Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community, a Federally Recognized Indian Tribe v. Bruce Babbitt, as Secretary of the Interior, and Ada E. Deer, as Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, United States Department of the Interior, Louise B. Smith Winifred S. Feezor Cecilia M. Stout Todd D. Brooks Mary Jo Gustafson Tina A. Hove Alan M. Prescott Cynthia L. Prescott Denise Prescott Leonard Prescott Robert Prescott, Jr. Tanya Prescott Kimberly Amundsen John Bluestone Brian Hester David Hester Kaye Hester Teresa Johnson Beverly Kosin Forest Leith Kirk Leith Shahn Leith Gary Prescott Jacqueline Prescott Jerome Prescott Stacy Prescott Kathleen Rykus Teri Schmitt Richard Scott Robert Scott Karen Swann and Dorothy Whipple, Amici Curiae

Citations: 107 F.3d 667; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3471Docket: 95-3736

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; February 26, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

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The Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community appeals a district court ruling that denied the effectiveness of proposed amendments to its constitution. The Eighth Circuit Court affirms this decision. To amend its constitution, the tribe must adhere to the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) and related regulations, which require a formal election process initiated by a request to the Secretary of the Interior. An election board, comprising a Bureau of Indian Affairs officer and two tribal members, must post a list of registered voters at least 20 days before the election and resolve eligibility challenges 10 days prior. Although the election board's eligibility determinations are final, any qualified voter can challenge election results within three days post-election, but grounds for such challenges are not specified in the regulations. Amendments require ratification by a majority of adult tribe members and subsequent approval by the Secretary to be effective. The Secretary's review is limited to ensuring compliance with federal law, and if not acted upon within 45 days, the amendments automatically become effective.

On April 19, 1995, an election was held by the Secretary for the Community to vote on amendments to its constitution regarding membership qualifications. A registered voter list of 111 names was posted, which was revised to exclude 44 ineligible voters 12 days before the election. The amendments passed with a vote of 35 to 27, and the election board certified the results. However, several Community members challenged the results, citing eligibility issues involving 40 individuals, claiming 18 qualified members were excluded and 22 unqualified members were included. 

Forty-three days post-election, the Secretary issued a decision stating he could not approve the election results due to significant doubts about voter eligibility and election integrity. He deferred to the election board on 17 challenges but ordered an administrative law judge to resolve the remaining issues, which involved complex blood quantum determinations and conflicting documents not reviewed by the board. A new election was promised after this resolution.

The Community sued the Secretary for violations of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act, seeking to have the amendments declared effective and to prevent the administrative law judge's resolution and a new election. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. 

On appeal, the Community argued that the district court erred by not declaring the amendments approved under 25 U.S.C. 476(d)(2) due to the Secretary's failure to act within 45 days. The Community also claimed the Secretary lacked discretion to review eligibility disputes. The court found that while the IRA specifies grounds for rejecting ratified election results, it does not clarify actions when ratification is uncertain. The Secretary's interpretation allowing rejection of results in such cases was deemed reasonable, as it aligns with the IRA's purpose of ensuring election integrity. The Secretary's authority to reject elections remains limited and must adhere to federal law.

The Community's reliance on a statutory construction principle favoring Indians does not support its position, as it fails to clarify its application when all parties involved are tribal members and does not indicate how ensuring accurate election results contradicts tribal interests. The Secretary's letter raised significant doubts about the election's integrity, leading to ambiguity regarding whether the amendments were ratified by a majority vote. Consequently, the district court correctly declined to declare the amendments approved as a matter of law.

The Community argues that "final" in 25 C.F.R. 81.13 means "final for the Department," which would bar any Secretarial review of election board eligibility determinations, claiming that any other interpretation is erroneous. However, the regulation's language allows for ambiguity in this interpretation. The Secretary's view that "final" pertains only to who can vote, not the validity of the election itself, permits the invalidation of results due to eligibility irregularities.

The Secretary presents three justifications for this interpretation: (1) Secretarial elections implicate federal rights, thus necessitating federal oversight to avoid due process violations stemming from the lack of notice or opportunity for individuals to contest eligibility before voting; (2) permitting review post-election aligns with ensuring election outcomes reflect the Community's intent; and (3) 25 C.F.R. 81.22 allows challenges to any election irregularities without limiting grounds to voter eligibility alone, reinforcing the IRA's objectives.

