The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals is reviewing the constitutionality of the Duval County, Florida school district's policy, which allows graduating students to vote on whether to include a student speaker who may deliver a message of their choosing at graduation ceremonies. The court concluded that this policy does not violate the Establishment Clause, distinguishing between government-endorsed religious speech—which is prohibited—and private speech containing religious elements, which is protected under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, emphasizing that the policy allows complete student autonomy in selecting the speaker and crafting the message, thus the content delivered is not state-sponsored. The case references a precedent from the Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman, which prohibited school officials from inviting clergy to deliver prayers at graduation, leading to the Duval County Superintendent's directive to refrain from any formal prayers at such events. Subsequent community feedback suggested that student-led prayer could be permissible, prompting further research into the policy’s implications.
Reynolds informed Zenke that student-initiated, student-led prayer at graduation ceremonies would be constitutional if the school administration and faculty did not participate in the decision-making. Following this, on May 5, 1993, Reynolds issued the 'Reynolds Memorandum' to area high school principals, restating that a prior Supreme Court decision (Lee v. Weisman) prohibited school-initiated prayers. The memorandum established guidelines allowing graduating seniors to choose a brief opening and/or closing message, with the content unreviewed by school officials, thus ensuring student autonomy in delivering messages. This policy was not voted on by the School Board but remained tacitly approved after a failed motion to replace it with a moment of silence. In 1993, student speakers at ten of seventeen graduation ceremonies delivered religious messages, while seven either had no messages or secular ones. In June 1993, some students sued the Duval County school system, claiming the policy violated their religious freedoms and sought to enjoin prayers at graduations. The district court denied their class certification and granted summary judgment in favor of the school system, deeming the policy constitutional. The students' subsequent appeal was deemed moot as they had graduated, and they waived their damages claims. Consequently, the Reynolds Memorandum continued as the official graduation policy for Duval County.
In May 1998, Appellants initiated legal action against the Duval County school system, claiming that the Reynolds Memorandum policy established religion and violated their free exercise rights. They sought both preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent the School Board from allowing any religious activities, including prayer at graduation ceremonies, along with monetary damages and class certification. The district court consolidated the hearing on their preliminary injunction with the merits of their claims and ultimately denied the injunction, ruling in favor of the School Board. Following an expedited appeal, the appellate panel reversed the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. However, the opinion was vacated and rehearing en banc was granted.
The primary legal question was whether the School Board's policy allowing a graduating student, elected by peers, to deliver an unrestricted message at graduation violated the Establishment Clause. The court concluded that the policy was constitutionally sound, as it involved student selection based on secular criteria and allowed unfettered content choices by the student, including religious messages. Citing previous case law, the court emphasized the importance of distinguishing between private student speech and state-sponsored messages, asserting that the absence of state control over the selection and content of graduation speeches protected the policy from constitutional challenges. The court evaluated the policy's constitutionality using standards from relevant Supreme Court cases, notably Lee v. Weisman and Lemon v. Kurtzman, confirming that the School Board's approach did not favor or endorse religious doctrine.
The Lemon test has faced significant criticism, with some legal commentators noting its decline in favor among justices. Despite its controversial status, it remains binding precedent. In *Lee v. Weisman*, the Supreme Court evaluated a public school policy in Providence, Rhode Island, that allowed principals to invite clerics for prayers at graduation ceremonies. The Court found this policy unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, emphasizing two key points: first, school officials actively orchestrated a religious exercise by selecting a clergyman and guiding the prayer's content; second, students felt pressured to participate in the prayer, even if they objected. Justice Kennedy highlighted that the state’s involvement essentially made participation obligatory for many students. In contrast, the Duval County graduation policy prohibits school officials from endorsing or allowing any religious message, ensuring a clear separation from religious content at graduation ceremonies.
Decisional control over key aspects of the graduation policy is vested in students rather than the state. Under the policy, school officials permit graduating classes to vote on whether to include a brief message during graduation ceremonies. If approved, a student volunteer is elected to deliver this message, which remains unmonitored and unrevised by the school. The School Board has no authority over the message's content or the selection of the speaker. Importantly, there are no suggestions or requirements for the class to consider religious criteria in their decisions. If a message is delivered, it is solely prepared by the elected student speaker, with no input or oversight from the senior class or the school.
The Duval County policy differs significantly from the policies deemed unconstitutional in prior cases, such as Lee, which involved state-directed religious exercises. The Duval County policy does not authorize any formal religious activity. It clarifies that any student message is separate from state sponsorship, and the Supreme Court's ruling in Lee does not mandate the exclusion of private religious expression from graduation ceremonies. Instead, it prohibits state endorsement of religious messages while allowing for neutral policies that permit private religious expression. The Establishment Clause prevents public schools from favoring any religion, and the Board’s policy aligns with principles of neutrality toward religion in accordance with relevant jurisprudence.
