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Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Rincon Reservation v. Schwarzenegger
Citations: 602 F. Supp. 3d 1019; 602 F.3d 1019; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8125; 2010 WL 1542452Docket: Nos. 08-55809, 08-55914
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 20, 2010; Federal Appellate Court
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) mandates that states negotiate in good faith with Native American tribes regarding casino gaming on tribal lands. The State of California and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger appealed a district court ruling that found the State negotiated in bad faith with the Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians. This determination stemmed from the State's insistence that Rincon contribute a portion of its net revenues to the State’s general fund, which the court interpreted as an unlawful tax attempt under IGRA. The State contended that this characterization was incorrect and argued that imposing a tax alone could not support a bad faith finding. The court upheld the district court's ruling. Background includes the 1999 compact negotiations, where the State, represented by then-Governor Gray Davis, granted Rincon rights to operate casino-style gaming, which was made enforceable by the passage of Proposition 1A in March 2000. This constitutional amendment allowed tribal gaming and gave tribes a monopoly over casino operations in California. In exchange for the State's support in passing Proposition 1A, tribes agreed to share a portion of their revenues with the State, initially intended for general use but later shifted to specific funds: the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) and the Special Distribution Fund (SDF). Monies deposited into the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) are allocated to tribes that do not engage in their own gaming activities. In contrast, funds from the Special Distribution Fund (SDF) are utilized for various purposes, including: (a) grants addressing gambling addiction; (b) support for state and local agencies affected by tribal gaming; (c) compensation for regulatory costs incurred by the State Gaming Agency and the Department of Justice; (d) covering shortfalls in the RSTF; and (e) any other legislative purposes. In the case of Coyote Valley II, appellants challenged the legality of the RSTF and SDF provisions in the 1999 compacts under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which restricts state taxation on Indian gaming. The court upheld the RSTF and SDF as lawful, stating that revenue sharing was aimed primarily at promoting tribal interests, and the state’s involvement was limited to protecting citizens and fulfilling regulatory obligations. From 2003 to 2006, Rincon, operating under the 1999 compact, sought to expand its gaming operations due to increased revenues allowing for improved self-sufficiency. Rincon initiated renegotiations with the state in March 2003, but negotiations shifted after the election of Governor Schwarzenegger. The state demanded a significant share (15%) of Rincon's gaming revenues for additional devices and an annual fee based on total revenues, while offering an "exclusivity provision" in return. Rincon countered that any fees should strictly cover regulatory costs and infrastructure needs, asserting that Proposition 1A already secured tribal gaming exclusivity, which was insufficient in a competitive market where Rincon operated. Proposed exclusivity provisions intended to limit non-tribal competition do not offer Rincon any significant economic benefits justifying requested payments. The State viewed Rincon's counter-proposal, which included limited-use fees and rejected exclusivity, as an attempt to operate beyond the 1999 compact limits without adequate compensation to the State. The State insisted on a portion of tribal gaming revenues for its general fund. Rincon responded with a similar offer but increased per-device fees and presented expert analyses indicating that the State's proposal would impose an additional $23 million in fees based on the 1999 Compact. The State's imposition of a 15% fee on net win would dramatically increase Rincon's payments without expanding its gaming capacity, which Rincon argued constituted an illegal tax under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). On October 23, 2006, the State countered with terms extending the compact for five years and reducing the fee from 15% to 10%, based on fiscal year 2005. The State claimed these terms were comparable to agreements with other tribes. Following Rincon's request, the State offered to allow 400 additional devices with an annual $2 million payment to the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) and 25% of net win from those devices to the State. The State's analysis suggested Rincon would benefit by accepting the counteroffer, gaining $2 million in revenues, while the State would receive $38 million. Rincon rejected this offer, leading to an impasse and subsequent cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled in favor of Rincon, prompting a timely appeal. Jurisdiction lies under IGRA, allowing district courts to hear tribal claims against states for failing to negotiate in good faith regarding gaming rights, with California having waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 1292(a)(1), and summary judgment is warranted when no material facts are in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The