Edwards v. Schwartz

Citation: 378 F. Supp. 3d 468Docket: Case No. 7:18-cv-378

Court: District Court, W.D. Virginia; March 19, 2019; Federal District Court

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A motion to dismiss has been filed by defendants Paul Schwartz, Yanna Lambrinidou, and Melissa Mays against Marc Edwards' Amended Complaint, citing lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The case was removed from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Virginia, to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, which has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. Edwards' Amended Complaint alleges five counts: defamation per se, defamation, tortious interference, common law conspiracy, and statutory civil conspiracy related to statements made regarding the Flint water crisis. The court ordered Edwards to submit a memorandum identifying specific statements that underpin his defamation claims, which he filed on November 9, 2018. The court's examination of the submissions led to a partial granting and denying of the motion to dismiss for personal jurisdiction and a complete granting for failure to state a claim on all counts. The crux of the case centers on a letter published on May 10, 2018, deemed by Edwards as central to his claims, which he argues is part of a broader campaign to undermine his reputation that began in 2016. The letter accuses him of misrepresenting Flint residents and engaging in defamatory actions.

Edwards submitted three versions of a Letter for court review, with each version differing in signatories while maintaining similar content. The first version, attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit 1 (ECF No. 9-1), included signatures from 39 Flint workers, parents, residents, and an Episcopal priest and was sent on May 10, 2018, to various notable recipients, including Virginia Tech president Timothy Sands and several scientific organizations. The email accompanying the Letter requested a formal complaint process against Professor Marc Edwards and a meeting to discuss residents' experiences and concerns regarding his conduct.

The Letter, addressed "To the Scientific and Engineering Communities," contained statements that Edwards identified as defamatory. These included requests for immediate engagement with Flint residents, accusations of dishonesty and exploitation against Edwards, claims that he portrayed residents negatively, and allegations concerning misinformation about health risks associated with Flint's water. Specific points highlighted included accusations that Edwards misrepresented residents’ hygiene practices and made unfounded claims about the community's behavior and health conditions, which the signatories labeled as false and harmful.

No oversight exists in the scientific community regarding Mr. Edwards’ conduct and claims related to Flint residents' water safety. Despite lacking qualifications, he asserts that Flint's water is free from pathogens and has publicly dismissed residents' concerns, labeling them as 'tribal' and declaring the Flint Water Crisis over in 2016. Residents seek an end to his disruptive influence to facilitate healing within the community and address ongoing issues. They request protection from Mr. Edwards and an investigation centered on their voices, emphasizing the need for a committee of experts in Environmental Justice to assess his actions.

Edwards contends that following a May 10, 2018 letter, defendants created a website and social media page to disseminate it, which he claims facilitated defamatory statements about him. He submitted two revised versions of the letter, allowing non-Flint residents to sign, and noted that earlier versions falsely claimed to be authored solely by Flint residents. He alleges that the letter's creation involved collaboration among Schwartz, Lambrinidou, and Mays, who aimed to obscure individual contributions to enhance the letter's damaging impact on his reputation. This misrepresentation was intended to amplify the letter's effect and was compounded by the anonymous nature of its dissemination.

Edwards alleges that the defendants, as individuals and members of the Campaign for Lead Free Water, collaborated to create and disseminate a defamatory letter and email. He claims the letter contains numerous falsehoods, many of which reference hyperlinks to third-party materials that he argues contradict its claims. Specifically, he identifies that the letter was saved and distributed from Melissa Mays' computer, and potentially from other defendants' devices. 

Edwards originally cited a range of statements from various communications as defamatory, but their relevance to specific claims of defamation was unclear to the court. Following a hearing, he produced a Supplemental Memorandum identifying six specific communications as additional instances of alleged defamation beyond the letter. These include comments made on Twitter by Mays, keynote presentations by Lambrinidou that allegedly contained harmful statements about Edwards, and an interview where Mays made several damaging claims about Edwards’ actions and the health impacts of water filters. Edwards conceded that some statements were time-barred and could not support his defamation claims. The additional communications are detailed in the Amended Complaint in specific paragraphs.

On May 10, Flint residents requested an independent committee to hear their accounts of harassment and intimidation by researcher Marc Edwards. They expressed concerns about ongoing public attacks and false accusations directed at them by Edwards and his students. The residents criticized Edwards for undermining their knowledge and efforts to address health issues in Flint, labeling his behavior as unethical and corrosive to scientific discourse. They also noted that Dr. Caren Cooper, who nominated Edwards for an award, lacked firsthand knowledge of the community's protests against him and had benefited professionally from her association with him.

On June 30, 2018, Melissa Mays made defamatory statements about Edwards on social media, which he claims were part of a prolonged defamatory campaign against him. Mays shared a misleading photo to accuse Edwards and his team of attacking Flint residents. Edwards contends that he repeatedly tried to correct the falsehoods but faced persistent misquotations and misrepresentations from the defendants. He asserts that their actions implied he violated professional ethical obligations and damaged his reputation, resulting in permanent stigmatization. Edwards denies the truth of these implications and argues that the defendants acted with actual malice, continuing to publish false statements despite knowledge of their inaccuracy.

Edwards alleges extensive efforts to dissuade the defendants from disseminating false statements about him, including conciliatory emails and text messages aimed at clarifying misrepresentations made in a letter dated May 23, 2017. He claims to have provided evidence and requested documentation to support his assertions of falsity. In response, the defendants allegedly published additional defamatory statements, characterizing Edwards’ communications as threats and republishing the defamatory letter online. 

Edwards countered these claims through multiple blog posts on www.flintwaterstudy.org, aiming to refute accusations of unethical conduct and clarify misconceptions about his statements regarding the Flint water crisis. He asserts that the defendants, particularly Lambrinidou, engaged in disparaging behavior, including a series of tweets against him. 

He contends that the interactions through various platforms illustrate that the defendants either knew their statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Edwards further claims that representatives from the American Association for the Advancement of Science found no basis for the allegations in the letter, reinforcing his assertions of falsity.

Edwards outlines the defendants' motives to harm his reputation, citing financial, professional, and personal incentives. Specifically, he notes Lambrinidou's animosity stemming from a romantic relationship and professional disagreements over collaborative research. Following disputes about intellectual property and teaching responsibilities at Virginia Tech, Edwards claims that Lambrinidou refused his suggestions for mediation, leading to her making negative comments about him to Schwartz and Mays, who he alleges believe he treated Lambrinidou unfairly.

Mays is identified as the named plaintiff in a multi-million-dollar class action lawsuit related to the Flint Water Crisis, alleging harm from lead and copper exposure. Edwards asserts that Mays manipulated water samples using a Virginia Tech lead test kit, producing false results that indicated dangerous lead levels. He claims Mays admitted to violating testing protocols but subsequently provided misleading results to the media to support her lawsuit. Edwards felt compelled to report Mays' actions to the Environmental Protection Agency, which funded the testing.

Edwards also suggests that the defendants harbor resentment towards him because of his recognition and perceived association with government interests, which they believe compromises his objectivity. This animosity allegedly motivated the defendants to publish and republish disparaging statements about him, including a defamatory letter aimed at influencing the outcomes of awards for which Edwards and his team were finalists.

Further, on July 18-19, 2016, the defendants formed a group called the Campaign for Lead Free Water, which Edwards claims competes with his work, undermining his credibility in a field where he has gained international recognition. Counts IV and V of his claims allege a civil conspiracy to discredit him and damage his professional reputation through false and misleading statements, which imply unethical or illegal conduct. Edwards contends these actions have caused him significant damages, including reduced grant funding, hindered career advancement, loss of eligibility for awards, diminished earning potential, and severe emotional distress for him and his family.

