Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division; May 19, 1981; New Jersey; State Appellate Court
Defendant, an 18-year-old high school student, appeals his conviction for defiant trespass under N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b), resulting in a $25 fine and costs. He argues for reversal based on four claims: (1) his actions were within "customary tolerance or license," warranting complaint dismissal under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(a) and (c), or that the Criminal Code does not apply; (2) the complaint was jurisdictionally defective; (3) he received insufficient notice regarding the trespass; and (4) he had a license to be on school grounds. The court finds the second and third claims meritless, as well as the "customary tolerance" argument.
The defendant was enrolled in a work-study program, with classes ending at 10:20 a.m. Following an altercation on December 6, 1979, he was instructed by school officials to leave the premises after class. He complied until December 21, when he returned after hours, reportedly smelling of alcohol, and was involved in another incident. Despite being told to leave by a teacher, he remained in the building. The vice-principal was notified, and the police arrested him after a complaint was filed.
Defendant claims N.J.S.A. 18A:37-1 to 5 prevents the school board from pursuing remedies under Title 2C. The court counters that these sections focus on student discipline and due process for serious sanctions and do not limit the board's rights to pursue criminal remedies. The statute does not require a suspension as a precondition for criminal charges, nor does it imply that a student must be suspended to have their license to be on school grounds revoked.
Defendant's reference to State v. Besson is deemed inappropriate as that case did not address the adequacy of notice regarding trespass. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:18—3(b)(1), notice of trespass can be communicated directly. The defendant received explicit notice to leave school premises immediately after classes on the day of the incident and two weeks prior, acknowledging his understanding that he was prohibited from being on school grounds afterward.
The defendant argues that being a student grants him a license to be on school property, which could only be revoked through expulsion or suspension. While the school property is considered public, and he was licensed to attend classes, the court asserts that revocation of such license does not solely require expulsion or suspension. Although the right to education is fundamental, it is not absolute; compliance with school rules is necessary.
N.J.S.A. 18A:37—1 mandates student adherence to rules, and continued disobedience or defiance can lead to punishment or suspension. The defendant's behavior constituted grounds for such disciplinary actions, although the school authorities chose to restrict his after-class access instead of pursuing suspension or expulsion. The court concludes that this restriction did not infringe upon the defendant's fundamental right to attend classes, thus not triggering the procedural protections associated with suspension.
Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(c)(3) allows for an affirmative defense of license in trespass cases, but the defendant was aware of his restricted access, and the principal acted within his authority to enforce this limitation. The court affirms the decision regarding the trespass complaint.
