Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; January 8, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
Unpublished opinions may now be cited if they hold persuasive value on a material issue, provided a copy is attached to the citing document or presented during oral argument. In *United States v. Guillermo Gonzalez*, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Gonzalez's conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, despite his claims of reversible errors. Gonzalez argued three points: the district court's refusal to allow a timely jury determination, denial of a double jeopardy dismissal, and admission of an involuntary proffer as evidence.
Gonzalez was arrested for possessing a vehicle with a concealed compartment, which had previously contained drugs, although none were found at the time of his arrest. Subsequent investigations connected him to two other vans later found to contain large quantities of cocaine. Testimony from Imelda Gonzalez, a passenger in one of the vans, implicated him in a drug trafficking operation, stating she organized trips for him and maintained contact through pager communications.
The prosecution intended to call Mirta Gomez, who allegedly recruited Gonzalez, but she never testified for the government. Instead, she was called as a defense witness by co-conspirator Irving Parker, where her testimony implied knowledge of drug concealment without directly referencing Gonzalez. Gonzalez sought severance from Parker's trial, arguing potential prejudice from Gomez's testimony, but the court stated that a severance is only warranted if actual prejudice is demonstrated, not merely speculative effects from joint trials. The court emphasized that the burden is on the defendant to show that a joint trial would compromise specific rights or affect the jury's ability to render a reliable verdict.
Defendant asserts he was denied the right to challenge the government's evidence at the end of the prosecution's case-in-chief, specifically objecting to Ms. Gomez's testimony which he believes prejudiced his defense by implying he was aware he was transporting cocaine. He claims this testimony was crucial for establishing his knowledge necessary for a conspiracy conviction and that the jury might have reached a different conclusion without it. However, Mr. Gonzalez fails to find federal precedent for his situation, where one defendant seeks judgment while a co-defendant presents a potentially damaging defense. He cites State v. Martin, which is distinguishable due to the antagonistic nature of the defenses involved, unlike in his case where both defendants maintained a non-conflicting defense regarding the knowledge of transporting drugs.
Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance, as the jury was instructed to consider each defendant's case separately, and safeguards were in place to limit prejudicial testimony from Ms. Gomez. The court's decision was not deemed arbitrary or capricious.
Regarding his pretrial motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy, stemming from a prior California conviction, the court reviews this denial de novo. The defendant bears the burden to prove double jeopardy, which he fails to do. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, he can be prosecuted federally after a state conviction for the same acts.
After pleading nolo contendere to the California charge, the defendant returned to Florida and was subsequently approached by DEA agents and an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Initially denying his California arrest, he later admitted it, and the agents entered his residence. The statements made before entering were admitted at trial, which the defendant contests as a protected "proffer" under Rule 410 and as a confession needing a voluntariness determination per 18 U.S.C. 3501(a). The court disagreed with these arguments, allowing the statements into evidence.
The district court's ruling that the defendant's statements to Trooper Pressnell were not protected by Rule 410 was reviewed for clear error. The court noted that neither Trooper Pressnell nor his colleagues indicated that their conversation with the defendant was a proffer. A statement made by Mr. Watson regarding the non-use of the defendant's statements occurred only after entering the residence, and prior discussions were aimed at determining the defendant's recent arrest in California. Consequently, this conversation did not qualify as a "plea discussion" under Rule 410. The defendant failed to provide evidence supporting the claim that the entire conversation should be treated as a proffer due to later discussions.
Additionally, even if the statements were considered a "confession" under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(e), the defendant did not invoke his right to a pre-trial voluntariness hearing, waiving that right for the trial and appeal. While the district court can grant relief from such a waiver for cause, no cause was shown in this case. The defendant argued that he was misled into believing his statements would only be used for impeachment, but this misunderstanding did not justify a pre-trial objection.
Ultimately, the court found that the defendant's arguments were unpersuasive; his motions for severance and judgment of acquittal were properly denied, he was not subjected to double jeopardy, and the voluntariness of his statements had not been appropriately contested. The court affirmed the district court's decision, noting that the ruling is not binding precedent except under specific legal doctrines. Both parties treated the defendant’s motion for judgment as a motion for severance for the purpose of this appeal.
