Court: District Court, D. Maryland; May 13, 2019; Federal District Court
Nine blind or visually impaired inmates, previously or currently housed in Maryland correctional facilities, are challenging their confinement conditions, alleging violations of their rights. The plaintiffs—Steven Brown, Wilbert M. Delano, Gregory Hammond, Sedric Holley, Russell Hopkins, Johnny James, Tyrell Polley, Maynard Snead, and Robert Wilson—claim that the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (the "Department") and specific individuals (Dayena Corcoran, Richard Miller, Stephen Moyer) have denied them access to the courts, inflicted cruel and unusual punishment, and discriminated against them due to their disabilities. Their Amended Complaint includes four counts: two under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, one under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and one under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Pending motions include Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Surreply, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Substitution under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). After a motions hearing, the court denied the Motion to Dismiss as moot, denied the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, granted in part and denied in part the Motion for Summary Judgment, and granted the Motions for Leave to File a Surreply and for Substitution. Summary Judgment was entered for all Defendants on Counts I and II, while Counts III and IV will proceed against the Department and Robert L. Green in his official capacity, starting June 17, 2019.
The court reviews facts favorably for the nonmoving party during the summary judgment process. All nine plaintiffs, who initially filed pro se complaints in March 2016 while at the Roxbury Correctional Institution, have varying degrees of visual impairment, and since the filing, five have been released. The Department is overseen by a Secretary, with the Commissioner of Correction supervising the wardens at individual prisons, including RCI and Eastern Correctional Institution.
Stephen Moyer served as the Secretary of the Department from January 2015 until his departure on March 7, 2019. He managed approximately 10,000 employees and a budget of $1.4 billion, focusing on coordination with other Maryland political bodies and participating in budgetary hearings, while having minimal involvement in daily operations at department facilities. Robert L. Green succeeded him as Secretary during the pendency of this case. Dayena Corcoran was the Commissioner of Correction from 2016 to September 2018, overseeing the implementation of Division of Correction policies and managing wardens. Richard Miller served as the Warden of RCI from April 2015 to November 2017, responsible for the operations of RCI, which included over 400 employees and 1,800 inmates.
The Department contracts with the Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation to offer educational and vocational programs at RCI and ECI, and also arranges for third-party medical services for inmates. Plaintiffs allege that they were provided inadequate aids and services to manage their affairs independently, which forced them to rely on other inmates for tasks such as filing grievances and navigating the prison. They also report issues with "double-celling," being housed with other inmates rather than alone, and being excluded from programs due to visual impairments, which has increased their vulnerability to violence and extortion.
Defendants acknowledge that RCI is designated as the facility for blind inmates regardless of security classification; however, ECI lacks adequate accommodations, leading to the transfer of severely visually impaired inmates to RCI. Most Plaintiffs have been primarily housed at RCI, with some also spending significant time at ECI.
Plaintiffs Brown, James, Snead, and Wilson are currently incarcerated at RCI. The Department provides access to programs primarily through written materials, but does not offer these in alternative formats for blind inmates, such as large print, audio, Braille, or accessible electronic formats. Inmates can submit requests or complaints via an informal or formal grievance process, both of which require print forms not available in accessible formats. The formal complaint process, known as the administrative remedy procedure (ARP), also relies on non-accessible print forms. No staff is explicitly assigned as readers or scribes for visually impaired inmates, although case managers can assist as requested. Assistance to blind inmates is described as voluntary by former RCI Warden Gregg Hershberger and former Commissioner Dayena Corcoran. Sighted inmates, referred to as "walkers," are assigned to help blind inmates navigate the prison, with selection criteria based on housing status and disciplinary record. Prior to 2018, sex offenders were also allowed to serve as walkers. The selection of these escorts lacks input from blind inmates. There are conflicting accounts regarding the training of inmate walkers and whether they are responsible for reading and writing for blind inmates. While one designee indicated that such tasks are part of walker duties, other evidence suggests that assistance in reading and writing is discretionary.
