Court: District Court, S.D. Ohio; May 3, 2019; Federal District Court
Defendant Ohio CVS Stores, LLC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiff Pamela Sue Mason's claims of negligence and products liability due to alleged wrongful distribution of medication. On July 24, 2015, CVS dispensed Amitriptyline HCL 150 mg tablets intended for another patient alongside Plaintiff's prescriptions. Plaintiff later took two of the Amitriptyline tablets, mistaking them for her prescribed medication, which resulted in abnormal behavior and hospitalization. Plaintiff initiated the lawsuit on August 3, 2017, and the case was subsequently removed to federal court. The court found that summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute of material fact. The burden lies with the movant (CVS) to demonstrate the absence of material facts, while the non-moving party (Mason) must show specific evidence to support her claims. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, although specific outcomes of the claims were not detailed in the excerpt.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view evidence favorably for the non-moving party. A genuine issue of material fact exists if the non-moving party presents significant probative evidence that creates more than a metaphysical doubt about the facts. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence does not allow a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party.
CVS seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's Ohio products liability claim for four reasons: (1) the claim is untimely; (2) CVS is not a "supplier" under Ohio law; (3) the medication was not defective; and (4) Plaintiff's expert is unqualified to link the medication to her injuries. Plaintiff counters that her complaint was timely, CVS qualifies as a supplier, and her expert is qualified.
Under Ohio law, a plaintiff must prove a product is defective in one of four ways: (1) manufacturing defect, (2) design defect, (3) inadequate warnings, or (4) failure to conform to manufacturer representations. CVS contends that the evidence does not show the Amitriptyline HCL was defective, only that the wrong medicine may have been supplied. Plaintiff failed to address CVS's argument regarding the lack of defectiveness of the medication and did not provide evidence or specify how the medication was defective under the Ohio Revised Code.
The court finds that, when considering the evidence in favor of Plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the defectiveness of the Amitriptyline HCL supplied by CVS. Establishing a product's defectiveness is crucial for a products liability claim, and CVS has demonstrated that no reasonable jury could rule in Plaintiff's favor on this element. Therefore, the court grants CVS's motion for summary judgment on the state-law products liability claim.
Plaintiff alleges that CVS provided her with medication that was neither intended for her nor prescribed to her, leading to her hospitalization on August 9, 2015. She filed a negligence claim on August 3, 2017. CVS contends that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations, arguing that it falls under Ohio's one-year statute for medical claims, which requires actions to be filed within one year of the cause of action accruing. Alternatively, CVS claims the negligence lawsuit was filed six days late under a two-year statute of limitations.
Under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2305.113(A), medical claims must be initiated within one year after the cause of action accrues. This statute defines a "medical claim" as any civil action against certain medical providers for issues arising from the diagnosis, care, or treatment of individuals. The definition includes derivative claims connected to medical care or treatment, as well as claims related to the hiring or supervision of medical personnel.
The Ohio Supreme Court has clarified that for a claim to qualify under the one-year statute, it must (1) arise from medical diagnosis, care, or treatment and (2) be asserted against enumerated medical providers. CVS's argument focuses solely on the first requirement, but Plaintiff asserts that pharmacists are not included in the enumerated providers, thus the one-year statute does not apply. The court emphasizes that the statute is clear and unambiguous, mandating adherence to its specific language and definitions.
In Reber v. Laboratory Corp. of America, the court addressed the application of Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 2305.113 regarding medical claims and the inclusion of pharmacists within its scope. The court noted that pharmacists are not explicitly listed in the statute and, therefore, should not be considered medical professionals under its provisions. Citing prior cases, the court emphasized that the Ohio General Assembly specifically enumerated medical providers, and it would be inappropriate to include pharmacists without legislative intent.
The defendant, CVS, argued that the statutory distinction could lead to unfair outcomes, where negligence claims against pharmacists would have differing statutes of limitations based on their employment setting (hospital vs. retail). CVS maintained that claims against pharmacists employed in hospitals would be subject to a one-year limitation, while those against retail pharmacists would have a two-year limitation, thus creating inconsistency.
However, the court rejected CVS's argument, stating that the statute's requirement for a claim to arise from medical diagnosis, care, or treatment is paramount, regardless of the pharmacist's employment location. The court reinforced that the nature of the pharmacist's work—dispensing medication—does not inherently connect the claim to medical treatment as defined in the statute. Consequently, the court found no basis for treating pharmacists differently based on their employment setting, affirming that claims against pharmacists must align with the statute's criteria.
