Graham v. City of Manassas Sch. Bd.

Citation: 390 F. Supp. 3d 702Docket: 1:19-cv-163 (LMB/TCB); 1:19-cv-164 (LMB/TCB)

Court: District Court, E.D. Virginia; July 1, 2019; Federal District Court

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Thomas Graham and Alan Lanier, plaintiffs in consolidated civil actions, were sexually abused as children by Steffon Rodney Christian, a former employee of Baldwin Elementary School. Christian was arrested in 2011 and pleaded guilty to 22 counts of sex crimes against minors, including offenses against the plaintiffs. Graham and Lanier, now adults, have filed a lawsuit against Christian, the City of Manassas School Board, and Alice H. Howard, the principal at Baldwin Elementary during the abuse, alleging federal claims under Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alongside state law claims for gross negligence, battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

The School Board and Howard filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court granted the School Board's motions entirely and partially granted and denied Howard's motions, dismissing all counts of the plaintiffs' complaints except for the gross negligence claims against Howard. 

Christian began working at Baldwin Elementary in 1981, initially as a kindergarten instructional assistant and later as a library secretary, while also coaching the boys' basketball team. He exploited his positions to groom male students for sexual abuse, establishing inappropriate relationships and providing gifts and pornography. 

Graham attended Baldwin from 1992 to 1995. Despite hearing rumors about Christian being a "child molester," he formed a close relationship with him, which led to sexual abuse beginning in fifth grade and continuing after he graduated. Lanier was a student from 1990 to 1993, and Christian began grooming him in fourth grade. While Lanier's sexual abuse did not start until after his graduation, it included multiple instances of forced sexual acts both at Christian's home and at the school office, continuing until 1999.

Christian bribed and threatened Lanier to prevent him from disclosing his criminal activities, specifically sexual misconduct involving male students at Baldwin Elementary. Despite Christian's attempts to conceal his actions, concerns about his relationships with boys were raised by parents, a school administrator, and a teacher, leading to a police inquiry in 1996, which was obstructed by Howard, the principal. In 2011, Christian was arrested for sexually abusing a male student, prompting other victims, including plaintiffs Graham and Lanier, to come forward. In June 2012, Christian pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including sodomy and aggravated sexual battery, and is currently incarcerated.

Both plaintiffs, who were minors during the abuse, have experienced significant long-term psychological harm. Lanier suffers from severe anxiety, dependency on alcohol, and suicidal thoughts. Graham faced academic challenges, ultimately dropping out of college due to psychological distress and struggles with anxiety and depression. In 2017, both sought therapy, where a doctor established a causal link between their abuse and subsequent mental health issues.

On February 8, 2019, nearly seven years post-conviction, Graham and Lanier filed civil lawsuits against Christian, the School Board, and Howard. Their complaints include federal law claims under Title IX and § 1983 for deprivation of constitutional rights, alongside state law claims for gross negligence, battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed Christian from the civil action due to his incarceration, which renders him incapacitated under Virginia law. Additionally, they consented to dismiss Counts I, VI, VII, and VIII solely against Howard. The remaining counts include Count I (Title IX against the School Board), Counts II, III, and IV (§ 1983 against the School Board and Howard), Count V (gross negligence against the School Board and Howard), and Counts VI, VII, and VIII (battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the School Board).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint can be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint must present sufficient factual matter to establish a plausible claim for relief, meaning it should allow the court to reasonably infer the defendant's liability, though it does not need to meet a probability threshold. The court assumes factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

The School Board and Howard seek dismissal of the remaining claims on several grounds, including that the federal law claims and certain state law claims are time-barred. The School Board also claims sovereign immunity regarding state law claims. Both defendants assert that even if any claims are timely, they fail to meet the plausibility standard outlined in prior case law.

Specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ claims under Title IX and § 1983 are barred by the statute of limitations, which the plaintiffs contest. The court finds that the defendants have a stronger argument for dismissal based on the statute of limitations, with a two-year period applicable to both Title IX and § 1983 claims, as determined by the forum state's personal injury statute. This aligns with established Supreme Court precedents indicating that these claims borrow the relevant state's statute of limitations.

In Wilmink v. Kanawha County Board of Education, the court determined that the applicable statute of limitations for the plaintiffs' Title IX and § 1983 claims is Virginia's two-year statute for personal injury actions (Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A)). The court emphasized that when a federal court adopts a state's statute of limitations, it also incorporates that state's tolling rules. Virginia law tolls the statute of limitations for minors, meaning that the time a plaintiff is under 18 does not count towards the limitation period (Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-229(A)(2)(a)). Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims must be tolled until they reach adulthood.

The plaintiffs contended that their claims did not accrue until August 2017, when a doctor linked their psychological issues to past abuse. They cited Virginia's § 8.01-249(6), which states that claims for sexual abuse during infancy accrue when the injury and its cause are first communicated to the victim by a licensed professional. However, this provision does not apply to their federal claims, as the accrual of a § 1983 claim is governed by federal law, not state law (Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384). Federal law dictates that accrual occurs when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of their injury (Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379).

Ultimately, the plaintiffs shifted their position in response to the defendants' motions to dismiss, moving away from reliance on § 8.01-249(6) and arguing instead that the reasonableness of their awareness of their injuries should be evaluated in light of the circumstances surrounding their cases.