Inmate walkers at RCI may assist visually impaired inmates with written correspondence, but they are not required to have any educational credentials, are not assessed for literacy, and receive no specific training. Kitchen assignments, which offer inmates up to 10 credits per month off their sentences, are restricted for blind inmates due to safety concerns regarding unsupervised operation in this environment. In 2016, a "blind greeter" position was created for blind inmates, limiting their duties to greeting correctional officers and requesting signatures. Despite requests for kitchen reassignment, two inmates, Delano and Hopkins, were placed in the blind greeter positions in 2016 and 2017, respectively.
Most plaintiffs were assigned to double-cells at various times, despite recommendations from the Department's medical contractor for single-cell assignments, which were not consistently followed. Procedurally, ten identical pleadings for appointment of counsel for nine visually impaired inmates were filed on March 30, 2016, leading to case consolidation and the appointment of counsel. After multiple extensions, Defendants responded to the Amended Complaint on January 10, 2019, for the first time claiming immunity from ADA claims, and have yet to file an answer. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on March 18, 2019, concerning their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.
On March 19, 2019, Defendants submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment aimed at resolving all of Plaintiffs' claims, leading to the denial of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as moot. Substantive arguments from the Motion to Dismiss are incorporated into the Motion for Summary Judgment. Claims that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations are rejected.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is warranted if there is no genuine dispute over material facts, with material facts defined as those that could influence the outcome of the case. A genuine issue exists when reasonable evidence could lead a jury to favor the nonmoving party. The court's role is limited to assessing whether enough evidence supports a factual dispute to necessitate a trial, ensuring unsupported claims do not proceed.
The court must view facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and is not permitted to weigh evidence or make credibility assessments at this stage; resolution of such disputes is left to the fact-finder. When both parties file motions for summary judgment, the court evaluates each motion independently to determine if either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Filing a motion for summary judgment acknowledges the absence of factual issues under the moving party's theory, but does not preclude the existence of disputes under the opposing theory. Cross-motions may indicate a shared understanding of the relevant legal theories and material facts, suggesting a lack of factual disagreement.
Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint allege constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I claims a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment due to denial of access to courts, while Count II asserts an Eighth Amendment violation concerning serious harm and risk of harm. Plaintiffs target Defendants Corcoran, Miller, and Moyer in both their individual and official capacities, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief.
The distinction between individual and official capacity claims is based on Kentucky v. Graham, where personal capacity suits impose liability on officials for their actions, while official capacity suits hold the state entity accountable. Plaintiffs' official capacity claims aim to hold the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services liable, which is considered an arm of the state under Section 1983. However, the Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police ruled that states and their officials in official capacities are not "persons" subject to monetary damages under Section 1983. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot pursue damages against Defendants in their official capacities but can seek injunctive relief, as such actions are not treated as claims against the state.
Plaintiffs are pursuing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking injunctive relief against Robert L. Green, the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, in his official capacity, while seeking monetary relief against Corcoran, Miller, and Moyer in their individual capacities. The document references the right to access courts for prisoners as established in Bounds v. Smith, emphasizing that while inmates have this constitutionally protected right, it does not equate to an absolute right to a law library or legal assistance. To succeed on access to courts claims, plaintiffs must demonstrate an "actual injury" that hinders their ability to bring nonfrivolous legal challenges. Merely citing a theoretical defect in legal resources is insufficient. Instead, plaintiffs must show that their legal claims were frustrated or impeded. Additionally, under § 1983, liability requires that defendants acted personally to cause the violation. For supervisory liability to apply, three criteria must be met: the supervisor must have known of the risk posed by a subordinate's conduct, their response must reflect deliberate indifference, and there must be an affirmative causal link between the inaction and the constitutional injury suffered.
Plaintiffs must provide substantial evidence to demonstrate Defendants' deliberate indifference, which cannot be established by isolated incidents but rather requires showing a supervisor's ongoing inaction amidst documented widespread abuses. In this case, Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding Defendants' liability for denying court access, as most cited incidents occurred before Defendants held their positions. Moyer, Corcoran, and Miller's tenures at RCI began in 2015, 2016, and 2015, respectively, meaning they cannot be deemed "personally involved" in events predating their supervisory roles.
