Warren County Community College v. Warren County Board of Chosen Freeholders

Citations: 350 N.J. Super. 489; 796 A.2d 257; 2002 N.J. Super. LEXIS 85

Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division; February 14, 2002; New Jersey; State Appellate Court

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The court, led by Judge Petrella, addressed an appeal from the Warren County Board of Chosen Freeholders regarding orders from the Law Division that mandated the Board to allocate funds for a capital project at Warren County Community College and issued contempt sanctions against two Freeholders. The consolidated appeals examined the extent of the Legislature's power to delegate taxing authority to non-elected boards and the application of contempt powers against public officials to compel them to vote on funding for the College’s community center project.

The court reversed the Law Division's order that incorrectly applied N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-15 and found procedural and substantive errors in sanctioning the two Freeholders for not voting to appropriate funds or issue bonds. The College Board of Trustees had previously adopted a resolution for the construction of the community center, despite voter disapproval, and referred to the state's Chapter 122 program for matching funds. The Board of school estimate, consisting of the Freeholders and Trustees, certified a funding request of $4,140,720, which included anticipated state matching funds. 

The Board of Chosen Freeholders, however, rejected hiring legal counsel to prepare a bond ordinance necessary for the project, leading the College to seek a court order to compel the Board to appropriate the required funds. The Board argued that the project funding necessitated a bond issue due to the nature of the Chapter 12 funding, asserting they could not be compelled to issue bonds despite N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-19(2) stating otherwise.

Bonding was necessary for the County to qualify for Chapter 12 matching funds, prompting the Board to assert it could not be compelled to make an appropriation under local bonding laws that grant discretion to public entities. The judge ordered the Board to initiate the bond issuance process but did not mandate approval of a bonding ordinance by the Freeholders. The Board contended that even if the statute requiring appropriation upon receiving a board of school estimate’s certificate was constitutional, its application in Warren County resulted in unconstitutional outcomes due to the unique characteristics of its Board. 

Although the Board acknowledged the transformation of the Community College Agency into a county college raised questions about the College's authority, it argued that the statutory framework for county colleges grants a board of school estimate greater budgetary powers only with specific Board actions. The College’s self-elevation to a superior status raised concerns about its authority compared to its original establishment as a community college agency. 

On May 28, 1999, the Trustees adopted a resolution to request $4,140,720 from the board of school estimate, omitting mention of Chapter 12 matching funds, which was subsequently approved by the board on June 16, 1999. The Board did not act on the matter in several meetings following receipt of the approval certificate. Following a complaint filed by the College on September 2, 1999, which sought summary judgment to compel action, the Board raised factual disputes about the intent behind the funding resolution, particularly regarding tax increases. The Board argued that bonding was the only viable financing method and that if a tax increase was necessary, it would be considered an emergency appropriation, a discretionary action. The Board also claimed the appropriation statute violated constitutional principles against taxation without representation. The motion judge found no material factual disputes and ordered the Board to appropriate funds by November 13, 1999, without addressing the constitutional claims. The deadline was extended to January 31, 2000, in anticipation of a new Freeholder assuming office and a potential shift in the majority’s stance on bonding and the Chapter 12 application.

On January 26, 2000, Ann Stone, the Freeholder Director, submitted a letter of intent to the State Treasurer for Chapter 12 funding for the College’s construction project, indicating plans to sell bonds by August 30, 2001, pending State approval. The State approved the funding request on May 2, 2000, setting a new bond sale deadline of August 30, 2002, yet the Board chose not to act. The College sought to compel the Board to comply with a previous October 14, 1999 order via a motion filed on March 6, 2001. During the hearing on March 30, the Board claimed it was not obligated to act until the State's deadline. The Board also raised questions about the College's county status, arguing it could not rely on the board of school estimate's certificate. Despite these claims, the judge suggested the College existed and the Board's actions might appear to dissolve it. The judge ruled that the prior order had not been amended, directing the Board to allocate funds within ninety days, warning that noncompliance could lead to individual sanctions against noncomplying Freeholders.

An April 12, 2001 order set a June 28, 2001 deadline for the Board to adopt a funding plan. The Board sought reconsideration of this order on May 4, 2001, questioning the constitutionality of the appropriation statute and the College's status, but their motion was denied. After the Board rejected a bond ordinance on June 27, 2001, the College filed a contempt complaint against the Board for failing to comply with court orders. On July 2, 2001, the judge found two Freeholders in contempt for voting against the bond ordinance, imposing sanctions for attorney’s fees. The Freeholders defended their actions by asserting they believed the College was improperly established under State law, emphasizing their budgetary control over the county and community college.