Justice Souter's concurrence in Lee clarifies that the Establishment Clause mandates neutrality, prohibiting the state from favoring one religion over another or endorsing religion over nonreligion. This principle ensures that religious beliefs do not influence a citizen's political standing. The Duval County policy is deemed content-neutral, allowing a student-selected speaker to deliver either a religious or secular message without favoring any particular viewpoint. This aligns with Supreme Court precedents, such as Widmar v. Vincent, where the Court ruled that an open forum policy providing equal access to religious and secular groups does not imply state endorsement of religion. The reasoning was similarly applied in Mergens, which upheld the Equal Access Act, preventing discrimination against religious content in school forums. The Court emphasized the distinction between government speech endorsing religion, which is prohibited, and private speech endorsing religion, which is protected. It found that secondary school students are capable of understanding that permitting religious speech does not equate to state endorsement. Recent cases reaffirm this stance, indicating that including private religious groups in neutral forums does not violate the Establishment Clause or suggest state endorsement, as seen in Capitol Square Review and Rosenberger.
Lamb’s Chapel confirms that a policy allowing private student religious groups equal after-school access to school property, based on neutral secular criteria, does not breach the Establishment Clause. It suggests that a similar policy, like the Duval County graduation policy, which permits student-selected private expression without preference for religious or secular viewpoints, remains constitutional. The Establishment Clause requires government neutrality towards religion, meaning the state cannot endorse religion but also cannot act hostilely toward private religious speech. The Ninth Circuit's Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321 case upheld a graduation policy allowing students to choose their content autonomously, reinforcing that student speakers do not represent state views when chosen by neutral criteria. Conversely, Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. upheld a policy allowing students to vote on including nonsectarian invocations at graduation, emphasizing student choice and reduced coercion. However, the Third Circuit's ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ. found a similar voting policy unconstitutional, indicating differing circuit interpretations on student-led prayer at graduation.
In Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, the Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a school district's policy allowing high school students to plan their graduation, including voting on whether to include prayer. The court found that the state’s involvement in the graduation prayer process raised concerns under the Establishment Clause, particularly because the majority selected the speakers and directed them to pray. In contrast, Duval County's policy allowed students to vote on delivering a message of unspecified content, which the court regarded as a significant difference.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District affirmed that student-initiated prayer must be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing to be constitutional, striking down a policy permitting student-led prayer at football games. The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to review the Santa Fe case but only regarding prayer at football games, not at graduations. Appellants argued that allowing sectarian prayers under the Duval County policy is unconstitutional, but the document contends that a policy allowing free expression aligns more closely with First Amendment protections than one that enforces censorship.
The excerpt critiques the arguments that linking student speech to state sponsorship implies public endorsement of religious content. It emphasizes that mere school sponsorship of a graduation event does not inherently render religious speech unconstitutional, as the Supreme Court's precedent does not suggest that all religious expression at graduation ceremonies is impermissible. The document argues against the notion that the selection of speakers by the student body reflects state endorsement of their messages, asserting that speakers at such events—whether chosen by schools or students—do not necessarily carry the state's imprimatur.
Schools must avoid allowing speakers to discuss religious topics or engage in prayer to prevent potential violations of the Establishment Clause and to protect against liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for perceived endorsement of a religious message. This principle extends to student speakers chosen based on neutral criteria, such as academic performance. However, the Establishment Clause does not mandate a completely secular graduation ceremony. Despite the Duval County School Board's significant control over the graduation event's logistics, it did not dictate the selection of speakers or their messages. Therefore, private expressions of belief made during a state-sponsored event do not automatically become state endorsements. This interpretation aligns with Supreme Court cases affirming that access to public facilities for religious groups, when granted through neutral criteria, does not constitute unconstitutional endorsement. The argument that state-controlled platforms convert private speech into government speech risks infringing on free expression rights under both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. Even within a nonpublic forum, students retain free speech rights, and viewpoint discrimination by the government in such forums is prohibited. The Supreme Court has established that distinctions in access based on subject matter and speaker identity must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral, allowing for the expression of religious viewpoints as valid perspectives in discussions.
A student’s religious beliefs likely influence their perspectives on graduation topics such as gratitude, personal reflection, and future aspirations. The School Board policy emphasizes private speech to avoid classifying student speakers as government actors, which could limit their ability to express religiously motivated opinions. This classification could compel the School Board to engage in viewpoint discrimination, contrary to constitutional protections against content discrimination. While graduations are celebratory events, the Constitution does not prohibit potentially offensive speech, including religious expression; it only restricts state-sponsored religious displays. Therefore, the School Board is not required to permit student speech but is also not barred from allowing it. The First Amendment entails a tolerance for speech that some may find offensive.
