Court: District Court, D. Vermont; June 10, 2019; Federal District Court
Defendant Susan Mateo faces charges including conspiracy to distribute controlled substances (heroin, fentanyl, and oxycodone) and money laundering conspiracy. A motion to suppress statements made during a January 23, 2018, interview with DEA agents is pending before the court, which the government opposes. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 19, 2019, with testimonies from Samantha Foss and DEA agents Christopher Paquette and Brandon Hope. Following the hearing, parties submitted memoranda, and the court took the motion under advisement.
The court incorporates findings from a previous ruling, noting that from September 2017 to January 2018, the DEA and Morristown Police Department collaborated with a confidential informant to conduct controlled buys from the defendant and her mother in exchange for monetary compensation. Upon her arrest on January 23, 2018, the defendant was taken to the Stowe Police Station, where she was interviewed by DEA agents. The interview was recorded, and prior to reading her Miranda rights, the agents indicated the seriousness of the situation, informing her of federal actions underway, including a search warrant at her home. The defendant inquired about her children, and the agents assured her that discussions regarding her cooperation would not affect the care of her children, emphasizing that her decision to speak was voluntary.
TFO Sylvia informed the Defendant that they were federal agents with a valid arrest warrant issued by a federal judge based on evidence related to drug sales involving the Defendant and others. She explained that this warrant allowed them to arrest her and search her residence, emphasizing the seriousness of the charges compared to local police. Sylvia cautioned that lying to federal agents constitutes a federal offense, referencing Martha Stewart as an example of someone who faced jail time for lying to the FBI.
The Defendant indicated she had not been previously read her Miranda rights and was unaware of them, though she understood English and did not require the rights to be read in Spanish. Sylvia then began to read the Miranda warning, explaining the rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning, clarifying that if she could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed for her in federal court.
During the exchange, the Defendant expressed a desire to speak with a lawyer before answering any questions. TFO Sylvia acknowledged this request, and the time of the conversation was noted as 9:30.
TFO Sylvia initiated a procedure to collect the Defendant's biographical information, emphasizing that no questions would be asked regarding matters of interest to law enforcement, as the Defendant expressed a desire to consult a lawyer. The Defendant would be taken to the local jail in Burlington for an overnight stay due to a federal arrest warrant, with no bail available until court proceedings the following morning. TFO Sylvia proceeded to collect personal details, including the Defendant's name, date of birth, social security number, citizenship, physical characteristics, and family information, including details about her children and their caretakers.
DEA Agent Paquette inquired about the prevalence of cell phone usage among individuals. The agents also asked about the Defendant's gang affiliation, medical history, and any prior suicide threats. The Defendant admitted to a past suicide attempt and discussed her mental health, alcohol consumption, and drug use, initially denying drug use but later questioned about marijuana. The Defendant was informed that she would need to submit to a urine test at court the next day. Throughout the questioning, TFO Sylvia expressed uncertainty about the implications of the Defendant's family situation and possible liabilities.
DEA agents requested an emergency contact from the defendant, suggesting her brother and inquiring about his phone number, including whether she could retrieve it from her cell phone. TFO Sylvia informed the defendant that consent would be needed to search her cell phone. During the interview, TFO Sylvia and the defendant discussed potential possession of drugs, with the defendant denying any such possession. DEA Agent Paquette testified that a booking form is required for processing federal defendants and must be sent to the U.S. Marshals Service. However, it was unclear when during the questioning this form was utilized, as Agent Paquette could not recall if he had it with him. The U.S. Marshals Service form requires extensive personal information from the arrestee, including identification details, health information, and emergency contact data. Agent Paquette also mentioned using a DEA Personal History Report to gather information, which includes family and criminal associate details. The court questioned the necessity of family information for booking purposes, to which Agent Paquette responded it was required for the DEA form.
DEA Agent Paquette acknowledged that during an interview, TFO Sylvia requested the Defendant's cell phone number after the DEA had already seized her cell phone as evidence, recognizing the number's relevance to their investigation. The Defendant asserts that the DEA agents conducted a custodial interrogation without providing Miranda warnings, did not respect her request for counsel, and misused the booking exception to Miranda to gather investigatory information. She seeks to suppress all statements made during the January 23, 2018 interview. The government argues that the Defendant received Miranda warnings before questioning and that subsequent questions were limited to standard procedural inquiries necessary for processing her as a federal offender.
The legal framework emphasizes that the Fifth Amendment safeguards against self-incrimination mandate that any statements made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless procedural safeguards, such as Miranda warnings, are observed. Miranda rights are triggered when an individual in custody is subjected to questioning or any actions likely to elicit incriminating responses. The determination of whether custodial interrogation occurred is based on the suspect's perception rather than the intent of law enforcement, indicating that violations of Miranda can occur through both direct questioning and other suggestive police conduct.
A court clarified that statements made by police do not automatically qualify as interrogation unless they are likely to elicit an incriminating response. Briefly informing a suspect of the basis for their detention does not constitute interrogation, as established in relevant case law. However, if the communication suggests the suspect's guilt and is deemed likely to prompt self-incrimination, Miranda warnings become essential. In this case, TFO Sylvia informed the Defendant of the federal arrest warrant and implied their guilt without advising her of her rights, leading to several statements from her before the warnings were given. The court noted that engaging in custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings is typically unjustifiable, and in this situation, the pre-warning statements made by the Defendant must be suppressed since they were likely to elicit an incriminating response.
