Court: District Court, W.D. Washington; August 1, 2019; Federal District Court
After discussing concerns about Mr. Shaffer's behavior with Ms. Hett, the Plaintiff reported to Ms. Barker on October 23, 2017, that Mr. Shaffer had touched her and made her feel unsafe, but did not inform Ms. Barker of her intention to miss work the following day. Following her report, the Plaintiff felt there was no follow-up regarding her complaint. On the same day, she attempted to contact Haggen's legal team but was told to call back later due to Ms. Parkes being out sick. Ms. Parkes attempted to reach the Plaintiff twice, but mistakenly dialed the wrong number. Ms. Parkes subsequently instructed Ms. Hett to counsel Mr. Shaffer and obtain a detailed written statement from the Plaintiff regarding her complaints.
The Plaintiff was scheduled to work with Mr. Shaffer on October 24, 2017, but did not show up, citing a panic attack and subsequent hospitalization for suicidal thoughts. On October 25, she informed manager Ms. West that she had quit, to which Ms. West responded dismissively. The Plaintiff clarified that she believed her resignation was voluntary and not a constructive discharge. On November 7, 2017, the Plaintiff learned from Ms. Parkes about the counseling Mr. Shaffer received in response to her complaints. The Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge on April 13, 2018, claiming she was constructively discharged due to sexual harassment by Mr. Shaffer, which she reported to management without any action being taken, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The charge filed by the Plaintiff indicated discrimination based on sex but did not include retaliation, as evidenced by the unchecked retaliation box. She received her Notice of Right to Sue on April 17, 2018, and subsequently filed an updated charge with the EEOC, asserting the same grounds, receiving a second Notice on August 16, 2018. The Plaintiff's claims against Haggen include hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), along with wrongful termination and claim suppression under Washington common law. She seeks injunctive relief, damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, with the trial scheduled to start on September 30, 2019.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, allowing the moving party to obtain judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving party fails to present sufficient evidence on an essential claim element. The court must resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party when their specific facts contradict those of the moving party. The Plaintiff must provide substantial evidence, as mere assertions are insufficient, and the court will not presume missing facts.
To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim under Title VII and WLAD, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) unwelcome conduct due to race or sex, (2) that conduct is severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions and create an abusive environment, and (3) the employer is liable for the harassment that created the hostile environment.
The working environment must be perceived as abusive both subjectively and objectively, evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable woman, as established in Fuller v. Idaho Dep't of Corr. The Plaintiff's claim for a hostile work environment under federal and state law should be dismissed due to insufficient evidence regarding the second and third elements of the claim.
1. **Unwelcome Conduct**: The Defendant, Haggen, does not dispute that the Plaintiff experienced unwelcome conduct.
2. **Severe or Pervasive Conduct**: The assessment of this element considers the frequency, severity, and nature of the conduct, including whether it was threatening or humiliating and if it interfered with work performance. Simple teasing or isolated incidents do not constitute an actionable claim under Title VII unless they are extremely serious. The Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence that Mr. Shaffer's conduct was severe or pervasive enough to alter her work conditions. His actions were not deemed physically threatening or humiliating, nor did they unreasonably interfere with her work. Specifically, incidents of staring and following were insufficiently severe, and even the isolated instance of Mr. Shaffer putting his arm around her waist was not deemed severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile environment.
3. **Conduct Imputed to the Employer**: An employer can be held liable for a hostile work environment through vicarious liability or negligence. The Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Mr. Shaffer’s conduct should be attributed to Haggen. After the Plaintiff reported Mr. Shaffer’s behavior on October 16, 2017, her supervisors counseled him regarding the staring incident, which was considered an appropriate remedial action. Furthermore, after the Plaintiff escalated her complaint to the legal team, an investigation was initiated promptly, and there was no overlap in the schedules of the Plaintiff and Mr. Shaffer until October 24, 2017.
On October 23, 2017, Ms. Hett provided coaching to Mr. Shaffer regarding his behavior and Haggen's policies, despite Mr. Shaffer not having worked with the Plaintiff since her complaint on October 16. The Plaintiff was scheduled to work with Mr. Shaffer on October 24 but did not attend. The document indicates that Haggen's response was reasonable and aimed at stopping Mr. Shaffer's conduct, thus failing to meet the necessary element to support a claim.