While Plaintiffs allege that Defendants ignored clear signs of constitutional violations, their claims are weak as they rely on vague allegations from lawsuits without specifying instances of denied access to courts. The knowledge of previous complaints or lawsuits does not automatically imply supervisory liability. For instance, despite a 2012 IGO decision regarding inadequate library services for the sight impaired and subsequent actions considered by Miller, no definitive remedial steps were taken, and discussions involving Corcoran did not lead to actionable results.
Additionally, ARPs filed by an inmate, Snead, highlighted issues regarding assistance for blind inmates and communication barriers with attorneys, but these complaints were ultimately dismissed by Defendants. The Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants should have been aware of these issues through depositions does not sufficiently establish their liability for the claims made.
One IGO finding and two ARPs over two years do not establish that Miller and Corcoran had actual knowledge of their subordinates placing plaintiffs at a significant risk of constitutional injury, failing to meet the Fourth Circuit's threshold for "longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted" rights violations. The IGO and ARPs do not assert that blind inmates were unable to file lawsuits. The evidence indicates that Miller and Corcoran were aware of library deficiencies and one inmate's complaint about filing grievances, but there is no indication they ignored the situation while plaintiffs were unable to access the courts. As a result, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Furthermore, plaintiffs have not provided evidence of actual injuries. To prove "actual injury" for summary judgment, they must demonstrate that their underlying claims are nonfrivolous and more than mere hope, as per Christopher v. Harbury. The plaintiffs failed to identify specific instances of being denied access to the courts; Wilson stated he made no such allegations, Holley admitted to having retained an attorney, Hammond succeeded in post-conviction relief with assistance from another inmate, and Polley reported no significant barriers to legal research. Other plaintiffs cited events outside the applicable statutory period for § 1983 claims, which in Maryland has a three-year statute of limitations from the date of the incident.
Plaintiffs concede that they cannot seek damages related to Delano's sentence modification issues from 2007-2008, Snead's missed deadlines for a federal habeas petition in 2002, and Brown's missed appeal deadlines in 2008 and 2009. The remaining claims are based on vague allegations of missed deadlines and unfiled documents without substantiating the merit of these claims or providing supporting evidence. For instance, Hopkins claims he was denied access to the courts in late 2016 or early 2017 due to his blindness and lack of trusted inmate assistance to file a motion in Maryland. Plaintiffs argue that presumed injury arises from a total denial of access to legal resources, citing cases that predate the 1996 requirement for demonstrating actual injury. However, the court notes these references as not applicable, as plaintiffs have not experienced a total denial of access. Their ability to challenge confinement conditions indicates access to the court system. Evidence exists of plaintiffs filing claims and consulting attorneys, such as Brown receiving assistance from a public defender's office lawyer to enter a drug program and reduce his sentence.
Plaintiffs lack evidence of actual injury, negating any genuine issue of material fact for a jury. The right to access the courts does not extend to filing grievances or obtaining a divorce. Plaintiffs argue that their difficulties with RCI's grievance procedures impede their constitutional right to court access, but they fail to show that Defendants obstructed their ability to challenge their sentences or conditions of confinement. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies before filing claims in court. Plaintiffs claim that the ARP process at RCI requires inaccessible print forms, which hindered their ability to file grievances, but the constitution does not guarantee participation in grievance proceedings. Case law establishes that inmates have no constitutional entitlement to grievance procedures, and their alleged exclusion does not constitute a constitutional claim. Even if access to these procedures was denied, it does not impede court access. The Supreme Court's precedent clarifies that inmates need only exhaust available remedies, not unavailable ones. Plaintiffs could bypass ordinary exhaustion requirements by proving their inability to utilize grievance materials. Additionally, the right to access the courts does not include claims regarding divorce, as established in Lewis, which limits claims to those directly related to sentence challenges or confinement conditions. Claims about divorce proceedings fall outside the scope of this right.
The constitutional right of access to the courts does not encompass divorce cases, as established by numerous cases. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits affirm that while prisoners have a First Amendment right to file civil actions with a reasonable basis in law or fact, this right does not extend to claims against state actions that merely fail to provide auxiliary aids and services for divorce proceedings. The court finds that James lacks a viable claim because he does not assert that the defendants actively impeded his divorce; thus, Summary Judgment is granted for the defendants concerning his denial-of-access claims.