The argument that selecting student speakers through a vote transforms them into state actors lacks merit; a student speaker represents their peers rather than the state and holds no official authority. Comparisons are made to roles such as a Homecoming Queen or a chosen graduation speaker, both selected by student votes but not characterized as state representatives. The idea that a student speaker becomes a mouthpiece for the state simply due to their election by classmates is deemed unreasonable.
The senior class's act of voting does not constitute state action, nor does it render the chosen student a state actor. Duval County's policy allows students to vote on the graduation message and select a speaker in a secular manner, similar to other student elections. The appellants have failed to demonstrate that the students' actions are significantly intertwined with government policies, which would subject them to constitutional limitations on state action. The policy emphasizes that decisions about who speaks, whether there is a speaker, and the content of the speech are independent of state control. The state’s involvement is limited to providing voting opportunities, enforcing time limits, and scheduling the message within the ceremony. The mechanism established by Duval County promotes student autonomy and neutrality in selecting a speaker. Thus, the state does not transform the student's speech into state speech when the selection is neutral and the student has full control over the message. Additionally, the question of whether Duval County students are coerced into participating in religious activities hinges on the level of state control over the graduation message, rather than the ceremony itself. While students may feel compelled to attend graduation and schools maintain significant control over the ceremonies, these factors alone do not establish coercion unless the state endorses a message in a way that obliges students to engage in a religious exercise.
The government's actions in this case do not constitute a requirement for participation in a religious exercise within the school setting. The Duval County schools and graduating senior classes do not dictate whether a religious prayer or message will be delivered, nor do they compel student participation in any private message. While a school may endorse private religious speech, it does not endorse all speech simply by not censoring it. The assumption that students will interpret a lack of censorship as endorsement is unfounded, especially since students are informed they can choose their speaker who will create the message independently.
Although there may be social pressures regarding attendance and conformity among peers, the state's control over religious exercises, which was pivotal in previous rulings like Lee, is absent here. The argument that a student-led prayer could coerce speakers into conforming to majority religious views is speculative. Evidence indicates that while some graduation messages contained religious content, many did not. The policy permits students to vote on whether a message is delivered, with no predetermined religious outcome.
The constitutionality of the policy aligns with the Lemon test, which assesses whether a policy has a secular purpose, neither advances nor inhibits religion, and avoids excessive government entanglement with religion. The policy is found to serve a secular legislative purpose, thereby supporting its constitutionality under existing legal standards.
A statute is deemed to violate constitutional principles only if it is entirely motivated by advancing religion, as established in Wallace v. Jaffree and Bowen v. Kendrick. Courts may invalidate legislation solely if it is entirely driven by impermissible religious motives, while a statute can still meet Lemon's first prong if it has a partial religious purpose. The Supreme Court has advocated for deference to a state's expression of a plausible secular purpose, especially when legislation articulates such a purpose. Legislative intent is assessed by examining the law's wording, with invalidation occurring primarily when statutes explicitly favor religion or lack a secular purpose. Examples of invalidated laws include those mandating religious practices in public schools.
In contrast, the Duval County policy is articulated with three clear secular purposes. Firstly, it provides graduating students the opportunity to choose a student speaker for their ceremony, promoting civic responsibility in planning. This aligns with the notion that a meaningful graduation ceremony can foster encouragement and self-assurance, which are secular objectives. Secondly, the policy facilitates students' ability to solemnize graduation as a significant educational milestone.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in Lynch, highlights the legitimate secular purposes of public ceremonies, which include solemnizing occasions, fostering confidence in the future, and recognizing societal values. The context of a graduation ceremony does not strip the policy of its secular character, even if it invites reflections on meaning and values. The School Board’s policy reflects a long-standing secular interest in student freedom of expression, encompassing both secular and religious content. The Supreme Court has established that private religious speech is equally protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular expression.
Appellants argue the policy lacks a genuine secular purpose, claiming it was designed to circumvent the standards set by Lee, is inherently sectarian based on its title, and is supported by comments from some School Board members indicating a sectarian intent. However, the Appellants overlook the explicit secular purpose stated in the policy and rely on historical context, the policy's title, and post-enactment comments without legal authority. The court emphasizes the importance of examining the policy's language rather than inferring subjective motivations behind its enactment. Appellants fail to provide compelling evidence that the policy was created to evade legal restrictions, and discerning the subjective motivations of lawmakers is inherently challenging, with motivations being diverse and not easily categorized.
