Alderman v. United States

Citations: 178 L. Ed. 2d 799; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 17; 131 S. Ct. 700; 562 U.S. 1163; 79 U.S.L.W. 3397Docket: No. 09-1555

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; January 9, 2011; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia (except for footnote 2), dissents from the denial of certiorari, arguing that the Court implicitly endorses the erosion of recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Ninth Circuit's decision relies on an outdated statutory interpretation, asserting that it creates a constitutional exemption for certain statutes, which could undermine the limits on Congress's commerce power and allow Congressional overreach into areas reserved for state police powers. 

Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 931(a) criminalizes the purchase, ownership, or possession of body armor by individuals with felony convictions involving violence. The case involves Cedrick Alderman, who was indicted after being found wearing a bulletproof vest during a police stop. Although the vest's possession was legal under Washington law, Alderman's prior robbery conviction and the vest's interstate sale invoked § 931. He entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 18 months in prison, subsequently appealing the constitutionality of § 931 based on the Commerce Clause.

The Ninth Circuit upheld the statute's constitutionality, leading to dissenting opinions and a denial of rehearing en banc. Justice Thomas emphasizes that the Constitution imposes real limits on federal power, asserting that the federal government does not possess a plenary police power and that the powers of Congress are specifically defined and limited. He references past rulings, including United States v. Lopez, which clarified the boundaries of Congress's commerce authority.

Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause should not be interpreted as a general police power. A previous ruling struck down a statute banning firearm possession within 1,000 feet of schools, as it did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. This decision was reaffirmed in United States v. Morrison, which invalidated Congress's attempt to regulate non-economic violent crime based solely on its aggregate effect on interstate commerce, specifically ruling against the civil remedy of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. The Court emphasized that such regulation exemplified the police power reserved for states, not the federal government.

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Lopez and Morrison significantly changed the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause but chose to follow the precedent set in Scarborough, which upheld a statute making it illegal for felons to possess firearms if there was a connection to interstate commerce. Scarborough held that evidence of a firearm's prior interstate travel was sufficient to establish this connection. The Ninth Circuit determined that it was bound by Scarborough, even while recognizing the tension between Scarborough and later Supreme Court cases like Lopez and Morrison.

The dissent argued that the Ninth Circuit's application of Scarborough had rendered the Supreme Court’s three-part Commerce Clause analysis unnecessary. It contended that the felon possession of body armor under Section 931 did not substantially affect interstate commerce, thus deeming it unconstitutional. The Tenth Circuit also noted the doctrinal inconsistency between Scarborough and recent Supreme Court decisions, asserting that it would continue to follow Scarborough until directed otherwise by the Supreme Court.

Scarborough conflicts with Lopez, as the former's interpretation reduces constitutional analysis to identifying jurisdictional hooks, undermining Lopez's framework. The Tenth Circuit has ruled that the body armor statute, while not fitting within Lopez categories, relies on Scarborough precedent. Lower courts seek clarification from the Supreme Court due to this conflict. The current interpretation risks expanding federal authority excessively, potentially allowing Congress to regulate virtually any item linked to interstate commerce, infringing on state powers. Historical context shows that states previously utilized their police powers to regulate body armor. The excerpt highlights a need for the Supreme Court to reaffirm the limits of Congress's commerce power established in Lopez, noting that lower courts recognize this issue and are calling for certiorari to address it. Other courts have applied Scarborough in similar contexts, though with divided opinions.

In *United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325 (CA7 2010)*, Judge Manion dissents regarding the scope of the Commerce Clause, referencing his prior opinions in *United States v. Lopez*, *United States v. Morrison*, and *Gonzales v. Raich*. He notes that at least 31 states have enacted regulations concerning body armor. For example, Maryland criminalizes wearing body armor during specific crimes and restricts possession for individuals with certain prior convictions, although permits may allow exemptions. Virginia classifies wearing body armor while in possession of a weapon during a crime as a Class 4 felony, while North Carolina enhances felony penalties for offenders who wear or possess body armor during the crime. Definitions of "body armor" vary significantly among states. Some states, including Montana, Hawaii, Alaska, Maine, Nebraska, and Rhode Island, do not regulate body armor at all. This information is corroborated by *United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615 (CA10 2006)*, which catalogs different state regulations.