In Count II, the plaintiffs allege that defendants Corcoran, Miller, and Moyer violated the Eighth Amendment by subjecting them to cruel and unusual punishment through "double-celling" without considering their blindness. They also assert that the defendants failed to modify policies or supply necessary aids, forcing them to depend on other inmates for assistance, increasing their risk of abuse. The defendants seek Summary Judgment on these claims. The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to ensure humane living conditions and protect inmates from violence. However, not every incident of inmate violence results in liability for prison officials. To establish such liability, plaintiffs must demonstrate a significant deprivation of rights and that they were subjected to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.
Society must recognize a risk as "so grave" that it breaches contemporary decency standards for a legal claim to be viable. Evidence of a "substantial risk" is sufficient, and plaintiffs are not required to show extreme physical injury; they can rely on evidence indicating that dangerous conditions, such as severe overcrowding leading to unsanitary conditions and health risks, are present. Inmates can file suit without having suffered immediate harm, as it would be unreasonable to deny relief based on the absence of injury when faced with life-threatening conditions. Courts have upheld claims based on allegations of hazardous conditions even if no physical ailments were reported. A minor injury can also demonstrate a risk of serious harm.
Prisoners do not need to establish that the risk of attack is personal; they can argue that all prisoners in similar situations face excessive risks. To succeed, a plaintiff must show that prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to inmate health or safety, meaning they had actual knowledge of a serious risk or should have inferred such a risk from the circumstances. This knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.
Double-celling inmates is not inherently unconstitutional, as established in Rhodes v. Chapman. However, inmates can challenge their cell arrangements if they can demonstrate a unique risk of serious harm and that officials were deliberately indifferent to that risk. Claims based solely on a belief of incompatibility with cellmates, without supporting evidence, may not succeed.
To withstand a Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs must provide evidence demonstrating a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the Defendants' culpable state of mind, specifically that they were deliberately indifferent to an inmate's health and safety. Defendants are required to have subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm and acted inappropriately regarding that risk. Plaintiffs can meet this burden by showing that the risk of injury was so obvious that the officer must have been aware of it or that a substantial risk was longstanding and well-documented, suggesting that the defendant was informed of the risk.
In this case, Plaintiffs argue that Warden Miller was aware of the dangers of double-celling blind inmates based on two emails he received regarding housing issues. One email from Lt. Franklin highlighted a shortage of designated cells for blind inmates, while another from Todd Faith expressed concerns about potential safety violations under ADA and PREA laws if the situation was not addressed. Miller's response indicated an understanding of the complexities involved in housing blind inmates but did not demonstrate a clear awareness of any specific incidents of misconduct or serious danger. The record suggests that serious altercations among blind inmates were rare, undermining the inference of Miller's awareness of a substantial risk.
Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that Corcoran ordered the double-celling of blind inmates without assessing the associated risks. However, the deposition evidence cited does not confirm that Corcoran made such an order. Overall, the evidence presented does not sufficiently establish that either Miller or Corcoran possessed the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates.
Plaintiffs assert that the Department of Corrections (DOC) failed to respond to requests regarding the single-cell placement of blind inmates, citing an email exchange and deposition testimony from Denise A. Gelsinger. However, there is no evidence that Corcoran was aware of any harm to blind inmates due to double-celling, making her not liable. Plaintiffs also struggle to establish liability for Moyer, claiming he was put on notice of the double-celling issue as of March 2016, yet there is no evidence of his actual knowledge of the risks involved, only constructive knowledge from the lawsuit. Additionally, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that double-celling posed a substantial risk of harm or that they were particularly vulnerable to abuse. Notably, two of the remaining Plaintiffs had no injuries from cellmates, and although one complained of theft, mere property theft does not constitute a constitutional violation. The remaining Plaintiffs reported isolated altercations without serious injuries. Overall, the evidence does not support a claim that double-celling constituted a constitutional violation, as the instances of harm were minimal and did not indicate a substantial risk.
