Court: District Court, S.D. Illinois; March 29, 2019; Federal District Court
Plaintiff Chiffon Davis filed a putative class action against the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) and its Chairperson, Oyeshola Olatoye, alleging inadequate heating in NYCHA public housing, particularly during severe winter temperatures in early 2018. Davis claims her apartment in the Andrew Jackson Houses frequently dropped below 50 degrees Fahrenheit and experienced periods without hot water, asserting that the heating system fails to meet minimum habitability standards. This alleged issue affects "hundreds of thousands" of residents, leading to physical discomfort, emotional distress, and health issues. Davis attributes the heating crisis to insufficient maintenance staff, premature closure of maintenance requests, and inadequate employee training.
The First Amended Complaint contains three claims for relief: 1) deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. 1437 and related regulations via 42 U.S.C. 1983; 2) violation of substantive due process rights under the Constitution via 42 U.S.C. 1983; and 3) a request for a declaratory judgment regarding violations of residents’ rights to adequate housing conditions under 28 U.S.C. 2201. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it attempts to enforce the warranty of habitability through federal law, which they claim is not permissible. The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must provide sufficient factual allegations to establish a claim that is plausible on its face, allowing the court to reasonably infer the defendant's liability. The court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Conversely, when assessing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court accepts the material factual allegations as true but does not draw favorable inferences for the plaintiff. A district court can dismiss a case under Rule 12(b)(1) if it lacks the statutory or constitutional authority to hear the case.
In the case of Davis's First Amended Complaint, the defendants are seeking its dismissal, and the court will consider their motion in five parts, focusing on specific claims. Davis's first claim alleges that the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) and Defendant Olatoye violated her rights to a safe and habitable home under federal law, actionable under Section 1983. She argues that this violation is based on the United States Housing Act of 1937 and related regulations that mandate compliance with state and local housing laws. Specifically, she claims that NYCHA's failure to adhere to New York City regulations regarding minimum heating standards constitutes a violation of federal law.
Defendants counter that the cited statutory and regulatory provisions do not confer a enforceable right to adequate housing under Section 1983, emphasizing that for a claim to proceed under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege the violation of a federal right rather than merely a breach of federal law.
For a statutory provision to be enforceable under Section 1983, it must establish a federal right and Congress must not have explicitly barred a remedy under Section 1983 for violations of that right. Courts assess three factors to determine if a federal right exists: (1) Congress must intend the provision to benefit the plaintiff; (2) the right must be sufficiently clear and defined to avoid vagueness; and (3) the statute must impose a binding obligation on states in mandatory terms. Although these factors guide the analysis, courts will not find a federal right if other considerations indicate that Congress did not intend to create enforceable rights under Section 1983.
In evaluating whether Davis can sue under Section 1983 based on 42 U.S.C. 1437(a)(1)(A), the court notes that this provision outlines a broad federal policy aimed at promoting safe housing for low-income families but does not impose a clear and binding obligation on the states. While the provision mentions "low-income families," it lacks specific "rights-creating" language and focuses more on overall housing conditions rather than individual rights. Courts have previously ruled that this provision does not confer a federal right enforceable under Section 1983, supporting the conclusion that Congress did not intend to grant public housing tenants the right to sue their municipal landlords for housing quality compliance.
Section 1437(a) is established as a general policy statement that does not create a private right of action for residents to sue landlords for unsafe or unsanitary living conditions, as affirmed in Green v. Konover Residential Corp. The court concludes that 1437(a)(1)(A) alone does not provide a federal right to adequate heating in public housing enforceable under Section 1983.
Davis attempts to establish such a right through 42 U.S.C. 1437d(l)(3), which mandates that public housing agencies maintain projects in decent, safe, and sanitary conditions. Although this provision may imply an individual right to a lease with enforceable maintenance obligations, courts have consistently ruled that it does not grant residents the right to enforce such terms in federal court. Previous cases, including Paige v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. and Edwards v. Dist. of Columbia, support this interpretation, emphasizing that a habitable residence is not a guaranteed right under this statute.