State contends that the district court made an error in granting summary judgment concerning its good faith negotiations, as outlined in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii-iv). The determination of good faith is a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to de novo review. Historically, the encroachment on Indian lands by colonists led to the British Crown assuming control over Indian affairs to mitigate injustices. Post-independence, the federal government inherited this responsibility, with Congress regulating commerce with tribes and the President authorized to make treaties. The relationship between the government and tribes has been likened to that of a guardian and ward, yet numerous treaties have been violated, resulting in the displacement of Native Americans. The Supreme Court highlighted instances of such injustices, like that against the Sioux Nation in the Black Hills. In response to the exploitation of tribal resources through gaming, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) to establish a legal framework for tribal gaming and ensure state accountability in negotiations. Under IGRA, tribes can only engage in class III gaming if a compact with the state is in place, which necessitates good faith negotiations from states. If a state is found to have acted in bad faith, the court can mandate further negotiations or mediation to establish a compact. Factors relevant to assessing a state's good faith include public interest, safety, financial integrity, and any demands for taxation of tribal lands, which may indicate a lack of good faith. The excerpt references the Coyote Valley II case, which interprets IGRA's provisions regarding tribal-state gaming compacts. It highlights specific criteria for assessing a state's good faith in negotiations and outlines permissible topics for such compacts. These topics include the application of laws related to gaming, jurisdictional allocation, regulatory costs, comparable taxation by tribes, breach of contract remedies, operational standards, and other relevant matters. However, a critical limitation is that states cannot impose taxes, fees, or charges on tribes, nor can they refuse negotiations based on a lack of authority to levy such assessments. The primary objectives of IGRA are to promote tribal economic development, ensure fair gaming operations, and establish federal regulatory authority over Indian gaming. In the case at hand, the State's demand for a significant percentage of Rincon’s revenues as part of the compact suggested bad faith negotiation. Upon Rincon presenting evidence of this, the burden of proof shifted to the State to demonstrate its good faith in negotiations, which the State failed to do. Tax demands from the State are deemed evidence of bad faith according to 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(II). A tax is defined as a governmental charge imposed to generate public revenue. The State mandated Rincon to pay at least 10% of its net profits into the State's general fund, which is comprised of all money received that is not allocated to other funds. This non-negotiable payment is characterized as a "tax." During subsequent negotiations post-2003, the State maintained its stance on this revenue-sharing demand without offering any reciprocal benefits to Rincon, emphasizing that additional concessions would only come with monetary payments. The term "demand" indicates the necessity of these payments, thus establishing the State's insistence as a clear demand. The dissenting view incorrectly interprets the nature of these negotiations, suggesting that the term "imposed" implies a lack of authority to levy a tax. This argument overlooks the fundamental nature of IGRA negotiations, where tribes are compelled by Congress to negotiate with states regarding lawful gaming activities. If a state fails to negotiate in good faith, IGRA allows for judicial and federal intervention to impose a gaming agreement. While IGRA grants states a voice in tribal gaming, it does not give them unilateral power to dictate terms or extract maximum revenue. Instead, it mandates cooperation and outlines alternatives for tribes if states do not engage in good faith negotiations. The dissent interprets 2710(d)(4) of IGRA as prohibiting states from having the authority to impose taxes and fees, suggesting that states are limited to negotiating terms. However, the argument fails to recognize that the states' role does not include imposing any obligations on tribes. The dissent's reasoning implies that negotiation allows states to demand various concessions, including potentially harmful ones, such as waiving tribal sovereign immunity for taxation, which contradicts IGRA. If a state insists on revenue sharing as a condition for a compact, it is effectively imposing a financial obligation, regardless of the terminology used. The distinction made by the dissent between a hard-line negotiating tactic and an outright tax is considered inconsequential. It is argued that IGRA prohibits California from compelling the Rincon Band to pay a portion of its income to the state as a condition for engaging in class III gaming. Previous rulings, such as in Coyote Valley II, indicate that demands for taxation by a state can be seen as evidence of bad faith in negotiations. While states can attempt to justify such demands by citing public interests, the need for general tax revenues is not aligned with IGRA's objectives, which focus on safeguarding against negative impacts