The case involves Summit Medical Associates, P.C. and William Knorr, M.D., as Plaintiffs-Appellees, challenging the Alabama Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997 and the Abortion of Viable Unborn Child Act. The appeal, addressed in the Eleventh Circuit, focuses on whether Alabama's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity prevents the lawsuit against state officials, including the Attorney General and District Attorney. The court determined that the challenge to the criminal liability provisions falls under the Ex parte Young exception, allowing the case to proceed. Conversely, the challenge to the private civil enforcement provision of the partial-birth abortion statute was barred by sovereign immunity since the Appellants lacked enforcement authority over those provisions. Consequently, the court affirmed part of the district court's decision, reversed it in part regarding the civil enforcement claim, and remanded the case with directions to dismiss that specific challenge.
Appellees, including three abortion clinic corporations and Dr. Knorr, filed the lawsuit on July 24, 1997, claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The statutes in question impose criminal and civil penalties on specific abortion procedures, defining a "partial-birth abortion" and classifying it as a Class C felony with potential fines and imprisonment, as well as possible license revocation for physicians. The private enforcement provision allows certain relatives of the fetus to sue the performing physician.
Abortion in Alabama is legally permissible without criminal or civil liability if necessary to save the mother's life. The Alabama Attorney General, following the enactment of the partial-birth abortion statute on August 1, 1997, instructed district attorneys on the statute's application, defining "partial delivery" as intentionally delivering a viable fetus into the vagina for the purpose of killing it. The post-viability abortion statute prohibits any intentional, knowing, or reckless abortion of a viable fetus, emphasizing the state’s public policy to protect unborn life capable of surviving outside the womb, particularly post-viability, which is identified as occurring around 23 to 24 weeks gestation. The Legislature has noted a significant survival rate for infants born between 23 and 29 weeks gestation and aims to enforce a ban on abortions after viability, with exceptions only for the mother's life and health. Definitions provided in the statute clarify terms such as "abortion," "fertilization," "gestational age," "hospital," "live birth," "medical emergency," and "unborn child and fetus," establishing a framework for understanding and enforcing the law. The intent is to uphold a strict policy against abortions past the point of viability, which is seen as a disregard for human life.
'Viable and viability' refers to the stage of fetal development when a physician determines, based on the specific case and available medical technology, that there is a reasonable chance of the unborn child's sustained survival outside the mother's body. No person may intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly induce an abortion once viability is established, except under certain conditions. An abortion is permissible if the physician believes it is necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or significant bodily impairment. However, this exception does not apply if the abortion is based solely on a claim that the woman may engage in conduct leading to her death or impairment.
If a physician assesses that the unborn child is not viable, the abortion may proceed without violating this provision. Outside of medical emergencies that prevent compliance with the regulations, abortions authorized under specific conditions must meet several criteria: the physician must certify in writing the necessity of the procedure to prevent the woman's death or serious impairment, have the concurrence of another physician who also examines the woman, conduct the procedure in a hospital, and terminate the pregnancy in a manner that maximizes the unborn child's survival unless it poses a greater risk to the woman. Violations of these regulations can result in felony charges, with a Class A felony for violations of the viability rule and a Class C felony for other specified violations. Additionally, for abortions after 19 weeks, the physician must assess and report the viability of the fetus and the justification for the procedure.
A physician must report the basis for determining a child's non-viability after 19 weeks of pregnancy. The statute explicitly does not recognize a right to abortion or legalize otherwise unlawful abortions. It includes a severability clause stating that if any part is found invalid, the remaining provisions shall still be enforceable. Physicians are required to make a good-faith medical judgment regarding fetal viability. Performing or inducing a post-viability abortion without meeting specific criteria results in a Class A felony, carrying penalties of 10 to 99 years imprisonment and fines up to $20,000. Exceptions allow for post-viability abortions if necessary to prevent the pregnant woman's death or severe bodily impairment, provided the physician follows five procedural requirements, including written certifications. Non-compliance with these requirements results in a Class C felony with penalties of 1 year and 1 day to 10 years imprisonment and fines up to $5,000, although these requirements are waived in medical emergencies.
