In 2008, Anthony E. Moore was convicted of conspiracy to distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine and being a felon in possession of a firearm, resulting in a mandatory life sentence due to four prior drug convictions. In 2021, Moore sought a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018, which the district court deemed him legally eligible for. However, the court did not apply the Supreme Court's ruling in *Mathis v. United States* (2016), which could have lowered his sentencing guidelines. Instead, the court reduced his life sentence to 420 months (35 years) based on an assessment of sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Moore challenged the decision on three grounds: misunderstanding of his *Mathis* argument, creating an unwarranted disparity with a co-defendant's sentence, and incorrectly presuming his conviction was for a violent crime. The appellate court rejected all challenges and affirmed the district court's reduced sentence. Moore had previously been indicted on multiple charges, with the jury finding him guilty on conspiracy and felon-in-possession counts, establishing a base offense level of thirty-four, leading to a final level of thirty-seven after enhancements. His mandatory life sentence was imposed due to the combination of the crack quantity and prior convictions. The First Step Act retroactively lowered statutory penalties for crack offenses, which was relevant to Moore's case.
Under section 404 of the First Step Act, defendants convicted of specific crack cocaine offenses before the Fair Sentencing Act can seek sentence reductions. Moore filed for a reduced sentence in 2019, contending that the district court should consider updated Sentencing Guidelines, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, his post-conviction conduct, and the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v. United States. He argued that, based on Mathis, his prior Illinois drug convictions were overbroad and indivisible, thus disqualifying them as predicate felony drug offenses for federal sentencing.
While the court acknowledged that Illinois law may not align with federal law regarding statutory enhancements, it maintained that the Guidelines still apply. Moore calculated his new guideline range as 210 to 262 months, given he had already served 164 months, and requested a reduced sentence of time served with a four-year supervised release. The government conceded his eligibility for a reduction but contended that a plenary resentencing was not mandated and proposed that Moore's guideline range should remain 360 months to life.
Ultimately, the district court recognized Moore's legal eligibility for a reduction but ruled against a plenary resentencing, opting to continue applying the career-offender enhancement. It noted Moore's significant involvement in drug trafficking and possession of firearms, which contradicted his assertion of a non-violent conviction. Although the court acknowledged Moore's efforts to improve himself over the past 14 years, it decided on a limited reduction, imposing a new sentence of 420 months without altering the supervised release term. Moore has since appealed, arguing that the district court incorrectly limited its consideration of the Mathis argument solely to the career-offender guideline, disregarding its relevance to the statutory enhancement. The appellate review will assess whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the First Step Act motion.
Moore contends that the district court only considered his Mathis argument in relation to his guideline range, failing to recognize its relevance to the statutory enhancement. This interpretation is deemed unpersuasive because Moore's amended First Step Act motion, referenced by the court, repeatedly addressed the statutory enhancement. Under Mathis, Moore argues he lacks the necessary convictions for both the § 851 enhancement and the career-offender guideline, asserting that two Illinois drug convictions do not qualify as “felony drug offenses.” Although the district court's order may not have explicitly mentioned the statutory enhancement, it is concluded that the court made a deliberate choice not to apply Mathis to either enhancement. The court acknowledged its ability to apply intervening judicial decisions but explicitly opted not to in this case. Despite potential misunderstandings, the court's decision was primarily based on § 3553(a) factors, including Moore's criminal history and the need for deterrence, suggesting that further consideration of the Mathis argument would not have altered the sentence. Moore claims that the statutory enhancement is "materially different" due to its mandatory nature, yet the court had already indicated it would not conduct a plenary resentencing. He retains the argument for further review but acknowledges that precedent from United States v. Fowowe suggests that the First Step Act does not obligate the court to apply intervening case law. Additionally, Moore argues that the failure to apply Mathis resulted in an unwarranted sentencing disparity compared to a co-defendant, but the government argues this issue should be reviewed for plain error due to Moore's failure to raise it in the district court.
