Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Kan. City v. City of Mission Woods

Citation: 385 F. Supp. 3d 1171Docket: Case No. 17-2186-DDC

Court: District Court, D. Kansas; May 10, 2019; Federal District Court

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Plaintiffs Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Kansas City in Kansas and St. Rose Philippine Duchesne Catholic Church filed a motion for a permanent injunction after their land use request to renovate a house into a meeting house was denied by the City of Mission Woods. The denial was based on local zoning laws. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sued, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and other constitutional provisions. At trial, the jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on their RLUIPA Equal Terms claim, awarding $10,000 in damages, but sided with the defendant on other claims. The plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction seeks approval of their 2016 land use application.

To grant a permanent injunction, the court must find: 1) actual success on the merits, 2) irreparable harm without the injunction, 3) that the threatened injury outweighs any harm to the defendant, and 4) that the injunction will not adversely affect the public interest. The court notes that the plaintiffs have indeed achieved actual success on the merits due to the jury's favorable verdict on their Equal Terms claim, rejecting the defendant's argument of "limited success" as unsubstantiated by case law. The court will further analyze these requirements in the discussion section of the order.

Plaintiffs have prevailed on their Equal Terms claim, which supports a finding of irreparable harm. The court dismisses the defendant's argument that success on the Equal Terms claim alone does not indicate irreparable harm, despite the jury not ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on their Substantial Burden claim. The court references previous cases, notably Rocky Mountain, where favorable verdicts under RLUIPA were found to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, emphasizing that violations of free exercise rights constitute irreparable harm regardless of whether the claims are statutory or constitutional. The RMCC's situation mirrors the Rocky Mountain case, affirming that the favorable verdict on the Equal Terms claim suffices to establish irreparable harm. The court also notes that the Equal Terms claim is not subordinate to other RLUIPA claims, as preventing religious property use inhibits religious exercise. Additionally, the appellate court in Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs rejected the necessity of a favorable Substantial Burden verdict to demonstrate irreparable harm. Overall, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have shown irreparable harm through the jury's favorable ruling.

The Fifth Circuit rejected the argument of the municipal defendant in Opulent Life, which claimed that the church could not demonstrate irreparable harm due to a lack of substantial burden. The court clarified that while a substantial burden can establish irreparable injury, it is not a necessary condition for such a finding. This reasoning aligns with the case of Rocky Mountain, both recognizing that violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) infringe on the free exercise of religion. The court determined that the balance of harms favored the plaintiffs, as the jury found a violation of RLUIPA's Equal Terms provision, which constitutes substantial harm. 

The defendant's argument, which suggested that the plaintiffs’ harm was weaker than in Rocky Mountain, overlooked the key issue: whether the plaintiffs had suffered enough harm to warrant injunctive relief. The court emphasized that the focus should be on whether the threatened injury from denying the injunction outweighs the potential harm to the defendant. Similar to Opulent Life, the court concluded that the plaintiffs met the irreparable harm standard based on their Equal Terms claim and that the defendant would need compelling evidence to counterbalance this. The defendant's claims about noise disturbances affecting neighboring residents were dismissed, having been previously rejected in the Rocky Mountain case, where the court upheld the plaintiffs' right to free exercise of religion against such concerns.

The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision, rejecting the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff's special use application violated the County Land Use Code. The court determined that Rocky Mountain Christian Church's (RMCC) statutory right to free exercise of religion outweighed any negative impacts of the proposed expansion on the community. Although the defendant raised concerns about noise affecting residents, the court noted that these concerns were less significant than the infringement on the plaintiffs' rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Evidence presented showed that the defendant had allowed similar expansions for other properties, specifically permitting Pembroke to increase recreational use despite community objections. The court emphasized that the defendant's previous approvals indicated that concerns over quiet enjoyment were not overriding.

