Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division; March 18, 1997; New Jersey; State Appellate Court
Jack Bona, the plaintiff, was incarcerated on a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum for not disclosing assets following a money judgment against him. While at Atlantic County jail, he was assaulted by another inmate, leading to injuries. He alleges that Warden Frank Markward violated N.J.S.A. 30:8-5, which prohibits the confinement of debtors and criminals together, and seeks damages under N.J.S.A. 30:8-6, which mandates double damages for violations of N.J.S.A. 30:8-5. A key legal issue is whether N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(4) of the Tort Claims Act, which shields jail officials from liability for injuries between inmates, implicitly repeals N.J.S.A. 30:8-6. Bona, a former business executive, had plans for a casino in Atlantic City through Jack Bona, Inc., which entered an option agreement with GNAC, Corp., a Golden Nugget subsidiary. He defaulted on this agreement after filing a complaint against GNAC and placing a lis pendens on the property. GNAC subsequently sued the Bona defendants, who filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. GNAC eventually obtained relief to clear title to the property. The suit against the Bona defendants included several counts, with the fraud claim resulting in a judgment of over $10 million against them after a finding of deliberate deception by Bona. Following this, a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum was issued, leading to Bona's arrest and imprisonment from September 1989 to August 1991. During his incarceration at Atlantic County jail, he was housed with convicted prisoners.
Bona, during his time at Atlantic County jail, was assaulted and suffered injuries, including a broken rib. He subsequently filed a lawsuit against multiple defendants, including GNAC officials, an attorney and law firm, government officials, the Newark Star-Ledger, and the FDIC. Initially filed in state court, the suit was moved to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey to address federal claims. The District Court dismissed the case against all defendants except Markward and the Ledger; the latter was dismissed due to lack of federal claims. Bona's current suit targets Markward, focusing on alleged wrongful confinement under N.J.S.A. 30:8-5, claiming he was improperly housed with the general population instead of being separated as a debtor. He also seeks damages related to the assault under N.J.S.A. 30:8-6, which mandates the separation of debtors from criminals. Markward acknowledges the assault but asserts immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(4), which exempts public entities and employees from liability for injuries caused by prisoners to other prisoners. The case raises questions about Bona's status as a "debtor" under N.J.S.A. 30:8-5 and 30:8-6, his classification as a "prisoner" under N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(4), and whether the latter statute supersedes the former in this context. The historical background of N.J.S.A. 30:8-5 is rooted in legislation dating back to 1876, emphasizing the necessity of separating debtors from criminals in confinement and detailing penalties for non-compliance.
No published opinions have addressed N.J.S.A. 30:8-5 or N.J.S.A. 30:8-6 in the last century, necessitating an examination of these statutes within their historical context to ascertain legislative intent. Historically, prior to the 1844 amendment of the New Jersey Constitution, all debtors faced imprisonment. The amended Constitution limited such imprisonment to cases of fraud related to debts or militia fines, stating that no individual could be imprisoned for debts arising from contracts unless fraud was involved. This provision remained unchanged in the 1947 Constitution.
There is debate over whether "fraud" pertains to the original transaction or to post-judgment asset non-disclosure. Two cases support the view that fraud must be connected to the underlying transaction, while another case suggests it could relate to actions taken after the judgment. In the current case, the judgment against Bona was based on fraud, and the judge determined that Bona engaged in deceptive practices and failed to account for his assets. Thus, he was imprisoned as a debtor due to fraud.
Bona was incarcerated under a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, which allows a creditor to arrest a debtor until the judgment is paid or the debtor is declared insolvent. The New Jersey Supreme Court has characterized this writ as a means of detaining a debtor until payment is made. Bona was arrested for not disclosing assets that could satisfy the judgment against him, thus categorizing him as a 'debtor' under the statutes in question. Additionally, he qualified as a 'prisoner' under the Tort Claims Act, as the Constitution specifies imprisonment for debts in cases of fraud. A straightforward interpretation of the Constitution denotes that an imprisoned individual qualifies as a prisoner.
