Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. American Atheists, Inc.

Citations: 181 L. Ed. 2d 379; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7919; 132 S. Ct. 12; 565 U.S. 994; 80 U.S.L.W. 3256Docket: No. 10-1276; No. 10-1297

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; October 31, 2011; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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Justice Thomas dissents, criticizing the Court for missing an opportunity to clarify the confusing state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Tenth Circuit ruled unconstitutional the Utah Highway Patrol Association's placement of white roadside crosses to memorialize fallen officers, claiming these crosses signal state endorsement of Christianity. Thomas highlights that the Court's vague analyses have led to inconsistent rulings based on subjective judicial preferences. The Association, a private entity, began erecting 12- by 6-foot white crosses in 1998 to honor deceased officers, with each cross displaying the officer's name, rank, and details of their death. Family members approved the use of crosses, which the Association chose for their historical significance in memorializing the dead. The Association received state permission to place these memorials in public areas, with the state stating it neither approved nor disapproved of them. American Atheists, Inc. and its members sued state officials, claiming the crosses on state property violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court initially sided with the petitioners, but the Tenth Circuit reversed, noting the Supreme Court’s divided stance on the Establishment Clause. The Tenth Circuit applied the "Lemon/endorsement test" to evaluate the government's purpose and effect regarding the crosses.

The court determined that the cross memorials, despite having a secular purpose, would lead a reasonable observer to perceive an endorsement of Christianity by the state of Utah. The court emphasized that the cross is a prominent Christian symbol and noted that the memorials were located on public land with the Utah Highway Patrol emblem, which reinforced their religious message. The panel dismissed other contextual factors as insufficient to counter the perception of religious endorsement. 

In a dissenting opinion, four judges criticized the panel for assuming the crosses were unconstitutional and argued that the analysis should have focused on whether the crosses actually endorsed religion, considering factors such as their commemorative intent and location. The dissenters also challenged the concept of a "reasonable observer" used by the panel, describing it as biased and flawed. They expressed concern over the panel's reliance on the Lemon/endorsement test, which has faced scrutiny, and noted the lack of clear guidelines for lower courts regarding its application in Establishment Clause cases. The dissent highlighted that some Supreme Court cases have ignored the Lemon test, while others have only suggested it as a useful tool rather than a binding standard. 

The majority opinion referenced the inconsistent application of the Lemon/endorsement test in recent Supreme Court decisions, illustrating the uncertainty in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Despite its ongoing relevance, the dissenters indicated that the test continues to complicate legal interpretations within this area of law.

Confusion has arisen in lower courts regarding the application of the Establishment Clause following the Supreme Court rulings in Van Orden and McCreary. Different circuits have adopted varying approaches to cases involving religious imagery, with some adhering to the Lemon/endorsement test while others follow the precedent set in Van Orden. Respondents argue that the distinctions made are artificial, asserting that the Van Orden standard applies to Ten Commandments cases and the Lemon/endorsement test to other religious displays. However, this distinction lacks a principled basis, as it raises questions about the coherence and rationale of the jurisprudence assessing government actions concerning religion.

Justice Breyer’s controlling opinion emphasizes the absence of a strict formula or test for these complex cases, suggesting that lower courts misinterpret the application of Van Orden. Courts have not consistently limited Van Orden to cases resembling the original, with examples such as Myers v. Loudoun County and Staley v. Harris County demonstrating its broader application. Conversely, the Tenth Circuit in Green v. Haskell applied the Lemon/endorsement test to a Ten Commandments monument, reflecting the inconsistency in how these standards are implemented.

The respondents suggest that variations among circuits are largely academic, noting that both Breyer’s opinion and the Lemon/endorsement inquiry consider the context and message of displays. Ultimately, the interpretation of the Texas display may align with the Court's more formal Establishment Clause standards.

A court may arrive at the same conclusion under differing tests, as evidenced by cases like ACLU Neb. Foundation v. Plattsmouth and Trunk v. San Diego, which illustrate the inconsistency of applying the Establishment Clause tests. The flexibility inherent in these tests allows for divergent judicial interpretations, as seen in the contrasting decisions in Harris v. Zion and Murray v. Austin regarding city seals depicting a cross, and between Plattsmouth and Staley concerning religious displays. The endorsement test, while intended to provide a consistent framework for evaluating the use of religious symbols by the government, has proven indeterminate, leading to arbitrary outcomes. Justice Kennedy noted that the endorsement test often resembles a subjective analysis rather than a principled judicial standard. Various cases regarding creche displays further highlight this inconsistency, with some being deemed unconstitutional under specific circumstances while others are upheld, regardless of their context or disclaimers. The nuanced nature of these decisions underscores the challenges in achieving a coherent application of the Establishment Clause doctrine.