Appellees argue that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague and may restrict first-trimester abortions, thus imposing an undue burden on patients' rights. They also claim the post-viability statute lacks adequate health safeguards and challenge the partial-birth abortion statute's civil enforcement provision as an undue burden. Appellants, including Attorney General Pryor and District Attorney Brooks, filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of standing and Eleventh Amendment immunity, while Governor James sought dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the Governor's motion and partially granted the Appellants' motion, dismissing claims for injunctive relief and challenges to viability testing but allowing claims for declaratory relief to proceed. The court rejected Appellants' standing and Eleventh Amendment defenses, asserting ongoing violations of federal law and a credible threat of prosecution established Appellees' standing. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal and a motion to stay proceedings, which the district court granted.
The interlocutory appeal involves two key issues: (1) whether the district court erred in denying Appellants' claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and (2) whether the district court correctly determined that Appellees have standing to pursue the action. The court reviews federal subject matter jurisdiction and the denial of a motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment grounds de novo. Jurisdiction exists under the collateral order doctrine to review the sovereign immunity claim, as established in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., which allows for immediate appeal if the order conclusively determines a disputed question, resolves an important separate issue, and is unreviewable after final judgment. The Supreme Court confirmed in Puerto Rico Aqueduct that denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity is a collateral order eligible for immediate appeal. However, the denial of a motion to dismiss on justiciability grounds, such as standing, is not immediately appealable under this doctrine.
The court may consider nonappealable orders under the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine if they are "inextricably intertwined" with an appealable decision. Citing Swint, the court found that since the standing and Eleventh Amendment immunity issues are not intertwined nor essential to one another, it will not exercise jurisdiction over the standing issue. Consequently, the court declines to review the Appellees' standing, as the Appellants did not meet the necessary criteria for pendent appellate jurisdiction.
Sovereign immunity, as outlined in the Eleventh Amendment, prohibits lawsuits against states by citizens of other states or the state's own citizens. This immunity extends to state officials when the state is the real party in interest, particularly in cases where the suit seeks to compel payment from the state treasury for wrongful actions. However, the Ex parte Young doctrine provides an exception, allowing suits against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief to address ongoing violations of federal law. This doctrine remains valid and permits the judicial system to compel state officers to comply with federal law, as unconstitutional statutes do not confer immunity. The distinction between retrospective and prospective relief is crucial; the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for past violations but permits suits for continuing violations. Notably, if the prospective relief sought is equivalent to monetary damages for past breaches, Ex parte Young does not apply. The doctrine is also limited to ongoing violations to protect state interests and maintain constitutional immunity.
In Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Supreme Court clarified that the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply when the equitable relief sought threatens state sovereignty, similar to a monetary damages award, thereby invoking the Eleventh Amendment. In the context of a lawsuit by abortion providers against Alabama officials regarding criminal liability under post-viability and partial-birth abortion statutes, the Appellants presented two main arguments for immunity. First, they argued that the district court wrongly determined they were continuously violating federal law, claiming that the Appellees only challenged the officials' responsibilities rather than any specific actions or threats of enforcement. They contended that such a minimal possibility of enforcement does not justify federal court intervention in Alabama's sovereign immunity. Second, they asserted that the Coeur d'Alene ruling's limitations on Ex parte Young are applicable due to Alabama's significant interest in regulating late-term abortions. However, the court found that the case met the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment, reinforcing that ongoing and continuous allegations of federal law violations are necessary for invoking the doctrine. The court clarified that the requirement does not necessitate current enforcement against the plaintiffs but distinguishes between prospective relief aimed at preventing future injury and retrospective relief for past violations. Citing precedents such as Papasan and Green v. Mansour, the court noted that future enforcement threats warrant prospective relief, rejecting the Appellants' argument that imminent enforcement was required for Ex parte Young applicability. This interpretation supports the necessity for plaintiffs to challenge state law constitutionality before enforcement occurs.
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court established that plaintiffs can challenge the constitutionality of a state statute in federal court before facing prosecution, especially when the penalties for non-compliance are severe enough to deter them from seeking judicial review. The Court emphasized that requiring plaintiffs to risk imminent prosecution would undermine the Ex parte Young doctrine, limiting their ability to file suits. Conversely, under the abstention doctrine from Younger v. Harris, once a state prosecution is underway, a defendant generally cannot challenge the constitutionality of the law in federal court unless specific conditions are met, such as an immediate and significant threat to federally protected rights. In Steffel v. Thompson, the Court ruled that without a pending state prosecution, federal courts could grant equitable relief, as intervening would not disrupt state proceedings. The refusal of federal intervention could place plaintiffs in a difficult position, forcing them to either risk state prosecution or abandon their constitutional claims. The excerpt critiques the Appellants' requirement for imminence, arguing it would prevent potential plaintiffs from effectively seeking judicial relief without first risking prosecution, an unpredictable and burdensome standard.