The absence of a clear record complicates the determination of the motivations behind the School Board's policy regarding graduation prayers. The district court found that the intentions of the Board members were unknown, as no debate or vote occurred regarding the Reynolds Memorandum. In assessing the motivations of Superintendent Zenke and Ms. Reynolds, the court identified mixed purposes: to allow students to solemnize the event, to enable student selection of a messenger for a secular or sectarian message, or to opt for no message at all. The appellants did not provide compelling reasons to challenge these findings, which were based on the neutral language of the Reynolds Memorandum.
Historical context revealed that prior to a 1992 Supreme Court decision (Lee), the district had a tradition of clergy-led prayers at graduations. Following the decision, the School Board ceased this practice, facing community pressure from both proponents and opponents of graduation prayers. The court warned against deriving legislative intent from community controversy rather than from the policy's text or stated purpose.
The Reynolds Memorandum's reference to the Lee decision and the constitutional status of student-initiated prayers does not undermine the policy's secular intent. It clarified the School Board's constitutional obligations and acknowledged that the law surrounding student prayer was ambiguous, with threats of lawsuits from opposing sides. The memorandum explicitly stated that the policy's purpose was secular, aimed at allowing students to express their own messages without school oversight, and it maintained a content-neutral stance accommodating both secular and sectarian messages. At most, it indicated that student-led prayers were permissible under the policy, consistent with the Lee ruling.
The title of the Reynolds Memorandum, "Graduation Prayer," does not indicate that the School Board's policy was driven by sectarian motives; rather, it merely identifies the subject of discussion following the Lee decision. The policy's language is what determines its purpose, which is clearly secular. Key provisions include that the decision to present a message lies with the students, the selection of the student speaker is made by the student body, the message is restricted to two minutes, it occurs at the beginning or end of the ceremony, and the content is solely prepared by the student speaker without oversight from the School Board. The title cannot overshadow or alter the explicit language of the policy. Legal precedents emphasize that titles should not limit the text's plain meaning and are only useful for clarifying ambiguities. Additionally, post-enactment comments from School Board members do not provide definitive evidence of sectarian intent, as the district court noted that the Board's motivation regarding the Memorandum is largely unknown, with no documented debate or vote on it.
Comments made on June 1 occurred nearly a month after the implementation of a policy aimed at replacing student-initiated messages with a moment of silence, which subsequently failed, leaving the original policy intact. This situation can be interpreted as a tacit endorsement of the Reynolds Memorandum. However, the School Board's comments during this meeting do not demonstrate an intention to promote or endorse graduation prayer through the Reynolds Memorandum. Only one Board member's statement could be seen as advocating for direct school involvement with religion at graduation, while other members’ comments suggest the policy was intended to keep school influence out of the graduation message content. Specifically, statements from Don Buckley and Nancy Corwin highlight the policy's goal to insulate student messages from school control, rather than indicating support for school-led prayer. The fourth referenced statement, by Stan Jordan, also aligned with support for the policy. Collectively, these statements reflect an acknowledgment that the previous system of state-directed school prayer had ended, with the new policy allowing for less school oversight. The evidence presented by appellants does not undermine the policy's clearly stated secular purpose, aligning with legal precedents that emphasize the importance of statutory language over individual legislative motives. Overall, the evidence cited fails to negate the secular intent behind the policy.
Duval County's policy is deemed facially neutral and demonstrates a secular purpose, fulfilling the first prong of the Lemon test. Appellants reference Jager v. Douglas County School District, asserting that a policy promoting prayer cannot satisfy the secular purpose requirement. However, Jager reinforces that a government policy must genuinely possess a secular purpose. In Jager, the court found that a practice endorsing Protestant Christianity failed this requirement. Conversely, Duval County's policy permits student messages on any topic, satisfying the second prong of Lemon as it is content-neutral and does not mandate graduation prayer. The policy allows for the possibility of no prayer being delivered at all. While a student may choose to read a prayer, they can equally opt for a secular message. The policy does not primarily advance religion since it equally accommodates both religious and secular speech, attributing any religious message to the student's personal choice rather than the policy itself. The policy explicitly states that student messages are not monitored or reviewed by the School Board, distancing the state from any perceived endorsement of religion. This approach aligns with Supreme Court precedent, which upholds neutral programs allowing private religious expression.
The excerpt analyzes the legality of a Duval County policy allowing student speakers to deliver graduation messages that may be secular, sectarian, or mixed. It references several Supreme Court cases that support the idea that providing aid to religious institutions does not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause if the aid is accessible to both religious and non-religious beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. The policy is deemed not to primarily advance religion and does not excessively entangle the School Board with religious matters, adhering to the Lemon test's criteria. The policy maintains neutrality by requiring student-led selection and composition of messages without prior review, thereby limiting the Board's involvement in religious content. The text also critiques the appellants' argument that state control over graduation ceremonies implies endorsement of all speech, highlighting that such control does not necessitate censorship of student speech. Ultimately, the policy aims to balance student expression with constitutional requirements without leading to greater entanglement with religion.