from gaming activities. Concerning the interpretation of terms under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), a broad construction favoring state interests contradicts the obligation to prioritize tribal interests. This principle is supported by relevant case law and congressional intent, which emphasizes resolving ambiguities in favor of tribes. The State fails to justify its revenue-sharing demands based on the factors specified in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(I) and incorrectly relies on the Coyote Valley II decision, which is not applicable due to distinct factual differences. In Coyote Valley II, revenue sharing mechanisms, specifically the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) and the Special Distribution Fund (SDF), were deemed negotiable subjects directly related to gaming operations per § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii). The SDF was clearly tied to gaming since its funds were exclusively for gaming-related purposes. The RSTF was also considered related to gaming as it facilitated economic development for tribes. Importantly, the court did not classify these funds as "taxes" because they were agreed upon in good faith as part of a bargaining process for constitutional exclusivity. The State’s claims that its general fund revenue sharing demands are similarly justified under § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii) are flawed. The assertion that such demands are directly related to gaming activities is circular and contradicted by § 2710(d)(4), which restricts states from imposing assessments unless agreed upon as specified. The precedent set in Coyote Valley II indicates that revenue-sharing discussions must focus on the purpose of the funds, not merely their source. Thus, the State's proposals do not meet the criteria established in Coyote Valley II for valid revenue sharing under the IGRA. General fund revenue sharing differs significantly from the funds allocated to the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) and the Special Distribution Fund (SDF) due to its undefined potential uses, as outlined in California Government Code § 16300. Payments to the general fund lack a direct connection to gaming activities. The distinction between general fund revenue sharing and the RSTF and SDF was recognized in the Coyote Valley II case, where it was noted that RSTF provisions do not benefit the State financially. The court also reserved judgment on the legality of the SDF if its funds were directed to the general fund. As a result, general fund revenue sharing cannot be considered "directly related to the operation of gaming activities" and is not a permitted negotiation topic under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii). This aligns with the 9th Circuit's decision in Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, which found a weak connection between state general fund fees and gaming regulation costs. The ruling further clarifies that the scope of negotiations under § 2710(d)(3)(C) does not extend to general fund revenue sharing, reinforcing that IGRA negotiations should focus solely on gaming regulation matters. Additionally, IGRA’s goals, as stated in § 2702, center on tribal development, crime prevention, and fair gaming, but do not encompass the State's economic interests. Thus, the State's interpretation of Coyote Valley II to support its economic pursuits is unfounded, as the statutory language does not provide a basis for such negotiations. The document asserts a reluctance to add unexpressed purposes to a statute, citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc. as a precedent. It critiques the State's interpretation of Coyote Valley II, specifically a quote regarding the State's economic interest in revenue generation. The full context indicates that a State's interests in class III gaming on Indian lands encompass public policy, safety, and regulatory impacts rather than serving as a justification for excluding tribes or protecting state gaming enterprises. The document emphasizes that interpreting the State's economic interests as a reason for taxing tribes distorts the original text and intent of Congress. Legislative history and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) are cited to support the view that the State cannot impose taxes on tribes under the guise of economic interests. The document clarifies that while Congress did not intend for states to disregard their economic interests during compact negotiations, it does not imply that states can pursue economic objectives at the expense of tribal revenues. Ultimately, IGRA aims to ensure tribes benefit from gaming activities, reinforcing the idea that state economic interests should not compromise this objective. Revenue sharing in this case is heavily skewed, with the State potentially gaining $38 million in net revenue compared to only $2 million for the tribe, indicating that the State, not the tribe, would be the primary beneficiary of the gaming rights being negotiated. This situation contradicts the intent of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which aims to ensure that tribes are primary beneficiaries of their gaming operations. The demand for general fund revenue sharing is deemed unauthorized by IGRA and incompatible with its objectives. Consequently, the absence of meaningful concessions from the State leads to a strong presumption of bad faith in these negotiations. Meaningful concessions are crucial in the context of IGRA as they are