Edwards alleges several negative impacts resulting from public attacks and accusations by the defendants, including: (1) colleagues' reluctance to nominate him for awards due to fears of retaliation, (2) concerns voiced by research sponsors about his reputation due to the defendants' statements, (3) a decrease in speaking engagements, with some requiring proof of liability insurance, and (4) difficulties in fundraising for his environmental justice initiatives. In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing they are not Virginia residents and lack sufficient contacts with the state to establish personal jurisdiction. They claim that asserting jurisdiction would impose an unreasonable burden and inconvenience on them. Furthermore, the defendants contend that their statements about Edwards are substantially true, protected opinions related to public concerns, and that Edwards' lawsuit undermines the Flint community's self-determination. They assert that he has not sufficiently demonstrated that they acted with actual malice, necessary given his public figure status. The defendants also argue that Edwards failed to plead essential elements for his tortious interference claim and that his conspiracy claims are redundant and lack non-speculative harm. The court will first address the jurisdictional issues before considering the motion to dismiss Counts I and II for defamation, and it will not address Counts III-V. In assessing personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), the burden lies with the plaintiff to show grounds for jurisdiction. However, in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff only needs to make a prima facie showing, with all allegations viewed favorably towards the plaintiff.

A plaintiff must demonstrate sufficient grounds for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction, after which the defendant must present a compelling case against such jurisdiction based on due process concerns. The reviewing court assumes the truth of any uncontradicted evidence submitted by either party during a motion to dismiss. The court uses a two-step analysis to address personal jurisdiction: first, it assesses whether Virginia's long-arm statute allows jurisdiction over the defendants, and second, it evaluates if this jurisdiction aligns with the due process standards of the Fourteenth Amendment. Virginia's long-arm statute allows for personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process, effectively merging the statutory and constitutional inquiries. 

The critical factor is whether the defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Virginia, ensuring adherence to traditional fair play and substantial justice principles. The determination of personal jurisdiction varies based on whether the defendant's contacts are related to the suit. Specific jurisdiction arises when the defendant's contacts with the state form the basis for the suit, while general jurisdiction pertains to unrelated contacts. Edwards asserts only specific jurisdiction under Virginia law, which involves a three-part test: (1) whether the defendant purposefully availed themselves of conducting activities in Virginia, (2) whether the plaintiff's claim arises from these activities, and (3) whether exercising jurisdiction is constitutionally reasonable. 

There is no definitive formula for establishing "purposeful availment." If the plaintiff satisfies the first prong, the court then evaluates the second and third prongs. The second prong requires that the defendant's contacts are the basis for the claim, while the third prong allows the court to consider additional factors to confirm the appropriateness of the jurisdiction. In reviewing Edwards' claims, the court found it challenging to ascertain which allegations supported each claim for relief due to their incorporation by reference throughout the complaint.

Count I and Count II of the defamation claims involve statements made in a May 10, 2018, email to Virginia Tech and various statements from the defendants' social media activities. Edwards utilized an incorporation-by-reference approach, which complicated the identification of specific allegations, prompting the court to request a supplemental brief from Edwards to clarify which statements constituted actionable defamation. Edwards subsequently identified six communications relevant to his claims: 1) Mays' Twitter post from September 9, 2017; 2) Lambrinidou's keynote presentations from late 2017; 3) Mays' February 27, 2018, interview on CAN TV; 4) a Facebook post from a page titled Flint Complaints allegedly by all three defendants; 5) a Facebook post by Schwartz on May 22, 2018; and 6) a June 30, 2018, Twitter post by Mays. 

Edwards asserts that the court has jurisdiction over these communications, noting that establishing personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in the Internet context poses unique challenges. The "purposeful availment" standard allows jurisdiction if a defendant's actions are intended to cause injury in the forum state, as articulated in *Calder v. Jones*. However, mere injury to a forum resident does not establish sufficient connection to the state, as clarified in *Walden v. Fiore*. The appropriate inquiry focuses on the defendant's conduct and its meaningful connection to the forum. The Fourth Circuit has adapted this analysis into a three-part test from *Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.*, allowing for jurisdiction if a defendant directs electronic activity into a state with the intent of engaging in business or interactions there, resulting in a potential cause of action within that state. This standard was further illustrated in *Young*, where Connecticut newspapers were alleged to have defamed a Virginia prison warden through online articles.

Warden Young contended that the district court held specific personal jurisdiction over newspaper defendants based on their intentional defamation of him as a Virginia resident, the accessibility of their articles online in Virginia, and the impact of these statements on his reputation in the state. The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected this argument, affirming that while the effects of the alleged libel in Virginia are relevant, it is crucial to determine whether the defendants specifically directed their conduct toward Virginia. The court clarified that simply posting information online does not automatically subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in every state where the information is accessed, as this would undermine traditional due process principles. 

Edwards, seeking specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants, must demonstrate jurisdiction over each individual claim. The Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, but other appellate courts have established that specific jurisdiction requires a claim-specific analysis. There is no concept of supplemental specific personal jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction must independently exist for each claim, meaning that a single claim's jurisdiction cannot extend to others that do not independently support it.

Edwards failed to establish a prima facie case for specific personal jurisdiction regarding six claims related to defamatory communications in the amended complaint. He could not satisfy the Calder "effects" test to establish jurisdiction over claims stemming from the defendants' social media activity, Lambrinidou's 2017 presentations, or Mays' 2018 interview. Although he alleged multiple instances of defamation across various media, he did not separate these claims into distinct counts.

The text emphasizes that the six additional communications identified do not represent separate claims for personal jurisdiction, despite being grouped under two umbrella counts. Each communication is treated as a distinct cause of action requiring individual jurisdictional analysis. Established legal precedents indicate that separate defamatory statements are considered individual torts, necessitating specific jurisdictional evaluation for each instance. The court must determine if there is a basis for exercising jurisdiction over all seven alleged defamatory communications, including one letter and the six others. The McNeil v. Biaggi Productions case illustrates that merely injuring a Virginia resident is insufficient for jurisdiction; the plaintiff must show purposeful availment through specific connections, such as communications directed at Virginia. The McNeil court found that while certain communications supported jurisdiction for one count, they did not extend to unrelated claims, reaffirming the need for distinct jurisdictional grounds for each allegation.

The McNeil court allowed the case to advance based on specific communications outlined in Count 5. It referenced Gatekeeper Inc. v. Stratech Sys. Ltd., emphasizing that establishing specific personal jurisdiction for one cause of action cannot be used to support unrelated claims based on a defendant's contacts with the forum state, as it would undermine the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction. The court intends to evaluate the jurisdictional basis for each communication and cause of action in Edwards' case.

Edwards claims that six identified communications caused tortious injury in Virginia and were directed to Virginia Tech via social media, but provides limited factual support for the latter assertion. The court is required to view the pleadings favorably towards Edwards but is not obliged to accept conclusory statements or speculative inferences. Citing precedents, the court indicates that a plaintiff must present specific factual evidence to establish personal jurisdiction, particularly against a motion to dismiss.

The court references the Fourth Circuit's prior rejection of jurisdiction based solely on tortious injury within the forum, highlighting the insufficiency of Edwards' claims and drawing parallels to cases involving alleged defamatory statements on social media. In FireClean, LLC v. Tuohy, a defamation claim was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, despite the plaintiff being harmed in Virginia. The court reaffirmed that jurisdiction cannot be based solely on where reputational damage occurred, regardless of the harmful nature of the statements.