School officials face a challenging decision regarding the management of religious content in student speeches at graduation. If they opt to censor or disrupt speakers, they risk excluding student expression and involvement in the graduation process. The Establishment Clause does not necessitate such a dilemma but emphasizes the distinction between private religious expression and state endorsement of religion. The Duval County School Board's policy allows students to vote on whether to include unrestricted messages in graduation ceremonies and does not inherently violate the Establishment Clause. The constitutional definition of religion is broad, encompassing various sincere beliefs without requiring them to be logical or comprehensible to others. Therefore, if the School Board's censorship is insufficient, even monitored student speech could face constitutional scrutiny.
The majority opinion affirms the district court's judgment, asserting that the Duval County policy is constitutional. However, dissenting opinions argue that this assessment overlooks broader implications, suggesting that the policy may violate the Establishment Clause based on the precedent set in Supreme Court cases such as Lee v. Weisman and Lemon v. Kurtzman. In Lee, the Court found a graduation ceremony unconstitutional due to excessive school involvement in religious practices, and while the connection in this case is less direct, critics maintain that the Duval County policy still leaves room for religious expression that could implicate state endorsement.
The Duval County policy violates the Establishment Clause as outlined in the Lemon test, primarily because its purpose is to promote the continuation of prayer at graduations, thus advancing religion. The policy generates a significant amount of religious expression, which is evident to any reasonable observer familiar with its context and the graduation traditions. Although it invokes free student expression and the public forum doctrine, these claims do not rectify its constitutional flaws. Allowing a majority of students to dictate religious speech undermines individual rights. The policy permits only one speaker, chosen by majority vote, which does not create an equal opportunity for diverse speech.
The dissent critiques the majority's interpretation of the Duval County policy and their assertion that plaintiffs waived their as-applied claims. It emphasizes the importance of Lee v. Weisman, the only Supreme Court case addressing prayer at public school graduations, where the Court identified two critical factors establishing unconstitutionality: pervasive government involvement in religious activities and the effective requirement for student participation in those activities. The dissent argues that the majority underrepresents state control and misapplies Lee's coercion aspect. In Lee, state actors made significant decisions regarding the prayer, which indicated state endorsement of the religious exercise, a situation that the dissent acknowledges is less severe in Duval County, yet still problematic.
State involvement in prayers at Duval County high school graduations is deemed excessive under the Establishment Clause. The majority opinion emphasizes a student's uncensored message at the podium but overlooks the state’s role in facilitating that occurrence. Essential points include:
1. The graduation policy imposes programmatic constraints that favor religious expression, particularly considering the context of its implementation.
2. The selection of a student speaker is classified as state action, and the voting process for this selection is influenced by the anticipated content of the message.
3. Although the majority claims that the School Board does not suggest religious criteria for selecting a speaker, the policy's terms implicitly encourage consideration of such criteria during planning.
4. The school administration organizes elections for the graduation program, limiting the scope of student input to the opening and closing messages, which are time-restricted to two minutes.
5. Historical context further indicates a tradition of prayer at these ceremonies, suggesting that religious invocation is an expected component.
6. The majority's view that students independently decide on the messages underestimates the policy’s influence on their choices and fails to recognize that these messages are part of a broader state-organized event.
7. Similar rulings from the Ninth and Third Circuits affirm that student decisions related to graduation ceremonies are attributable to state authority, emphasizing the overarching responsibility of school administrations in these events.
The document underscores that actions taken by students in this context may reflect state endorsement of religious practices, raising constitutional concerns.
The student vote is determined to be influenced by school policy, as the vote would not occur without it. Prior to the policy's implementation, the school administration held ultimate authority over the graduation ceremony's structure and content. The determination of whether a private party acts as a state actor depends on whether their actions are governmental in nature. Relevant cases illustrate that student authority to make decisions regarding graduation is contingent upon school permission, and the school significantly controls the ceremony's details.
The Fifth Circuit previously ruled that a student vote on prayer could not be attributed to the state, but this contradicts later decisions, such as in Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District, where allowing prayers at graduation was found to violate the First Amendment despite the senior class selecting the speaker.
The analysis considers three factors: reliance on government assistance, performance of a traditional governmental function, and unique aggravation of injury by governmental authority. The student decisions under the Duval County policy are deemed governmental because they occur under school district policy, on school property, with faculty assistance, and involve messages delivered at a school-controlled event. Planning graduation ceremonies is a traditional governmental function, with the administration retaining control over the event's specifics. Additionally, state involvement in religious expressions during the ceremony is problematic, as it can coerce or alienate individuals regarding their personal beliefs, thus violating the First Amendment.
