Gomez v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc.

Citation: 383 F. Supp. 3d 1376Docket: CASE NO. 3:17-CV-41 (CDL)

Court: District Court, M.D. Georgia; April 18, 2019; Federal District Court

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Plaintiffs Robert V. Gomez, II, Kaitlyn Ann Wille, and Jennifer Price allege injuries resulting from an explosion of a Blitz portable gasoline can when Gomez poured a mixture of diesel and gasoline onto a mostly extinguished fire. They claim the can was defective due to the absence of a flame arrestor and inadequate warnings. The gas can was purchased from a Harbor Freight store, which is named as a defendant alongside Central Purchasing, LLC, and HFT Holdings, Inc. The court previously identified a factual dispute regarding the can's purchase location. 

Harbor Freight's motion for summary judgment was partially granted, dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims of negligent failure to warn and implied warranty of merchantability, but denied regarding the negligent sale claim. Summary judgment standards require that the moving party demonstrate no genuine dispute of material fact exists. The facts, viewed favorably to the Plaintiffs, indicate Ronda Baldree bought the gas can from Harbor Freight in September 2012. Gomez borrowed the can on March 6, 2015, adding diesel without emptying the remaining gasoline. During a gathering, he attempted to ignite a fire but after the initial attempt failed, he poured more diesel from the can, which subsequently exploded, producing a loud hissing sound prior to the incident.

Gomez was aware of the dangers of using gasoline as a fire accelerant due to its extreme flammability and had read the warnings on gas cans prior to March 6, 2015. However, he claimed ignorance regarding the dangers of using diesel in a fire, despite having previously used diesel to extinguish flames without incident. On March 6, he assumed that the predominance of diesel in a gas can would neutralize any hazardous properties of the gasoline mixed in, failing to recognize the risks indicated by the warnings on the can, which explicitly stated that gasoline is highly flammable and should not be used to start fires.

The plaintiffs filed claims against Harbor Freight for negligent sale, negligent failure to warn, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability, seeking punitive damages. Harbor Freight seeks summary judgment, acknowledging that a seller can be liable for negligence if they sold a product known to be unreasonably dangerous. They reference case law establishing that a seller is not negligent if they lack knowledge of a product’s dangerous quality. The plaintiffs argue that the Blitz gas can was unreasonably dangerous due to the absence of a flame arrestor and contend that Harbor Freight was negligent in selling the can, asserting that the company had actual or constructive knowledge of its dangers. Harbor Freight counters that there is no evidence of such knowledge and that the cans met industry standards, which is relevant but not conclusive regarding negligence.

Harbor Freight contends it was unaware of defects in Blitz gas cans until December 2013, despite the plaintiffs asserting that evidence exists indicating Harbor Freight was aware of significant issues as early as February 2012. At that time, Harbor Freight managers were informed of Blitz's bankruptcy and received a letter from Midwest Can Company, one of its gas can suppliers, indicating that the entire industry faced significant legal challenges and rising costs due to increased liability insurance. This letter described the precarious state of the portable fuel container market and suggested that minimal follow-up might have revealed incidents similar to the plaintiffs' experience.

The court finds that whether Harbor Freight had knowledge or constructive knowledge of the dangers associated with Blitz gas cans before September 2012 presents a jury question. The court clarifies that it is not ruling the letter alone constituted notice of any defects but suggests that a reasonable retailer would have investigated further in light of the industry's turmoil. Consequently, Harbor Freight's motion for summary judgment is denied, and the negligent sale claim remains pending for trial.

In terms of the plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim under Georgia law, they must show that Harbor Freight was aware of dangers uncommunicated by the manufacturer and that the lack of adequate warnings was the proximate cause of their injuries. The reference to a case involving a stud gun seller illustrates a precedent where failure to provide safety instructions led to a determination of potential negligence.

In Bishop v. Farhat, the court addressed whether a product distributor had reasonable knowledge of the dangers associated with its latex gloves, which were improperly labeled as hypoallergenic. The ruling emphasized that a seller is not obligated to warn users about dangers that are clearly indicated on the product label. In Farmer, the manufacturer of Fix-a-Flat provided explicit warnings about its flammable nature, which the plaintiff misunderstood, believing the flammability would dissipate over time. The Georgia Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiff was aware of the risks from the label and that the seller had no knowledge of any unique situation that would require further warning.

Similarly, in the present case regarding Gomez, the warnings concerning gasoline were clear and known to him. Despite this knowledge, Gomez poured a gasoline and diesel mixture onto a fire, leading to injuries. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Harbor Freight, the seller of the gas can, had any prior knowledge of such risks or that they had a duty to provide additional warnings about the specific dangers associated with the mixture. The court found that the injuries stemmed from Gomez's misjudgment rather than any failure on the part of Harbor Freight. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Harbor Freight on the plaintiffs' negligent failure to warn claim.

Additionally, regarding Gomez's claim of breach of implied warranty of merchantability under Georgia law, it was noted that a merchant implicitly warrants that goods are fit for their ordinary use. To succeed on this claim, the plaintiff must prove that the product was unfit for its intended purpose and that this unfitness was the proximate cause of the injury.

Plaintiffs contend that the Blitz gas can is unfit for its intended use—pouring gasoline—citing its spout as evidence of this purpose. However, they fail to provide evidence supporting that the can was designed for pouring gasoline onto a fire, disregarding the explicit warning on the can to keep it away from flames due to the risk of ignition from gasoline vapors. The plaintiffs argue for Harbor Freight's liability under the implied warranty of merchantability, claiming that it was foreseeable someone might misuse the can. Nevertheless, they did not present any legal precedent to support a claim for breach of warranty when usage contradicts explicit warnings. Consequently, Gomez's warranty claim is rejected.

Regarding the punitive damages claim, plaintiffs did not respond to Harbor Freight's summary judgment motion, leading the court to consider this claim abandoned. The court denies Harbor Freight's motion concerning the negligent sale claim but grants it for the negligent failure to warn, implied warranty of merchantability, and punitive damages claims. Harbor Freight maintains that it has no record of selling Blitz gas cans, the same argument it made in a prior motion that was denied due to conflicting testimony from Baldree. The court highlights that evidence of prior incidents must show substantial similarity to be admissible. As it stands, a genuine factual dispute exists regarding the sale of Blitz gas cans, and only the implied warranty of merchantability claim remains active, as the warranty claims of Wille and Price have been previously settled. The court assumes Harbor Freight qualifies as a merchant under O.C.G.A. 11-2-314 for the purposes of summary judgment.