Tuohy engaged in various forms of communication with a Virginia-based company, including non-defamatory emails, texts, and social media interactions, and received lubricant samples from the company. Of the 9,181 people who liked Tuohy's allegedly defamatory Facebook posts, only 90 were in Virginia, and some online content may have been processed by Virginia servers. However, the court determined that these interactions did not establish a basis for the defamation claim or indicate purposeful targeting of Virginia. Specifically, the Facebook "likes" were deemed random and not indicative of intent to direct activity towards Virginia, paralleling a prior case where similar online actions did not demonstrate purposeful availment of the forum. Edwards failed to provide evidence that any communications were specifically aimed at Virginia or that Virginia residents engaged with the defendants' social media. Furthermore, the court noted that mere reference to Virginia or Virginia Tech in communications does not suffice to establish jurisdiction if there is no evidence of intent to target Virginia. The court concluded that the nature of the defendants’ contacts with Virginia remains unclear, and the mere mention of Virginia in posts does not confer specific jurisdiction.

Edwards' allegations against the defendants regarding defamatory statements directed at Virginia Tech lack sufficient evidence to establish personal jurisdiction. Specifically, there is no support indicating that the statements were purposefully aimed at Virginia or that they were made with the intent to reach residents or businesses in Virginia, as outlined in paragraphs 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, and 63. The references to social media and keynote presentations do not demonstrate a targeted approach to Virginia. 

The court emphasizes that prior case law, such as *Headstrong Corp. v. Jha*, supports the conclusion that jurisdiction cannot be established merely through the republishing of statements without a direct connection to Virginia. Consequently, Count I and Count II, based on those paragraphs, are dismissed without prejudice.

However, the court will exercise specific jurisdiction over Mays regarding a defamatory letter sent to Timothy Sands, the president of Virginia Tech. Edwards successfully meets the three-part test for jurisdiction in the context of Internet communications. The defendants are alleged to have participated in the drafting and sending of the letter to Virginia Tech, demonstrating intent to target the institution. The letter's content indicates a clear intention to damage Edwards' professional reputation within Virginia, thereby establishing a potential cause of action for defamation cognizable in the state.

Courts have recognized specific jurisdiction in cases involving allegedly defamatory communications sent to particular recipients, including analogues like faxes, phone calls, and letters from out-of-state defendants to forum residents, as these communications can directly give rise to a cause of action. While case law for defamation via email is less extensive, several district courts have established specific jurisdiction over out-of-state emailers when the causes of action are linked to the transmission of allegedly tortious emails. In this case, defendants claimed that their actions were not related to Virginia and focused instead on Edwards' conduct in Michigan. They argued that the only relevant actions were the transmission of a few tweets or emails to many recipients, including Virginia Tech, and contended that any injury in Virginia was incidental. However, evidence showed that the emails specifically targeted Virginia Tech's president and sought to prompt an investigation into Edwards' conduct, indicating a deliberate intent to affect Edwards in Virginia. The defendants' assertion that minimal communications could not establish purposeful availment was deemed unsubstantiated given the clear intent shown in the correspondence.

The defendants acknowledge that the essence of jurisdictional analysis is based on the quality of contacts with the forum, where even a single contact can establish minimum jurisdiction. They reference case law illustrating that a single contact can suffice for establishing jurisdiction, notably citing McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. In this case, the email transmission of a defamatory letter to the president of a Virginia university is emphasized as not being a random or passive act, but rather a targeted communication intended to provoke action in Virginia, thus supporting a finding of purposeful availment. 

Edwards must connect each defendant to this transmission, particularly highlighting Melissa Mays. Edwards alleges that metadata shows the letter was saved on Mays' computer, and she is linked to the creation of a derogatory phrase used in the letter through her prior publication. Although this metadata does not definitively prove distribution from her computer, the circumstantial evidence is deemed sufficient to support jurisdiction over her. 

Conversely, the connections between Schwartz and Lambrinidou and the letter's transmission are described as weak, lacking factual support for claims of joint participation in sending the letter. Edwards' allegations are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over these defendants, as relying solely on vague pleadings is inadequate for overcoming a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Edwards attempts to establish the involvement of defendants Schwartz and Lambrinidou in the creation and dissemination of a Letter by citing an article and referencing an anonymous Facebook page and website, Flintcomplaints.com, which purportedly indicated the Letter was "crafted for us," referring to Flint residents. However, the court finds these allegations insufficient to infer their involvement in drafting or transmitting the Letter to Virginia Tech. Consequently, the court grants the motion to dismiss Schwartz and Lambrinidou for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Regarding Mays, the court assesses whether exercising personal jurisdiction aligns with principles of fair play and substantial justice, emphasizing that jurisdiction must be "constitutionally reasonable." The court considers multiple factors, including the burden on the defendant, the forum state’s interests, and the plaintiff’s interests in effective relief. The court concludes that exercising jurisdiction over Mays is reasonable, noting no random or fortuitous connection to Virginia. Virginia has a vested interest in ensuring effective redress for its residents, particularly Edwards, who is employed at a public research university there. The court also finds that litigating in Virginia does not impose an undue burden on Mays and serves the judicial system's interest in efficient resolution of disputes, especially in defamation cases linked to statements directed at Virginia. Mays fails to present compelling reasons against the court's assertion of jurisdiction.

The court asserts its authority to exercise specific jurisdiction over Mays concerning the allegedly defamatory statements in the Letter, denying the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court will now address the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), such a motion assesses the sufficiency of the complaint without resolving factual disputes or the merits of the claim. To survive dismissal, a complaint must provide enough factual detail, assumed to be true, to establish a plausible claim for relief. Complaints need not include extensive factual allegations but must present sufficient facts allowing the court to reasonably infer the defendant's liability. However, mere assertions of misconduct require factual enhancement to shift from possibility to plausibility. Legal conclusions, unsupported by well-pleaded facts, are not accepted as true. The court emphasizes the importance of early complaint evaluation to mitigate issues related to frivolous litigation, especially in defamation cases, which are scrutinized more rigorously due to their potential chilling effect on free speech. Courts often dismiss defamation claims that rely on constitutionally protected speech. Additionally, in assessing a motion to dismiss, courts typically only consider documents explicitly included in the complaint.

The court's analysis during a motion to dismiss is generally confined to the allegations within the complaint. Two exceptions allow consideration of external documents without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. The first exception includes documents explicitly referenced or attached to the complaint. The second allows for documents not included or referenced in the complaint to be considered if they are integral to the complaint and undisputed in authenticity. A document is deemed integral if its existence supports the legal claims asserted. The rationale for this exception is that if the plaintiff has actual notice of and has relied on such documents, the concern over lack of notice is mitigated. 

In the current case, the plaintiff only attached three versions of a letter, while the defendants submitted several documents, including online articles related to the Flint water crisis. Although the plaintiff acknowledges that the court may consider documents referenced in the complaint, they argue that the defendants' submissions and factual claims regarding the truth of certain statements should be addressed at trial or summary judgment, not at the motion to dismiss stage. The court concludes that it is either unnecessary or inappropriate to consider the defendants' exhibits and materials at this stage, except for one specific exhibit, emphasizing that mere references to documents do not incorporate them into the complaint.

A document deemed to have "no independent legal significance" to the plaintiff's claim was not considered integral to the complaint. The court cited Corbett v. Duerring, indicating that while multiple newspaper articles were presented as exhibits, they could not be judicially noticed during a motion to dismiss. Conversely, a transcript from a presentation titled "Truth Seeking in an Age of Tribalism: Lessons from the Flint Water Crisis" was recognized as integral and incorporated by reference into the pleadings. The plaintiff, Edwards, did not dispute the authenticity of this transcript but challenged the defendants’ interpretations and implications drawn from it, asserting that they misrepresented his statements. He contended that the transcript, which he actively referenced, supported his claims of actual malice and falsity regarding allegedly defamatory statements. Specifically, he highlighted that the word "tribal" was absent from his presentation. Edwards also argued that the context of the entire letter in which the defamatory statements appeared would lead an objective reader to perceive him as prejudiced. The court acknowledged that it could consider the transcript without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Furthermore, the court confirmed it had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and noted the necessity to apply Virginia's choice-of-law rules in defamation claims, adhering to the lex loci delicti commissi rule, which applies the law of the location where the alleged wrong occurred.