The student vote in public high school graduation ceremonies qualifies as state action, as established in precedent cases where governmental delegation to private actors retains state control over public functions. Specifically, administering elections is a state function, and while states may allow political parties or private groups to participate in candidate selection, their involvement is still considered state action. The state cannot evade its constitutional obligations by ceding control to non-governmental entities. This principle applies beyond elections; for instance, a city cannot avoid integration mandates by appointing private trustees to manage a previously public park, as the park's public status obligates compliance with constitutional requirements.
In the context of Duval County’s graduation ceremonies, the school maintains significant involvement in the events despite delegating a single decision to the senior class. The requirement for students to vote on a speaker does not diminish the state's responsibility, as fundamental rights should not be subjected to majority vote. The Bill of Rights aims to protect certain rights from political influence. The ruling also critiques the notion that the selection of a speaker can be entirely content-neutral, arguing that students are likely to consider the anticipated content of the speaker's message when voting.
The graduation speaker is elected for a specific task: to deliver a speech at the ceremony, which is initiated by students but organized by school officials. This raises concerns about potential infringement on minority rights, akin to the ruling in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, where the Supreme Court found a religious display in a government building violated the First Amendment. The majority opinion suggests that allowing a town council in a predominantly Christian community to hold elections for festive decorations would not eliminate the government’s control or the religious implications.
The brevity of the graduation speech (lasting less than two minutes) raises questions about the purpose of the election if students are not expected to vote based on the candidates’ performance. The selection process for the speaker becomes problematic because it is influenced by state involvement, which necessitates clear, secular, and neutral criteria unrelated to speech content to effectively dissociate the state from the graduation speech.
The policy in this case is compared to that in Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist., where speakers were chosen based on academic standing without content restrictions, allowing for a clear separation between the state and the content of the speeches. The Duval County policy, in contrast, lacks such limitations and does not restrict campaigning, potentially allowing for influence over the speech content, unlike Doe's non-discretionary selection process that focused on objective criteria related to student achievement.
The Duval County policy does not require a prayer at graduations but maintains significant state involvement in the ceremonies, allowing and even encouraging the inclusion of prayer. This involvement mirrors elements from the Supreme Court case Lee, where state control over religious expression raised concerns about coerced participation in prayer. Unlike the policy in Doe, which did not encourage prayer from student speakers, Duval County's policy creates a risk of promoting religious messages. The Supreme Court in Lee highlighted that coerced participation is a distinct issue from control over the exercise itself, noting that dissenting students suffer injury when compelled to conform to religious practices. The majority opinion in the current case misinterprets this by asserting that coercion is linked solely to government control over the religious exercise, effectively diminishing the significance of the coercion aspect identified in Lee. Additionally, it overlooks the interplay between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, which protect individual freedoms of conscience and worship. In Lee, three factors contributed to coercion: the mandatory nature of graduation attendance, the school's control over the event's content, and the susceptibility of adolescents to peer pressure. The analysis concludes that both elements of coercion and state control are present in the Duval County policy.
The Supreme Court recognized the injury to student plaintiffs as being compelled to participate in a religious exercise, emphasizing that the coercive pressure to conform is particularly strong in social contexts. This pressure parallels that observed in Duval County graduation ceremonies, where school policies mandate student behavior, often requiring silence or standing during key moments. The policy intensifies peer pressure, as dissenters are aware that the student speaker was chosen by the majority. Furthermore, the allowance for religious expression during the formal ceremony heightens the social pressure to participate.
The audience typically remains passive during most of the ceremony but is prompted to stand for certain segments, including religious components. Even minimal participation, such as remaining silent or standing, is constitutionally significant. The environment discourages dissent due to the expectation of polite participation and school authority over decorum.
The analysis of the Duval County graduation policy hinges on the Lemon test for Establishment Clause compliance, which requires a secular purpose, no advancement or inhibition of religion, and no excessive government entanglement with religion. The policy fails to meet at least two of these criteria: it lacks a genuine secular purpose and primarily advances religion. The assessment of the policy's purpose will focus on whether it serves a secular aim or acts to endorse or disapprove of religion.
Deference is owed to the government regarding the stated purpose of a policy, which does not need to be solely secular. However, judicial review is essential; if a policy's primary purpose is religious, or if its secular justifications are insincere, it violates the Establishment Clause. In the case of the Duval County policy, the primary motivation for its enactment was to allow prayer at graduation ceremonies, with any secular justifications being secondary. The context of the policy’s creation, its terms, and its title indicate a predominantly religious intent. Historical practices prior to 1992 included prayer at graduation ceremonies, but a 1992 ruling prohibited this. Following community pressure, the administration developed a new policy allowing student-led decisions on graduation ceremonies while lifting restrictions on religious expression. The policy's structure, which focuses on the opening and closing segments of ceremonies—traditionally reserved for prayer—and its stipulation of a two-minute time limit for these segments suggest a design favoring prayer inclusion without directly contravening the earlier ruling. Additionally, the title "Graduation Prayer" of the memorandum outlining this policy reinforces its religious intent, contrary to the majority's interpretation that dismisses the significance of the title. This memorandum was specifically crafted to guide school principals in implementing the new policy.
