Court: District Court, S.D. Illinois; May 20, 2019; Federal District Court
Jannine Blash initiated legal proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to challenge the Acting Commissioner's denial of her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Blash filed her applications on April 18, 2014, claiming disability starting August 1, 2012. The Social Security Administration denied her applications on September 3, 2014, prompting Blash to request a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place on June 6, 2016. The ALJ issued a decision on April 26, 2017, concluding that Blash was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Blash's subsequent request for Appeals Council review was denied on January 17, 2018, leading her to file this action on March 14, 2018.
During the ALJ hearing, Blash, represented by attorney Roland Nemes, amended her alleged onset date to April 18, 2014. She provided personal details, including her living situation and previous employment as a home health aide, which involved physically demanding tasks. Blash ceased working due to severe pain from gynecological issues, later compounded by pancreatitis, which led to debilitating episodes a few times a year. Additionally, she suffers from asthma that limits her ability to walk long distances and experiences significant psychological issues, including depression, for which she takes various medications. Blash reported difficulties in daily activities due to her health conditions, including pain management and sleep disturbances. The Commissioner has moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the Court has granted this motion.
Blash experiences significant anxiety around new people and has increasing difficulty riding the subway due to fears of large crowds and urban violence, compounded by her claustrophobia. As a result, she prefers taking the bus. She reports a reduced appetite linked to depression and struggles with concentration, often remaining at home and lacking motivation to engage in daily activities unless she has appointments. With her daughter in college, she receives no assistance with household chores but manages to prepare meals and do some cleaning, albeit less than before her impairments. Blash maintains limited contact with family, primarily communicating with her son while having no hobbies requiring her to leave home.
She is currently receiving mental health treatment, seeing a psychiatrist monthly and a new therapist weekly, after previously attending therapy twice a week. Blash finds therapy challenging as it addresses uncomfortable topics. She typically sleeps 10 to 12 hours nightly and takes frequent daytime naps. During a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) noted that the vocational expert (VE) was absent but explained that VE input could be obtained through written testimony and that the record would remain open for updated medical records.
Subsequently, the ALJ reached out to VE Yaakov Taitz, who completed interrogatories regarding Blash's case. Taitz assessed that an individual with Blash's hypothetical limitations could not perform her past jobs but could engage in three unskilled occupations—hand packager, machine packager, and warehouse worker—all medium, unskilled jobs. Blash's attorney objected to Taitz's findings, arguing that the hand packager role conflicts with the hypothetical's restriction on exposure to pulmonary irritants.
Blash's ability to perform medium work was deemed inconsistent with her treatment records and medical opinions. On December 16, 2016, the ALJ posed new hypothetical interrogatories to a different vocational expert (VE), Andrew Vaughn, asking him to consider a person limited to sedentary work while avoiding environmental irritants and extreme weather conditions. On January 23, 2017, VE Vaughn concluded that this hypothetical individual could not perform any of Blash's previous jobs but could work in three unskilled occupations available in the national economy: table worker, press operator, and addressing clerk. Blash was informed of this finding and given the opportunity to respond, but she did not.
The Commissioner summarized the medical evidence, which Blash did not contest, leading to the assumption that she accepted the Commissioner’s factual account. The ALJ denied Blash's applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on April 26, 2017. The ALJ confirmed that Blash met the insured status through December 31, 2017, and found she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant period. The ALJ identified severe impairments of asthma, pancreatitis, and major depressive disorder, but concluded that none of these impairments met the criteria for listings 3.03, 5.08, or 12.04. The ALJ noted that neither Blash nor her medical providers contended that her impairments equaled any listing. Consequently, the ALJ proceeded to assess Blash's residual functional capacity (RFC).
Blash's Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) was determined by the ALJ to allow for sedentary work with specific limitations: she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; she can frequently balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl; must avoid exposure to environmental irritants, extreme temperatures, unprotected heights, hazardous machinery, and excessive vibration. Additionally, she is limited to simple, routine tasks requiring occasional decision-making, changes in the work setting, and interactions with others. The ALJ reviewed medical records and found Blash's testimony inconsistent with the evidence. At step four, the ALJ concluded she could not perform her past work as a home health aide, babysitter, receptionist, or general office clerk. At step five, considering her RFC, age, education, and experience, the ALJ identified jobs in significant numbers in the national economy suitable for her, including table worker, press operator, and addressing clerk. The ALJ concluded that Blash was capable of adjusting to other work and had not been under a disability as defined by the SSA during the Relevant Period. The judicial review scope under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) emphasizes that courts do not determine disability de novo but rather assess whether the Commissioner’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and correct legal standards. Substantial evidence is defined as adequate evidence a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion, as established in relevant case law.
The evidentiary threshold for administrative law judges (ALJs) is low, as established in Biestek v. Berryhill, which emphasizes that ALJ factual findings must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence, even if contrary evidence exists. The reviewing court's role is limited, affording substantial deference to the Commissioner's decisions, as articulated in various cases including Johnson v. Astrue and Brault v. Social Security Administration. The substantial evidence standard allows for rejection of an ALJ's findings only if no reasonable factfinder could agree with them.
The Social Security Act defines "disability" as the inability to perform substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable impairment expected to last at least 12 months. A claimant is deemed disabled only if they cannot engage in any substantial gainful work considering their age, education, and work experience.
To evaluate disability claims, the Commissioner must consider: 1) objective medical facts; 2) medical diagnoses or opinions; 3) subjective evidence of pain or disability from the claimant or others; and 4) the claimant's educational background, age, and work experience. The regulations outline a five-step process for evaluation: 1) determining if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; 2) assessing whether the claimant has a severe impairment; and 3) evaluating the impact of the impairment on the ability to perform basic work activities.
If a claimant has a severe impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, or an equivalent condition, they are deemed disabled regardless of age, education, or work experience. If the impairment is not listed, the Commissioner assesses the claimant's Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to determine if they can perform past relevant work. If they can, they are not considered disabled. If they cannot perform past relevant work, the Commissioner evaluates whether the claimant's RFC, along with their age, education, and experience, allows them to perform other work. If the claimant is unable to do other work, they are found disabled. The claimant bears the burden of proof except in the final determination regarding the availability of other work.
In the case of Blash, her arguments are unclear as they primarily rest on objections from her previous counsel, which were addressed by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Blash objected to the vocational expert’s (VE Taitz) assumption that she could perform "medium work" and the consideration of non-exertional limitations. However, the ALJ did not rely on VE Taitz's testimony but later consulted a different VE, Vaughn, who was instructed to consider a hypothetical individual limited to sedentary work with no exposure to environmental irritants. Vaughn concluded this individual could perform three unskilled occupations available in the national economy, even though they could not perform any of Blash's past jobs. The ALJ confirmed reliance on Vaughn's testimony and determined that Blash could perform only sedentary work, acknowledging additional limitations that restricted her from exposure to environmental irritants and mandated simple, routine tasks with minimal decision-making and interaction.
The ALJ concluded that Blash lacked the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform a full range of sedentary work, considering how limitations affect the unskilled sedentary occupational base. The ALJ also evaluated Blash's age, education, work experience, and RFC in reaching this decision. Blash did not contest the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's RFC determination or the hypothetical posed to Vocational Expert (VE) Vaughn. The ALJ's reliance on VE Vaughn's testimony is deemed appropriate, given that substantial record evidence supports the assumptions underlying the expert's opinion. Consequently, Blash has not provided justification for the ALJ’s conclusion that he could not perform certain nationally available jobs and was thus disabled under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.