Case law establishes that a 'prisoner' under the Tort Claims Act includes any individual confined in a jail cell, regardless of their legal status at the time (e.g., arrested or convicted). The definitions from both case law and a dictionary highlight that a prisoner is someone in custody or restrained. Bona, incarcerated due to a writ, is classified as a 'prisoner' because he was detained until he either paid his debt or was discharged as insolvent. This classification holds even for individuals jailed before trial if they are charged with a crime.
The legal issue at hand concerns whether Markward, as the jailer, can be held liable for injuries Bona sustained from an assault by another inmate. There is a potential conflict between N.J.S.A. 30:8-6, which allows double damages for a debtor injured due to lack of separation from other inmates, and N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(4), which grants immunity to jailers for such injuries. Markward argues that the latter statute implicitly repealed the former.
The Tort Claims Act's Repealer provision indicates that any inconsistent laws are repealed, even if not explicitly listed. Although N.J.S.A. 30:8-5 and N.J.S.A. 30:8-6 are not mentioned, they may still be considered repealed by implication due to their inconsistency with the Tort Claims Act. The inclusive nature of the Repealer provision allows for this interpretation, suggesting that preexisting statutes can be impliedly repealed if they conflict with the Act's provisions.
The inquiry focuses on whether N.J.S.A. 30:8-5 and N.J.S.A. 30:8-6 conflict with the Tort Claims Act, complicated by a lack of case law on these statutes. New Jersey law holds a strong presumption against implied repealers, requiring clear evidence of legislative intent for a repeal to be recognized. Courts emphasize that statutes should be read in a way that allows them to coexist unless there is clear inconsistency. The Tort Claims Act does not expressly repeal the aforementioned statutes; however, when viewed alongside N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(4), it suggests that they may not reasonably coexist. The Tort Claims Act aims to establish immunities for municipalities rather than to create liabilities, extending this immunity to public employees. Under the Act, the liability of public employees is subject to existing legal immunities and defenses available to them as private individuals.
Immunity for public employees under the Act is upheld unless they act outside their employment scope or commit a crime, fraud, malice, or willful misconduct (N.J.S.A. 59:3-14). Courts may interpret the Act to expand public employee liabilities, but these cannot override the immunities established by the Act, which emphasizes that immunity is the default and liability the exception (Tice v. Cramer, Chatman v. Hall, Bombace v. Newark). N.J.S.A. 30:8-6 imposes civil penalties on sheriffs and jailers for offenses against N.J.S.A. 30:8-5, mandating double damages for aggrieved parties. However, this provision is inconsistent with N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(4), which grants immunity, particularly in cases like Markward’s liability for the assault on inmate Bona, where both statutes conflict. The Supreme Court's directive in Tice necessitates that the inconsistent earlier statute (N.J.S.A. 30:8-6) must be disregarded. N.J.A.C. 10A:31-22.2(a) provides guidelines for inmate separation in jails, allowing discretion based on space constraints, which was pertinent to Bona's housing situation, emphasizing that total separation may not always be feasible due to overcrowding.
Markward's motion for summary judgment is granted due to the absence of material facts in dispute regarding the injury caused to inmate Bona by another inmate. The court emphasizes that correctional officials' inability to separate inmates due to overcrowding does not constitute liability, given the discretion granted under N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(4) and N.J.A.C. 10A:31-22(a). The Tort Claims Act provides immunity to public entities and employees for injuries among inmates, which supersedes previous statutes like N.J.S.A. 30:8-6. Bona’s cross motion for mediation is rendered moot by Markward's immunity. The complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The court highlights that Bona, who sustained injuries from an assault while alone in his cell, had his financial circumstances scrutinized, revealing his past wealth but current insolvency, leading to his release from jail as his imprisonment lost its coercive effect. Additionally, the opinion does not address certain statutory provisions regarding sheriff liability. The court notes the constitutional intent to protect honest debtors while allowing for legislative action against fraudulent debtors. Lastly, it reiterates that agency rules are to be interpreted with the same principles as statutes.