The memorandum analyzed in the excerpt focuses on the policy regarding graduation messages, specifically its implications following the Supreme Court decision in Lee v. Weisman. It highlights that the policy's language avoids direct mention of prayer, labeling this omission as disingenuous given the tradition of prayer at graduations. The majority opinion suggests three secular purposes for the policy: empowering students, permitting free expression, and allowing solemnization of graduation. However, these purposes are criticized as insufficiently substantiated, as the policy is perceived to constrain rather than promote student autonomy. The concluding statement of the policy claims to allow student-directed messages without oversight, yet this is viewed as a self-serving assertion lacking genuine intent. The comparison is made to a prior Supreme Court case, Stone v. Graham, where the Court found that despite a statute's stated educational rationale, the primary purpose was still religious. Overall, the memorandum contends that the policy is a veiled attempt to continue the practice of prayer under the guise of neutrality.
The memorandum critiques the Duval County policy regarding student involvement in graduation ceremonies, highlighting that the reference to student direction appears unsubstantiated and inconsequential. Despite community pressure to retain prayer at graduations, there is no evidence that there was a significant push for increased student input in planning the ceremonies. The policy allows limited student control, as seniors cannot choose their speakers or deliver messages beyond a two-minute restriction. While historical student involvement varied, school officials maintained ultimate authority, and there was no indication of growing demands for student autonomy in the early 1990s. The policy's constraints suggest that fostering student expression was not its primary aim. Although it claims to allow unfettered content for messages, the reality is that options are limited, potentially undermining the solemnity of the ceremony. The transition from mandatory prayers to optional messages raises concerns about the policy's efficacy in achieving solemnity, as it creates scenarios where no or inappropriate messages may be delivered. Ultimately, the suggestion that the policy enhances student control while also aiming to solemnize graduation is contradictory, as the administration's likely intent was to maintain prayer as a solemnizing element.
Student speakers at graduation ceremonies are free to express criticism towards school officials and peers, which may detract from the solemnity of the event. Prayer, particularly if sectarian or proselytizing, is deemed divisive rather than solemnizing. The majority opinion references cases that only support non-sectarian prayer as serving a solemn purpose, while Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphasizes that government acknowledgment of religion must not imply endorsement of specific beliefs. Public officials are prohibited from promoting prayer, as it fundamentally promotes religion despite potential secondary secular benefits. The majority's rationale suggests that the graduation policy's intent does not include solemnization, as this concept is absent from the policy's text. The Lemon test requires examination of actual purposes rather than hypothetical justifications, revealing the policy's primary aim to promote religion. The second prong of the Lemon analysis indicates that a policy fails if it endorses religion, which can be inferred if a reasonable observer perceives a message favoring religion. The majority dismisses the idea that a neutral policy could primarily advance religion.
Determining the effects of a policy extends beyond its text, necessitating an examination of its history, language, and administration to assess potential religious endorsement. The Duval County policy, despite its neutral wording, conveys a preference for religious expression, as evidenced by the events leading to its creation and public pressure to maintain prayer at high school graduations. Key indicators include the policy's title, the memorandum announcing it, and its application only to the prayer portion of the ceremony, all suggesting a favoritism toward including prayer.
The actions of school principals, who were the first to receive the policy and implement it, further reinforce this interpretation. Since 1993, many principals facilitated direct voting on graduation prayers and identified student speakers as chaplains, using religious terms like "invocation" and "benediction" in official programs. The policy ultimately resulted in increased prayer at public events, with ten out of seventeen schools opting for prayer in its first year, thereby reestablishing the practice after prior limitations. The policy's tangible outcomes, including the advancement of the speaker's religious beliefs, highlight its implications beyond mere textual analysis. The majority view posits that such student speeches are private and do not violate established legal standards.
The opening and closing messages at graduation ceremonies are attributed to the State, but this disagreement does not resolve the issue at hand. The presence of prayers, as a result of the school policy, occurs during a significant state-controlled segment of the ceremony, intensifying the problematic endorsement of religion. The court in Santa Fe highlighted that student-led prayers do not inherently avoid violating the second prong of the Lemon test regarding government endorsement of religion, particularly when sectarian prayers are permitted, as this signals government support for a specific religion.
