Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; March 24, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
Pedro Medina was sentenced to death for auto theft and the first-degree murder of Dorothy James. His conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit in Medina v. Singletary, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari in June 1996. Following the Governor of Florida signing a death warrant for Medina, scheduled for execution between December 2 and 9, 1996, his counsel raised concerns about his competency under Florida Statutes § 922.07. Consequently, the execution was stayed, and a commission of psychiatrists unanimously concluded that Medina understood the death penalty and was likely feigning psychosis. The stay was lifted on January 6, 1997, and a new execution warrant was issued for January 29, 1997.
On December 6, 1996, Medina's counsel filed a second Rule 3.850 motion in the Circuit Court, seeking to vacate his conviction or, alternatively, an evidentiary hearing and a stay of execution. They also sought a competency determination for Medina regarding his ability to proceed with the motion. After a hearing on January 14, 1997, the trial court ruled there was no right to competency in post-conviction proceedings and found Medina competent to proceed with the 3.850 motion. The court denied his motions for rehearing and reconsideration. Subsequently, on January 21, 1997, the trial court held a hearing on the 3.850 motion and, on January 23, denied it, concluding that all claims were procedurally barred. Medina then appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of Florida.
On January 27, 1997, the Supreme Court of Florida stayed Medina's execution, and on February 10, 1997, affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court's ruling that denied Medina's motions for post-conviction relief. The reversal pertained to the trial court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding Medina's competency for execution, as three of six experts had found him incompetent. The case was remanded for this hearing, while the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Before the hearing, the trial court appointed two independent experts who evaluated Medina and concluded he understood his impending execution. The evidentiary hearing began on February 24, 1997, lasting three and a half days, during which 35 witnesses testified, including 22 for Medina. The trial court reviewed extensive evidence and expert reports before ruling Medina competent to be executed, which led to a scheduled execution date of March 25, 1997.
Medina appealed the competency ruling on March 12, 1997, with the Florida Supreme Court affirming the trial court's decision after a thorough review, including over 4,000 pages of records. On March 17, 1997, Medina filed a third 3.850 motion in the Circuit Court, claiming newly discovered evidence warranted vacating his conviction or delaying execution. The State responded that this motion was an abuse of process, as the information was previously available. The trial court denied this motion on March 21, 1997, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial on the same day. Later that day, Medina's counsel filed a habeas corpus petition and a Rule 60(b) motion in federal court, seeking relief from a prior judgment and a stay of execution.
On March 24, 1997, the district court denied Medina's habeas petition and Rule 60(b) motion, citing non-compliance with the successive habeas provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court highlighted that Medina failed to seek authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) for a successive petition. Additionally, it indicated that even if AEDPA did not apply, the petition and motion would be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. The court also denied Medina's request for a Certificate of Probable Cause.
Medina's claims were evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), which restricts second or successive habeas corpus applications. He attempted to bypass these restrictions by framing his petition as a Rule 60(b) motion, a strategy previously rejected in Felker v. Turpin. The court reaffirmed that the second petition restrictions of § 2244(b) apply to Rule 60(b) motions, regardless of when the original judgment became final.
Medina further argued that the AEDPA amendments should not apply retroactively since his first petition was filed before the April 24, 1996, effective date. However, this argument was dismissed as foreclosed by prior rulings, including Felker, In re Mills, and In re Waldrop, which confirmed that the amended provisions apply even when the first application predates the amendments. These precedents are binding and negate Medina's retroactivity argument.
Medina contends that the restrictions imposed by amended § 2244(b) of the AEDPA should not apply to cases where the first federal habeas application was filed prior to the AEDPA's effective date. However, this argument contradicts the Supreme Court's ruling in Felker, which upheld the constitutionality of the AEDPA amendments concerning second or successive habeas applications, even when the first application was filed before the amendments took effect. This precedent suggests that the AEDPA provisions regarding second applications do apply retroactively. Accepting Medina’s argument would render these provisions ineffective for several years, which is unlikely to have been Congress’s intention.
Additionally, Medina attempts to draw a parallel to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Burris v. Parke, where the court ruled that the AEDPA amendments did not apply due to the unique circumstances surrounding the prisoner’s first application. In Burris, the prisoner had filed his first habeas application without exhausting state remedies concerning a newly imposed death sentence, which he could not have anticipated under the new law. The Seventh Circuit found that the prisoner had relied on pre-AEDPA law to his detriment.
In contrast, Medina claims that he filed his first application as soon as possible and that he only recently became aware of the new claims he is now presenting, such as his competency to be executed. He argues that these claims could not have been raised earlier due to the specific legal circumstances at that time. Thus, he asserts that his current claims are now properly before the federal court, as he had never faced imminent execution while being insane before this point.
