Pelzer v. Superintendent Lawrence Mahally & Pa Attorney Gen.

Citation: 388 F. Supp. 3d 366Docket: No. 4:15-CV-00222

Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania; June 18, 2019; Federal District Court

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Caine Pelzer filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition claiming multiple constitutional violations during his criminal trial and subsequent state proceedings. On May 9, 2019, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson recommended granting Pelzer's petition, directing the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to release him within 90 days unless it reinstated his appellate and post-conviction relief rights. The Court found no clear error in the recommendation as no objections were timely filed. 

The Court adopted Carlson's Report and Recommendation, denied Pelzer's motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctions, and granted his habeas petition. The Commonwealth is ordered to release Pelzer within 90 days unless his appellate and post-conviction rights are reinstated, and the case is to be closed. 

Pelzer, currently serving a 22-44 year sentence for multiple offenses, also sought reinstatement of his state appellate rights and raised thirteen additional claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the respondents argued the petition was time-barred, the Court applied equitable tolling due to misleading information from Pelzer’s attorney regarding the status of his post-conviction litigation, which prevented timely filing of the petition.

Pelzer is recommended for limited habeas corpus relief, with an order for his release within 90 days unless the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania reinstates his appeal and post-conviction relief rights. Caine Pelzer was convicted in 2002 for robbery, theft, unlawful restraint, and reckless endangerment, receiving a 22-44 year sentence. His appeal, which raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel, was dismissed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in 2003 on the basis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Grant, which mandated that such claims be filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Pelzer's conviction became final on June 6, 2003, after he failed to file a petition for allowance of appeal.

Counsel communicated the need for information to support Pelzer's PCRA petition, but there was confusion regarding whether Pelzer received this correspondence, as prison officials could not verify its delivery. The counsel's failure to file a PCRA petition caused the statute of limitations to expire on June 6, 2004, leaving Pelzer unaware of the default due to his continued inquiries about the status of his petition. In 2006, when Pelzer sought updates, counsel misled him into believing the PCRA petition was still active, despite knowing it was time-barred. The counsel's lack of timely communication and failure to act on Pelzer's behalf ultimately contributed to the loss of his post-conviction rights.

In August 2007, Pelzer's counsel communicated with him regarding a petition he submitted, acknowledging his efforts but indicating it required revisions before filing. Subsequently, counsel informed Pelzer that the petition faced timeliness issues, making acceptance by the courts unlikely. Pelzer pursued updates on his PCRA petition through multiple letters to counsel and the Luzerne County Clerk, expressing concern about the lack of confirmation for his petition's filing. In March 2008, he requested his trial transcript to file his own PCRA petition, which he did in April 2008. However, the petition was denied as untimely after several hearings.

On appeal, the Superior Court remanded the case due to procedural issues related to Pelzer's incarceration at SCI Fayette and SCI Greene. The PCRA court conducted another hearing and again denied Pelzer's petition for not meeting the statutory exception for untimeliness. The Superior Court affirmed this decision in July 2014, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further appeal in December 2014. Subsequently, Pelzer filed a federal habeas corpus petition in January 2015, seeking reinstatement of his appellate rights and raising various claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel. The respondents argued that his claims were unexhausted and the case was stayed pending the outcome of his state PCRA petition.

After exhausting his state appeals, Pelzer moved to reopen his federal case, which occurred on May 5, 2018. The respondents maintained that the petition was untimely and that equitable tolling should not apply. Pelzer contended that his attorney's actions hindered his ability to file on time, warranting equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA. The review of the record indicated that Pelzer's attorney's conduct constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying equitable tolling. Consequently, it was recommended that the petition not be dismissed as untimely, allowing Pelzer limited federal habeas relief, specifically an order for his release within 90 days unless the Commonwealth reinstated his appeal and post-conviction relief rights. The legal standard for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires a state prisoner to demonstrate custody in violation of constitutional or federal laws.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner will only be granted if the applicant has exhausted state court remedies, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. 2254(a) and (b). Even if remedies are not exhausted, a habeas application may still be denied on its merits. A federal court can only grant relief if the prisoner is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, establishing a high threshold for relief. Violations of state law alone do not suffice for habeas relief unless they reach a constitutional level, such as leading to a fundamental defect resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

Federal courts are required to defer to state court factual findings and legal rulings, as mandated by 28 U.S.C. 2254. Specifically, relief is unavailable for claims adjudicated on their merits in state courts unless the decision was "contrary to" or involved an unreasonable application of established case law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Factual determinations made by state courts are presumed correct, and the burden is on the petitioner to prove otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. This standard means that federal courts will not reassess credibility determinations and will uphold state court decisions based on factual findings unless they are deemed objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented.

