Manso v. Federal Detention Center

Citations: 182 F.3d 814; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17876Docket: 97-5570

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; July 29, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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Hector Ricardo Manso, Jr. appealed a decision from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, which denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Manso had been sentenced to one year imprisonment followed by five years of special parole after pleading guilty to drug-related offenses. Upon violating his special parole, the Parole Commission revoked it and returned him to prison for two months but later re-released him. A second violation led to another revocation, during which Manso escaped, was rearrested, and ultimately served the remainder of his parole in prison. 

Manso argued that the special parole statute, 21 U.S.C. 841(c), does not allow the Parole Commission to impose a new term of special parole after revocation of the original term. The district court denied his petition, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Parole Commission had exceeded its authority in assigning an additional term of special parole. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the denial of Manso's habeas petition, determining that he was not entitled to an unconditional release. The case was heard by Circuit Judges BLACK and BARKETT, along with Senior Circuit Judge CUDAHY, who sat by designation. Manso's legal troubles included his 1990 escape and subsequent conviction for which he received an additional 27-month sentence. The district court's denial of relief was based on a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, which the court fully adopted.

Special parole, established by statute, was utilized in sentencing until the late 1980s, distinct from traditional parole as it was imposed at sentencing and followed the term of imprisonment. It was replaced by supervised release, which is managed by the courts. The appeal centers on the revocation provision of the special parole statute, 18 U.S.C. § 841(c), allowing for the revocation of special parole if its terms are violated, resulting in an increase in the original term of imprisonment without credit for time spent on special parole. Manso argues that after revocation, the Parole Commission cannot impose a second term of special parole, asserting that once a violation is served, the individual must be released unconditionally. He contrasts this with the supervised release statute, which prohibits additional terms of supervised release after revocation. The Seventh Circuit has identified three distinguishing features of special parole: it follows imprisonment, is imposed by the district court, and revocation converts its duration into a term of imprisonment. However, the Parole Commission interprets § 841(c) as allowing re-release on special parole for the remainder of the original term, claiming this aligns with the district court's sentence and Congressional intent for post-imprisonment supervision. This interpretation contrasts with views in other circuits, which have developed differing approaches to the issue.

A special parole violator returned to prison may be reparoled as a special parolee to serve the remaining portion of their special parole term, receiving credit for time spent in prison but not for time on the street. This interpretation is supported by the D.C. and Eighth Circuits, as seen in *United States Parole Comm'n v. Williams* and *Billis v. United States*. Conversely, a majority of circuits contend that after revocation of special parole, an offender is released on regular parole instead. This view is supported by cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which assert that revocation transforms special parole into regular imprisonment, leading to traditional parole upon release. The supporting argument emphasizes statutory language in Section 841(c), which allows for revocation and mandates a new term of imprisonment without street time credit. This reasoning parallels interpretations of the former supervised release statute, where a revoked term could not be extended or modified. Thus, once special parole is revoked, it is extinguished and replaced by normal imprisonment.

Section 841(c) permits the Parole Commission to revoke special parole but prohibits it from reimposing or extending the term; instead, it can only return the violator to prison for the entirety or a portion of the new imprisonment term. In United States v. Williams, the 11th Circuit disagreed with a prior ruling, suggesting that Congress intended for district courts to have the option to imprison an offender for all or part of the original supervised release term following its revocation. This disagreement was later addressed by amendments to the supervised release statute, though the concerns raised remain relevant in the context of special parole. 

The district court sets the initial term of special parole, while the Parole Commission handles revocation but lacks the authority to create or impose special parole terms. Unlike the district court's role in supervised release, the Commission can release an offender from prison to serve the remainder of their term under traditional parole, providing a more lenient alternative to incarceration. The critical question is whether the release should be classified as special or regular parole. The text suggests that a violator's release is more aligned with regular parole, as it allows for conditional release while continuing to serve the sentence. Furthermore, since 841(c) does not grant special parole violators credit for time spent in the community, it supports the perspective that such individuals should be released on regular parole to avoid an indefinite cycle of incarceration and re-release.

Manso supports the majority view that a special parole violator cannot be released to another term of special parole after being returned to prison. He argues further that such a violator should not be released on any form of parole, citing *Artuso v. Hall*, where the Fifth Circuit held that the Parole Commission lacks authority to impose a second term of special parole once the first is canceled. However, the Fifth Circuit later clarified that *Artuso* did not address the Commission's authority regarding regular parole. The court finds Manso's interpretation unsupported, stating that the Commission retains jurisdiction over an offender during their new term of supervision. The Commission contests Manso's claims, noting his special parole was revoked on February 24, 1988, and without credit for time spent in the community, his new full term would extend to February 24, 1993. Manso was released on May 9, 1988, but his regular parole was canceled on June 9, 1989, due to further violations. Ultimately, the court agrees with the Commission that Manso was not entitled to earlier release and affirms the denial of his habeas petition, asserting that Manso was not prejudiced by the Commission's error in re-releasing him on special parole. The Commission argues it is not estopped from treating the May 9, 1988 release as regular parole, noting that Manso did not rely on this purported error to his detriment, which Manso seems to concede by not responding to the Commission's argument.