Brown, James, and Hopkins cannot assert that their experiences with double-celling constituted a violation of their constitutional rights, nor can they demonstrate that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to any substantial risk of harm from this arrangement. While two Plaintiffs reported minor altercations with cellmates, neither sustained significant injuries that indicated serious danger. One Plaintiff described a non-injurious poke from a cellmate, leading to a brief punch, with no further conflict. Another reported being physically grabbed by a cellmate but did not sustain any injuries, nor did he report other alleged assaults. The evidence suggests these incidents were typical of jail life and did not indicate a serious risk.
Additionally, a third Plaintiff experienced violence from a cellmate over three weeks, resulting in bruises, but the cellmate was relocated shortly after the Plaintiff reported the assaults. His subsequent double-celling was incident-free, indicating the Defendants did not ignore a substantial risk of harm. Another Plaintiff mentioned multiple arguments with a cellmate over a month; however, arguments alone do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. He also referenced a prior attempted rape incident from 2011, which is outside the statutory period but was claimed to illustrate a past risk. This single incident does not imply a current or future substantial risk in double-celling, especially as the Defendants were unaware of it and it occurred at a different facility prior to their employment. The Plaintiffs’ circumstances do not show they were at a greater risk than other inmates currently in similar living conditions.
Among the nine Plaintiffs, only three reported physical altercations with fellow inmates, and none of these incidents led to serious injuries within the limitations period. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that any of the Plaintiffs faced a "substantial" risk of injury or that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to such a risk. The record does not establish a heightened risk of harm due to double-celling, nor does it show that the Defendants were aware of such a risk. Allowing the Plaintiffs to present a weak case to the jury could impose liability on prison officials for double-celling arrangements, potentially leading to unnecessary isolation of blind inmates from cellmates, which is not constitutionally required.
Further, the Plaintiffs failed to prove that their reliance on other inmates for assistance posed a significant risk of serious injury. There is no evidence indicating that the named Defendants were aware of the substantial risk alleged by the Plaintiffs. While one Defendant, Miller, acknowledged that placing inmates under the control of others could lead to problems, this did not equate to an understanding of any specific danger to the Plaintiffs. Miller believed that the provision of assistive devices for the visually impaired was adequate. The Plaintiffs' arguments regarding another Defendant, Corcoran, are similarly insufficient. Although Corcoran recognized potential conflicts arising from reliance on other inmates, there is no evidence she was aware of any specific risks to the individual Plaintiffs. The evidence only suggests a general awareness of risks to blind inmates, without indicating that these Plaintiffs faced any greater danger than the average inmate.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Moyer, a high-ranking official in the Department, was aware of any substantial risk of injury to a small segment of the prison population under his supervision. Moyer believed that Plaintiffs had access to adequate equipment for assistance. There is no evidence to support that Moyer had the necessary mens rea for liability concerning a constitutional violation. Additionally, Plaintiffs failed to show widespread abuse from inmate assistants, with many not presenting evidence linking their visual impairments to a heightened risk of assault. Specifically, Brown did not report harm caused by inmate escorts, and while James experienced some minor incidents with walkers, he was not injured. Polley’s only injury was a minor bump, treated with Motrin and an ice pack. Wilson and Hammond also did not report assaults. Overall, Plaintiffs have not substantiated claims of injury due to reliance on others, nor shown that the Defendants were aware of isolated incidents of violence. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants regarding claims of constitutional violations due to reliance on inmate assistance.
Furthermore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as they have adequately demonstrated that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts constituting a constitutional violation or that any such right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violations. Plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence that they were unable to pursue a legitimate legal claim, nor did they show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm, which is essential for establishing an Eighth Amendment violation. Without meeting this evidentiary burden, Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiffs have not established a genuine dispute regarding constitutional violations, as they only referenced isolated incidents of poorly documented injuries and some plaintiffs reported no serious injuries. Consequently, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, leading to Summary Judgment in favor of defendants on Counts I and II. Regarding Counts III and IV, which pertain to violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, both statutes prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Title II of the ADA ensures that qualified individuals are not excluded from public entity services due to their disabilities, while Section 504 provides similar protections in programs receiving federal funding. The analysis for claims under both statutes is substantially similar, as they share definitions of disability and remedies. To succeed on these claims, plaintiffs must demonstrate exclusion from or denial of benefits from public entity services or discrimination. Plaintiffs claim disparate treatment and failure to make reasonable accommodations. The defendants named in Counts III and IV include the Department and its former and current Secretaries, Moyer and Green, respectively. However, neither statute allows for individual capacity suits against state officials, confirming that claims against Moyer in his individual capacity are not permissible.