An August 14, 2001 order mandated that individual Freeholders would face incarceration if appropriations were not made by August 27, 2001. After a hearing on August 16, 2001, a motion for reconsideration was denied, leading the Board to file an appeal of the contempt order. While a different court panel denied a stay pending appeal, the Supreme Court intervened to stay the contempt order during the appeal process. The College argued in docket number A-5697-00 that the County's appeal was untimely due to its failure to appeal an earlier October 14, 1999 order. This argument was rejected, as the case was distinguishable from IMO Newark Teachers Union, where sanctions were imposed for outright defiance of a court order by public employees. The October 14, 1999 order required the County to appropriate capital outlay funds by November 13, 1999. Although the deadline was informally extended, the County opted to wait until the August 30, 2002 deadline for bond issuance. The College believed the County was delaying and sought to enforce its rights, leading to an April 12, 2001 order imposing a new deadline of June 28, 2001 for appropriations, which conflicted with the State Treasurer's deadline and removed discretion from the Freeholders. The County's appeal targeted the April 12, 2001 and May 25, 2001 orders, making the notice of appeal timely. Additionally, the Board argued that N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-19(2) was unconstitutional as applied to Warren County, highlighting the legislative mechanism for community college funding that involves an unelected board of school estimate. This board evaluates funding requests from the college's board of trustees, who must then receive certification for appropriations from the county board of freeholders, which is mandated to allocate necessary funds upon receipt.

An appropriation procedure for property tax increases is outlined in N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-18 and N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-19(1), while bond issuance is addressed in N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-19(2)(b). The Trustees initiated a resolution for the County to secure Chapter 12 matching funds for a building project, which was endorsed by the board of school estimate, indicating an intent to finance the project through bonds. The Board contends that N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-19(2) unlawfully delegates tax authority to an unelected body, violating established legal principles. This argument references Township of Bernards v. Allen, which invalidated a tax levy by appointed commissioners based on excess taxation beyond town meeting approval. The court emphasized that only elected bodies can receive delegated taxing power from the Legislature. Although the board of school estimate is not elected, it is theoretically controlled by elected freeholders. The freeholders can influence the board’s decisions, as they appoint members who align with their views. However, in Warren County, the unique structure of having only three freeholders results in them all serving on the board of school estimate, limiting the majority's ability to appoint representatives aligned with their views. This arrangement leads to an unconstitutional outcome under N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-19(2) in Warren County, as it prevents a majority from effectively controlling the board's decisions on funding.

In counties with a higher number of freeholders, a majority can prevent the board of school estimate from issuing certificates that the Board refuses to adopt. In the current case, the dissent of one Freeholder allowed the approval of a certificate for a College building project. The critical question is whether, according to N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-19(2), the Board is mandated to appropriate funds upon receiving the certificate. If it is, a minority of the Board can effectively bind the majority by collaborating with two College trustees to approve the project. The delegation of tax-raising or bond-issuing authority by the Legislature to unelected bodies is prohibited, as seen in relevant case law, including Bernards Township and Meadowlands Reg. Dev. Agency v. State. Despite this principle, the ruling by the motion judge has allowed the unelected board to compel Freeholders, who represent the electorate, to vote for appropriations against their majority's wishes, despite public opposition as indicated by a non-binding referendum. New Jersey precedents establish that the decision to bond is discretionary; thus, elected bodies retain the authority to approve or disapprove bond issuance. The motion judge’s order undermines this discretion and intrudes upon the legislative authority of the Board, violating the separation of powers doctrine entrenched in the State Constitution. Previous cases illustrate that the delegation of power must respect this separation, and the County cannot interfere with judicial administration under constitutional authority.

The County lacks authority to control the judiciary's budget, rendering the referendum question invalid as it pertains only to matters the County can address. This case does not involve public officials breaching constitutional duties or ministerial acts; instead, it focuses on county government functions and the responsibilities of Freeholders. Without explicit constitutional authorization, neither Freeholders nor state legislators can be compelled to vote in a specific manner, as such coercion could lead to significant governmental mischief. Courts should not interfere with legislative processes. The judge's directive to the County to raise funds via taxation or bonding constitutes a discretionary legislative function, which the Board cannot be compelled to execute based on an unelected body’s certificate or a court order. The elected Board can refuse funding for projects they oppose. The College claims the board of school estimate can mandate appropriations, relying on a precedent where the court ordered a city to fund a school lunch program due to the established authority of its type I school district. However, Warren County's creation of the College was solely by Freeholder vote, and no subsequent actions were taken to convert it into a county college or to seek voter approval for such a status. The legitimacy of the College as a county college is disputed by the County, and the board of school estimate's authority, as defined by state statute, applies only to county colleges, not to community college agencies. The College's argument that past cooperation and funding by the County validates its status as a county college is unfounded, as no formal decision or vote by the County’s voters or Board established this status.