The Seventh Circuit has similarly noted that private speech can infringe upon the Lemon test's primary effects prong if it occurs within a government-controlled setting. The majority opinion cites several Supreme Court cases that suggest neutral programs allowing private support for religion are constitutional, but these cases involve distinctly different factual circumstances, particularly regarding the neutrality and comprehensiveness of benefits extended to families with children in private schools. In contrast, the Duval County graduation policy constrains students' choices, effectively coercing them toward prayer, with the decision made by the majority of the senior class rather than allowing individualized ceremonies.
The majority's reliance on the public forum doctrine to validate the policy is refuted, as Duval County graduation ceremonies do not embody the characteristics of a public forum. In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court recognized that school authorities closely control graduation programs and speeches, undermining the claim that private speech in this context conveys no state endorsement.
Five Justices have indicated that private speech in a public forum might violate the Establishment Clause, as seen in *Capitol Square Review Advisory Bd. v. Pinette*. A plurality opinion by Justice Scalia opposed this view but acknowledged the potential for government manipulation of public forums to favor religious speech. The Seventh Circuit echoed this sentiment, rejecting a "per se" approach to Establishment Clause claims and ruling that a city's sale of land with a religious statue breached the Establishment Clause by effectively granting preferential access to a public forum.
Graduation ceremonies are not considered public fora, which typically allow broad access for diverse viewpoints. In Duval County, school officials review and approve valedictory speeches, which undermines the notion of a public forum since it does not permit extensive public participation. The majority of cases permitting religious groups to use public facilities relied on the presence of a "broad spectrum" of users to negate any implication of government endorsement of religion.
None of the speech activities in question occurred at a government-sponsored event, which reduces the likelihood of the public perceiving state endorsement of the speech. The context differs significantly between allowing an organization to use a classroom after hours and the government organizing a presentation. While students may host a private prayer meeting on school grounds prior to graduation, that scenario is not relevant here. Duval County has no “open microphone” policy during graduation ceremonies, which limits the number of speakers to one at the beginning and end, thereby constraining the diversity of viewpoints expressed. The selection process, which involves a majority vote, undermines the concept of “general access” needed in a public forum and restricts the introduction of fresh perspectives, resulting in the speaker primarily addressing an already supportive audience.
During a preliminary injunction hearing, the district court considered expediting the trial on the merits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2), subsequently consolidating it with the preliminary injunction hearing and ruling in favor of the Duval County School Board. The majority contends that the Appellants waived their as-applied claims by agreeing to this consolidation. However, this interpretation lacks support in legal precedent or the district court's records. Consent to a Rule 65(a)(2) consolidation does not preclude a party from later raising concerns about limited preparation time and restricted discovery opportunities. The majority fails to cite any case law indicating that advancing the trial negates claims that would have benefitted from more comprehensive discovery.
A court issues final judgment on all claims following a Rule 65(a)(2) consolidation based on limited evidence available at that time. The district court's order and the transcript from the preliminary injunction hearing do not indicate any intention to dismiss as-applied claims. The Appellants' complaint included factual allegations about graduation ceremonies from 1993 to 1997 and an as-applied Establishment Clause claim, which the district judge recognized during the hearing. The court instructed the Clerk to enter final judgment for the Defendants without differentiating between facial and as-applied claims, and made minimal references to the facts of the case. The assertion that Appellants' counsel agreed the operative facts remained unchanged since 1994 is not supported by the record. During the hearing, Appellants’ counsel emphasized the necessity for further discovery related to their damage claim. The court's focus was on whether the law had changed since a prior ruling in 1994 that upheld the graduation policy, ultimately concluding it had not. The court's judgment for the Appellees on the as-applied challenge may have been improper due to an inadequate record regarding the policy's application; however, there was evidence presented, including graduation programs and an affidavit, which the court acknowledged by taking judicial notice of the previous case's record.
The record contains transcripts of sectarian prayers and official programs from Duval County graduation ceremonies, indicating that ministers have continued to deliver prayers despite prior rulings. Appellants argue for a reversal of all claims based on the existing evidence, which they believe supports their position. The case's procedural posture complicates the focus on the constitutionality of the graduation policy. The policy, while not explicitly mentioning religion, encourages prayer during a significant part of the ceremony, which is seen as a violation of the Establishment Clause. This clause prohibits the government from promoting religious expression, directly or indirectly. The dissent emphasizes that graduation ceremonies are state-sponsored events, and school officials must establish neutral criteria for speaker selection to avoid endorsing religious views. Religious expressions not part of the official program do not raise constitutional issues. The dissent argues against the majority opinion, asserting that constitutional rights should not be subject to majority rule, while allowing for personal prayer among attendees and organized student prayer outside the ceremony.