Davis argues against this precedent, urging the court to find an enforceable right to safe housing. However, she fails to effectively distinguish the relevant case law cited by the defendants. Instead, she references Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority to assert that rights created by federal statute should be enforceable in federal court, a position not supported by the case's findings. The court recognizes substantial differences between the provisions in question, leading to a different conclusion than that reached in Wright.
The Supreme Court clarified that the Brooke Amendment imposes a clear and mandatory limit on tenant rent, capping it at 30% of income, thus creating an individual enforceable right under Section 1983. Similarly, Section 1437d(l)(3) establishes a contractual right requiring public housing authorities to include a term in leases ensuring the maintenance of decent, safe, and sanitary conditions. However, this provision does not grant tenants a direct right against breaches of that term. Consequently, the Court concluded that Davis's assertion of a right to habitable conditions does not stem directly from the statute, as it requires a more inferential interpretation not permissible under precedents governing federal rights enforceable under 1983. The Court acknowledged that issues of housing conditions typically fall under state jurisdiction, with tenants having access to state courts for remedies not available under federal law. Davis's claims, which center on NYCHA's alleged failure to comply with lease covenants, do not derive from Section 1437d(l)(3) as that provision does not confer an individual right. Additionally, Davis's reliance on 24 C.F.R. 5.703, which mandates compliance with local codes for housing maintenance, was found insufficient for federal enforcement under 1983 since the relevant statutory provisions do not create a federal right to adequate heating.
The federal regulation cited lacks a personal right from the statute that could be supplemented, meaning it does not establish a federal right to housing at a specific temperature actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Davis has not identified an individual right to adequately heated housing in the Housing Act or its regulations, leading to the dismissal of her § 1983 claim based on federal rights.
Additionally, Davis asserts that the Defendants' failure to provide adequate heat violates her constitutional rights to bodily safety, integrity, liberty, and property interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Defendants contend that this claim should be dismissed for three reasons: 1) a lack of actionable constitutional rights to enforce under § 1983, 2) failure to allege affirmative actions by state actors, and 3) absence of any constitutional right violation.
The Defendants argue that since no actionable federal right exists under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 and 1437d, Davis cannot pursue a § 1983 claim based on the same state actions. The Court, however, finds that the relief sought by Davis does not merely aim to enforce federal statutes but seeks compensation for constitutional violations reflected in economic losses and suffering due to inadequate heating. The requested relief includes back rent and other damages, which may be appropriate remedies under § 1983, supported by precedents allowing for compensatory and punitive damages in such claims.
Defendants' argument encounters a significant hurdle at the second step, as established case law indicates that a plaintiff cannot bypass statutory remedial schemes by solely invoking Section 1983. This principle emphasizes that Congress must not have explicitly foreclosed remedies under Section 1983 by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme. Defendants failed to demonstrate that the Housing Act established such a scheme that would preclude challenges under Section 1983, whether based on statutory or constitutional rights.
Additionally, Defendants contend that Davis's substantive due process claim is flawed due to its basis in NYCHA's inaction rather than affirmative conduct. The Second Circuit has clarified that only affirmative actions can constitute a substantive due process violation, as the Due Process Clause restricts state power rather than assuring minimal safety levels. Nevertheless, a failure to act may be actionable in exceptional circumstances, such as when a governmental entity has a constitutional obligation to protect individuals due to a special relationship or has created a dangerous situation.
The Court will assess Davis's claims based on the First Amended Complaint, which alleges that NYCHA's policies caused a heating crisis through three main practices: insufficient boiler maintenance staffing that did not meet emergency demands, a policy of prematurely closing heating maintenance tickets to misrepresent responsiveness, and inadequate training for employees to address heating complaints.
Defendants assert that the allegations against NYCHA and Olatoye do not sufficiently demonstrate affirmative acts or meet the "state created danger" or "special relationship" exceptions necessary for substantive due process claims. They acknowledge a "code of silence" as an alleged affirmative act but argue it is conclusory and lacks factual foundation, asserting that any rights deprivation resulted from inaction regarding boiler repairs rather than the cover-up. The Court disagrees, stating that allegations based on information and belief can meet pleading standards when facts are within Defendants' control, which is the case here. Davis provides a basis for her belief through past issues with lead inspections and discrepancies between official statements and her experience.