necessary for the legitimacy of any revenue-sharing agreements. Previous cases, such as *Coyote Valley II* and *Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes*, highlight that while states cannot impose taxes or fees unilaterally, they can negotiate for such payments if they provide meaningful concessions in return. The State's claim of having offered meaningful concessions is unconvincing, as the tribe, Rincon, did not propose revenue sharing and has consistently opposed it. The State's argument fails to recognize that in *Coyote Valley II*, the tribes initiated the revenue-sharing provisions, contrasting with the current situation. Furthermore, the exclusivity provision in the 1999 compacts was significant, as it stemmed from California's prohibition on casino-style gaming. The State was not obligated to negotiate with tribes regarding gaming, yet it chose to create compacts and even facilitated a constitutional amendment to permit tribal gaming. This historical context underscores the necessity for substantial concessions to justify any demands for revenue sharing. The value of a monopoly is significantly enhanced when its alteration requires a constitutional amendment. This surpasses the benefits mandated by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which only requires states to treat tribes equally regarding class III gaming. In California, voters, influenced by the governor, granted tribes unique economic opportunities not available to others, indicating that the state's request for wealthier tribes to support less fortunate ones was a negotiated agreement. The exclusivity granted to tribes in this context was recognized as a "meaningful concession" because it was valuable and bargained for, unlike the current situation where exclusivity is not new since tribes already possess that right under state constitutional law. Proposition 1A's benefits have already been utilized in establishing the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) and the State Distribution Fund (SDF) through a 1999 compact. It is a legal principle that providing something to which a party already has a right does not constitute valid consideration for a contract. The state argues that it is unfair for the Rincon tribe to retain exclusivity benefits without ongoing revenue-sharing obligations; however, it is clear that exclusivity cannot serve as new consideration for additional revenue sharing since a prior agreement had already been reached. The state has presented alternative arguments to assert that it offered more than nominal consideration, claiming it proposed revised and expanded exclusivity with greater economic value than that granted by Proposition 1A. However, the lack of clarity regarding the specifics of this proposed exclusivity undermines the state's argument. It is assumed that the new exclusivity would resemble agreements accepted by other tribes, such as the Pala Band of Mission Indians, which restricts gaming activities within specific geographic areas to Indian tribes only. If the State breaches its obligation to ensure geographic exclusivity, the Tribe can seek an injunction against gaming and halt payments to the State. The proposed exclusivity changes would be largely ineffective for Rincon, as a constitutional amendment that eliminates tribal gaming exclusivity is unlikely. Consequently, both injunctive and monetary remedies, dependent on such an event, hold only speculative value for Rincon. Additionally, Rincon is not seeking a revised local exclusivity provision since it would not shield them from significant tribal competition in their key market. The current statewide exclusivity provides Rincon with sufficient economic advantages, and any potential benefits from the proposed changes are minimal, with Rincon projected to gain only $2 million compared to the State’s expected $38 million. This situation contrasts with Coyote Valley II, suggesting that the State may be misusing its negotiation authority to impose fees rather than negotiate fairly. Although a hardline negotiation is not inherently bad faith, it becomes problematic when it results in a “take it or leave it” offer that includes non-beneficial provisions outside the permissible scope of IGRA. The State’s argument for requiring new considerations in exchange for expanded gaming rights aligns with general contract principles; however, IGRA restricts the negotiation topics to specific rights and obligations, limiting the scope of what can be exchanged. General fund revenue sharing is not recognized as a state public policy interest related to gaming and is not an authorized negotiation topic under IGRA. Gaming rights that tribes can negotiate, such as device licensing and operational time, cannot be exchanged for general fund revenue sharing; the consideration must relate to separate interests. To obtain additional gaming rights, a tribe like Rincon may need to accept more stringent state regulations or increased payments to cover regulatory costs, but it cannot be compelled to assist the state with its budget crisis. The Department of the Interior supports this interpretation, stating that revenue-sharing payments can only be made in exchange for quantifiable economic benefits not mandated for negotiation under IGRA, such as exclusive rights to Class III gaming. The Assistant Secretary noted that accepting revenue-sharing in exchange for standard compact terms would allow states to commercialize gaming rights, contradicting IGRA's intent to prevent states from leveraging compact negotiations for fees. The State's argument that the value of offers during negotiations should be considered holistically, rather than in parts, is rejected. It contends that the exclusivity of gaming rights is integral to negotiations, but the distinction between exclusivity and gaming rights is minimal. Accepting the State's view would imply that it could demand general fund revenue sharing as a condition for renegotiating basic gaming terms, which is contrary to IGRA's provisions that allow tribes to negotiate for essential gaming rights without such conditions. The State's assertion that it makes "meaningful concessions" by offering a more valuable bundle of rights than the current status is disputed. Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), states possess limited negotiation authority over certain issues. Accepting the State's broad interpretation of negotiations would allow it to combine unrelated proposals, such as taxation and land use restrictions, with IGRA class III gaming rights, which would contravene the law's intent. The State also argues that its revenue-sharing demands were made in good faith based on its belief that they were authorized by Coyote Valley II and approved by the Department of the Interior. However, good faith should be evaluated objectively, centered on the negotiation record rather than the State's subjective beliefs. The statutory framework emphasizes that the good faith requirement is designed to streamline tribal gaming arrangements, not to engage in disputes over subjective intentions. Consequently, the State’s belief in the legality of its demands does not negate the inference of bad faith arising from objectively improper requests. The State's claim that IGRA allowed for its revenue sharing demand is deemed objectively unreasonable. IGRA specifically prohibits states from imposing fees for purposes outside the defined criteria. While Coyote Valley II recognized that some revenue sharing might be permissible under certain circumstances, the exceptional rationale relevant to that case does not apply here, making the State’s reliance on it unwarranted. Additionally, the Department of the Interior has expressed skepticism regarding the legitimacy of general fund revenue sharing, approving such provisions only with caution and based on tribal confirmations. The State could not justifiably rely on the Department of the Interior’s approval of other compacts as evidence of the legality of its demands from Rincon. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) specifies that any waiver of rights by tribes does not imply similar expectations for other tribes, as emphasized in legislative reports. The State's demand for 10-15% of Rincon's net winnings constitutes an impermissible tax on the tribe, further indicating bad faith in negotiations. Despite California's fiscal challenges, historical breaches of trust towards Native Americans and the potential for state abuse in compact negotiations under IGRA necessitate adherence to a good faith requirement. The court affirmed the district court's finding of bad faith regarding the State's revenue-sharing demands, ordering the parties to either reach a compact or submit their best offers to mediation. The ruling does not address additional bad faith claims made by Rincon. The court noted the classification of gaming under IGRA and provided context regarding the limited gaming provisions in Rincon's 1999 compact. The State is not pursuing a specific fund for designated purposes but aims to deposit into its general fund. Subsection (d) is part of the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) and does not require separate analysis. Subsection (e) has been previously interpreted to only encompass gaming-related purposes. In June 2004, Rincon initiated a lawsuit to compel the State to expedite negotiations. The negotiations involved both Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) discussions and formal settlement talks. Key proposals from the State included: 1. Allowing the Tribe to operate an additional 900 Gaming Devices, capping total devices at 2,500. 2. The Tribe must maintain current Gaming Device licenses while negotiating contribution amounts to the RSTF. 3. An annual payment to the State of 15% of the average net win from additional Gaming Devices, based on all devices operated. 4. An annual fee to the State equivalent to 15% of the net win from devices in Fiscal Year 2004. 5. The term of the amended compact would mirror the existing compact. 6. A portion of the Tribe’s payment could be allocated for San Diego County and CalTrans, subject to negotiation. 7. Most non-economic provisions would replicate those in the Pala Compact Amendment. 8. The Tribe would have an exclusivity provision similar to that of the Pala compact amendment, with specific terms to be negotiated. Additionally, many states have not waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity under IGRA, unlike California, which complicates tribal challenges to state demands perceived as bad faith. Various cases illustrate that tribes in states without such waivers lack the ability to contest revenue-sharing agreements, often leading them to accept these agreements to secure compacts. The Department of the Interior viewed the revenue sharing provision as illegal but felt compelled to allow the compact because the tribe lacked legal recourse against the state. This situation may mitigate the risk of lawsuits, contrary to concerns raised by dissenting opinions. The dissent references 25 C.F.R. 291.1 