United States v. Timothy James McVeigh Terry Lynn Nichols, National Victims Center Mothers Against Drunk Driving the National Victims' Constitutional Amendment Network Justice for Surviving Victims, Inc. Concerns of Police Survivors, Inc. Citizens for Law and Order, Inc. Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, Amici Curiae. United States of America v. Timothy James McVeigh Terry Lynn Nichols, Marsha Kight H. Tom Kight Jean Bell Eva Maureen Bloomer Marvin Buckner Martin Cash Margie Cash Jannie M. Coverdale Christopher C. Gregan Saundra K. Cregan Dawn Dearmon Jody Dearmon Dorris Delman Ernest Delman Leslie Downey Mike Downey Cecil Elliott Sonia Diane Leonard Cathy McCaskell C. Neil McCaskell Amy L. Petty Roy Sells Terri Shaw Patricia Smiley Enetrice Smiley Tina Tomlin Richard Tomlin Kim Tomlin Judy Walker National Organization for Victim Assistance Julie Ann Adams Janet K. Beck Mary Suzanne Britten John Henry Carlile Gloria Chipman Sandra Kay Cole John Cole Sherri A. Coleman Teresa C. Cook Cathy Jean Coulter Keith T
Docket: 96-1469
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; March 10, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves the United States of America as the plaintiff against defendants Timothy James McVeigh and Terry Lynn Nichols. Numerous individuals and organizations, including the National Victims Center and Mothers Against Drunk Driving, are listed as amici curiae, expressing their interest in the case. The document also identifies a large number of petitioners, including private citizens and victim advocacy groups, who are appealing against Honorable Richard P. Matsch, the District Judge. The extensive list of parties indicates a significant concern regarding the impact of the proceedings on victims and their families. The case highlights the involvement of various victim advocacy organizations, emphasizing their role in supporting victims' rights and interests in the legal process.
In consolidated proceedings involving Timothy James McVeigh and Terry Lynn Nichols, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether a pretrial order preventing victim-impact witnesses from attending the criminal trial is subject to review by the government or the witnesses. The court concluded that, generally, such orders are not subject to review, although mandamus relief may be available in cases of improper use of sequestration. The district court had invoked the sequestration rule (Fed. R. Evid. 615) during pretrial hearings, initially on its own initiative and later at the defense's request. Upon reconsideration, the court reaffirmed its decision, prompting appeals from the government and the excluded witnesses. The court consolidated these appeals, granted expedited review, and ultimately dismissed the government's appeal on jurisdictional grounds, denied its request for mandamus, and also dismissed the appeals and mandamus petition from the excluded witnesses for lack of standing.
The government's right to appeal in criminal cases is limited and governed by specific statutory provisions. Historically, government appeals were not permitted until Congress began to loosen restrictions in the 20th century. Two main principles persist: appeals can only be initiated with explicit statutory authority, and there is a presumption against government appeals. The Criminal Appeals Act (18 U.S.C. § 3731) provides the necessary framework for determining the jurisdiction of such appeals, which is strictly defined. The Act allows government appeals in three specific instances: from dismissals of indictments or new trial orders, from suppression or exclusion of evidence under certain conditions, and from decisions granting the release of a defendant or denying motions related to their release. These provisions are carefully circumscribed to protect individuals from the risks of extended litigation against the government. The statute does not authorize appeals regarding witness sequestration orders, and courts have consistently rejected government appeals that do not fit within the defined categories of 3731.
The excerpt addresses the limitations on government appeals in criminal cases, referencing several cases that illustrate the principle of deferring decisions on evidence exclusion and other procedural matters until trial. It asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 3731 does not authorize the government’s appeal in the current case. Instead of relying on § 3731, the government attempts to invoke a judicially recognized exception akin to the Cohen collateral-order doctrine, which allows certain independent orders in criminal cases to be appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that such instances are rare. The government argues that the sequestration order impacts a significant right separate from the merits of the case and would be unreviewable post-trial, thereby meeting the Cohen criteria. The document critiques this argument by emphasizing that the government has overlooked the necessity of § 3731 authorization, which is required in addition to the finality stipulated by § 1291. The excerpt concludes that the courts have historically avoided broad interpretations of § 3731 and have rejected the government's reliance on the Cohen doctrine to expand the scope of appeal in this context.
The document outlines a longstanding policy against government appeals in criminal cases, which is supported by prudential considerations beyond the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Key prudential reasons include avoiding undue delays and harassment. There is no explicit authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 for government appeals in criminal matters; thus, a new trial order is viewed as a part of the prosecution's main proceedings, limiting jurisdiction under § 1291 and the Cohen-Carroll exception. The First Circuit's recent ruling in United States v. Horn established that government appeals might be permissible if certain conditions of the collateral order doctrine are met and prudential concerns do not oppose such appeals. However, the Horn court noted unique circumstances that justified its decision, which do not apply in the current case. The document emphasizes the necessity for a strict interpretation of the independence required for appeals, referencing prior Supreme Court decisions that clarify what constitutes an independent proceeding. The district court's sequestration order is deemed not independent from the ongoing criminal prosecution as it aims to maintain the integrity of the proceedings and prevent improper influence on testimony.
