Sacks Realty Co. v. Batch

Citations: 235 N.J. Super. 269; 561 A.2d 1216; 1989 N.J. Super. LEXIS 294

Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division; May 24, 1989; New Jersey; State Appellate Court

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The case involves a landlord-tenant dispute concerning the termination of residential leases due to the permanent retirement of a building from residential use. The court scrutinizes the interplay between judicial authority and legislative intent, particularly regarding the 1986 amendments to the Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq.). The court concludes that the plaintiff's failure to adhere to notification requirements outlined in these amendments necessitates the dismissal of complaints against the remaining tenants.

Procedurally, on June 24, 1987, the plaintiff, managing agent for the property at 2025 Lemoine Avenue, sent certified notices to tenants, terminating their tenancies effective December 31, 1988, due to plans to convert the building to commercial use. The tenants received these notices by July 3, 1987. The plaintiff initiated legal action on January 10, 1989, claiming compliance with N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(h). Although a trial date was set for February 3, 1989, it was postponed pending a motion by the defendants seeking to transfer the cases, which was ultimately denied. The trial commenced on April 6, 1989, with several motions to dismiss by the defendants being denied to allow for a comprehensive record.

Factually, the property is a 22-unit building intended for conversion to office/commercial use, compliant with local regulations. However, the plaintiff failed to notify the Department of Community Affairs and the Fort Lee Rent Leveling Board within the required five-day period after sending the termination notices, as mandated by N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1c and N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1d.

On January 10, 1989, the plaintiff initiated summary dispossess actions and belatedly notified the Department of Community Affairs and the Fort Lee Rent Leveling Board, fulfilling a requirement that should have occurred over 18 months prior. At the time of trial, the plaintiff held a partial demolition permit from the Borough of Fort Lee to commence rehabilitation, aiming to transition the property from residential rental to office/commercial use, which it claims is allowed in its zoning area without needing site plan approval. The plaintiff argues that it cannot obtain further development permits until an architectural and engineering study, requiring tenant removal, is completed. The plaintiff, not having constructed the building, lacks blueprints or plans, necessitating an on-site investigation to prepare final plans for a building permit. 

Despite acknowledging noncompliance with N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1b, the plaintiff contends that these unusual circumstances justify proceeding with the action. Defendants called tenants as witnesses to assert that no relocation assistance or comparable housing was offered, and that they had raised complaints about apartment conditions, which they claim supports their defense under N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.10 et seq. against retaliatory evictions. The court noted the plaintiff’s admission of not securing all necessary permits for the intended office/commercial use and questioned the practicality of the plaintiff's position, suggesting a circular problem: studies cannot be conducted without tenant removal, yet tenants cannot be removed without permits. The statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1b, specifies that eviction cannot occur without necessary permits, but distinguishes between "eviction" and "judgment of possession," indicating that landlords can still seek possession even if permits are pending. This legislative language suggests an intention to provide landlords relief in summary dispossess actions despite the absence of required approvals.

The lack of necessary permits or approvals does not prevent a plaintiff from being entitled to a judgment of possession; however, it does prohibit the court from issuing a warrant for removal under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 until the plaintiff proves possession of all required state and local permits. This situation may lead to extended court proceedings, primarily disadvantaging the landlord, who benefits from expedited processes. If a landlord fails to secure these permits in a timely manner, they cannot complain about delays in obtaining a removal warrant. The issues surrounding the plaintiff's architectural and engineering studies may create a cycle of delays, potentially prolonging tenant occupancy indefinitely, contrary to the statute’s intent.

N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1b focuses on land use regulations rather than construction issues, establishing that obtaining a building permit is not necessary for tenant removal; rather, final site plan approval validating the use is essential for warrant issuance. If a building permit is obtainable without final site plan approval, it typically suffices under the statute. The plaintiff will not face endless delays unless they themselves cause the final site plan approval to be postponed.

Regarding reprisals, defendants may assume the eviction is retaliatory under N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.12, but the plaintiff has convincingly refuted this presumption, demonstrating that eviction efforts began in 1986, prior to most tenant complaints. There is no evidence of retaliatory motives; the plaintiff's actions appear driven by economic interests rather than malice. The tenant-landlord relationship may be strained, but this does not undermine the legality of the summary dispossess action.