Virginia courts apply the law of the state where defamatory statements are first published in defamation cases. For defamation via email, the place of publication is determined by where the email was opened and read. If a plaintiff does not specify where an email was opened, courts may infer this based on the circumstances, as seen in *Velocity Micro, Inc. v. J.A.Z. Mktg. Inc.*, where it was assumed the email was opened in Minnesota because the defendant was based there. In this case, since Virginia Tech is located in Virginia and the email was sent to its administrator, it is likely that publication occurred in Virginia, thus Virginia law applies.

To establish a defamation claim in Virginia, a plaintiff must prove three elements: publication, an actionable statement, and the requisite intent. A statement is considered defamatory per se if it suggests unfitness for a job or questions integrity, leading to presumed harm to reputation without needing proof of damages. The court notes that while publication is not disputed, the elements of an actionable statement and requisite intent are contested. An actionable statement must be false and defamatory, harming the reputation of the individual such that it lowers their standing in the community.

Merely offensive or unpleasant statements do not constitute defamation; only those that render the plaintiff odious, infamous, or ridiculous are actionable. Statements that are unflattering or hurtful to feelings without factual content are not actionable. To be considered potentially false, a statement must be factual; thus, opinions are generally not actionable as they cannot be objectively classified as true or false. Virginia law stipulates that speech lacking a provably false factual connotation cannot form the basis for a defamation claim. Defamation per quod, or defamation by implication, is recognized, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that the statements made were intended to convey a defamatory implication, that such implications were perceived by the audience, and that the plaintiff suffered harm as a result. Courts must interpret the meanings of alleged defamatory statements in favor of the plaintiff, but such meanings cannot extend beyond their ordinary interpretations. It is the court's role to determine if a statement has a provably false factual connotation and whether it can be defamatory. While opinions are typically protected, distinguishing between opinion and fact can be complex. The Supreme Court has identified that statements not provable as false are protected under the First Amendment, emphasizing that actionable statements must assert demonstrably false facts verifiable by objective evidence.

Statements of subjective belief, based on disclosed facts, are considered opinions rather than assertions of fact if a reasonable reader would view them as such. This protection extends to loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language that negates the impression of stating actual facts, including rhetorical hyperbole and vigorous epithets. In defamation cases, the intent required varies based on the plaintiff's status: public figures, private individuals, and limited-purpose public figures. Private citizens can be treated as public figures in specific controversies, while limited-purpose public figures are those who actively engage in public disputes to influence outcomes. They are subject to the "actual malice" standard due to their access to media for rebuttal and their voluntary exposure to defamatory risks. The actual malice standard is rooted in the principle of robust public debate, allowing for sharp criticisms of public figures. Determining if a plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure is a legal issue, assessed by their involvement in the controversy that led to the defamation.

The Fourth Circuit outlines five factors for determining if a plaintiff is a public figure in defamation cases: 1) access to effective communication channels; 2) voluntary assumption of a prominent role in a public controversy; 3) efforts to influence the outcome of that controversy; 4) the existence of the controversy prior to the defamatory statements; and 5) retention of public figure status at the time of the alleged defamation. The second and third factors are often combined into a key question regarding the plaintiff's voluntary role in the controversy and their attempts to influence it.

In the case at hand, the court concludes that Edwards qualifies as a limited-purpose public figure, subject to scrutiny under the "actual malice" standard. The allegedly defamatory statements relate to a significant public controversy—the Flint water crisis—impacting the general public. Edwards had ample access to effective communication, evidenced by extensive media coverage, recognitions from major publications, and his engagement on social media. He received notable accolades, including being recognized by Time Magazine as one of the most influential people in the world and receiving various prestigious awards for his work in Flint.

Edwards's visibility and involvement have invited public commentary, as he has actively participated in the public discourse surrounding the Flint water crisis. His self-described role in this context further reinforces his status as a public figure who has sought to influence the crisis's resolution.

Plaintiffs in this case are recognized as public figures due to their charitable activities, which are acknowledged in their complaint. The controversy surrounding Edwards predates the publication of a Letter on May 10, 2018, which was a response to disputes related to his advocacy work in Flint. Edwards is identified as a limited-purpose public figure, requiring him to prove that any allegedly defamatory statements were made with actual malice, as outlined by the Supreme Court.

Under Virginia and federal law, Edwards has not successfully stated a claim for defamation in Counts I and II. The court analyzed the Letter and the specific statements in question, concluding that many qualify as protected opinion under First Amendment jurisprudence because they cannot be objectively proven as true or false. Statements that might suggest verifiable facts either lack sufficient defamatory impact or are recognized as subjective opinions regarding contentious public matters.

The court emphasizes that it must assess not only whether a statement has a defamatory implication but also the context in which it was made to determine if it is protected by the First Amendment. While the Supreme Court in Milkovich denied a distinct constitutional privilege for opinion, it stated that a statement is protected if it does not inherently imply a provably false fact. To evaluate whether a statement conveys a falsehood, the Fourth Circuit employs a four-factor test, examining the choice of words, the statement's capacity for truth, its context within the overall discourse, and its place within the broader social context. This second factor is essential for all plaintiffs to establish a viable claim.

Words that cannot be classified as true or false are deemed non-actionable in legal contexts, as established in *Potomac Valve* and reiterated in *Biospherics*. Courts must evaluate statements not only by their content but also by their context and overall message, as per the Fourth Circuit's guidance. This assessment is based on how an objective, reasonable reader would interpret the statement. Even objectively verifiable statements may be classified as opinions if they exhibit weak substantiation or a subjective nature, which reasonable readers would recognize and discount. This principle ensures that public discourse remains vibrant, allowing for imaginative expression and rhetorical hyperbole, which are common in social interactions.

The excerpt highlights a comparison between different cases involving hyperbolic language, illustrating that context influences how statements are perceived. Specifically, the term "traitor" in a labor dispute was considered non-actionable as it was understood not to be used literally, while exaggerated rhetoric in a professional directory was deemed inappropriate. In the present case, the court will apply the relevant factors to evaluate statements made by Edwards concerning the Flint water crisis. Edwards acknowledges that the dispute is linked to this public health issue, but contends that this context does not justify the publication of false statements harming his reputation, a position the court supports. The court recognizes that the disagreements detailed in the Letter are closely tied to the Flint crisis.

The contamination of Flint's municipal water supply incited significant national media attention and a fervent public discourse, encompassing the Letter and various social media exchanges among the involved parties. In January 2016, both state and federal authorities declared a state of emergency in Flint, leading to numerous congressional hearings, partisan blame, and extensive litigation. The crisis remains unresolved, with lawsuits pending in at least seven state and federal courts in Michigan. Despite the commitment to open debate on public issues, the existence of controversy does not justify the dissemination of falsehoods that harm reputations. The context of a heated public health debate influences how claims are interpreted, with parties involved likely viewed as engaging in spirited critique. Edwards attributed the conflict to differing views on community activism and allegations that he represents government interests while being criticized for his water testing methods and public statements. Both parties use blogs and social media to promote their positions on the Flint crisis and to criticize each other. Defendants accused Edwards of various misdeeds, including co-opting state interests, undermining community knowledge, and exploiting the crisis for personal gain. In response, Edwards and a student published counter-arguments, leading to a prolonged and contentious exchange across multiple communication platforms. The interactions reflect a deep mistrust that has permeated into public discourse.