Forfeiture is defined as the failure to timely raise an argument due to inadvertence, neglect, or oversight, but this does not apply to Moore’s disparity argument, which arises from a co-defendant’s resentencing under the First Step Act occurring after Moore's own resentencing. The court reviews the district court's decision for abuse of discretion, especially after the Supreme Court's ruling in Concepcion v. United States, which states that while district courts must consider intervening changes, they are not compelled to reduce sentences based on such arguments. The district court found Moore's arguments unpersuasive regarding guideline or statutory enhancements.
The excerpt highlights a legal debate on whether a defendant can challenge a sentence based on a later-sentenced co-defendant. While a district court may not consider disparities that did not exist at the time of sentencing, doing so could disadvantage the first-sentenced co-defendant. Previous rulings have established that disparity arguments based on co-defendant sentences are typically not valid unless they can be contextualized within similar nationwide sentences. The court recalls its earlier stance that focused on nationwide sentencing discrepancies and acknowledges a shift in perspective since United States v. Statham, where challenges based on co-defendant sentences were entertained, but ultimately rejected. The legal standard remains that § 3553(a)(6) addresses unjustified differences across different judges or districts, rather than those among co-defendants in a single case.
The Supreme Court has endorsed the consideration of both unwarranted disparities and similarities among co-conspirators when determining reasonable sentences. Courts are open to arguments claiming a defendant's sentence is unreasonable due to disparities with co-defendants. However, some earlier decisions suggested that § 3553(a)(6) only applied to disparities among judges or districts, not co-defendants. In United States v. Solomon, the court clarified that district courts can apply rules against unwarranted disparities to co-defendants’ sentences, thus allowing for such arguments.
In this case, Moore challenges the disparity of his sentence compared to his co-defendant, Answar Rollins. Rollins, charged with conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, initially received a 240-month sentence, later reduced to 103 months due to a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. After revocation of his supervised release for resuming drug activities, Rollins was sentenced to an additional 24 months, along with a new sentence of 151 months for new charges, with supervised release terms running concurrently.
After the passage of the First Step Act, Rollins sought a reduced term of supervised release, arguing that his prior Illinois drug conviction no longer qualified as a predicate offense, similar to Moore’s argument.
The defendant requested a reduction of his supervised release terms, seeking four years on Count One and three years on Count Two, which would leave him with a five-year term from a 2018 charge. The government opposed this, advocating for an eight-year term on Count One and six years on Count Two due to recidivism concerns. The court declined to conduct a full re-sentencing of Rollins, acknowledging the merit of his Mathis argument but emphasizing it was not required to reduce his terms. The court expressed skepticism regarding Rollins's respect for the law and understanding of his offenses but ultimately reduced the supervised release terms to four years and three years, respectively, deeming a five-year term sufficient for community protection and Rollins's rehabilitation.
Moore contended that the district court's application of Mathis in Rollins's resentencing created an unwarranted disparity. However, the court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that § 3553(a)(6) only addresses unwarranted disparities. The differences between the cases, including Rollins's previous sentence reduction, his guilty pleas, and the nature of their respective charges, justified variations in their sentences. While both were convicted of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, Moore faced additional charges and received a life sentence due to prior convictions, whereas Rollins received a 240-month sentence. The court highlighted that its decisions were based on the § 3553(a) factors and reiterated that it was under no obligation to reduce Rollins's terms, emphasizing the sufficiency of the imposed supervised release for his rehabilitation, while Moore's circumstances warranted a more limited reduction.
No abuse of discretion was found in the district court’s reasoning regarding Mathis and the categorical method under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The court highlighted that even minor differences between federal and state drug laws can affect the application of the ACCA and related sentencing enhancements. Such differences may limit the relevance of a defendant's prior state drug convictions to their moral culpability and potential for future offenses, which are significant factors for a district judge under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The discretion of district courts in balancing these factors is substantial.
Moore's argument that the court mistakenly categorized his crime as violent was dismissed. The court's reference to the discovery of firearms and drug paraphernalia in Moore's home directly countered his claim of a "non-violent drug offense." The court clarified that it was not applying the categorical approach for classifying offenses but was responding to Moore’s assertion regarding the nature of his conviction. The mention of weapons was intended to demonstrate that his drug trafficking involved firearms, which was relevant since his original guideline calculation included a two-level enhancement for possessing a weapon during the offense. Consequently, the court’s comments were deemed appropriate, and the ruling was affirmed.
