Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; May 5, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
Anthony Emmanuel was convicted of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The district court set his sentencing range at 57 to 71 months based on a criminal history category III and total offense level 23, ultimately sentencing him to 60 months in accordance with the minimum sentence required by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii). Emmanuel appealed his conviction, challenging the admission of evidence related to firearms seized from his and a co-conspirator's residences, as well as testimony from his ex-girlfriend about uncharged methamphetamine distribution and physical abuse. He also contested his sentence based on the determination of the type of methamphetamine, a sentence enhancement for firearm possession during the crime, and the classification of methamphetamine.
The court reviewed the evidentiary ruling on the firearms under an abuse of discretion standard, which is broad in conspiracy trials. Six firearms were found at Emmanuel's residence, including five shotguns and a .22 caliber rifle, many of which were loaded. Additional drug-related evidence included various controlled substances and paraphernalia. At co-conspirator Michael Crestoni's residence, two firearms—a loaded 30-30 rifle and a 10mm semi-automatic pistol—were located along with similar drug-related evidence. Crestoni testified that the firearms were for protection against drug thieves. The court affirmed Emmanuel's conviction and sentence.
Crestoni's testimony establishes a clear connection between him and Emmanuel in a drug conspiracy involving methamphetamine. Crestoni began receiving methamphetamine from James Ryan in mid-1993, escalating to weekly deliveries of up to three pounds by mid-1994, at a cost of $8,000 per pound. Crestoni repackaged the drugs into ounce quantities for distribution at $1,000 per ounce, selling to Emmanuel three to four times, with transactions occurring at both their residences. The presence of loaded firearms at both Crestoni's and Emmanuel's homes is deemed relevant evidence supporting the existence of the drug conspiracy, as they were found near drug paraphernalia and were indicated by Crestoni to be for protection against theft.
Emmanuel argued for the application of the Bailey v. United States standard, which requires proof of 'use' of firearms in drug trafficking cases, but the court rejected this, stating that the firearms' presence was sufficient for establishing the conspiracy without needing to demonstrate their active use.
Additionally, Emmanuel contested the admission of co-conspirator Connie Kissel's testimony about prior methamphetamine dealings and her allegations of assault by him, which were not included in the government's pretrial disclosures. However, since Emmanuel did not preserve an objection during the trial, the court found no plain error regarding this testimony.
The government filed an amended notice to use Rule 404(b) evidence, intending to present Kissel's testimony about Emmanuel's prior drug activities during their relationship from March 1993 to February 8, 1994. Emmanuel objected, arguing that the testimony fell outside the alleged conspiracy period of June 1994 to August 5, 1994. The district court initially decided to exclude Kissel's testimony but later admitted it conditionally at trial, allowing it to demonstrate Emmanuel's knowledge of the conspiracy's objectives, his connections to co-conspirators, and methamphetamine availability. The court provided the jury with a cautionary instruction under Rule 404(b), specifying that Kissel's testimony could be used to establish Emmanuel's knowledge, intent to distribute, plan to join the conspiracy, opportunity to participate, or the absence of mistake or accident.
Kissel testified about her long-standing relationship with Crestoni and her history with Emmanuel, explaining that she had purchased methamphetamine from Crestoni in late 1993 and summer 1994. Although she never witnessed Emmanuel obtain methamphetamine from Crestoni, he claimed to her that he received it. During their relationship, Kissel stated that Emmanuel purchased methamphetamine at a rate of one ounce every one to two weeks. Despite their breakup, they maintained weekly contact during the conspiracy period, during which Emmanuel revealed he was selling three to four ounces of methamphetamine weekly.
Prior bad acts can be admitted under Rule 404(b) to establish various factors such as motive and intent, provided the evidence meets specific criteria: it must be relevant to a material issue, similar in kind and close in time to the charged crime, sufficient to support a jury finding of the prior act, and its probative value must outweigh any prejudicial effect. The district court has broad discretion in admitting such evidence unless it solely indicates the defendant's criminal disposition, and evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Kissel's testimony regarding Emmanuel's distribution of methamphetamine from late 1993 to February 8, 1994, was deemed admissible under Rule 404(b) as it met all necessary conditions. The court did not abuse its discretion in this ruling, supported by precedents.
Emmanuel contested the district court's classification of methamphetamine as a Schedule II controlled substance and its determination that it was d-methamphetamine. The statutory mandatory minimum sentence for possessing a specified amount of methamphetamine mandates at least five years of imprisonment. The court imposed a 60-month sentence based on this minimum, rejecting Emmanuel's argument that the distinction between d- and l-methamphetamine should affect sentencing, as the statute does not make such distinctions.
Additionally, Emmanuel objected to a two-level enhancement for firearm possession during the crime; however, the mandatory minimum sentence rendered this objection moot. Ultimately, the judgment and sentence were affirmed by the court.