Furthermore, the court concluded that the injunction sought by the plaintiffs was not contrary to the public interest, affirming that protecting First Amendment freedoms is inherently beneficial to the public. The defendant's argument against the injunction—suggesting that it would have better served residents by denying all applications—was dismissed as irrelevant since the jury found that the plaintiffs and Pembroke were similarly situated and that the defendant had treated them differently. The court supported the plaintiffs' position that it is possible to protect resident interests while approving the Church's application, leading to the conclusion that the public interest favored the injunction.

Defendant challenges the breadth of the plaintiffs' requested injunction, asserting it is overly broad and not specifically tailored to address the plaintiffs' injuries, as established in Garrison, 287 F.3d at 962. The defendant proposes implementing time and occupancy restrictions on the plaintiffs' use of the meeting house. In contrast, plaintiffs argue that such restrictions would contradict the jury's verdict, which indicated that their 2016 land use application did not include any such limitations. They maintain that the jury found them and Pembroke to be similarly situated despite the absence of restrictions in their application, and retroactively adding these restrictions would create further inequity.

The resolution of this issue relies on Tenth Circuit case law regarding Equal Terms claims. The court instructed the jury to assess whether the plaintiffs' application was treated similarly to Pembroke's applications. To succeed in their claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the City treated them less favorably than it treated a comparable secular entity in processing their renovation request. The jury was directed to consider all relevant similarities and differences between the requests.

While the court acknowledges that its jury instructions provided broad discretion for evaluating the comparability of religious and secular entities, it also notes criticism from a Sixth Circuit case, Tree of Life Christian School v. City of Upper Arlington, regarding the Tenth Circuit's approach to assessing similar situations under facially neutral land-use regulations. The Tenth Circuit's methodology focuses on "substantial similarities" rather than strict identity, allowing for a reasonable jury to conclude that the entities are similarly situated.

The test for determining if a comparator is similarly situated to a religious entity lacks the clarity established by other circuits and is not aligned with the purpose of land-use regulation. This ambiguity introduces subjectivity in applying the equal terms provision of RLUIPA, with the Sixth Circuit contributing to the lack of consensus on its interpretation. Eight circuits have developed distinct interpretations of RLUIPA's Equal Terms provision. The plaintiff, Tree of Life Christian Schools, has sought certiorari to challenge whether the Sixth Circuit applied the correct test for their Equal Terms claim. During the jury trial on November 9, 2018, the court adhered to Tenth Circuit precedent, evaluating the defendant's claim that the plaintiffs' land use request was dissimilar to Pembroke's due to the absence of agreed-upon time and occupancy restrictions. The court rejected this argument, finding sufficient evidence to support that both requests were similarly situated, particularly regarding concerns raised by neighbors and the nature of the land use. The court determined that a reasonable jury could conclude the requests were comparable despite some differences, thus challenging the defendant's position that any injunctive relief should impose limits on hours and occupancy.

The court directed the jury to evaluate Pembroke's land use applications in comparison to the plaintiffs' application, noting that the plaintiffs' request did not impose any occupancy or hour restrictions. The jury concluded that the two applicants were similarly situated, which rendered any imposed restrictions by the court unnecessary. Consequently, the court determined that the plaintiffs satisfied all requirements for a permanent injunction and found their request for such relief to be appropriately narrow. The court granted the plaintiffs' Motion for Permanent Injunction, mandating the defendant to approve the plaintiffs' 2016 land use application within 45 days, allowing time for the defendant to seek appellate relief if desired.

Additionally, the court granted the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the plaintiffs' claims of Unreasonable Limitations and Equal Terms, specifically rejecting comparisons to the University of Kansas Hospital Authority. The court reaffirmed that no government entity may enforce land use regulations that discriminate against religious institutions in comparison to nonreligious ones. The plaintiffs are still required to adhere to the defendant's existing regulations regarding noise, traffic, and parking. The court refrained from determining the jury's specific findings on the similarity of land use requests but provided context regarding the evidence presented at trial.