et seq. as a means for tribes to challenge state demands; however, a circuit court has invalidated these regulations (Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491), and their validity is not under consideration here. The dissent also argues that 2710(d)(3)(C) is not exhaustive, but the text suggests it is, allowing negotiation only within seven specified categories. Although "may" implies some flexibility, it does not grant unrestricted permission, as the language limits topics to those directly related to gaming. The interpretation aligns with past case law, emphasizing that statutes affecting tribal rights must be construed favorably towards tribes. Although the dissent acknowledges that 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii) is unambiguous, the core issue remains whether revenue sharing qualifies as "directly related to gaming," which is contested by the parties. The resolution of this dispute is guided by a Congressional directive to favor tribal interests in ambiguous matters. The Committee opposes extending jurisdictional elections to issues beyond gaming, reinforcing the unique nature of gaming as an economic enterprise. Congress did not intend for compacting methodology to apply to taxation, water rights, environmental regulation, or land use. The rapid growth of gaming in Indian territories and concerns over corruption justified utilizing existing state regulatory frameworks specifically for class III gaming. In the case Coyote Valley II, the court concluded that any claims of bad faith were effectively rebutted, negating the need to determine whether the RSTF and SDF constituted state-imposed taxes. In the current case, however, bad faith is a key concern, prompting an examination of whether state assessments align with statutory provisions. Section 2710(d)(4) clearly states that not only "taxes" but any "fee, charge, or other assessment" is precluded unless agreed upon under 2710(d)(3)(C)(iii). The state's characterization of its demands as "annual fees" raises questions about their compliance with this provision. The analysis must focus on state "demands" rather than perceived authority to "impose" fees. Even accepting the dissent’s interpretation of the relevant sections would suggest that IGRA does not explicitly support revenue sharing, and ambiguities should favor tribal interests, implying a limitation on state authority to negotiate such terms. The state’s references to limiting gaming devices reflect a legitimate interest but are irrelevant in this instance, as the state has demonstrated a willingness to allow extensive gaming if compensated appropriately. This distinction was noted in the Seventh Circuit’s deliberation in Ho-Chunk Nation. While the current ruling does not address the contentious issue of revenue sharing, it distinguishes the revenue-sharing agreements in question from those in the Compact between the Nation and the State. In In re Indian Gaming, the state's handling of payments from tribes is notably restricted, with funds allocated to specific purposes: one for distributing gaming revenue among non-gaming tribes and another for addressing gambling addiction and supporting affected local agencies. In contrast, the Nation's payments to the State lack any restrictions, allowing the State full discretion over their use. While some tribes have renegotiated compacts for general fund revenue sharing and exclusivity, Rincon did not freely accept the State's demands for revenue sharing in return for revised exclusivity, deeming it of limited value. Even with a potential constitutional amendment that could lift the nontribal casino ban, the viability of an injunctive remedy is questionable, as no authority supports enjoining such an amendment based on contract violations. The State argues that the amended monetary remedy is preferable since it allows continued gaming post-exclusivity loss, unlike the 1999 compact, which mandates termination. However, Rincon may benefit more from the 1999 compact's termination provisions, which could lead to new compact negotiations under the good faith requirement of IGRA. Licensing issues could encompass operational agreements and facility specifications. The Assistant Secretary's concerns during 2003 congressional discussions emphasized the need for clarity on revenue sharing agreements to prevent excessive state revenue claims under compacts, underscoring that IGRA was not intended to allow all provisions for sale. The dissent misinterprets this context. The State contended that it could require revenue sharing from the tribe if the new gaming compact offered the tribe better terms than the previous one. However, consideration for revenue sharing must be meaningfully independent and not merely a bundle of rights compared to the prior agreement. This consideration needs to stand alone as not illusory or illegal. The expectation is for States to negotiate fairly and respect tribal authority. Regarding the scope of discovery in IGRA negotiations, the State argued that good faith should be assessed through objective negotiation conduct. However, the State cannot limit discovery while also asserting that any improper demands were made innocently. In approving compact amendments, the Secretary expressed that direct payments from tribes to States for purposes other than regulating gaming are significantly restricted, but approved the compacts based on the tribes confirming that the exclusivity provisions were meaningful and the payments were appropriate relative to the exclusivity granted.