United States v. Lewis Matthews, Also Known as "Country"

Citations: 106 F.3d 1092; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 38Docket: 750

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; January 2, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

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Lewis Matthews, known as "Country," was convicted for assaulting Pjeter Boga, a handyman employed by P. L Management, which was contracted by the U.S. Marshals Service to maintain the Kenmore Hotel, seized by the federal government due to pervasive illegal activities. Matthews was found guilty under 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(b) and 1114 for using a dangerous weapon against Boga while he was performing duties related to the Marshals. The conviction followed a jury trial on January 3, 1996, and Matthews was sentenced to 100 months in prison, two years of supervised release, a $5,000 fine, and a $50 special assessment. 

On appeal, Matthews raised three arguments: (1) the work Boga was doing did not qualify as "official duties" assisting the Marshals, (2) the jury charge incorrectly defined "dangerous weapon," and (3) the district court did not consider a downward departure in sentencing despite the unique facts of his case. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment. 

The Kenmore Hotel had a history of narcotics-related incidents leading to the federal seizure. After the government took control in June 1994, the Marshals Service assumed management, contracting with P. L for operations. Prior to the assault, Matthews had requested repairs in his room and was aware of the scheduled maintenance.

Matthews exhibited aggressive behavior during a construction project, initially complaining about his co-worker Boga's work before escalating to violence by brandishing a kitchen knife and threatening Boga. Matthews cornered Boga, held the knife to his head for about two minutes, and made threats while Boga attempted to appease him. Security intervened, leading to Matthews' arrest by police and subsequent FBI action two days later on federal assault charges. During the trial, Matthews did not contest the applicability of certain legal statutes (111(b) and 1114) or the jury instruction defining "dangerous weapon." Following his conviction, Matthews sought to dismiss the indictment or reduce his sentence, citing the unusual circumstances of his case. The district court denied these motions and sentenced him to 100 months in prison, two years of supervised release, a $5,000 fine, and a $50 special assessment. On appeal, Matthews raised three points: insufficient evidence regarding Boga's role in assisting U.S. Marshals, an overly broad jury instruction on "dangerous weapon," and the court's failure to consider a downward departure based on the case's atypical nature. The jury instruction was upheld as not plainly erroneous, given Matthews' failure to object during the trial, and the judge provided context on the knife's unique characteristics when defining "dangerous weapon."

Matthews argues that the jury was improperly instructed by Judge Sand, allowing them to classify "almost any object" as a dangerous weapon. However, established legal precedent supports that the determination of an object as a dangerous weapon is based on its use or threatened use in the context of an assault. Multiple circuit court cases affirm that even innocuous objects can qualify as dangerous weapons depending on how they are wielded. Matthews contends that a proper definition of a dangerous weapon should encompass any instrument capable of inflicting serious injury or death, which closely resembles the instruction provided by Judge Sand.

Regarding sentencing, Matthews suggests a downward departure due to the atypical nature of his case under statutes 111(b) and 1114, but he has not demonstrated that Judge Sand believed he lacked the authority to grant such a departure. The discussions at the sentencing hearing indicated that both sides acknowledged the appropriateness of federal jurisdiction in this case. Judge Sand's refusal to depart downwards implies that he found the circumstances insufficiently unique to warrant a departure from standard sentencing. His statement affirming his power to depart if deemed appropriate further clarifies this. A district court's discretionary decision not to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines is generally not subject to appeal, unless a defendant can show that the court mistakenly believed it lacked the authority to do so, which Matthews has failed to establish, leaving the refusal unreviewable.

Matthews contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(b) and 1114, arguing that Boga was not performing official "law enforcement" duties for the Marshals Service at the time of the incident. The court acknowledges that Congress intended these provisions to protect federal officials and deter interference with their duties, as established in prior cases. While a handyman's role is not typically associated with law enforcement, the court concludes that Boga was "employed to assist" the Marshals Service in its official activities, thereby affirming Matthews's conviction.

Section 111 prohibits the use of a dangerous weapon to forcibly assault designated federal personnel engaged in official duties, with a potential sentence of up to 10 years. Section 1114 lists various federal officers protected under this statute, including those assisting U.S. marshals. The term "employed to assist" is interpreted broadly to include those contracted by public or private entities to support the Marshals Service, as seen in precedent cases.

The court examines whether Boga's handyman work was sufficiently related to the Marshals Service's law enforcement functions. The government argues that the extensive list of covered individuals includes many who do not engage in law enforcement, suggesting that it need only demonstrate that Boga performed contracted services for the Marshals. However, the court critiques this interpretation for lacking a limiting principle, cautioning that it could extend protections too broadly to anyone employed under contract with the Marshals Service. The court ultimately focuses on the specifics of Boga's work to determine if it indeed advanced the Marshals Service's law enforcement activities.

Matthews argues that Boga is merely a hotel worker at a facility taken over by the U.S. government due to a forfeiture order, but the court disagrees. Judge Sprizzo did not approve the seizure due to issues like overbooking or service delays; rather, it was a necessary action against ongoing lawlessness. The government's control over the 600-unit Kenmore hotel was essential for its physical maintenance and operational management, which could involve hiring or contracting personnel, all of whom faced significant risks due to the environment, marked by crime and disorder. This context distinguishes the role of a handyman at the Kenmore from similar positions in more reputable establishments. The court affirms the conclusion that Boga was employed to assist the Marshals Service in fulfilling its official duties, especially given Matthews' threats against someone performing essential repairs. The district court's conviction of Matthews is upheld, as the Kenmore's seizure was justified due to its association with illegal drug distribution, specifically cocaine, under federal law.