Regarding the Plaintiff's retaliation claims under Title VII and WLAD, Haggen seeks dismissal on the grounds that the Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies with the EEOC, as she did not assert retaliation claims in her charge. It cites Fort Bend County v. Davis, emphasizing that filing with the EEOC is mandatory before pursuing a Title VII action in court. Although the charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional, it is a processing rule. Claims not explicitly listed in the EEOC charge can still relate to the original allegations if they are consistent with the plaintiff's case theory.
The evaluation of whether the exhaustion requirement is satisfied should consider the factual allegations, including the basis for discrimination or retaliation, dates of the alleged acts, perpetrators involved, and locations of these occurrences. EEOC charges are interpreted liberally due to the informal nature of the filings. The document suggests that a retaliation claim could emerge from an EEOC investigation into the Plaintiff's sex discrimination allegations, especially since Personnel Action Notices were issued shortly after her harassment report.
For a retaliation claim under Title VII or WLAD, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection between the two. While both statutes require similar showings, Title VII specifically necessitates that the desire to retaliate was the "but-for" cause of the adverse employment action, a stricter standard than the motivating-factor standard applied in WLAD cases.
In a retaliation claim under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), a "looser standard" for causation is applied, focusing on whether retaliation was a "substantial factor" in an adverse employment action. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant can present legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse action. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that these reasons are pretextual.
In this case, the plaintiff's October 16, 2017 complaint is recognized as a protected activity, fulfilling the first element of the prima facie case. However, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate an adverse employment action, as the two Personnel Action Notices received on October 20, 2017—related to failure to turn on soup pots and excessive absenteeism—do not constitute adverse actions. There were no changes in employment terms, demotions, or any significant penalties that would qualify as adverse.
Consequently, since the plaintiff did not meet the requirement of showing an adverse employment action, the court need not consider the causal link to the protected activity. Furthermore, even if a prima facie case had been established, the reasons for the notices were deemed legitimate and non-discriminatory. The plaintiff's argument regarding the timing of the notices did not sufficiently demonstrate that the employer's reasons were "unworthy of belief." Thus, the retaliation claim should be dismissed due to lack of sufficient evidence.
The tort of wrongful discharge in Washington serves as a limited exception to the at-will employment doctrine, established in Martin v. Gonzaga University. This tort is applicable in four specific scenarios: (1) termination for refusing to engage in illegal conduct, (2) termination for fulfilling a public duty, such as jury service, (3) termination for exercising legal rights, like filing workers' compensation claims, and (4) termination in retaliation for whistle-blowing. If a wrongful discharge claim does not fit these scenarios, courts may reference the Perritt test. However, in this case, the Plaintiff alleges wrongful discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim and reporting sexual harassment, which fall under the exercise of a legal right.
To succeed, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that her discharge contravened a clear public policy mandate. If she proves this, the burden shifts to the employer to show the dismissal was for other reasons. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff quit rather than being discharged, noting that wrongful discharge claims can arise from either express or constructive discharge. Constructive discharge requires the Plaintiff to prove: (1) the employer made conditions intolerable, (2) a reasonable person would have to resign, (3) the resignation was due to these conditions, and (4) the Plaintiff suffered damages from the resignation. The Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of constructive discharge, specifically not demonstrating that the employer made working conditions intolerable or that a reasonable person would be compelled to resign. Therefore, her wrongful discharge claim should be dismissed.
A plaintiff's failure to demonstrate severe or pervasive harassment precludes a hostile work environment claim and makes it impossible to establish constructive discharge, which requires intolerable conditions prompting a reasonable person to resign. The plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence that Mr. Shaffer's actions met this threshold, nor did she substantiate claims of intolerable conditions justifying a constructive discharge. Consequently, her wrongful discharge claim, based on public policy, lacks factual support and should be dismissed.
Regarding the claim for "claim suppression," the plaintiff contends that receiving a Personnel Action Notice coinciding with her worker's compensation claim constitutes discrimination under Washington's Industrial Insurance Act. However, the statute permits employer action for reasons unrelated to the worker's compensation claim, and the corrective action taken by Haggen concerning the plaintiff's conduct is excluded from potential grounds for suit. Therefore, the claim for worker's compensation claim suppression should also be dismissed.
On the issue of punitive damages, Haggen seeks dismissal of this claim, which the plaintiff does not contest. Punitive damages under Title VII are contingent on proving that the respondent acted with malice or reckless indifference, which the plaintiff failed to demonstrate. Additionally, punitive damages are not available under Washington law unless specifically authorized, and the WLAD does not provide such authorization. Thus, the punitive damages claim should be dismissed.
Ultimately, the court orders the defendant's motion for summary judgment to be granted, resulting in the dismissal of the case.