A menorah displayed on government property typically violates the Establishment Clause, as illustrated in Kaplan v. Burlington, which deemed a large menorah unconstitutional due to its proximity to City Hall and its sponsorship. In contrast, Allegheny upheld a menorah displayed alongside a Christmas tree, and Skoros supported a school policy allowing multiple religious symbols, including a menorah. Similarly, displays of the Ten Commandments on government property are generally unconstitutional, with Green ruling against a Ten Commandments monument at a courthouse, while Van Orden upheld a Ten Commandments monument among secular symbols at a state capitol. Cross displays on government property also violate the Establishment Clause, as shown in Friedman, which found a county seal with a cross unconstitutional, while cases like Murray and Weinbaum upheld certain cross representations in city insignias. Overall, these cases highlight the nuanced interpretations of the Establishment Clause regarding religious displays in government settings.

A cross placed alongside a public highway, commemorating a deceased state trooper, is not necessarily an endorsement of sectarian beliefs by the government. The legal framework surrounding the Establishment Clause lacks a clear principle to evaluate such displays, leading to inconsistent judicial outcomes based on subjective interpretations of what a hypothetical reasonable observer might conclude regarding government support for religion. The Tenth Circuit's decision reflects this unpredictability, with differing opinions on what this observer would perceive and feel about the memorial crosses. The majority argued that a driver passing by at high speed would primarily notice the cross and its association with a state entity, while dissenters contended that a more thorough examination would reveal the fallen officer's details prominently displayed. The court also disagreed on the emotional implications for the observer; the panel expressed concern that the cross could suggest preferential treatment for Christians by the Utah Highway Patrol, while dissenters argued that such fears were exaggerated and that the crosses should be viewed simply as memorials. The size of the crosses was also a point of contention, with the majority asserting that their large stature could exacerbate fears of discrimination, unlike smaller roadside crosses.

Dissenters argued that the size of the crosses was essential for ensuring that a reasonable observer would notice the display and understand its commemorative message. The court debated the knowledge and perceptions of a reasonable observer regarding the crosses, acknowledging that while the crosses symbolize death, they predominantly memorialize Christian deaths. The dissenters contended that the observer would recognize the crosses as chosen by the fallen officer's family and erected by a private group, noting that the majority of Utahns do not revere the cross. The court criticized the inconsistency in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which leads to subjective analyses regarding the constitutionality of religious symbols on government property. Several Justices have criticized the continued use of the Lemon and endorsement tests, arguing that they lack clear standards and create confusion in Establishment Clause challenges. The dissent emphasized a pressing need for clarity in this area of law, supported by numerous amici curiae briefs.

Respondents argue there is no likelihood of similar cases arising, suggesting this should influence the Court's decision against certiorari. However, failing to hear such cases would prevent future Establishment Clause challenges to religious displays. The Court's precedent has established that even minor aesthetic aspects of religious displays affect constitutional evaluations. The excerpt emphasizes the necessity for the Court to clarify its standards for assessing these challenges, as the current ambiguity leads to over-censorship of religious elements in public displays. It references Justice O'Connor's viewpoint that courts have conducted case-specific evaluations to avoid completely eliminating government acknowledgment of religion's role in society. The discussion also highlights the inadequacy of the Lemon test for passive monuments and the importance of considering the broader purposes of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. The confusion stemming from multiple opinions in prior cases complicates the legal landscape, with judges noting the resulting 'judicial morass.' The author advocates for granting certiorari to address these issues, emphasizing the need for a coherent legal framework rather than ad hoc judicial solutions.

The court addresses the complexities of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding public displays of religious symbols, highlighting the fragmentation among Justices and the challenges in applying the Lemon test. Despite criticisms, the Lemon test remains applicable as the Supreme Court has not explicitly rejected it. The court emphasizes that it is bound by the Lemon framework and the endorsement test, particularly in light of precedents like McCreary County and Van Orden, which do not alter its application. Notably, Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Van Orden is recognized for carving out an exception to the Lemon test in certain cases. The court critiques the Establishment Clause jurisprudence, suggesting it has become misguided by relying on an observer's potential misperception rather than actual government conduct. Additionally, it notes that approximately 57% of Utah residents belong to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which does not use the cross as a religious symbol. The court mentions ongoing litigation involving the removal of a cross at Ground Zero, asserting that this does not impede the certiorari process regarding the cross memorials in question.

The Court is not obligated to grant certiorari regarding the endorsement test's viability and application, as sought by state petitioners. Respondents contend that this case is unsuitable for examining a coercion-based Establishment Clause test due to the State's perceived preference for one religion over others. They highlight that the State previously asserted it could not approve memorials if the Association allowed requests for symbols other than a cross, despite no such requests having been made. Respondents argue this misrepresents the State's stance, which is that a different marker would not be recognized as a secular death symbol. This perspective aligns with the Tenth Circuit’s finding that the State and Association's purposes in the memorial program were secular. Additionally, the conflicting views between the State and Association about the permissibility of using crosses versus other religious symbols underscore the ambiguity surrounding the Establishment Clause's requirements.