State prisoners seeking relief under Section 2254 must adhere to specific procedural standards, including timely filing for habeas corpus relief. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposes a one-year statute of limitations for such filings, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period begins from the latest of four events: (A) when the judgment becomes final, (B) when a state-created impediment to filing is removed, (C) when a new constitutional right recognized by the Supreme Court is made retroactively applicable, or (D) when the factual basis for the claim could have been discovered through due diligence. 

The limitations period can be tolled in specific ways. For direct appeals, tolling applies during the time a petitioner could have sought further appellate review, even if not pursued. For collateral review, § 2244(d)(2) allows tolling while a properly filed state post-conviction application is pending, but only if the application is timely under state law. Late filings do not qualify for tolling. Unlike direct appeal tolling, the post-conviction tolling does not extend if further discretionary appellate review is not sought. Importantly, the one-year limitation is not a jurisdictional bar, allowing for the possibility of equitable tolling.

Equitable tolling is permitted under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) for state habeas petitions, but it is not favored and applies only under stringent conditions. The Third Circuit highlights that equitable tolling is justified when equity would render a strict limitation period unfair, particularly if a petitioner has been extraordinarily prevented from asserting their rights. To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must demonstrate reasonable diligence in pursuing their claims; simple neglect is insufficient. The three recognized circumstances for equitable tolling include: (1) active misleading by the defendant, (2) extraordinary prevention of the plaintiff from asserting rights, or (3) timely but mistaken filing in the wrong forum. Courts have generally ruled that attorney errors or miscalculations do not meet the threshold for "extraordinary" circumstances, although complete abandonment by counsel may qualify.

In *Holland v. Florida*, the Supreme Court affirmed that equitable tolling applies to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and that egregious attorney misconduct can constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting tolling. In Pelzer's case, the respondents argue his habeas petition is untimely due to the untimeliness of his post-conviction relief act (PCRA) petitions, asserting that these did not toll the AEDPA's one-year limitations period. They contend Pelzer lacked diligence and did not face extraordinary circumstances.

However, the analysis concludes Pelzer should be granted equitable tolling due to his appellate counsel's inaction and his diligent efforts to pursue his rights. The PCRA court had previously determined Pelzer's first PCRA petition was untimely, based on an April 2004 letter from his attorney that warned him of the impending deadline. Pelzer denied receiving this letter, and evidence from correctional facilities suggested he could have received it despite it not being logged. The Superior Court upheld the PCRA court's decision, but this reliance is challenged. The evidence does not conclusively demonstrate that Pelzer was adequately informed of the limitations period. His subsequent actions, including multiple requests for assistance over the next four years, bolster his claim of not being notified of the statute of limitations in 2004.

Pelzer's receipt of an April 2004 letter from his counsel lacks corroboration from prison officials, undermining the assumption that he had notice of it. The state court's attention to Pelzer's actions overlooks the failures of his counsel, who was aware of the approaching statute of limitations for filing a Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition but failed to act, prejudicing Pelzer's rights. Counsel's misleading communications further exacerbated this prejudice, preventing Pelzer from effectively pursuing equitable tolling for a minor oversight in his PCRA petition filing. The current court must not reassess the state court's handling of the PCRA's timeliness under state law, but rather, it must determine whether equitable tolling of the federal statute of limitations may apply. Pelzer's 2015 habeas petition is clearly beyond the one-year limit following his final conviction in 2003. While generally deferring to state court factual findings, federal courts may evaluate the circumstances of the petitioner's case for potential equitable tolling. The Supreme Court has recognized that significant attorney error can create "extraordinary circumstances" justifying such tolling, as seen in the Third Circuit’s Ross v. Varano case. The Supreme Court emphasizes that equitable tolling decisions should be flexible and made on a case-by-case basis, considering the specific conditions of each petitioner. Equitable tolling should be applied sparingly but is warranted when strict enforcement of limitations would be unjust, particularly if the petitioner has diligently pursued their rights despite their attorney's misconduct, such as ignoring client communications, providing misleading information, and failing to file necessary motions.