In 2017, Edwards was the subject of a profile in the New York Times Magazine, where defendants made disparaging remarks about him. Additionally, the contents of a Letter related to these issues were discussed in an article from East Village Magazine. The Letter included hyperlinks to articles from various news sources addressing controversies surrounding the Flint water crisis, including claims about falsified research and the implications for the special prosecutor's case. The public knowledge of these controversies is relevant for understanding how a reasonable reader might interpret the statements in the Letter, particularly considering the adversarial context between the parties involved.

The Letter itself is characterized by emotionally charged language and a clear bias, lacking any pretense of neutrality. It begins with a request for recipients to guide the authors on filing a formal complaint against Marc Edwards, claiming the attached Letter represents a full complaint regarding his behavior since January 2016. The Letter outlines four main points of grievance: violation of democratic principles, obstruction of Flint residents' self-determination, unfounded defamation of residents, and a lack of oversight of Edwards’ actions in the scientific community.

Specifically, the authors express discontent with a formal complaint Edwards filed against a Wayne State University professor, asserting it fails to aid Flint residents and exacerbates their struggles. They argue that Edwards misrepresented their grievances without their consent, sarcastically suggesting that the complaint should be titled "Marc Edwards v. Whomever He Chooses," and assert that Flint residents have their own voice and did not authorize Edwards to act on their behalf. They criticize Edwards' claims of representing the community as insincere, pointing out that his evidence of collaboration comes from a small, loyal group rather than the broader community.

Residents of Flint express strong objections to Mr. Edwards' behavior, viewing his actions as self-serving and detrimental rather than protective. They describe themselves as "exhausted" by his antics, which they believe threaten an ongoing criminal investigation into Legionnaires' deaths, a key source of justice for them. The authors criticize Edwards for making disparaging comments about their bathing habits and for allegedly undermining allies who provided important information regarding bacteria issues. They emphasize their desire for scientific discourse that truly addresses their experiences and needs, feeling misrepresented and silenced by Edwards. The letter calls for Edwards to prioritize the residents' lived experiences and for scientific and engineering representatives to offer protection from him, initiate an investigation centered on their voices, and form a committee with experts in environmental justice. A tone of exasperation permeates the letter, evident in the capitalization of words like NEEDS and LIVES, and statements highlighting the residents' leadership in activism. The letter's subjective nature and partisan tone suggest it aims to influence public debate rather than merely present facts. However, the court will still assess whether specific statements imply objective facts that could be deemed defamatory.

The court will evaluate statements under the first and second Ollman factors, focusing on whether the wording supports or undermines any implication of defamatory facts and the verifiability of those statements. Verifiability is crucial, as established by the Fourth Circuit in Milkovich, emphasizing that unverifiable statements cannot be seen as asserting actual facts. This lack of verifiability may lead juries to base decisions on biases rather than facts, potentially stifling First Amendment activities.

In the context of paragraphs 13(a) and 13(i), which request investigations into Mr. Edwards due to alleged professional misconduct affecting Flint residents, Edwards argues that these statements imply he is guilty of wrongdoing and lacks integrity. He contends that the claims are false and that no protection from him is necessary. The court recognizes that the signatories' feelings of needing protection constitute an opinion, as does Edwards' assertion that no one needs safeguarding from him. The call for an investigation does not inherently imply defamatory facts; rather, it invites public scrutiny of Edwards' actions, which is permissible for public figures like him. Inquiry, however uncomfortable, does not equate to accusation, and the language used cannot be manipulated to assert certainty where there is none. The case underscores the balance between protecting reputations and upholding free speech rights.

Courts grant journalists and commentators increased leeway in addressing public issues, emphasizing that calling for an investigation into a public figure, such as Edwards regarding the Flint water crisis, is not inherently defamatory. Edwards' active involvement in a controversial public debate and advocacy work subjects him to heightened scrutiny, which differs from the treatment of private individuals. The Flint water crisis exemplifies a significant public concern, reinforcing the necessity to investigate influential figures. The context of calls for an investigation indicates they stem from the personal experiences and opinions of the signatories, rather than accusations of specific criminal behavior. Statements regarding Edwards' "abuses of professional power" and the "harm" caused are viewed as subjective opinions lacking objective verification. Such broad, non-specific language is likely to be interpreted as opinion by a reasonable audience, particularly since it does not cite specific instances of misconduct but rather generalizes conduct over several years.

Statements that are "indefinite and ambiguous" lack a precise consensus of meaning, as noted in Ollman. In Spirito v. Peninsula Airport Commission, specific comments about a plaintiff’s conduct—specifically a single incident of document shredding—were highlighted as potentially wrongful, implying a factual basis that could be proven true or false. However, many accusations in the Letter are not objectively verifiable. The Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich emphasized that defamatory language must articulate verifiable events, as evidenced by comparing sworn testimonies to determine if perjury occurred. Similarly, in Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, the effectiveness of a rain repellant product was deemed verifiable through objective testing. The Milkovich case did not define specific evidence requirements for verifiability, but vague claims about "abuses of professional power" are seen as subjective rather than factual. The court noted that it cannot conceive a method to verify the complained-of statements without resorting to speculation, aligning with Phantom Touring, which ruled that certain critical descriptions were non-actionable due to lack of objective evidence. Lastly, the vaguely described "harm" is unverifiable as it lacks specificity in type or reference to any objectively verifiable events.

Mr. Edwards is accused of exploiting residents' crises for personal gain and building his professional power through bullying tactics. He claims that statements in paragraph 13(b) are defamatory, alleging they imply he has engaged in professional misconduct and lacks integrity. However, these statements are framed as constitutionally protected opinions, contextualized by preceding remarks that criticize his behavior as petty and vindictive. The court cites legal precedents affirming that opinions regarding a person's character or conduct, especially when based on the speaker's perspective, do not constitute defamation. Virginia law supports this by rejecting defamation claims based on unflattering expressions. Consequently, the court concludes that describing Edwards' actions as "dishonest, paternalistic, and exploitative" is protected speech.

The adjectives used in the critique are interpreted as subjective opinions of the authors rather than factual claims. The relative nature of terms like "exploitative" and "paternalistic" indicates their dependence on personal perspective, highlighting the lack of a universally accepted meaning. Such evaluative language falls within the realm of non-actionable opinion, as established in Ollman, which emphasizes the ambiguity of statements lacking a precise meaning. Claims regarding Flint residents feeling "exhausted from Mr. Edwards bullying" are also subjective, as perceptions of bullying can vary, making it non-defamatory. Legal precedents support that characterizations, such as calling someone a "bully," do not constitute provable facts. The context of the statements reinforces their opinionative nature, with phrases critiquing Edwards' conduct as violating self-determination and detracting from his claims of humanitarianism. Edwards does not assert that these statements are defamatory, acknowledging their emotional rhetoric and hyperbolic language, which signal their subjective character to a reasonable reader. Lastly, the ongoing portrayal of Flint residents as "dumb, dirty, and vulnerable" is noted as misguided and offensive, but still reflects opinion rather than factual assertion.

Edwards argues that a statement inaccurately depicts him as having labeled Flint residents as "dumb, dirty, and vulnerable to being misled," asserting that he has never made such statements or behaved in a disrespectful manner towards them. He claims this portrayal undermines his integrity, damages his reputation, and diminishes his standing in the professional community. The statement in question does not accuse Edwards of direct quotes but suggests an alleged portrayal, which the authors deem misguided and offensive. They provide a rationale for their opinion, indicating that the statement does not support a defamation claim. 