The reasoning in Garfield does not align with the College's stance regarding the establishment of a county college. The standard procedure requires the board of freeholders to petition the commission on higher education for authorization, as outlined in N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-2. This differs from the community college agency route under N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-30 et seq., which presents several legal distinctions, including the lack of condemnation powers for a community college agency and its limited ability to recommend budgetary funds to the Board per N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-36. The College's reliance on Barber v. Board of School Estimate is critiqued, as the outcome they seek appears anomalous and undermines the constitutional framework, rendering N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-19(2) invalid in Warren County.

Regarding the contempt orders in appeal A-105-01, procedural deficiencies necessitate the reversal of contempt orders against Freeholders Michael Doherty and John DiMaio. Every contempt action must adhere to R. 1:10-2 procedures, which require notice and specific allegations against individuals. The College's complaint failed to name the individual Freeholders, thereby not providing proper notice of potential personal sanctions. Although the Freeholders were aware of the contempt proceedings, this does not equate to being notified of personal consequences. Furthermore, the motion judge improperly imposed sanctions not requested in the College's verified complaint, violating R. 1:10-2(c), which mandates prosecution of contempt by designated parties such as the Attorney General or County Prosecutor.

Counsel for the College signed and verified the complaint and led the contempt proceedings, although the 1994 amendment to court rules recommended that such matters be prosecuted by the Attorney General or county prosecutor. The judge did not establish good cause for bypassing this recommendation, despite the College alleging that the judge determined political considerations warranted local law enforcement's absence. This assertion lacks support in the records from the July 2, 2001 contempt proceedings. Given the political implications, judicial involvement should be cautious, and the College's attorney should not have prosecuted the matter.

Additionally, prior rules mandated that the judge whose order was allegedly violated could not preside over the contempt proceedings unless both parties consented. It was thus a reversible error for the same judge to oversee the case, as seen in City of Bridgeton v. Jones. The 1994 amendment to R. 1:10-2(c) reinforced this by stipulating that the judge who initiated the prosecution should not hear the case if objectivity is at stake. Concerns about the judge's impartiality were evident, especially after he made statements suggesting personal affront regarding compliance with his orders and expressing a willingness to hold Freeholders in contempt. 

The judge also identified himself as a taxpayer affected by the situation and criticized the Freeholders before they had the chance to present their case, indicating a lack of neutrality. The contempt proceedings should have been assigned to another judge. Furthermore, the trial judge denied a required stay of execution following a contempt finding, contrary to court rules, which the Supreme Court later granted on September 7, 2001.

The Board argues that the judge's procedural failures demonstrate a lack of objectivity and constitute a denial of due process, revealing significant defects in the proceedings. The judge improperly awarded attorneys’ fees to the College for prosecuting contempt against two individual Freeholders, as no fees should be granted to a private attorney in such cases; only reasonable out-of-pocket expenses are reimbursable. Even if the contempt ruling had been upheld, the awarding of counsel fees was deemed inappropriate. Additionally, the imposition of sanctions on the Freeholders lacks substantive merit and conflicts with equitable principles. Citing Spallone v. United States, the text highlights that contempt orders against individual elected officials require prior contempt orders against the governing body. The Spallone case involved contempt orders against Yonkers City Council members for failing to comply with a federal court order regarding desegregation, which were reversed by the Supreme Court, emphasizing that sanctions should compel legislative actions without compromising the officials' ability to act in the public interest. The Court noted that individual fines may coerce legislators to prioritize personal financial interests over their constituents' needs, undermining the legislative process.

Individual sanctions against councilmembers create a more significant distortion of the legislative process than sanctions imposed on a city for failing to enact an ordinance. Legislators may feel pressured to support an ordinance, like the Affordable Housing Ordinance, to avoid severe financial penalties that could threaten the city's fiscal health. The District Court should have initially applied contempt sanctions against the city alone to ensure compliance with a remedial order, considering the extraordinary nature of sanctions against individual councilmembers. Only if the city's compliance failed within a reasonable timeframe should individual sanctions have been contemplated, adhering to the principle of exercising minimal necessary power.