Equitable tolling of Pelzer's habeas petition is justified due to the petitioner's diligent pursuit of his rights contrasted with his counsel's inadequate actions. Pelzer's conviction became final on June 6, 2003, establishing a deadline of June 6, 2004, for filing a PCRA petition. Evidence shows Pelzer actively communicated with his attorney regarding his appeal and PCRA petition during 2002 and 2003. However, counsel's responses were inconsistent and sometimes misleading. Notably, a letter from counsel on May 8, 2003, indicated an intention to file the PCRA petition after the direct appeal, but the next correspondence was not until April 7, 2004, just before the deadline, requesting information he claimed was necessary to file. Pelzer testified he never received this letter and continued to seek updates after the deadline passed, yet many inquiries went unanswered. A letter dated June 26, 2006, from counsel, misleadingly suggested the possibility of moving the case forward despite the statute of limitations having expired two years prior. Further correspondence in April 2007 indicated a desire to proceed, and in August 2007, Pelzer submitted his own brief for the PCRA petition, to which counsel responded with intentions to refine it. However, after informing Pelzer of potential timeliness issues on August 22, 2007, counsel failed to communicate again until March 2008, despite multiple inquiries from Pelzer and his family. The last correspondence occurred in March 2008, leaving Pelzer reliant on counsel's assurances throughout the process. The counsel's negligence and lack of communication were significant enough to warrant equitable tolling of the habeas petition due to Pelzer's reliance on counsel for filing his PCRA petition.

Pelzer demonstrated diligence in pursuing his Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition through multiple letters and inquiries to his counsel regarding its status. Counsel's misleading communications suggested that Pelzer's case was active, despite his testimony that he closed the case around 2003 or 2004 and only responded to Pelzer as a courtesy. Notably, counsel's letters in 2006 and 2007 indicated attempts to progress Pelzer's case, contradicting his claims of no intention to file a PCRA petition. Although Pelzer may not have been aware of the original filing deadline, he reasonably relied on counsel's assurances that the matter was moving forward. Despite being informed in 2004 about the impending expiration of the statute of limitations, Pelzer contended that he never received this notification. Although prison officials could not confirm its receipt, the court inferred it to support a finding of lack of diligence. Pelzer's continued inquiries after April 2004 further suggested reliance on counsel's representations. Counsel did not clarify Pelzer's misconceptions until years later, maintaining that they could advance the case, and even stated in August 2007 that he would refine Pelzer's petition before filing. After unsuccessful attempts to contact counsel in 2007 and 2008, Pelzer received his trial transcripts in March 2008, after which he promptly filed a pro se PCRA petition in April 2008.

Pelzer's diligence in pursuing his rights is supported by evidence that he filed his petition soon after receiving crucial information and being informed by his counsel of their decision not to file on his behalf. He and his family consistently communicated with counsel regarding his Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition and sought updates from the court on its status. Despite counsel's lack of response for nearly seven months, Pelzer persistently inquired and requested trial transcripts to file the petition independently. He also corresponded with the Luzerne County Clerk of Courts to verify whether his counsel had filed the PCRA petition. After filing the PCRA petition, Pelzer actively engaged in the appeals process, leading to a habeas action in January 2015 following the denial of his appeals. The court finds that Pelzer's circumstances qualify for equitable tolling due to his attorney's misleading actions, which contributed to the untimeliness of his state petitions. Thus, the court concludes that the strict application of the limitation period would be unfair and endorses a limited relief option. This relief allows for Pelzer's release within 90 days unless Pennsylvania reinstates his appeal, as the district court's authority is confined to directing his release if the state fails to rectify the constitutional violation. The court emphasizes that this approach facilitates the full consideration of Pelzer's claims by state courts, recognizing that much of the forfeiture of his rights stemmed from his counsel's inaction.

The court is recommended to deny the respondents’ request to dismiss the petition as time-barred. In light of the inaction of state counsel, it is advised that Pelzer be granted limited relief, specifically an order for his release within 90 days unless the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania reinstates his appeal and post-conviction relief rights. Any objections to this recommendation must be filed within fourteen days, as outlined in Local Rule 72.3, and should specify the parts of the report being contested. The reviewing judge will make a de novo determination on these objections and may choose whether to conduct a new hearing or to rely on the existing record. The factual context derives from various documents including the Petitioner’s and Respondent’s memoranda. Pelzer has previously filed a second PCRA petition, which asserted similar claims to those in his current habeas petition, but it was denied as untimely. His initial direct appeal included a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to not obtaining alibi phone records. However, this appeal was dismissed to allow the claim to be raised in a PCRA petition, following the precedent set by Commonwealth v. Grant. Pelzer’s second PCRA petition was denied by the PCRA court in 2016, and this denial was affirmed in 2017. The current habeas petition was stayed pending the resolution of state appeals and was reopened in May 2018.