In the Letter, the main paragraph, titled "Unsubstantiated defamation of Flint residents," includes subparagraphs that articulate the basis for the authors' claims. In subparagraph 3(a), the authors emphasize that Flint residents discovered their water contamination before Edwards' involvement and assert their leadership in local activism. Subparagraph 3(b) counters Edwards' claims regarding communication about water safety and hygiene practices, explaining that residents continue to experience health issues linked to bathing. Subparagraph 3(c) critiques Edwards for incorrectly accusing others of instilling fear about bathing and includes a hyperlink to a 2016 article from The Guardian. The article cites Edwards discussing improvements in water safety, noting that while lead levels are declining, they remain too high for direct consumption.

Ruffalo and his organization, Water Defense, reported finding lead and hazardous chemicals in Flint's water, leading to increased fear among residents, particularly parents who began restricting their children's hygiene practices. In contrast, Edwards, hired by the city to manage water testing, acknowledged the improvements in water quality due to phosphate treatments and urged residents to flush their systems to remove lead. Despite his criticisms of state and federal agencies, he questioned the credibility of Ruffalo's group, suggesting they lacked the scientific expertise necessary for accurate water sampling. 

There is a dispute regarding the portrayal of Edwards’ comments, with claims that he implied Flint residents were "dumb, dirty, and vulnerable." The authors of a related article did provide a factual basis for these characterizations, allowing readers to assess their fairness. Edwards refuted claims that he misrepresented data, accused residents of neglecting hygiene, or falsely stated that shigella was present in the water, describing such allegations as lies. He maintained that his statements were consistent with guidance from the CDC and that he adhered to professional standards. His argument suggests that the allegedly defamatory statements in question may have been misattributed to him.

Edwards claims that the use of the term "lie" by the authors suggests he lacks integrity and is unfit for his professional duties. He questions whether he ever made the statements attributed to him regarding Flint residents being informed about shigella in their tap water or that they caused a shigella outbreak due to fear of the water. Citing Virginia case law, particularly Tharpe v. Saunders, the court acknowledges that false attribution of statements can harm reputation, allowing for defamation claims. However, for such claims to be actionable in Virginia, the attributed statements must not only be false but also defamatory, producing a "sting" to one's reputation. The court references the standards for defamatory language, which include those that injure reputation or subject an individual to scorn or ridicule. Edwards does not adequately demonstrate how the alleged false attribution regarding shigella is defamatory, nor does the court identify the necessary level of harm.

Edwards has not demonstrated any defamatory implications from the statements attributed to him, particularly regarding the first alleged false attribution. For the second claim, which asserts that Flint residents "caused" a shigella outbreak by changing bathing habits due to water fear, the court finds that Edwards has (1) inadequately pleaded falsity and (2) the statement is substantially true. Under Virginia law, plaintiffs must plead facts that would allow a reasonable person to view the statement as false. Although the court typically credits the plaintiff's allegations unless they are vague or contradict external documents, Edwards' claims are both vague and contradicted by undisputed evidence. Edwards initially denies making the claim about residents not bathing but later states he has always relied on data from the CDC concerning shigella. The pivotal issue is whether he claimed that residents' altered bathing habits caused the outbreak. Despite his denials, Edwards indicates he will present evidence at trial showing that altered bathing habits contributed to the outbreak, suggesting an inconsistency in his position.

Edwards' defamation claim hinges on the assertion that Flint residents were falsely attributed with causing a shigella outbreak through changes in bathing habits. However, the claim lacks clear allegations of falsity. The defendants' motion to dismiss includes Exhibit 2, which the court previously determined was integrated into Edwards' pleadings, demonstrating that the attribution to Edwards is largely true. Although substantial truth is typically assessed at the summary judgment stage, this case allows for an exception where sufficient facts for an affirmative defense are evident in the complaint. The court highlights that when there is a conflict between the allegations in the complaint and the attached exhibit, the exhibit takes precedence. This principle holds even if the exhibit is attached by the defendant but incorporated by reference in the plaintiff's complaint. The court concludes that it can consider Exhibit 2 for its truth and prioritize its factual content over Edwards' conflicting claims in the Amended Complaint. Additionally, the nature and purpose of the document must be evaluated before accepting its contents as true.

Edwards claims actual malice regarding the defendants' use of the term "tribal" in reference to his remarks, asserting that the term does not appear in the transcript of his presentation (Exhibit 2). He argues that defendants acted with malice because the term was falsely attributed to him. The transcript, prepared by a third party and not the defendants, is not a unilateral document and likely reflects Edwards' actual words rather than a self-serving narrative from the defendants. Edwards included hyperlinks to the transcript in his pleadings, indicating he relied on its contents for his allegations, which implies he adopted its truth. The "exhibit-prevails rule" allows the transcript to be used against any contradictory claims made by Edwards in his pleadings. 

The transcript, from a lecture titled "Truth-Seeking in the Age of Tribalism" dated February 20, 2018, contains statements made by Edwards about the response to the Flint water crisis, emphasizing public health issues and a significant outbreak of shigella. These remarks demonstrate that the substance of the defendants' attribution is justifiable, thereby undermining his defamation claim. The court references precedents indicating that a statement is not considered false unless it would mislead readers differently than the pleaded truth.

Edwards claims that the authors' labeling of certain statements as "lies" amounts to accusing him of being a "liar" and of manipulating scientific data. However, the court finds no support for the latter accusation. The term "lie," as used in this context, is determined to be non-actionable rhetorical hyperbole, as established in *Schnare v. Ziessow*. The court notes the inconsistency in defamation cases involving accusations of lying, emphasizing that context is crucial in determining whether such statements are actionable or merely opinion. Judge Robert D. Sack's treatise highlights that the terms 'lie' and 'liar' often reflect strong disagreement rather than literal accusations of falsehood, which may be actionable if they imply specific false assertions. The court references multiple federal cases where accusations of dishonesty are construed as non-actionable opinions. In *Schnare v. Ziessow*, the author made statements about a rival breeder during a controversy over Labrador breed standards, characterizing the rival's claims as "half-truths" and "outright lies." The court analyzed these statements within the context of public debate, reinforcing the notion that such characterizations often fall under protected expressions of opinion rather than actionable defamation.

Ziessow claims that an affidavit contains numerous lies and inaccuracies, casting doubt on its credibility. The plaintiff alleges that Ziessow's article is libelous for accusing him of perjury related to breed standard revisions. The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the case, emphasizing that opinions labeled as defamatory must be assessed in context. It noted that while Ziessow's terms like "lie" and "fabrication" appear accusatory, they are interpreted as opinion or hyperbole rather than factual assertions of wrongdoing. The court determined that statements describing the plaintiff's affidavit as a mix of "fact and fiction" reflect the contentious nature of the debate rather than defamation. Additionally, it referenced a related case involving a Wired magazine article where the plaintiff claimed defamation from being labeled a liar in the context of a public debate on vaccination. The Fourth Circuit concluded that statements arising from controversy do not constitute defamation.

In dismissing the case, the district court highlighted several critical points regarding the vaccine controversy, emphasizing its status as a significant public issue that enhances constitutional and common law protections. The court noted that prior to his controversial statement, Offit expressed frustration with his opponents, using figurative language that indicated a lack of intent to assert factual claims. The court reasoned that Offit's comment "she lies" cannot be interpreted as a literal accusation of dishonesty against the plaintiff but rather as an expression of frustration regarding the plaintiff's views, which Offit considered misguided. The court also expressed concern that the plaintiff's claim of falsity could entangle the court in a contentious debate about vaccine risks and the truthfulness of opposing sides. Additionally, the excerpt references the case of Faltas v. State Newspaper, where the plaintiff alleged defamation based on critical statements made in response to her op-ed about homosexuality. Faltas claimed that these statements mischaracterized her views and accused her of dishonesty, leading to her defamation claim against the newspaper and its staff.