Individual capacity liability under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is not permitted, as established in Badillo v. Thorpe and Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of Brooklyn. Plaintiffs cannot hold Defendants Moyer and Green personally liable under these statutes, leaving only official capacity claims against Green and claims against the Department for adjudication. Defendants have waived their sovereign immunity defense regarding Plaintiffs' ADA claims by accepting federal funding, per Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason University. Their motion for summary judgment, based on immunity, was filed nearly three years after the case began and over two years after the Amended Complaint was submitted, indicating a waiver due to delay in asserting this defense. The Supreme Court in United States v. Georgia ruled that the ADA abrogates state sovereign immunity for actions violating the Fourteenth Amendment, yet the applicability of this abrogation to non-constitutional Title II claims remains unresolved. The court notes that a defendant can waive sovereign immunity through litigation conduct that implies consent to the suit and acceptance of federal court jurisdiction. This includes tactical delays in raising immunity defenses, as outlined in various case precedents.
Numerous federal courts have established that defendants may waive sovereign immunity by engaging in litigation without objection for an extended period. In particular, cases such as *Cable v. Dep't of Developmental Servs. of California* and *Hill v. Blind Indus. Servs.* illustrate that active participation in pre-trial proceedings and litigation, especially when delayed assertions of sovereign immunity occur close to trial, can constitute waiver. The case at hand indicates that the Defendants' prolonged involvement in settlement discussions and their failure to timely file a Motion to Dismiss—specifically, the late assertion of sovereign immunity—demonstrates waiver of that defense.
Defendants received multiple extensions to respond to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and their Motion to Dismiss was not filed until January 10, 2019, well after the March 9, 2018 deadline. During this delay, they participated in settlement conferences and discovery, which reflects consent to suit and is incompatible with claiming sovereign immunity. Furthermore, since the Defendants are vulnerable to suit under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, they cannot simultaneously assert immunity against claims that are legally indistinguishable under Title II of the ADA. Both statutes seek the same remedies, and the parties agree that their differences are not relevant, leading to the conclusion that the claims should be treated similarly. Thus, holding the Defendants liable under Section 504 while shielding them from identical ADA claims would be inconsistent.
The state cannot claim sovereign immunity against Plaintiffs' Title II claims since it accepted federal funding, making it liable under Section 504. Plaintiffs are not entitled to Summary Judgment on their ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims. They seek partial Summary Judgment to declare ten specific items, necessitating the Court to make factual findings and mixed rulings of law. The focus will be on identifying genuine issues of material fact for a jury to resolve.
During the Motions Hearing, Plaintiffs emphasized six major claims: 1) lack of a process for providing auxiliary aids and informing Plaintiffs of their rights; 2) denial of auxiliary aids for effective communication; 3) refusal to make reasonable modifications for safe housing of blind inmates; 4) failure to provide necessary training for navigating facilities; 5) exclusion from desirable kitchen jobs; and 6) restrictions to medium security facilities despite lower security classifications or necessary programs being unavailable.
Summary Judgment is deemed inappropriate for these claims. Specifically, Plaintiffs lack a private right of action regarding the Department's failure to implement ADA-required policies and procedures. Under the ADA regulations, public entities like the Department of Public Safety must designate an employee as the ADA Coordinator to oversee compliance and address complaints related to noncompliance.
Public entities are required to evaluate their services, policies, and practices to ensure compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and make necessary modifications if they do not meet requirements. Specifically, the regulations mandate that the Department provide disabled inmates with information about the ADA and its protections against discrimination. However, plaintiffs cannot assert a standalone claim based solely on the defendants' failure to comply with these regulations, as there is no private right of action for enforcing them. This has been supported by various court decisions indicating that regulations under 28 C.F.R. 35.105, 35.106, and 35.107 do not provide a basis for private lawsuits.