The case presented is less severe than Spallone, which involved serious federal constitutional issues. Two Freeholders were improperly held in contempt and sanctioned without prior charges or liability. The judge expressed concern over taxpayer burden due to the Freeholders' defiance, despite their actions aligning with a non-binding voter referendum. Consequently, the appeal in docket number A-5697-00 is reversed, and the contempt order and sanctions in docket number A-105-01 are vacated.

Additionally, the Warren County Community College was established by the County Freeholders in 1981 under a specific statute, with its change in status to a college occurring through a resolution by the Board of Higher Education rather than legislative action or referendum. The commission contends that this change did not comply with statutory requirements, particularly regarding the referendum needed for college status, raising questions about the legitimacy of its establishment. However, there has been no challenge to the college's de facto existence, despite concerns from the Law Division Judge.

The decision does not affect the actual existence of the educational institution in question. A county college is defined under L. 1971, c. 12, as an educational entity established by one or more counties, offering programs typically not exceeding two years beyond high school, which may include various curriculums such as college transfer courses and technical programs, per NJ.S.A. 18A:64A-1(c). The establishment process for a county college is outlined in NJ.S.A. 18A:64A-2 through 6. The College may not qualify under this definition since it was established only as a county community college agency, governed by a commission, rather than as a college as per NJ.S.A. 18A:64A-30, which seeks funding through county budget recommendations (NJ.S.A. 18A:64A-36). Relevant statutes indicate that the board of chosen freeholders must appropriate certified amounts for specified purposes, either through established methods or via bond ordinances, as detailed in L. 1974, c. 89. Moreover, if a board of chosen freeholders has not established a county college, it may form a community college agency with the Commissioner’s consent, as originally enacted by L. 1967, c. 271. The Board's attorney indicated that a challenge to the statute's constitutionality was filed, permitting the Attorney General to participate, though he declined. The order does not mandate completion of the bonding process within thirty days, as it involves more than just the Board's desire to issue bonds. Authorization from the State Treasurer was not received until May 2, 2000, over four months after the initial request. If denied, the County would bear the bonding costs or seek funding through property tax increases. The College contested the timeliness of the County’s challenge to its establishment, but the Board raised this issue multiple times in the trial court. Public interest concerns necessitate consideration of this issue on appeal.

The Board does not dispute the College's de facto existence but argues that it was not properly established under the relevant statutes, which serves as a defense against funding appropriation and contempt orders. A comparison is made between N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-2 (county college establishment procedures) and N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-30 (procedures for creating a county college agency). Historically, prior to 1981, the composition of county boards of freeholders was based on county population, with smaller counties having boards of three members. The 1981 amendment allowed counties to determine their board size, up to nine members. Warren County, with a population under 125,000 in 1981, retained a three-member board unless changed by voter referendum, which did not occur.

In a non-binding referendum on November 3, 1998, Warren County residents voted against a proposed capital project by the Trustees, which was to be funded through bonding. The judge and the College contended that N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-19(2) intended to remove certain funding matters from political processes. However, a similar argument was noted in Bernards Township, where the court upheld a funding levy for public health, emphasizing the voters' responsibility to raise funds. The State Board of Higher Education's authority to create a county entity and override the Board's powers is questioned, particularly given a 1992 resolution that was later justified by a 1993 attorney general's opinion claiming that county approval or a referendum was not needed. The County maintains that statutory procedures are essential for creating a county college due to its financial implications. N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-35 delineates the powers of community college agency trustees, referencing N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-12, which outlines the powers of a county college board of trustees, notably omitting the school estimate board. Additionally, N.J.S.A. 18A:64A-36 details the funding request procedures for community college agencies, mandating recommendations for budget inclusion based on public higher education needs.

The Warren County Board of Chosen Freeholders challenges NJ.S.A. 18A:64A-19(2), while NJ.S.A. 18A:64A-36 limits a commission's authority to making recommendations rather than issuing bonding certificates, contrary to the claims of the board of school estimate. The authorization of the College under statutory procedures may impact the funding requirement but does not pertain to contempt issues. A prompt appeal is necessary, as a good motive cannot justify willful violations of an unchallenged court order, as established in In re William Brown Jr. and In re Contempt of Carton. The court's decision today nullifies the binding order. The contempt order's reversal means the court did not evaluate defenses related to First Amendment rights and legislative immunity. The dissent viewed the individuals involved as operating outside their legitimate legislative functions.