enactment. Generally, courts defer to the state's assertion of a secular purpose, but this purpose must be genuine, not merely a façade.
The statute in question has a preamble stating that its purpose is to provide students with a brief period of quiet reflection, which is reiterated in the statute's language. Subsection (a) explicitly mentions this "brief period of quiet reflection," while subsection (b) clarifies that the moment is not intended as a religious service and should focus on non-religious topics, such as the day's anticipated activities. However, there is a contention that subsection (c) introduces an improper religious purpose into the Act.
Bown contends that subsection (c) of the Act allows voluntary, nonsectarian, nonproselytizing student-initiated prayer, suggesting that the Act has a religious purpose. However, an analysis of subsection (c) and its legislative history indicates it does not authorize any activities but instead counters any unintended implications from the prohibition of religious activity in subsection (b). The language in subsection (c) clarifies that subsections (a) and (b) do not prohibit activities deemed constitutional by the legislature, specifically allowing for voluntary school prayers that are nonsectarian and nonproselytizing. The plain text of subsection (c) does not affirmatively authorize religious activities, aiming only to prevent misinterpretation of subsections (a) and (b).
The structure and title of the Act, which emphasizes a "moment of quiet reflection," aligns with a secular purpose rather than a religious one, as supported by the severability clause. This clause ensures that if any part of the Act is deemed unconstitutional, the remaining sections, particularly those promoting a moment of quiet reflection, will still be effective. Legislative history reveals conflicting views, yet it predominantly underscores a secular intention. The primary sponsor, Senator Scott, introduced the bill to address violence among students, emphasizing self-reflection rather than school prayer. While some House representatives expressed a desire for school prayer during debates, others clarified that the bill was not intended to reinstate prayer, indicating a lack of consensus on its religious implications.
Several legislators believed that subsection (c) of the amendment was a step towards reinstating prayer in schools, while others disagreed. Evidence suggests that subsection (c) was influenced by a Fifth Circuit ruling allowing voluntary, nonsectarian, and nonproselytizing student-initiated prayers at high school graduations, specifically referencing *Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District*. Supporters of subsection (c) aimed to clarify that it would not prohibit constitutionally permissible activities, unlike subsections (a) and (b).
This legislative history contrasts with *Jaffree*, where the primary sponsor and the Alabama Governor explicitly stated their intent to reinstate school prayer without presenting evidence of a secular purpose. Although some Georgia legislators expressed a desire to return prayer to schools, others believed the Act did not pertain to school prayer. There is no clear indication of the motivations of all legislators who voted for the Act.
Guidance from *Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens* suggests that conflicting motivations among legislators do not invalidate the Act if its legislative purpose is secular. Despite some legislators citing religious motivations, the Act's language indicates a secular purpose: providing students a moment of quiet reflection. The assessment of legislative history supports this secular purpose, and the expressed statutory language reinforces it, asserting a clear secular intent while disclaiming any religious purpose.
The Act satisfies the first prong of the Lemon test, demonstrating a sincere secular purpose. Under the second prong of the Lemon test, the focus is on whether the statute's primary effect advances or inhibits religion, considering whether the practice conveys an endorsement or disapproval of religion, as established in prior case law including *Jaffree* and *Lynch*.
The implementation of the Act by the Gwinnett County School District does not primarily advance or inhibit religion. Principal Hendrix's announcement regarding a moment of silence did not indicate whether students should pray or not. An Administrative Bulletin instructed teachers not to suggest that students use this time for prayer, allowing students to pray silently if they choose, without any teacher encouragement or favoritism regarding prayer. The case records show that only two students placed Bibles on their desks, with one bowing her head. The argument that the Act advances and inhibits religion by favoring silent prayer is unconvincing. While audible prayer is not allowed, the Act mandates a moment of quiet reflection rather than silent prayer, enabling students of various beliefs to reflect without compromising their values or being subjected to others' prayers. All students can engage in this moment as they prefer, as long as it remains silent. The case does not involve coercion, as there is no evidence of public or peer pressure for students to engage in any religious activities.
The Georgia Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act mandates a 60-second period of silence for students, clarifying that this moment is not a religious exercise and does not involve coercion or encouragement to pray. The Act meets the second prong of the Lemon test, as it does not advance or inhibit religion. Regarding the third prong, the statute does not create excessive government entanglement with religion, as teachers are not required to lead or monitor prayers during this period. The requirement for teachers to maintain silence does not constitute excessive entanglement, given that similar expectations occur throughout the school day. Arguments suggesting that the Act allows for voluntary student prayers that would require teacher monitoring are rejected, as the statute does not authorize such activities. Consequently, the Act is deemed to satisfy all three prongs of the Lemon test, affirming that it does not violate the Establishment Clause. The district court's judgment in favor of the appellees is upheld.