The government acknowledges that the Defendant, while in custody, explicitly invoked her right to counsel. However, it argues that the DEA Agents only asked routine booking questions, which are exempt from Miranda requirements, as they are intended to gather biographical data necessary for processing an arrest. The legal precedent established in *Pennsylvania v. Muniz* confirms that such booking questions do not require Miranda warnings, regardless of whether they occur before or after these warnings are given. Further, the Second Circuit in *Rosa v. McCray* affirmed that inquiries related to administrative concerns are permissible under the booking exception, even if the answers may be incriminating.
The excerpt emphasizes that once a suspect invokes their right to counsel, all interrogation must halt until an attorney is present, as reiterated in *Miranda v. Arizona* and reinforced by the Supreme Court in *Edwards v. Arizona*. The Court has established that a valid waiver of the right to counsel cannot be inferred from a suspect's responses to further police questioning unless the suspect initiates the communication. The distinction between requests for counsel and requests to remain silent is critical, as only the former mandates cessation of interrogation until legal counsel is available. The document underscores that it is inconsistent with Miranda jurisprudence for law enforcement to reinterrogate a suspect after a clear invocation of the right to counsel.
An invocation of the right to counsel typically prevents law enforcement from conducting any questioning; however, the Supreme Court's decision in *Rhode Island v. Innis* clarifies that questions related to the booking process, deemed 'normally attendant to arrest and custody,' do not constitute interrogation. Therefore, even after a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, law enforcement may ask pedigree questions that meet the criteria outlined in *Muniz*. Nonetheless, caution is advised, as not all questions during booking are permissible without a waiver of Miranda rights. Justice Brennan emphasized that questions aimed at eliciting incriminating admissions are not allowed.
In the present case, DEA Agents implied that the Defendant was required to answer biographical questions after her invocation of counsel. They stated they needed her biographical information but acknowledged that they would refrain from asking about matters of interest due to her request for a lawyer. However, it is questionable whether these agents had a legitimate need to ask the subsequent questions, which extended beyond mere booking inquiries. The Defendant was not obligated to respond to pedigree questions, and her refusal could be interpreted as an invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights, inhibiting further questioning.
The DEA Agents asked not only routine booking questions but also numerous inquiries likely to elicit incriminating responses, such as detailed personal information about her siblings, drug use, and the presence of drugs during her arrest. These questions did not serve any administrative purpose and exceeded what could be justified under the booking exception. The government's argument that any question on a standardized booking form qualifies for the exception lacks judicial support, as courts have not broadly applied this reasoning.
The DEA Personal History Report would permit inquiries about the Defendant’s family, 'Source of Supply,' 'Criminal Associates,' and 'Criminal Organization,' indicating that the existence of a standardized question alone is not determinative. In this case, DEA Agents posed questions absent from the booking form, underscoring that the focus is on the suspect's perceptions rather than police intent, though intent remains relevant. The Second Circuit emphasizes an objective inquiry to assess whether police should have known that asking pedigree questions could elicit incriminating information. The definition of interrogation extends to police actions that are likely to provoke such responses. Subjective intent is relevant but not definitive. A three-part test is established for the booking exception to Miranda rights: law enforcement questions must seek necessary biographical data, relate to administrative concerns, and not be likely to elicit incriminating responses. In this instance, the DEA Agents should have recognized that their questions about family, acquaintances, cell phone PIN, gang affiliation, and drug use were either irrelevant to booking or likely to elicit incriminating answers, leading to the conclusion that the Defendant's responses to these inquiries must be suppressed.
The solicitation of the Defendant's cell phone number raises a complex legal issue. Some district courts in the Second Circuit have ruled that a phone number, even if it could be incriminating, falls under the Muniz exception. However, in the case of Durand, the Second Circuit emphasized the need for a thorough inquiry. The court found that the postal inspectors had been investigating mail and identity fraud for months and were aware that a few phone numbers were crucial to their investigation. The defendant raised a valid concern that asking for his phone number could yield incriminating information, potentially violating the Fifth Amendment.
The court determined that the booking exception does not apply when police suspect someone of a crime and ask questions that could confirm that suspicion. Since the DEA Agents already knew the Defendant's cell phone number and had seized her phone as evidence, there was no administrative reason to solicit it from her. The request was deemed unnecessary and primarily served investigative purposes, thus falling outside the Muniz exception.
In contrast, the Defendant's statements regarding her name, address, and other identifying characteristics were found to be within the Muniz booking exception, leading to a partial denial of her motion to suppress those statements. As a result, the court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to suppress. The court also noted that the adequacy of the Miranda warnings was not challenged and that there is no requirement for an attorney present during questioning to represent the defendant in federal court. Lastly, it acknowledged that various courts have addressed the permissibility of police confronting suspects with evidence without it constituting custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation was determined in United States v. Szymaniak, where an officer's repeated confrontations with the defendant regarding incriminating information qualified as interrogation. The officer cited judicial approval for arrest and search based on alleged drug activity. It is established that once a suspect invokes their right to counsel, law enforcement must wait for a lawyer to be present before questioning, unless the suspect initiates a further exchange that requires new Miranda warnings and a valid waiver (Duckworth v. Eagan). Contrasting cases illustrate this principle: in United States v. Stewart, questions deemed as pedigree did not constitute interrogation, while in People v. Antonio, resuming questioning post-invocation violated the defendant's rights, as the inquiries pertained directly to the crime. A five-month investigation involving controlled buys preceded the defendant's arrest. Concerns arose in United States v. Brown regarding the U.S. Marshal's Prisoner Personal History form, with questioning potentially exceeding the routine booking exception recognized in Pennsylvania v. Muniz. Routine booking questions are exempt from Miranda if they gather necessary biographical data. In this instance, law enforcement questioned the defendant about her drug use, contact details, and associations with known drug users, which could be viewed as extending beyond mere booking inquiries.