The Court concludes that a pharmacist is not categorized as a medical provider under Ohio Revised Code 2305.113, hence a negligence claim against a pharmacist does not qualify as a "medical claim" under Ohio's Malpractice Statute. CVS argues that even if the claims aren't considered medical, they are still barred by the two-year statute of limitations under R.C. 2305.10 for bodily injury actions. This statute incorporates a discovery rule, which states that a cause of action for bodily injury due to exposure to ethical drugs begins upon when the plaintiff is informed by a medical authority of the injury or when the plaintiff should have reasonably known about the injury.
The plaintiff asserts that the statute of limitations should start from August 9, 2015, when she fell ill after ingesting drugs from CVS. In contrast, CVS contends that the limitations period should begin on July 28, 2015, when the medications were dispensed. CVS references the concept of a "cognizable event," which indicates that the statute of limitations starts when a patient has sufficient information prompting them to investigate a potential claim. CVS argues that the dispensing of the medication on July 28, 2015, constitutes this event. However, the Court disagrees, noting that CVS's cited cases pertain to medical malpractice and are governed by the Malpractice Statute, while the plaintiff's claim falls under Ohio's Personal Injury Statute, which is crucial for the analysis at hand.
An injured party in medical malpractice cases must have sustained an actual injury for the statute of limitations to begin. CVS's interpretation, suggesting that the statute begins with the discovery of potential claims, is incorrect. The relevant case law clarifies that the statute starts when a patient believes their injury is linked to prior medical treatment. In this instance, the plaintiff’s injury occurred on August 9, 2015, establishing that the statute of limitations commenced on that date. Ohio's Bodily Injury Statute requires a bodily injury for claims, which triggers a two-year statute of limitations based on when the plaintiff is informed of the injury or should have reasonably known about it. Therefore, the plaintiff's personal injury negligence claim is timely filed.
Regarding the motion to exclude the plaintiff's causation expert, the admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 104(a), which require that an expert's qualifications, the basis of their testimony, and the reliability of their methods be established. The court acts as a gatekeeper for such testimony but does not replace the jury's role. The jury is responsible for evaluating the weight of the evidence, and proper procedures, including cross-examination and jury instructions, are essential for addressing potentially weak expert testimony. The court must ensure that the expert's methods reflect the intellectual rigor typical in their field.
Expert opinions must be based on scientific knowledge and adhere to the scientific method, as established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The reliability test for expert testimony is flexible, and any doubts regarding admissibility should favor allowing the testimony. Case law indicates that rejecting expert testimony is rare. The plaintiff in this case presents the expert testimony of Dr. Patrick J. McDonnell, a Professor of Clinical Pharmacy Practice with extensive experience in adverse drug reactions. His report, supported by medical records and articles, concludes that Amitriptyline was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's symptoms on August 9/10, 2015.
The plaintiff must demonstrate that her injuries were caused by the medication dispensed by CVS. However, CVS argues for summary judgment, claiming the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case due to insufficient expert testimony regarding causation, asserting that this testimony must come from a physician under Ohio law. The defendant's reliance on prior cases to support this claim is misplaced, as those cases pertain specifically to medical malpractice and require physician testimony under Ohio Evidence Rule 601(D). The case of Grigsby v. Anesthesiologists of Southwestern Ohio emphasizes that a non-physician expert must possess adequate qualifications to testify about medication effects; otherwise, their testimony may be excluded.
In Clodgo, the court refrained from determining whether a pharmacist could provide competent medical testimony regarding causation, as the expert report did not establish the pharmacist's qualifications. Similar to Clodgo, in Grigsby, non-physician experts were excluded from offering causation opinions due to insufficient qualifications. The defendant argues that Dr. McDonnell lacks the necessary expertise to opine on whether the plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by Amitriptyline HCL, citing his statement that he would defer to physician experts for opinions on more permanent harm. However, this assertion is mischaracterized; in context, Dr. McDonnell clearly stated that the prescription error led to the plaintiff's medical issues and only deferred to physician specialists for ongoing impacts on pulmonary health. The plaintiff asserts that a treating physician will address causation, allowing Dr. McDonnell to testify on pharmacology. The court concluded that the concerns raised by the defendant pertain to the credibility of Dr. McDonnell's testimony rather than its admissibility, which can be addressed during cross-examination. Thus, the defendant did not fulfill its burden to demonstrate that Dr. McDonnell is unqualified, and there remains a genuine issue of material fact regarding proximate causation. Consequently, the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's negligence claim is denied. The court partially grants and partially denies the defendant CVS's motion for summary judgment. The defendant does not challenge the constitutionality of Ohio's Malpractice Statute, as such a challenge must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1, which requires notifying the state attorney general.