Prosecutorial discretion is emphasized, indicating that decisions to prosecute, including the choice of charges, rest solely with the prosecutor once probable cause is established. A prosecutor is not required to act immediately upon obtaining sufficient evidence for an indictment; instead, they may wait until they are prepared to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The text argues against an implied requirement for imminent prosecution in the context of federal court grievances, stating that plaintiffs should not be barred from seeking relief based on the mere pendency of an investigation or prosecution. The Appellees are seeking a declaratory judgment asserting the unconstitutionality of certain abortion statutes, despite no current prosecution having been initiated. However, the potential for prosecution exists, and the severity of penalties associated with these statutes creates a credible risk for the Appellees. The court finds that the Appellees have adequately alleged a continuous violation of federal law. Additionally, the arguments presented by the Appellants regarding the necessity of an imminent prosecution and the applicability of the Ex parte Young doctrine are deemed unpersuasive. The comparison to the Coeur d'Alene case is made, clarifying that the relief sought does not threaten state sovereignty in the same way, thus distinguishing it from the Eleventh Amendment concerns raised in that case. The court concludes that the requested declaratory judgment does not equate to relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment, allowing the case to proceed.
A declaratory judgment will only clarify the constitutionality of specific statutes without preventing state enforcement. In Morales, the Court referenced Ex parte Young solely to assess imminent injury for injunctive relief, without addressing the Eleventh Amendment or Ex parte Young, rendering Morales inapplicable to the current case. Appellants contend that Ex parte Young is irrelevant when a state official neither enforces nor threatens to enforce an unconstitutional statute, citing Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters. However, in Deters, the defendant lacked enforcement authority, and the plaintiffs sought broader enforcement rather than an injunction against enforcement. Thus, the court found Ex parte Young inapplicable. The case differs from Coeur d'Alene, where a ruling would significantly affect state property interests. A successful challenge to the current statutes would not retroactively affect Alabama's treasury, distinguishing it from Coeur d'Alene. The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent Appellees from challenging the criminal liability provisions of the abortion statutes, but it does bar their challenge to the private civil enforcement provision, as there is no connection between the defendants and the enforcement of that law. Although Appellants did not raise this latter argument earlier, the court retains discretion to address it.
The issue at hand is whether Appellees can contest the private civil enforcement provision of the partial-birth abortion statute based on the Ex parte Young doctrine, despite the Eleventh Amendment's limitations. The court emphasizes that challenging a state officer's enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional act requires a demonstrated connection between the officer and the act itself. The Supreme Court's Ex parte Young decision states that without this connection, claims against state officers do not evade sovereign immunity, as such officers cannot be considered parties to a suit merely because they hold official positions. The distinction is made between preventing state officers from acting under an unconstitutional statute versus merely testing the statute's constitutionality. The court cites Fitts v. McGhee, which clarifies that state officers must possess specific enforcement responsibilities related to the statute for a lawsuit to proceed. If state officers lack this direct responsibility, then private individuals cannot initiate suits against them to challenge state statutes, as this would contradict the principle that states cannot be sued without their consent.
Federal courts will not apply the Ex parte Young doctrine if the officer named in the lawsuit lacks the authority to enforce the statute in question. In this case, the court cited examples where actions against officials like the Attorney General were dismissed because enforcement power lay solely with local prosecutors. While a governor has a general duty to enforce state laws, that does not automatically make them a suitable defendant in constitutional challenges. The court compared this to a case where a governor was found to have sufficient involvement due to his law enforcement responsibilities. In the current matter, only a husband or maternal grandparent can enforce the civil provisions of the partial-birth abortion statute, meaning the Governor, Attorney General, and District Attorney have no role in enforcement. Consequently, the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply, leading to the conclusion that the lawsuit against these officials regarding the civil enforcement provision is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The district court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss is affirmed concerning criminal liability provisions since those claims fall under an Ex parte Young exception. However, the Eleventh Amendment prevents challenges to the civil enforcement provision due to the lack of enforcement authority by the defendants. The court declined to address the standing issue, leaving it for future appeal after final judgment. Ultimately, the district court's judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the challenge to the civil enforcement provision.