Victim-impact evidence, while related solely to sentencing, is crucial to the prosecution's overall process and integral to a conviction. The court holds that neither 3731 nor its independent-proceeding exception applies to the government's appeal, leading to its dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction. The government’s right to appeal is strictly limited by Congress to protect significant interests. Granting mandamus relief would improperly extend the government's right to interlocutory appeals beyond the provisions of 3731, which is not permissible. Although mandamus can be used to review certain procedural orders in criminal cases, this particular case does not warrant such review. The court emphasizes that its decision reflects a broader principle concerning the constitutional separation of powers, acknowledging that many important interlocutory decisions are not subject to immediate appeal, particularly in criminal cases.
Serious questions regarding the need for government appeals from sequestration orders and the potential impact on criminal law enforcement are acknowledged, but responsibility for addressing these issues lies with Congress, which has the authority to modify the traditional limits on appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases. The existing statutes and historical jurisdiction development must guide current decisions.
The primary focus in the case at hand is the standing of sequestered victim-impact witnesses to challenge their exclusion from proceedings. Constitutional standing, as mandated by Article III, is essential for federal court jurisdiction and comprises three requirements: (1) actual or imminent injury in fact to a legally protected interest, (2) a causal link between the injury and the challenged action, and (3) the likelihood of redress through a favorable ruling.
The victim-impact witnesses claim standing based on two sources: the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act, which asserts their right to attend public court proceedings, and the constitutional right to public access to criminal trials established in case law. However, their reliance on the Victims' Rights Act has limitations. The statute only requires federal authorities to use their "best efforts" to uphold victims' rights, and the judicial officer (the district court judge) is not compelled to follow this pledge. The government's arguments against sequestration were sufficient to satisfy the Act's requirements before the district court's decision was made.
The right of victims to attend criminal proceedings is limited if a court determines that hearing other testimonies would materially affect the victim's testimony. This limitation acknowledges the policies of Rule 615, which inherently restricts victims' rights in such contexts. Additionally, Congress has clarified that the Victims' Rights Act does not establish a private cause of action for victims regarding the rights enumerated in the statute. The argument from excluded witnesses that this provision applies only to independent enforcement actions, allowing for appeals or mandamus challenges, is weakened by case law. Specifically, in United States v. Kelley, the court ruled that victims lack standing under the Victim and Witness Protection Act to appeal unfavorable restitution orders, emphasizing that the statute's language does not support a private cause of action for victims. Consequently, the Victims' Rights Act, which explicitly denies such a right, does not grant standing for victims to challenge related orders.
Furthermore, the constitutional argument for standing based on the First Amendment's public right to access criminal proceedings does not support the witnesses' claims. They cannot assert that a witness-sequestration order, which does not close proceedings to the public or press, violates this right. Any recognition of a personal First Amendment right to attend would risk an unwarranted expansion of the public trial-access right. Case law indicates that constitutional violations occur only when access is fundamentally restricted, which is not the case here, as the trial remains open to the public and media. No precedent supports the notion that such an order infringes upon the constitutional rights established in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper Co.
The assessment of case law aligns with the Supreme Court's recognition of the public's right to trial access, driven by various structural interests. These interests include fostering public discussion on government affairs, enhancing perceptions of fairness, supporting the therapeutic effects of criminal proceedings, providing a public check on corruption, deterring perjury, and improving overall performance in the justice system. A publicly open trial serves these interests, regardless of individual attendance, as it ensures public confidence in fairness standards. Consequently, excluded witnesses lack Article III standing to appeal the district court's sequestration order, resulting in a lack of jurisdiction over their appeal and mandamus petition. The government's appeal is dismissed, as well as the victims' appeal and mandamus petition. Amicus curiae motions from several organizations supporting the appellants are granted. The panel unanimously decides that oral argument would not aid in resolving the matters, thus submitting the cases on briefs. Additionally, the text discusses the application of 3731 to orders with practical effects akin to those covered by the statute, referencing cases about conditional suppression orders. However, the current order is deemed unconditional, emphasizing that the district court may enforce it through various sanctions, at its discretion, without guaranteeing exclusion of evidence for noncompliance.
A witness's violation of a sequestration order allows the district court discretion to either admit or exclude their testimony. The government has not indicated whether it will comply with the court's order, and to demonstrate that the order practically excludes evidence, it must commit to actions that make exclusion unavoidable. The collateral-order doctrine allows for appeal from specific orders, such as those granting new trials, without depending on individual case facts. Sequestration orders should be evaluated collectively for appeal rights. While standing for mandamus review does not necessarily require appellate standing, constitutional considerations must be met for judicial review. Nonparty status does not prevent seeking mandamus review, as exemplified by cases allowing news organizations to challenge orders barring access. The analysis of standing focuses on constitutional issues rather than the status of excluded witnesses. The discussion briefly mentions the Victims' Rights Act and closed circuit televising provisions but clarifies they do not affect the standing analysis. The court does not address broader constitutional issues related to trial exclusions. Finally, individual circumstances may be relevant to standing if a public deprivation is established, particularly for victims seeking to attend prosecutions related to their injuries, fulfilling the requirement for demonstrating individualized harm.