The court concludes that while plaintiffs cannot hold defendants liable for failing to implement specific policies, such failures may indicate violations of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act in other respects, such as the lack of reasonable modifications. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that defendants did not provide adequate accommodations for communication, which affected their ability to engage with various institutional processes and services, thereby violating Title II of the ADA. Title II prohibits public entities from excluding individuals with disabilities from their services and encompasses all activities of the entity, including access to recreational, medical, and vocational programs.
Benefits and services for individuals with disabilities must be specified with sufficient detail, as established in Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Lamone, focusing on particular programs, such as absentee voting, rather than a broad category. Plaintiffs can contest the adequacy of accommodations for "equal access" to specific aspects of prison life. Equal access necessitates "reasonable modifications" to rules or practices, removal of barriers, and provision of auxiliary aids and services as defined under 42 U.S.C. 12131(2). This concept aligns with "reasonable accommodations" in Title I employment discrimination cases. Reasonable modifications can include qualified interpreters for the hearing impaired, readers or taped texts for the visually impaired, equipment modifications, and other related services.
The Justice Department's regulations under 42 U.S.C. 12134(a) interpret Title II requirements, emphasizing that public entities must ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities. Regulations mandate that these entities provide necessary auxiliary aids and services to allow equal participation in services or programs. The definition of "auxiliary aids" is broader than the statute and includes various formats and technologies to assist individuals with visual impairments. Public entities are required to prioritize the preferences of individuals with disabilities regarding auxiliary aids, unless an alternative effective communication method exists or the chosen method would fundamentally alter the program or impose undue burdens. Auxiliary aids must be accessible, timely, and respect the privacy of individuals with disabilities. The determination of necessary auxiliary aids is a nuanced inquiry often unsuitable for summary judgment.
In Reyes v. Dart, the court addressed the issue of reasonable accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act (RA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The determination of what constitutes reasonable accommodations is fact-specific and varies based on circumstances, as affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. The court highlighted that evaluating whether an entity has provided appropriate auxiliary aids is inherently fact-intensive, which often precludes summary judgment in effective-communication claims.
The key question is whether the defendants' communication with the plaintiffs was as effective as with other individuals, rather than whether the plaintiffs received their preferred auxiliary aids. The defendants acknowledged that most communications were not in accessible formats but argued they complied with the law by providing "qualified readers" and other effective methods for visually impaired individuals. Evidence was presented showing that inmates and staff routinely assisted the plaintiffs in reading and writing.
The plaintiffs contended that relying on other inmates or staff compromises their privacy and independence, as mandated by the regulations. However, the court found this argument flawed, emphasizing that the ADA permits the use of "qualified readers" and that assistance inevitably reduces independence and may involve privacy invasions. Moreover, the court noted that prisons do not guarantee privacy or independence for any inmates.
The necessity for effective communication aids varies depending on the communication context, and the critical inquiry is whether the defendants' services enabled the plaintiffs to communicate as effectively as their peers. The plaintiffs further criticized the defendants for not mandating assistance from walkers and case managers and claimed that inmate escorts were not "qualified" due to lack of educational screening. However, these objections were deemed non-dispositive.
Defendants are questioned on their efforts to ensure blind inmates can communicate effectively, comparable to other inmates. Previous rulings, such as Wells v. Thaler and Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs. Inc., established that assistance from fellow inmates can meet Title II obligations under the ADA. The jury's role includes assessing the necessity and adequacy of assistance provided to blind inmates by both peers and staff, determining if such support allowed for effective communication.
Plaintiffs' claim for Summary Judgment on Claim 3 is denied, as they argue that Defendants failed to provide equal access to safe housing by disregarding single cell orders and inadequately addressing a request from inmate Brown. Evidence indicates that medical assessments recommended single-cell housing for several inmates, yet they were placed in double cells, with Brown facing placement issues due to a lack of documented visual impairment. Title II and Section 504 obligate Defendants to ensure safe housing for all inmates, as illustrated in cases like Spencer v. Earley and Arenas v. Georgia Dep't of Corrs. The determination of what constitutes reasonable accommodation, such as single versus double-celling, requires a detailed factual analysis, with the jury tasked to evaluate if single-celling was essential for safety or if double-celling could suffice, as some testimonies suggest.
