Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division; November 17, 1960; New Jersey; State Appellate Court
Vincent Sawicki appeals a judgment against him from a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs Bialoblocki in a consolidated legal action stemming from a November 12, 1957, automobile accident in Perth Amboy, where Sawicki's car struck a bridge girder. The plaintiffs sought damages for personal injuries, while Sawicki also filed an affirmative claim against Lehigh Valley Railroad Company for allegedly negligent barricade placement at the bridge. Sawicki argues for reversal based on (a) the wrongful admission of incompetent evidence and references made by Lehigh's counsel during summation, and (b) prejudicial remarks regarding the voluntary dismissal of earlier actions against Middlesex Excavating Co. and Middlesex Concrete Products, claiming they improperly influenced the jury's verdicts. The incident occurred on a two-lane road, with the bridge owned by Lehigh elevated above railroad tracks. Prior road resurfacing by Middlesex had raised the roadway two inches, leading to the placement of a barricade with two kerosene lanterns, one of which was unlit until police inspection shortly before the accident. Sawicki, traveling 15 to 25 miles per hour, claimed he did not see the barricade until he was 6 to 8 feet away and was unaware of the lights, leading to his failure to brake before the collision.
A driver turned sharply left to navigate around a barricade but crashed into a bridge girder, resulting in serious injuries to himself and two passengers, Sygmunt and Wanda Bialoblocki. Bialoblocki filed a lawsuit against Sawicki and Middlesex on January 16, 1958. Sawicki subsequently filed a complaint against Lehigh and Middlesex on June 11, 1958, with an amendment on July 2, 1958, adding Lehigh as a defendant. The cases were consolidated for trial on August 21, 1958. Prior to jury selection, both Bialoblocki and Sawicki dismissed their claims against Middlesex. After the verdicts, Sawicki sought a new trial, which was denied, leading him to appeal. He abandoned most of his grounds for appeal, focusing on the argument that the judgments against him were based on incompetent evidence, particularly regarding the cross-examination of a police officer. The officer initially refuted a claim about skid marks made by Lehigh’s counsel, but later, under Lehigh's questioning, provided testimony related to photographs taken the day after the accident, which showed a long mark on the road. Sawicki's counsel did not object to most of this testimony at the time, although he later sought to introduce the photographs as evidence. Sawicki contends that reversible error occurred due to the improper use of these photographs and references to them by Lehigh’s counsel during the trial.
Sawicki’s counsel argues for the reversal of a judgment that exonerated Lehigh, claiming that without references to "skid marks," there is insufficient evidence of Sawicki’s negligence. Lehigh counters that ample evidence exists to demonstrate Sawicki’s negligence in failing to navigate around a barricade, resulting in a collision with a girder. The appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing Lehigh’s counsel to refer to "skid marks" and by not overturning the jury’s verdict which found Sawicki at fault. Despite complaints about Lehigh's counsel's conduct and the trial court's inaction regarding the "skid marks," Sawicki’s attorney did not object during the trial, except for one instance. The court noted that Sawicki’s counsel introduced the very photographs now deemed problematic, thereby negating claims of reversible error based on those references. The court found no inconsistency with substantial justice in its decision. Additionally, the appellant challenged references made by Lehigh’s counsel regarding the voluntary dismissal of claims against Middlesex, suggesting these remarks aimed to prejudice the jury. However, the sole criticism raised at trial was regarding the form of the opening statement, not the substance discussing Middlesex’s paving work and the dismissals. No objections were raised concerning these critical details.
Appellant contends that the opening statement by Lehigh’s counsel was 'improper offensive' and warrants a reversal of the judgment. During the trial, Sawicki's counsel objected to attempts by Lehigh's counsel to explore the paving work done by Middlesex on the bridge and its condition prior to the erection of a barricade. Sawicki's trial attorney voluntarily became a witness to clarify why he initially sued Middlesex and later dismissed the suit, stating it was based on the belief that Middlesex was not liable, and confirmed that no money was exchanged for the dismissal. The trial attorney for the Bialoblocki plaintiffs testified that their initial action included Middlesex, but after investigation, he amended the complaint to include Lehigh, concluding that Middlesex was not involved in the accident and also received no compensation for the dismissal.
Appellant's primary criticism focuses on Lehigh’s counsel’s closing remarks questioning the dismissal of Middlesex from the suit, suggesting something inappropriate was behind the initial lawsuit against them. Appellant claims this led to 'irreparable harm' and argues that it constituted plain error under B. B. 1:5-3(6) and 1:5-3(c) due to improper insinuations. However, it is noted that during the trial, Sawicki's counsel did not express concerns about these remarks, only requesting the jury be instructed that there was no evidence linking Middlesex to the accident. The court complied with this request, and no motions for mistrial or to strike the comments were made during trial, raising questions about the strategic decisions made by Sawicki’s counsel at that time.
At no point did the appellant object during the trial or claim prejudice from the trial court’s actions. The appeal asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to be influenced by the tactics of counsel, specifically citing R.R. 1:5-3(b) and 1:5-3(c). Several principles are reiterated: objections to evidence are necessary to avoid error; strict adherence to R.R. 4:52-1 is required for charging errors; failure to object generally precludes appellate criticism; trial errors must significantly impact justice to warrant a new trial; and harmless errors cannot be exaggerated on appeal without objections. The special relief of R.R. 1:5-3(c) applies only when substantial justice has not been achieved. The appellant failed to object to the summation or the court's charge and now claims plain error due to alleged prejudicial material presented by Lehigh’s counsel.
The appeal argues that the trial court's rejection of Sawicki’s new trial motion, based on the verdict being against the weight of evidence, was erroneous, claiming overwhelming evidence favored Sawicki. However, the court disagreed, stating the jury could justifiably disbelieve Sawicki’s testimony about his speed and control of the vehicle. The jury had evidence, such as photographs of the accident, supporting their decision. The court concluded that the verdict was well-supported and the appellant’s claims of prejudice were unfounded. The court's affirmation of the trial court’s judgments does not imply approval of the counsel's methods, but rather that they did not obstruct substantial justice.