Plaintiffs argue that the federal "knew-or-reasonably-should-have-known" standard aligns with state child sexual abuse laws, but this reasoning is rejected. The state provisions were designed to address the issue of claim dismissals for survivors who only recognize the harm years after the abuse. It would be inconsistent to apply the standard rule, which is broad enough to encompass the specialized rule's intent, especially when it could lead to the conclusion that awareness of injuries only occurs upon a formal psychological diagnosis. The federal standard does not require victims to realize the connection between their injuries and the abuse upon turning 18; rather, once a victim possesses critical facts about their injury and the perpetrator, they have a duty to investigate potential accountability. In this case, the arrest of Christian in late 2011 prompted plaintiffs, Graham and Lanier, both nearing 30, to come forward as victims, leading to Christian’s charges for additional offenses. Even if plaintiffs were unaware of the connection between their injuries and the abuse, the law required them to investigate their status as victims. The court clarifies that while turning 18 does not trigger inquiry notice, the circumstances surrounding Christian's prosecution initiated the period for filing lawsuits. Consequently, the plaintiffs' failure to file in a timely manner results in the dismissal of their federal claims. The argument that child victims should have a chance to vindicate their abuse does not override the statute of limitations, which reflects a balance between the substantive policies of a claim and repose policies. Thus, the plaintiffs' Title IX and § 1983 claims are deemed untimely and must be dismissed.

Counts V through VIII of the plaintiffs' complaints assert that the School Board is liable for gross negligence, battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The School Board contends that these claims are barred by the statute of limitations and common-law sovereign immunity. The court determines that the School Board is protected by sovereign immunity, rendering the statute-of-limitations argument unnecessary. Sovereign immunity in Virginia serves to shield the state from interference with governmental functions and is recognized as a prevailing doctrine. Municipal entities, including school boards, enjoy this immunity concerning their governmental functions, which are actions taken for public welfare involving political, discretionary, or legislative authority. The line between governmental and proprietary functions can be challenging, but Virginia courts affirm that planning, designing, and providing services for the common good are governmental functions. School boards, as arms of the state, perform vital governmental duties, thus generally enjoying immunity for tortious injuries related to their operations.

The plaintiffs do not contest the typical immunity of school boards for educational activities but argue that failing to address known sexual abuse cannot be deemed a governmental function, as it serves the institution's interests rather than the public's. The court finds this argument novel and unconvincing, asserting that an action performed within a governmental function retains its character, regardless of its negligence or unlawfulness. The claims stem from the School Board’s management of schools and safety oversight, which are discretionary functions integral to their responsibilities. Consequently, these claims are entitled to common-law immunity. The plaintiffs also reference a Virginia case suggesting that sovereign immunity does not cover gross negligence claims against school boards; however, the court deems this reference flawed and unpersuasive.

Sovereign immunity does not protect the School Board from tort claims related to its governmental functions, as established by the Simpson court, which incorrectly conflated the immunity of municipal entities with that of municipal agents. In Virginia, while a government agent can claim sovereign immunity, they are still liable if gross negligence is established, raising the burden from simple negligence. Consequently, the School Board is immune from all tort claims, whether based on simple or gross negligence or intentional torts, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against it.

The only remaining claim is a gross negligence allegation against Howard. Despite her arguments referencing Twombly and Iqbal standards, the claims against her are sufficient under Virginia law, which defines gross negligence as an extreme lack of prudence. The plaintiffs assert that Howard failed to take action regarding Christian's inappropriate relationships with students, despite being aware of multiple warning signs and complaints. Incidents described include a sixth-grade student labeling Christian as a child molester and police investigation attempts in 1996, which should have alerted Howard to potential dangers. Allegations indicate that Howard neglected to investigate or restrict Christian’s interactions with students, thus establishing a plausible gross negligence claim against her. 

In summary, the School Board's motion to dismiss is granted, Howard's motion to dismiss is partially granted and partially denied, and all claims against the School Board, except the gross negligence claims against Howard, will be dismissed.

Civil actions against the School Board and Howard have been consolidated for pretrial purposes, with each defendant filing separate motions regarding plaintiffs Graham and Lanier. The motions and plaintiffs' responses present similar arguments. Notably, while the plaintiffs' complaints do not specify their dates of birth, it is inferred that Lanier turned 18 in 1999 or 2000 and Graham in 2000 or 2001. Under Virginia law, the School Board is responsible for operating public schools and ensuring compliance with school laws. Similarly, a principal's role includes fostering a safe and effective educational environment and managing personnel.

The constitutional right to bodily integrity, protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is established as fundamental, with case law affirming that physical abuse by school employees violates this right. Virginia law mandates the appointment of a guardian ad litem for unrepresented minors or incompetent defendants.

The plaintiffs' Title IX claim against Howard is subject to dismissal because individual school officials cannot be sued under Title IX. Additionally, claims of battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Howard are dismissed due to lack of alleged tortious conduct by her and because a principal is not vicariously liable for employee actions. Citing case law, such as Varnell v. Dora Consolidated School District, the court found that the federal claims were untimely, negating the need to address supplemental arguments made by the defendants regarding the Title IX and § 1983 claims.