Faltas was determined to be a limited-purpose public figure due to her involvement in a public controversy, which distinguished her case from Milkovich. In Milkovich, the statements at issue involved a sports writer accusing a high school coach of lying under oath, a serious allegation tied to a verifiable incident. In contrast, the statements in Faltas' case originated from a letter responding to her op-ed on a controversial topic, characterized by subjective opinions rather than verifiable facts. The court concluded that reasonable readers would interpret the letter as an emotional rebuttal to Faltas' views rather than a literal accusation of lying. The allegedly defamatory statements suggested that Faltas drew conclusions without supporting data or manipulated statistics, which the court deemed as rhetorical hyperbole. Additionally, the court highlighted that the scientific issues underlying the statements about homosexuality were not easily provable. The case parallels previous cases like Schnare, where parties engaged in opposing sides of a public controversy, suggesting that the heated nature of the discourse would be evident to readers.

The characteristics surrounding the statements in paragraph 13(d) closely resemble those in prior cases, suggesting that the Letter embodies an "opinionated and hyperbolic screed," where the challenged statements should be viewed as "expressions of disagreement" or "contempt" rather than factual claims. The assertion that Flint residents contributed to the shigella outbreak by changing their bathing habits would lead the court into a complex scientific debate, which is typically avoided in defamation cases. Edwards intends to introduce evidence from a CDC presentation linking altered bathing habits to the outbreak, which further complicates the matter. 

The authors of the Letter do not present themselves as neutral observers; rather, it is clear they are involved in a contentious public dispute, which would lead a reasonable reader to approach their statements with skepticism. The issues raised regarding what Flint residents were told about the outbreak cannot be definitively proven true or false with objective evidence. Consequently, a reasonable reader would interpret the authors' use of the term "lie" as expressions of dissent rather than as accusations of knowing falsehood. This aligns with judicial precedent that recognizes such language as nonactionable rhetorical hyperbole, reflecting a vigorous disagreement rather than factual assertions.

The emotional nature of the debate surrounding a sensitive topic suggests that a reasonable viewer would perceive the defendant's statement as an expression of outrage rather than a factual accusation. Specifically, Mr. Edwards argues that a statement implies he lacks integrity and is unfit for his professional role, which he claims is factually untrue since he has never misrepresented or silenced Flint residents. The court finds the statement non-actionable due to its rhetorical, figurative language and lack of verifiability. Reasonable readers would not interpret "silence" literally, nor would they view "misrepresent" as a factual assertion; instead, these terms express the authors' subjective frustration regarding broader disagreements. The context indicates the authors were expressing indignation over claims about Flint residents’ bathing habits, using hyperbolic language. Additionally, the statement does not contain provably false content necessary to support a defamation claim, as it lacks objective parameters for verification. Any effort to prove its falsity would require subjective interpretations of the signatories' views. The document also references a previous case, highlighting that generalized statements of unfitness do not imply factual support for defamation. Similarly, the unverifiable nature of the statement means it cannot reasonably imply the authors have undisclosed damaging knowledge. Lastly, Mr. Edwards's accusations against individuals for allegedly instilling fear in residents about bathing are described as false and insulting.

Mr. Edwards contests accusations that he lacks integrity and is unfit for professional duties, claiming that statements made regarding Flint residents' bathing habits are factually false. He denies having made inflammatory remarks, such as "returned to a state of filth," and asserts he referenced CDC statistics about Flint's bathing practices. However, evidence from a speech he made at Swarthmore College contradicts his claim, as he suggested that parents who allowed their children to bathe in Flint's water were exposing them to harm, influencing many residents to change their bathing habits. CDC studies later indicated that 80% of Flint residents altered their bathing routines. The phrase "state of filth" is characterized as rhetorical hyperbole, not a factual assertion, indicating that a reasonable reader would not interpret it as a direct quote from Edwards. Furthermore, while Edwards claims not to have made erroneous accusations against Scott Smith, Water Defense, or FACHEP, his statements are ambiguous and suggest that any accusations made were not incorrect. The court finds that these matters, being subjective opinions rather than factual statements, do not substantiate claims of defamation or suggest Edwards' lack of integrity. Lastly, it is noted that there appears to be no oversight from the scientific community regarding Edwards' work or the impact of his statements on Flint residents.

Mr. Edwards asserts that he has made statements regarding the absence of bacteria or dangerous pathogens in Flint residents' water, despite lacking microbiological expertise and conducting no mass testing. He contends that certain statements in paragraph 13(g) of the document imply he lacks integrity and is unqualified for his professional role, suggesting he is not subject to the same peer review and oversight as his peers and that he abuses his authority to harm individuals. Edwards counters these claims by affirming that he is indeed subject to the same scrutiny as other academics and maintains integrity in his work. He argues that the accusations misrepresent his comments about bathing and are therefore false.

Furthermore, Edwards highlights that the language in the challenged statements conveys "subjective and speculative supposition," which the Fourth Circuit has deemed unlikely to constitute actionable facts. He argues the authors' claims reflect their subjective impressions rather than verifiable facts. The inclusion of cautionary phrases like "to our knowledge" indicates that the statements should be interpreted as opinion rather than fact, thus diminishing their potential for actionable defamation. Edwards also disputes implications in the final statement of paragraph 13(g) that he has violated professional norms, made irresponsible statements, and is unfit for his position as a professor.

Verification of whether Edwards has made statements claiming the absence of dangerous pathogens in Flint's water is theoretically possible. The case Tharpe establishes that a defamatory statement may not be in the content of the quote but in the verifiability of the claim itself. Edwards argues that generalizations in scientific discourse can be deemed inappropriate or irresponsible. However, a reasonable reader would likely interpret the attributed statement as a subjective or oversimplified paraphrase rather than a literal representation of Edwards' views.

Even if the court assumes that the statement was attributed to Edwards, it lacks the necessary "sting" for actionable defamation under Virginia law. The Virginia standard for defamation, particularly regarding false attribution, suggests that significant reputational injury must be demonstrated. The Echtenkamp case illustrates that statements perceived as critical in an employment context were not defamatory because they did not imply unfitness or integrity issues nor render the plaintiff odious or infamous.

In this instance, Edwards claims a false attribution rather than a statement made about him to others. However, the precedent from Echtenkamp indicates that the alleged attribution lacks sufficient sting to support a defamation claim. A single "inappropriate" or "irresponsible" comment, especially one that does not significantly harm Edwards' professional reputation, does not meet the threshold for defamation per se or general defamation. Comparisons to other cases reinforce that the statements attributed to Edwards do not rise to the level of reputational harm necessary for a valid claim.

Mr. Edwards has been criticized for dismissing concerns regarding the Flint Water Crisis and has inaccurately claimed that the crisis ended over two years ago. He seeks to end the negative impact of these criticisms to facilitate healing and address ongoing issues. In reference to paragraph 13(h), he denies ever calling Flint residents "tribal," asserting that such an attribution falsely implies he is racist or prejudiced. Edwards clarifies that he mentioned "the age of tribalism" in a political context, not with any derogatory intent. The defendants concede he did not use the term "tribal" but argue his statements suggested Flint residents caused their own health issues, perpetuating harmful stereotypes. Edwards contends that accusations of him causing division among residents and lacking integrity are false, emphasizing that the term "rift" is vague and subject to interpretation, making it non-actionable as a statement of fact. The imprecision of the term renders it unprovable and more opinion-based, complicating any legal assessment of its truth or falsity.