The court upheld the Secretary's interpretation of the interaction between 25 C.F.R. §§ 81.13 and 81.22, ruling that it was not plainly erroneous. While there is a belief that a more reasonable interpretation could limit Secretarial review of the election board's eligibility decisions, the court cannot replace the Secretary's interpretation with its own, as established in Miller v. United States. The district court's finding that the Secretary has the discretion to review eligibility disputes was affirmed.

In dissent, Circuit Judge Heaney argued that the election process for amending the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community's constitution is governed by federal law, which the Secretary must follow. He emphasized that section 81.13 states the election board's eligibility determinations "shall be final," highlighting the importance of tribal sovereignty in such decisions. He criticized the Secretary's interpretation, which allows for revisiting eligibility determinations, as inconsistent with the regulations and potentially delaying elections, contrary to congressional intent for timely Secretarial elections as mandated by the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934. The IRA establishes strict timelines for holding elections and approving constitutional amendments, emphasizing the need for prompt resolution in tribal governance matters.

Congress granted the Secretary the authority to create rules for tribal-reorganization elections under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The Secretary established regulations that form an election board composed of one BIA representative and two tribal representatives, responsible for ensuring election compliance. This board oversees voter registration, including informing eligible voters to register and posting a list of registered voters at least twenty days before the election. 

The election board also resolves eligibility disputes regarding voter registration claims, with a final ruling required no later than ten days before the election. Claims not submitted by this deadline are disallowed. After the election, qualified voters may contest results within three days by presenting evidence to the Secretary, who can order a recount or a new election if the objections are deemed valid.

In this case, the Community sought to amend its constitutional membership requirements in 1994. After initial concerns, the Secretary approved an election on February 17, 1995, after the Community revised its proposals. An election board was formed, and a list of 116 enrolled members was provided by the Community, resulting in a registered voter list of 111 after excluding minors and non-residents. Challenges were filed against more than 50% of the registered names by the April 6, 1995 deadline. The election board met on April 6 and 7, resolving all but one challenge unanimously, and posted a revised list with sixty-seven eligible voters on April 7, 1995.

An election held on April 19, 1995, allowed voters from the April 7 registration list to participate, resulting in a constitutional amendment passing with a vote of thirty-five to twenty-seven. The election board certified the results on the same day. Subsequently, two community groups challenged the election board's voter eligibility decisions, claiming that twenty-two ineligible individuals voted and that eighteen eligible individuals were excluded. Forty-three days post-certification, just before the amendment's effective date, the Secretary declared he could not approve the election results due to voter eligibility irregularities. A letter from the Assistant Secretary outlined a process to reassess voter eligibility, appointing an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to evaluate the blood quantum of twenty-three individuals. A new election is planned for thirty to sixty days after the Assistant Secretary approves the determinations, effectively suspending the current election.

The regulations explicitly grant the election board authority over voter eligibility disputes, making its decisions final and binding on the Secretary, unless the board acted outside its authority. This framework acknowledges tribal sovereignty and emphasizes the need for timely election processes. The Secretary's interpretation that he can revisit the election board's final decisions is rejected as inconsistent with the regulations and congressional intent, reinforcing that he cannot challenge the board's determinations after delegating authority.

The Secretary's decision has led to a stagnation in the election process initiated by the Community in 1994, resulting in a situation where the Community cannot modify its membership requirements without an election that is indefinitely postponed. This creates a Catch-22 for the Community, as it must wait for the Secretary to approve its membership before proceeding. Judge Richard H. Kyle expresses disagreement with the majority’s view that this outcome is reasonable. The regulations define a qualified voter as someone registered to vote, but do not explicitly prevent a registered voter from challenging the composition of the voter registration list. Initially, the list of enrolled members included all recognized members of the Community, regardless of their eligibility under the 1969 constitution. However, the revised list only included those constitutionally eligible to vote as per federal law. The Community argued for broader eligibility based on General Council recognition, but the election board adhered to the Bureau of Indian Affairs' stance that eligibility must follow the membership criteria outlined in the Shakopee Mdewakanton Constitution.