Jason Starr v. Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Warden, Also Known as Duane Shillinger Wyoming Attorney General

Citations: 107 F.3d 21; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6891; 1997 WL 57169Docket: 96-8033

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; February 11, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

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Unpublished opinions may now be cited if they have persuasive value on a material issue, provided a copy is attached to the citing document or furnished to the Court and parties during oral argument. Jason Starr, a Wyoming state prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was dismissed by the district court on the grounds of state procedural default. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.

In 1985, Starr was charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder. After being appointed counsel, a plea agreement was proposed where he would plead guilty in exchange for reduced charges and recommended sentences. During the initial plea colloquy, Starr claimed self-defense, leading the court to reject the plea. Later, after consulting with his attorney, he accepted the plea again without renewing his self-defense claim, resulting in a guilty plea and sentencing.

Starr did not file a direct appeal but made several subsequent filings over the years. These included a 1986 motion for credit for presentence incarceration, which was denied, and a 1990 motion for correction of an illegal sentence that was also denied but led to a certiorari petition where the Wyoming Supreme Court ultimately granted him presentence incarceration credit. In 1993, he filed a post-conviction relief petition claiming various violations, which was dismissed without review by the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Starr later filed a federal habeas petition that was dismissed for failing to exhaust state remedies. He returned to state court seeking a writ of certiorari for restoration of his direct appeal but was denied as the court deemed it a successive post-conviction relief petition without addressing the merits.

In 1993, the petitioner initiated a habeas corpus action alleging denial of his right to appeal, ineffective assistance of counsel, and lack of access to the courts, later claiming coercion in his guilty pleas. The district court dismissed the petition without prejudice for being 'mixed' with exhausted and unexhausted claims. Upon appeal, the appellate court determined the district court incorrectly categorized the claims and remanded the case for examination of state procedural defaults. On remand, the district court found that the petitioner defaulted his claims by not adhering to state procedural rules and failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse this default, resulting in a dismissal with prejudice. 

The petitioner appealed again, disputing the district court's findings on cause and prejudice and arguing that not hearing his claims would lead to a fundamental miscarriage of justice. He additionally claimed violations of due process and equal protection due to not receiving all documents submitted by the state and alleged bias from the district court. The appellate court reviews the dismissal under a de novo standard, asserting that summary judgment is warranted only when no genuine material fact is in dispute. 

The Wyoming Supreme Court declined to consider the petitioner's claims due to his failure to follow procedural rules, establishing that federal habeas review is barred for claims not adjudicated on their merits due to procedural noncompliance. The petitioner did not concede to the default, but it arose from his failure to raise all claims in his initial post-conviction petition. To overcome this default, he must demonstrate cause—an external, objective factor hindering compliance with state rules. The petitioner argued that the trial court misinformed him about his appeal rights and that his attorney was ineffective. However, even if these claims were substantiated, they would not absolve his failure to include all claims in his initial state petition, which is the default identified by the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Petitioner’s failure to comply with Wyoming's procedural rules regarding post-conviction relief lacks sufficient justification, as he was present at the change of plea hearing and cannot claim ignorance of the judge's statement made during that session. Although the petitioner argues coercion in abandoning a self-defense claim, he has not demonstrated factual innocence, as he initially suggested self-defense but later denied it and admitted to the shooting due to a loss of temper. The petitioner’s claims of due process and equal protection violations are unfounded, as the court did not rely on the three exhibits he claims he did not receive, which were provided to the court for background information only. Furthermore, the plea agreement he references was acknowledged in court by both him and his counsel, negating his claim of unawareness. Claims of judicial bias based solely on adverse rulings are insufficient to demonstrate actual bias, and no such bias is found in this case. The court affirms the dismissal of the petition, noting that this order and judgment is not binding precedent except under specific legal doctrines.

The appellate panel has unanimously decided that oral argument will not aid in the resolution of this appeal, as per Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal on April 11, 1996, and on May 22, 1996, the district court issued a certificate of probable cause (CPC). The standard for issuing a CPC aligns with the certificate of appealability standard established by the Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act, effective April 24, 1996. Consequently, the district court's CPC allows the petitioner to proceed with the appeal. Additionally, the district court permitted the petitioner to appeal in forma pauperis. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), enacted on April 26, 1996, imposes filing fees on prisoners pursuing civil actions or appeals in forma pauperis. However, the PLRA does not apply to this case since the petitioner filed his notice of appeal prior to the PLRA's enactment, as supported by precedent in White v. Gregory, which ruled that amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 do not affect appeals where the notice of appeal was filed before the law took effect.