Similarly, Summary Judgment on Claim 4 is denied, emphasizing that Defendants must facilitate Plaintiffs' access to prison services by ensuring they can navigate the facilities, as established in Chaffin v. Kansas State Fair Bd.
Defendants assign sighted inmates as escorts, referred to as "walkers," to assist blind inmates in navigating prison facilities, including accompanying them to appointments and providing emergency assistance. The jury is tasked with determining the necessity of these walkers for the plaintiffs, the availability of alternative accommodations (such as canes), and whether the plaintiffs received adequate assistance to ensure "equal access" to programs and services, indicating that these issues cannot be resolved via Summary Judgment.
The plaintiffs have sought Summary Judgment regarding claims of being denied kitchen assignments due to their blindness. Defendants counter that kitchen work is deemed too dangerous for plaintiffs because of insufficient staff to ensure their safety with cutlery. They assert compliance with legal obligations by providing a special kitchen role, the "blind greeter," for blind inmates. Under Title II, vocational programs in prisons are recognized as essential benefits. Jurisprudence indicates that excluding inmates from work due to disabilities violates Title II and Section 504, necessitating plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are "otherwise qualified" for the benefits sought. An individual is not considered otherwise qualified if they pose a significant risk to others due to a disability that cannot be reasonably accommodated.
Defendants can use the "direct threat" defense, showing that the plaintiffs would endanger themselves or others in the kitchen. The Department of Justice requires an individualized assessment to determine if an individual poses such a threat, considering the nature and severity of the risk, the likelihood of injury, and the potential for reasonable modifications to mitigate the risk. Evidence suggests that employees at RCI expressed concerns about the plaintiffs posing a risk in the understaffed kitchen environment.
Concerns have been raised about the potential risks posed by Hopkins in a kitchen environment shared with numerous other inmates, specifically regarding safety with hot food. However, evidence indicates that the plaintiffs have been provided adequate accommodations through the "blind greeter" position. The determination of whether the plaintiffs were qualified for kitchen work and if the blind greeter position constitutes a reasonable modification remains a factual question. Summary judgment for the plaintiffs on Claim 6 is denied.
The Department of Justice regulations prohibit discriminatory housing practices for inmates with disabilities, stating they must be housed in the most integrated settings appropriate to their needs. In this case, while RCI is designated for blind inmates, it lacks certain programs available in other facilities. Factual disputes exist regarding individual inmates’ requests and placements, necessitating a jury's evaluation of whether housing in RCI was appropriate given its specialized assistance for blind inmates and the reasonableness of the accommodations provided.
Numerous factual issues must be resolved at trial, as the reasonableness of accommodations is typically a jury question. The jury must assess whether the plaintiffs received reasonable accommodations affecting multiple aspects of their lives in prison. The defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief is also addressed. To obtain a permanent injunction, the plaintiffs must show irreparable injury, inadequacy of legal remedies, balance of hardships favoring equity, and that the public interest would not be harmed.
Plaintiffs Polley, Hammond, Delano, Hopkins, and Holley lack claims for equitable relief due to their release from incarceration, as established in Rendelman v. Rouse, which states that a prisoner's transfer or release typically moots claims for injunctive and declaratory relief related to their incarceration. The court ruled in favor of Defendants on the constitutional claims (Counts I and II), denying any injunctive relief for those claims. However, genuine disputes of material fact prevent Summary Judgment on Counts III and IV regarding the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, as conditions at RCI have remained largely unchanged since the litigation began.
The court's conclusions include denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as moot, denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in part, and granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Surreply and Motion for Substitution under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). Summary Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants on Counts I and II, while Counts III and IV will advance to trial against the Department and Green in his official capacity. Robert L. Green is substituted for Moyer regarding official capacity claims due to his new position as Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services.
Defendants may waive sovereign immunity concerning the ADA, but not under Section 1983, and Plaintiffs must demonstrate "actual injury" beyond mere violation of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act to succeed in their claims. The court noted ongoing uncertainty about whether such actual injury must be distinct from unfair treatment based on disability, yet sufficient evidence exists for Plaintiffs to attempt to prove actual injury related to the alleged violations. During a Motions Hearing on April 24, 2019, Defendants did not inform Plaintiffs of their intent to assert a specific defense before filing the Motion to Dismiss.
