In re Wilner's Livery Service, Inc.

Citations: 159 N.J. Super. 226; 387 A.2d 1202; 1978 N.J. Super. LEXIS 912

Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division; April 26, 1978; New Jersey; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

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Wilner’s Livery Service, Inc. (Wilner) appeals a Board of Public Utilities (Board) decision categorizing its limousine services as charter services under N.J.S.A. 48:4-1, thus placing Wilner under the Board's jurisdiction. The Board ordered Wilner to apply for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity within a specific timeframe, warning of penalties for non-compliance. The dispute originated in 1976 when the Board notified Wilner and similar operators to apply for necessary certificates. On January 17, 1977, Wilner petitioned the Board, asserting it was not under the Board’s jurisdiction. A public hearing occurred on April 25 and May 26, 1977, after which the hearing examiner's report was waived, and the record was sent directly to the Board. On September 16, 1977, the Board affirmed its jurisdiction over Wilner and mandated the filing of a certification petition within 15 days. Wilner filed its appeal on October 3, 1977, and a stay was granted on October 31, 1977. Wilner argues the Board erred by classifying its operations under the autobuses statute (N.J.S.A. 48:4-1 et seq.) rather than the autocabs statute (N.J.S.A. 48:16-13 et seq.), which defines autocabs as vehicles for hire under certain conditions. The Board's factual findings, particularly regarding Wilner’s refusal to comply with the Bureau's request to file for a Certificate, remain undisputed. Wilner maintains it does not operate within the definitions set by N.J.S.A. 48:4-1 et seq. and thus is not subject to the Board's authority.

David Wilner, the president and CEO of the petitioner, operates a limousine and livery service that includes transporting passengers to various destinations, including New York airports, for private events like weddings, as well as providing vehicles for funeral directors. The service is not bound by fixed routes or schedules and is available to the general public at flat rates or based on time/mileage. The petitioner’s fleet consists of 1 station wagon, 18 limousines, 11 hearses, and 7 flower cars, with insurance filed with the City Clerk of Rahway, where the vehicles are registered. The Board claims jurisdiction over the petitioner’s operations based on a 1973 statute (N.J.S.A. 48:4-1.2) that it argues implicitly repealed earlier laws (N.J.S.A. 48:16-13 et seq.) governing autocabs. Historically, autocabs were distinguished from autobuses, with the former being hired by charter, hence falling under municipal regulation rather than Board oversight. Despite amendments over the years that expanded the Board's jurisdiction, the petitioner contends that no implied repeal occurred, leading to a disagreement with the Board's position, which is ultimately reversed.

The legal principles surrounding the implied repeal of statutes were reaffirmed in *Swede v. Clifton*, emphasizing that legislative intent is paramount, and there is a strong presumption against the notion of repeal by implication. Repeals should be clear and unambiguous; if statutory provisions can coexist without conflict, the earlier statute is not considered repealed. The court expressed doubt that the legislature intended to repeal the regulations governing autocabs, noting that the definitions and jurisdictions established in various statutes (N.J.S.A. 48:4-1 and N.J.S.A. 48:2-13) indicate an awareness of existing provisions concerning autocabs (N.J.S.A. 48:16-13 to 22). The legislature's failure to amend or repeal autocab statutes while granting jurisdiction over charter buses in 1973 further supports this view. The language in legislative statements also suggests an intent to clarify rather than repeal existing definitions. Furthermore, the court distinguished prior cases involving limousine services, which were not relevant to the current context, leading to the conclusion that the service in question does not fall under the Board's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Board's decision was reversed.