Davis contends that, absent the cover-up, timely repairs would have prevented harm. The complaint indicates that improperly closed heating maintenance requests deprived residents of necessary services, making the allegations plausible enough to withstand a motion to dismiss. The premature closure of requests obscured issues from city officials, further complicating potential intervention. While Defendants question the sufficiency of the cover-up as a causal factor for constitutional deprivations, the Court acknowledges that Davis has adequately pleaded affirmative acts and their causal link to rights deprivation for the purposes of the motion to dismiss. Finally, Defendants argue that Davis has not established any constitutional rights violations necessary for a § 1983 claim, specifically referencing her substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
To establish a substantive due process violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) infringement of a right protected by substantive due process; and 2) the state actor's conduct must be egregious or outrageous enough to constitute a constitutional violation. Davis claims violations of her "property interests" and "rights to bodily safety, integrity, and liberty."
Regarding property interests, Davis must show that she had a valid property interest and that the defendants infringed upon it in an arbitrary or irrational manner. A property interest requires a legitimate claim of entitlement, typically determined by state law rather than the U.S. Constitution. Defendants argue there is no constitutional right to housing of a certain quality, referencing cases that do not directly apply to Davis's claims. They also assert that the Housing Act does not create a property right for Davis, but this overlooks that her property interest stems from the lease agreement with NYCHA, which is recognized as both a contract and a property interest under state law. Thus, the defendants' arguments do not effectively counter Davis's claims of a substantive due process violation based on her property interests.
Leases for public housing must include provisions requiring the public housing authority to maintain the properties in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition, as mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(3). While these property interests are derived from state law rather than the Housing Act, they are recognized as property interests for due process claims, consistent with case law such as King v. New York City Employees Retirement System and Cine SK8, Inc. Defendants do not contest that Davis's lease creates property interests that are constitutionally protected under substantive due process, nor do they dispute that these interests were violated due to inadequate heating in her home.
To establish a substantive due process claim based on property rights, Davis must demonstrate that her rights were infringed in an arbitrary or irrational manner. The First Amended Complaint asserts that the infringement was intentional and deliberate. Defendants argue that this claim lacks factual support; however, the complaint provides credible allegations that employees were instructed to falsely report that heating issues had been resolved, thereby misleading tenants about the responsiveness of the housing authority. This alleged "code of silence" cover-up resulted in residents living in unheated and uninhabitable conditions.
The court concludes that these allegations sufficiently suggest that the Defendants' actions may have crossed the limits of legitimate governmental action. Additionally, substantive due process protections extend to interests that are fundamental to ordered liberty, including the right to bodily integrity free from unjust governmental interference, which Davis also claims in her constitutional argument.
The claim under 1983 asserts a violation of rights to bodily safety, integrity, and liberty due to exposure to extreme cold in the plaintiff's home, which exacerbated her asthma and caused permanent injuries. Defendants argue there is no constitutional right to a heated apartment, but the plaintiff, Davis, frames the issue as a violation of her bodily integrity rather than a general right to heating. The court references case law indicating that the right at stake is the freedom from bodily intrusion, as seen in cases involving contaminated water supplies and unauthorized radiation exposure. The defendants do not contest that the extreme cold in Davis's apartment constitutes an interference with bodily integrity.
As the motion to dismiss is considered, the court will not address arguments not presented by the defendants. Davis has adequately pleaded the first element of her substantive due process claim regarding the infringement of her bodily integrity. For the second element, the interference must "shock the contemporary conscience," which requires conduct that is egregious and offensive to human dignity. Davis argues that three factors support her claim of conscience-shocking conduct: 1) the inhumane living conditions due to lack of heat, supported by public official statements and media reports; 2) the defendants' history of lawsuits and settlements regarding heating issues without corrective action; and 3) the deliberate indifference exhibited by the defendants toward the residents' welfare.