The court refrains from deciding whether to diverge from the Seventh Circuit's approach in the Burris case, acknowledging significant differences compared to Felker v. Turpin. The circumstances in Burris allowed for the application of new law, which is similarly applicable here due to the lack of detrimental reliance, aligning with the rulings in Felker, Mills, and Waldrop regarding the AEDPA amendments to second application rules. Medina contends that his Ford v. Wainwright competency claim should not be subject to the amended § 2244(b) provisions, arguing that he had a right to file a second habeas application at the time his first was denied, making the application of new rules retroactive. However, the court finds this argument unconvincing, stating that if such a right existed, it would contradict prior rulings in Felker, Mills, and Waldrop. The court asserts that Medina's claim does not hold merit, as it would negate the relevance of the Supreme Court's Felker decision and mischaracterizes an expectation interest in pre-AEDPA law as a vested right without sufficient justification. Ultimately, the absence of detrimental reliance in Medina’s case parallels that in the aforementioned cases, negating his claims.
Medina argues that the Ford v. Wainwright decision provides death row inmates with the right to a federal determination regarding their competency to be executed, suggesting that § 2244(b) does not apply to such claims. However, the court identifies significant issues with this argument, noting that Ford does not guarantee federal court intervention any more than other decisions do. The court emphasizes that Medina's difficulties stem from procedural barriers, including second application limitations established by the AEDPA, which the Supreme Court upheld in Felker. Although Medina could not raise his competency claim in his first habeas application, he had the option to seek certiorari review of state competency proceedings, which he did unsuccessfully. Furthermore, he could pursue his claim through an original habeas application to the Supreme Court, as § 2244(b) does not restrict its authority in this regard. Consequently, the court concludes that the restrictions of § 2244(b) apply to Medina's competency claim, alongside his other claims. The court asserts that Medina should have sought a certificate to file a second application in the district court as mandated by § 2244(b)(3)(A). His failure to do so led to the district court's dismissal of his habeas application, denial of a stay of execution, and denial of a certificate of appealability. The court will now assess Medina's claims against the requirements of § 2244(b), noting that his competency claim, based on Ford, does not invoke a new constitutional rule and thus does not fall under the exception to the second application bar.
Medina's claim regarding his competency for execution does not pertain to his guilt or innocence of the underlying offense, which disqualifies it from the exceptions outlined in § 2244(b)(2)(B). The exceptions are strictly related to claims that challenge an applicant's guilt, not those focused solely on sentencing. Consequently, Medina is not entitled to a certificate to pursue this incompetency claim in district court, as he has not met the prima facie showing required by § 2244(b)(3)(C).
Regarding Medina's Brady claim, which stems from the Supreme Court case Brady v. Maryland, he filed this claim after the precedent was established, thus rendering the § 2244(b)(2)(A) exception inapplicable. Furthermore, even if the factual basis for this claim was undiscoverable through due diligence, it still does not meet the standards of § 2244(b)(2)(B) because Medina has not demonstrated that, if proven, the facts would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty absent the alleged constitutional error. The analysis considered both the current and prior evidence submitted in support of the Brady claims, confirming that neither exception applies, which also bars the claim raised in his first habeas application.
Medina's final claim asserts his innocence of the death penalty based on two subclaims: first, that the jury instructions on the aggravating circumstances leading to his death sentence were erroneous, and second, that his sentence lacks proportionality compared to similar cases. However, the § 2244(b)(2)(B) exception is not applicable to these claims, as it is limited to issues of guilt, thus preventing Medina from asserting this claim in the second habeas proceeding.
Two subclaims against the § 2244(b)(2)(A) exception to the second application bar are examined. The first claim asserts that Medina is innocent of or ineligible for the death sentence he received. To succeed, he must demonstrate a constitutional error that invalidates all aggravating circumstances underlying his sentence—specifically, the heinous nature of the crime and that it was committed for pecuniary gain. The § 2244(b)(2)(A) exception applies only if the claim is based on a new, retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law that was unavailable at the time of Medina's first federal habeas application in 1991. The argument that one innocent or ineligible for death may not be executed does not rely on a new rule that was unavailable at that time.
Additionally, to fit within the exception, Medina must show that both aggravating circumstances are constitutionally invalid and that this invalidity is based on a new rule of law. While the status of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance is uncertain, Medina's assertion regarding the pecuniary gain jury instruction does not stem from a Supreme Court decision unavailable in 1991; it relies instead on older Florida Supreme Court rulings.
The disproportionality claim also fails to meet the criteria for the § 2244(b)(2) exceptions, as it does not derive from a new Supreme Court ruling that was unavailable at the time of his first habeas petition. Consequently, Medina has not established the necessary prima facie showing required by § 2244(b)(3)(C) for either subclaim, leading to the decision to deny a certificate for a second application regarding his sentence innocence or ineligibility claim.
Medina's requests to file a second habeas corpus petition, stay execution, obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal, seek oral argument, and all related motions have been denied. The district court referenced *Nunez v. United States* in its denial, but Medina's assertion that he relied on the prior state of law is deemed disingenuous, as it contradicts his extensive 219-page pleading, where he claimed he raised new issues as soon as possible. He failed to indicate he could have included these new claims earlier had he known about the enactment of AEDPA. Furthermore, Medina's identical claim regarding the aggravating circumstance was already presented in his first habeas application, making it subject to dismissal under § 2244(b)(1), which prohibits repeating claims in successive applications without exception. Medina's own application acknowledges that the AEDPA amendments likely prevent him from bringing this claim again.