Lastly, New Jersey landlords face significant procedural challenges to achieve a judgment of possession through summary dispossess actions, often complicating the process despite the intended expediency of the statute.

To obtain a judgment for eviction, landlords must adhere strictly to the procedural requirements set forth in the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq. Courts cannot assist landlords who fail to follow these rules, regardless of any perceived wisdom in the statutory framework. The law requires that landlords act within specific guidelines, including notifying the Department of Community Affairs and the relevant municipal agency within five days of providing notice of termination to tenants. In this case, the landlord violated these provisions but argues that their intention to permanently retire the property from residential use justifies noncompliance with the five-day requirement, claiming that the notice serves only an informational purpose and that "substantial compliance" is adequate. However, this argument is flawed as it overlooks the Legislature's intent. The defendants assert their right to housing and relocation benefits under related statutes, but this position is deemed without merit.

N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.13 et seq. applies exclusively to tenancies in Atlantic City, and any further discussion on its broader applicability lacks merit. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.22, related to the New Jersey Senior Citizens and Disabled Protected Tenancy Act, is specifically relevant only to the conversion of rental housing into condominium or similar ownership formats, not to the permanent retirement of a building from residential use. Although there is a logical argument for extending protections in cases of permanent retirement, the statute is clear that protected tenancy status is confined to conversion scenarios.

Plaintiff asserts that the statute's intent is to notify public agencies to protect tenants should a landlord later decide to resume residential use, suggesting that the timing of this notice is less critical than ensuring it is given. The plaintiff contends that providing notice on the day complaints were filed does not undermine the statute's purpose and that any delay has not adversely affected the defendants.

The court acknowledges the statute's intent to prevent landlords from circumventing protected tenancies through permanent retirement claims and recognizes the need for timely notice to facilitate governmental assistance. Even if notice requirements were violated, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2(d) mandates that tenants receive a written termination notice at least 18 months before any dispossess action. This statute is considered procedural and jurisdictional, necessitating compliance. The court concludes that the harsh consequence of dismissing a dispossess action for noncompliance with notice provisions is aligned with the legislative intent, ensuring each element of the Anti-Eviction Act has both purpose and enforceability.

The Legislature's intent is clear in its statutory requirements for landlords regarding tenant termination notices, emphasizing that alternative penalties would have been explicitly outlined if intended. Compliance with these requirements is straightforward, necessitating only the mailing of two notices, which can coincide with the termination notice. This minimal requirement for landlords is not burdensome, and the court should avoid interpreting compliance ambiguities. The legislation is unambiguous, and any necessary remediation should be addressed by other governmental bodies, not the judiciary. The statutes serve legitimate public policy goals and uphold the Legislature’s decisions, ensuring predictable legal outcomes for individuals and businesses. 

The court dismissed the complaints brought by the plaintiff against individual tenants for lease terminations, consolidating similar cases due to nearly identical circumstances. Historical context highlights that the plaintiff previously issued a six-month notice under the Anti-Eviction Act before the law was amended to require an 18-month notice, leading to the dismissal of prior complaints, which was upheld by the Appellate Division. 

The judgment affirms that no possession judgment can be entered unless a written demand and notice for possession have been provided, with specific reference to relevant statutes regarding judgments and the timing of hardship stays following a judgment of possession. The failure to secure necessary permits does not pause the six-month period for hardship stays.

If a landlord takes more than six months to complete permitting, the tenant benefits from an extended tenure. Conversely, if the landlord finishes in less than six months, the tenant can request a hardship stay of up to six months following the judgment of possession. The court dismisses the plaintiff's assertion of "substantial compliance" with the statute due to an 18-month delay in notifying public agencies, contrasting this with the possibility of arguing substantial compliance had the notice been given within six days or six months post-notification to tenants. Although the plaintiff claims to have acted in good faith, the court deems it premature to evaluate the plaintiff's conduct until the permanent cessation of residential use is finalized. Testimonies from representatives of the Division of Housing highlighted that only six notices have been filed since the 1986 amendments to the Anti-Eviction Act, with the division merely recording these notices without further action. Additionally, the administrator of the Fort Lee Rent Leveling Board indicated that the notice received in January 1989 was the first of its kind for her agency, leading to confusion about its purpose and required action. Despite the apparent neglect by public agencies, the plaintiff has not satisfactorily justified its delay in filing.