Defendants' actions were characterized as deliberate, resulting in prolonged exposure of Davis to freezing temperatures, rather than being a response to an emergency. They argued that Davis's physical injuries were not significant enough to be deemed "constitutional proportions." However, the court emphasized that the severity of the injury is not the sole factor; rather, a thorough analysis of the circumstances and the defendants' conduct is essential. The First Amended Complaint (FAC) claims that the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) had previously faced litigation over heating issues and agreed to maintain adequate heating standards, yet another crisis arose after the agreement expired due to staffing shortages and inadequate training. The recurrent heating problems and NYCHA's awareness of them indicated that the state actors had ample time for reflection and decision-making. Allegations of a cover-up by NYCHA and Olatoye further indicated a deliberate choice to conceal the severity of the heating crisis instead of addressing it, thereby exposing tenants to cruel and unusual punishment conditions. This behavior demonstrated a level of deliberate indifference that shocks the conscience, leading the court to conclude that Davis sufficiently pleaded her substantive due process claim regarding her bodily integrity. Consequently, the motion to dismiss this claim was denied. Additionally, in her third claim, Davis sought a declaratory judgment that her right to public housing, compliant with temperature regulations, had been violated, and she claimed entitlement to withhold rent for necessary repairs.
Defendants contend that the claim must be dismissed due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the Court finds no private right to enforce sections 1437 or 1437d of the Housing Act in federal court. Davis does not address this point in her response, nor does she mention her declaratory judgment claim, leading to the conclusion that she has abandoned it. Consequently, the Court dismisses the declaratory judgment claim.
Regarding claims against Defendant Olatoye, Defendants assert that these should be dismissed based on a lack of personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. It is established that personal involvement is necessary for liability under § 1983. The standard for personal involvement includes direct participation in the violation, failing to remedy a known violation, creating or allowing unconstitutional policies, gross negligence in supervision, or deliberate indifference to unconstitutional acts. Defendants argue that Davis's allegations against Olatoye are conclusory; however, Davis asserts that her First Amended Complaint sufficiently details Olatoye's involvement. The Court finds the allegations plausible enough to warrant proceeding with the claims against Olatoye.
Defendants also seek to dismiss the demand for punitive damages, correctly noting that punitive damages are not available against municipal defendants under § 1983, as established by the Supreme Court. However, punitive damages can be awarded against individual public officers in such actions.
The Court has permitted the constitutional claims against Defendant Olatoye to proceed, allowing punitive damages to remain an option for relief. Consequently, there is no basis for dismissing this part of the complaint at this stage. The Court's conclusion results in a partial grant and partial denial of the Defendants' motion to dismiss, requiring them to file an answer to the remaining claims within 14 days. The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the motions associated with Docket Numbers 18 and 22, which are treated as one due to docketing issues and disorganized filing.
The Court evaluates the claims against the background of the Housing Act, noting that while it sets broad policy goals aimed at benefiting lower-income families, it does not establish an unequivocal federal right to adequate heating. The analysis draws from both § 1983 cases and implied right of action cases to determine whether Congress intended to create a federal right. The Defendants argued that there is no private right of action based on a regulation lacking obligations from the statute. Conversely, Davis contended that the enforceability of a federal regulation under § 1983 remains an unresolved issue in the Second Circuit, although prior decisions clarify that it has been settled.
Davis's substantive due process claims sufficiently challenge Defendants' affirmative actions, making it unnecessary for the Court to address arguments regarding the "state created danger" or "special relationship" exceptions. Defendants' only counter to Davis's property-interest-based due process claim was minimal and unaddressed in their reply, while Davis provided a more extensive argument. Additionally, although municipal law requires landlords to maintain minimum temperatures, Davis did not explicitly connect these provisions to her claimed property interest in her complaint. The Court notes that some property interests, especially certain contractual rights, may not be recognized as constitutionally valid under substantive due process.
Defendants do not dispute that Davis has sufficiently alleged a violation of constitutionally protected property interests related to her lease. They argue that any deprivation of rights was unintentional, citing a settlement between the New York City Public Advocate and the Defendants concerning previous litigation over inadequate public housing heating. However, the court emphasizes that it cannot consider external matters when evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, as established in Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys. Inc. A document can only be included in the consideration if it is "integral" to the complaint. Although the First Amended Complaint mentions the settlement, it does not rely on its specific terms. Consequently, the court determines that the settlement is not "integral" to the complaint and will not take it into account at this stage of the proceedings.