The only remaining allegedly defamatory statement in the case claims that Mr. Edwards referred to Flint residents as "tribal." Edwards contends that this characterization implies he is "racist, bigoted, and/or prejudiced." Defendants acknowledge that Edwards did not technically use the word "tribal," but the inclusion of the term in quotation marks may mislead readers into believing it was a direct quotation. Quotation marks typically indicate exact speech, suggesting faithful representation. However, a reasonable reader, aware of the broader context and emotional tone of the Letter, would likely interpret the statement as a subjective characterization rather than a direct quote. This interpretation is supported by the precedent set in Phoenix Trading, Inc. v. Loops LLC, which indicates that audiences in public debates expect exaggerations and mischaracterizations. Furthermore, the discussion references Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., where defamation claims arose from fabricated quotations that misrepresented the subject's statements. In that case, the court found that the use of quotation marks to attribute false comments constituted a material alteration of the individual's words, undermining their true meaning.

In the case discussed, Malcolm cited Masson, highlighting that colleagues regarded Masson as a significant scholar, a view not supported by over 40 hours of taped interviews. The Supreme Court asserted that a jury could find the published statements to be false, emphasizing the authoritative nature of quotations compared to descriptive passages. The use of quotation marks typically indicates an attempt to accurately represent a speaker's words rather than paraphrase. Quotations allow readers to form their own conclusions rather than relying solely on the author's interpretation, although the Court noted that quotation marks do not inherently guarantee the truth of the quoted material. In analyzing a New Yorker article related to Masson, the Court remarked that the article did not signal that quotations were rhetorical devices and presented itself as nonfiction based on interviews, leading readers to interpret the quotations as accurate representations of actual conversations.

In contrast, the current case's facts differ significantly from those in Masson. The document in question, referred to as the Letter, lacks the characteristics of journalistic writing, and readers would not expect factual accuracy from a communication that claims to reflect the views of multiple individuals while originating from a generic email address. Thus, a reasonable reader would interpret the use of quotation marks around the word "tribal" in the Letter very differently from how they would perceive the extensive quotations in the New Yorker article. Overall, the Letter does not encourage readers to accept its content at face value.

The tone and style of the Letter lead a reasonable person to expect a lack of strict factual accuracy. Surrounding the challenged statement, the authors emphasize urgency and resentment regarding Mr. Edwards' actions, indicating their discontent with his involvement in their community. The Letter uses quotation marks strategically, not to denote direct quotes from Edwards but rather to convey sarcasm and skepticism. For instance, phrases like "the people of Flint" and claims of being a "humanitarian" are cited with skepticism, suggesting that the authors do not genuinely endorse these representations. The use of quotation marks throughout the document signals a rhetorical device rather than accurate attributions, undermining any claim that the phrases attributed to Edwards were direct quotes. Edwards does not contest this rhetorical usage, which further implies his acknowledgment of its nature. Ultimately, the statements he challenges lack the necessary character to support a defamation claim.

The defendants' motion to dismiss is granted regarding Edwards' defamation claims (Counts I and II) related to the Letter. Consequently, Edwards' remaining claims for tortious interference with contract expectancy, business relationship, and economic advantage (Count III), common law civil conspiracy (Count IV), and statutory civil conspiracy (Count V) are dismissed, as they are closely linked to the defamation claims. The court references past cases indicating that without a valid underlying tort, conspiracy claims cannot stand. The defamation claims in the Amended Complaint are dismissed without prejudice, with specific dismissals for Schwartz and Lambrinidou under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied only for Mays regarding claims from the Letter. All defamation statements in the Letter are dismissed with prejudice, as are Counts III, IV, and V, which are based on those statements. The defendants' request for attorney's fees is denied. The court confirms subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) due to complete diversity and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, with Edwards seeking $3,000,000 in damages. Discovery is stayed pending the outcome of the motion to dismiss, which is now rendered moot as the case will not proceed. Paragraph 11's alleged defamatory statements are analyzed in conjunction with paragraph 13(a). In a prior email from May 14, 2017, Edwards expressed strong disagreement with comments from Schwartz and Lambrinidou, describing them as "sickening."

Edwards claims that Schwartz's email correspondence and a Facebook post contained factual inaccuracies and requested specific examples of alleged defamation against Flint residents. Schwartz's response dismissed the need for further discussion. Edwards also asserts he sent multiple texts to Mays asking her to stop making false statements about him. The court applies Virginia law based on its choice of law provisions. Edwards acknowledges Lambrinidou's teaching role in Virginia but does not assert that this relates to the claims in the case or establishes jurisdiction. The court notes that the "single publication rule" in Virginia allows for only one cause of action for a single defamatory publication, regardless of subsequent distributions, impacting damages but not creating new claims. Edwards fails to provide specific publication dates for the statements in question, which prevents the court from assessing their timeliness under the statute of limitations. Federal pleading standards require detailed allegations for defamation, including specifics about the statements made. Edwards' claim that live tweeting of Lambrinidou's statements supports specific jurisdiction is rejected, as due process necessitates that a defendant's contacts with the state arise from their own actions, not from third-party interactions.

Even if evidence were presented showing that the attendee's tweets targeted Virginia or reached an audience there, it would not affect the determination of whether specific jurisdiction applies to Lambrinidou. No evidence indicates that she produced, endorsed, or directed the tweets. The defendants' knowledge or belief about Edward's Virginia residency is insufficient to demonstrate that Virginia was the target of the allegedly defamatory statements. Citing case law, the court distinguishes this situation from Hawbecker v. Hall, where specific jurisdiction was found due to the defendant's deliberate online targeting of Texas residents, supported by substantial evidence, including posts and direct communications aimed at Texas individuals.

The court notes that while Edwards has not yet presented relevant jurisdictional evidence, the lack of a valid defamation claim stemming from the Letter renders the opportunity to amend unnecessary. The court considers all versions of the Letter submitted by Edwards as part of the pleadings, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c). The documents attached include various articles and communications related to the case, which the court will evaluate in totality when deciding on the motion to dismiss.

Hyperlinks to Exhibit 2 were included in the plaintiff's pleadings, but the content behind these hyperlinks was not provided by Edwards, raising questions about whether the hyperlink inclusion qualifies as "explicitly incorporated" or "attached" to the complaint. Edwards noted that the defendants referenced Virginia law without addressing potential choice of law issues, though he did not object to the application of Virginia law. He mentioned operating a blog with a student, which published posts countering the defendants' statements. The First Amendment offers significant protections when the defendant is part of the press, the plaintiff is a public figure, and the subject matter concerns public interest. A four-factor test, while not explicitly endorsed in Milkovich, is suggested for distinguishing opinion from fact, and the Fourth Circuit appears to approve its application. Statements may still be protected even if verifiable, provided they convey the author's personal views. Virginia law necessitates context examination, meaning that statements should not be analyzed in isolation but as a whole, with context being crucial in defamation evaluations. Edwards reportedly testified in a case related to the Flint water crisis but did not claim that the statement regarding his testimony was false. Courts have recognized that allegations, such as those advocating for investigations, are typically understood as non-actionable.

In Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., the court upheld a demurrer, stating that accusations of a plaintiff seeking personal gain rather than acting in the best interests of their constituents do not constitute libel. The court examined the implications of dishonesty in statements referenced in paragraph 13(d) and found that similar analyses apply to the term "dishonest" in paragraph 13(b). In Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, the Ninth Circuit determined that an attorney’s description of a judge as "dishonest" was rhetorical hyperbole and merely reflected the attorney's contempt. Edwards claims that Mays introduced the derogatory phrase "dumb and dirty" in a 2016 New York Times Magazine article. The court recognized the relevance of a linked Guardian article but clarified that taking judicial notice only acknowledges public availability, not veracity. The court expressed difficulty in interpreting Edwards' statements, noting that hedged language does not automatically shield potentially defamatory implications. Contextual factors may lead a reader to view certain statements as speculative rather than factual. Furthermore, hyperlinks can mitigate defamatory potential by allowing readers to verify the information. Edwards acknowledged that Counts III-V are contingent on the success of his defamation claims in Counts I and II.