Glaser v. Upright Citizens Brigade, LLC

Citation: 377 F. Supp. 3d 387Docket: 18-CV-971 (JPO)

Court: District Court, S.D. Illinois; March 28, 2019; Federal District Court

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Plaintiff Aaron Glaser, a 31-year-old male stand-up comedian, has filed a sex discrimination lawsuit against various affiliated comedy theaters and schools located in New York City and Los Angeles, as well as against a property-owning company and three theater directors. Glaser's claims include tort claims and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. 

Currently, the Court is considering three motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint filed by the Defendants. Glaser has a background as a student and intern at the New York Entities, which include Upright Citizens Brigade LLC and Upright Citizens Brigade Training Center, LLC, where he performed and hosted shows. He claims that his successful comedy series was exploited by the New York Entities for advertising and other benefits. 

In addition to the New York Entities, Glaser identifies affiliated California Entities under the Upright Citizens Brigade umbrella, including several LLCs managed by Defendant Susan Hale. He alleges that all UCB entities operate as a unified entity, sharing management and staff, and that Hale plays dual roles in both the California Entities and the property-owning entity, 5419 Sunset Properties, LLC.

Glaser alleges that the entity 5419 Sunset is a "dummy entity" established by New York and California Entities to circumvent Title IX regulations. He received an invitation to a meeting on August 11, 2016, where he learned from Defendants O'Neill and Sidtis that he faced accusations of multiple rapes prior to 2011, leading to a ban from their properties and events. Glaser asserts his innocence and claims the investigation was biased and one-sided, denying him the chance to contest the allegations or appeal his ban, which he attributes to gender bias against men at UCB aimed at addressing previous failures to handle sexual violence allegations properly.

Supporting his claims of bias, Glaser included a news article in his complaint detailing UCB's history of neglecting male-on-female harassment allegations and the public backlash following his ban. Despite assurances of confidentiality, information about the allegations was leaked shortly after the meeting, and a fake press release labeling Glaser a rapist circulated online. UCB did not publicly refute the allegations but issued a general statement on the seriousness of sexual misconduct claims.

The fallout from these allegations severely impacted Glaser's life and career, leading to a loss of comedy bookings, removal of his work from a business's online presence, expulsion from his residence by roommates, and death threats. Consequently, he experienced suicidal thoughts and began taking antidepressants to cope with the distress.

The plaintiff, Glaser, claims he will live with the false label of "rapist." He initiated legal action against UCB LLC, O'Neill, and Sidtis on February 4, 2018. Following a motion to dismiss from the Initial Defendants, Glaser filed a First Amended Complaint, adding claims against additional parties, including California Entities, Hale, 5419 Sunset, and UCBTC LLC. Currently, three motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint are pending: one from the Initial Defendants, another from the California Entities, Hale, and 5419 Sunset, and a third from UCBTC LLC.

For motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) concerning subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must allege facts that suggest a plausible basis for jurisdiction without an evidentiary burden in a facial attack scenario. If a fact-based motion is presented by a defendant, the plaintiff must provide evidence to counter any factual disputes regarding jurisdiction. 

Under Rule 12(b)(6), to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief. Courts must assume the truth of the allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Courts may also consider documents attached to or referenced in the complaint.

Glaser's First Amended Complaint includes federal claims under Title VII and Title IX, as well as various state and city law claims. Defendants have filed motions to dismiss Glaser's Title IX claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. They also seek dismissal against the California Entities, Hale, and 5419 Sunset for improper service and lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Court finds that Defendants have not substantiated their claims regarding the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over Glaser's Title IX claims. They argue that Glaser failed to prove that any defendant operates an educational program receiving federal funding, which is necessary for a Title IX claim. However, the Court determines that this argument is a merits-based challenge rather than a true jurisdictional issue. The statutory requirement concerning federal funding under Title IX is not jurisdictional and does not affect the Court's ability to hear the case. Moreover, Glaser has asserted that the New York and California Entities are educational institutions receiving federal funding, which counters the Defendants' argument. Thus, the Court concludes that while the Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the claims, the Title IX claims do not lack subject-matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Glaser's remaining claims and will not address the motions concerning improper service and personal jurisdiction.

Glaser claims that 5419 Sunset, which secured a federal loan in 2012, is a "dummy entity" established by Hale and associated New York and California Entities to evade Title IX liability. He asserts that 5419 Sunset shares employees, management, and operations with these entities. Case law suggests that entities acting as agents of an educational institution can be treated as such for Title IX purposes, with factors like institutional affiliation, written agreements, shared staff, and fund circulation influencing this classification. The court finds Glaser's allegations sufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction over his Title IX claims, as they are not frivolous. 

Regarding dismissal motions by the defendants for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court agrees that Glaser has not adequately pleaded a Title VII or Title IX claim. For Title VII claims, Glaser must demonstrate he was an "employee" of UCB LLC, defined as someone employed by an employer that has at least fifteen employees. The Second Circuit applies a two-part test to ascertain employee status: Glaser must show he was hired and received remuneration, and the court must evaluate his employment under a thirteen-factor agency test determining control by the employer. This requires proof of compensation and control over work. The court will not address the defendants' arguments regarding Glaser's state-law claims.

The compensation analysis serves as a critical threshold for establishing an employee-employer relationship. A plaintiff must demonstrate that their putative employer provided remuneration for services rendered before the court examines additional factors outlined by the Supreme Court. While remuneration does not need to be a salary, it must encompass substantial benefits that are significant rather than merely incidental. The Second Circuit identifies specific forms of financial benefit, including salaries, health insurance, vacation pay, and other employee benefits, as sufficient to meet the remuneration standard. Non-salary benefits such as retirement pensions, life insurance, and medical benefits have been deemed substantial. 

In this case, Glaser claims to have received three types of compensation: free drinks, free admission tickets to shows, and opportunities to showcase his work to casting directors. However, these benefits do not align with the recognized forms of sufficient remuneration. The court concludes that Glaser's alleged compensation lacks the required level of significance and is merely incidental to his performances. The document references a precedent in Hughes, where a Title VII claim was dismissed due to insufficient remuneration, as the plaintiff's claimed benefits, including transportation reimbursement and personal grooming expenses, were also deemed insubstantial. This reinforces the conclusion that Glaser's benefits are similarly inadequate to establish an employment relationship.

Glaser's career benefits from performances at the New York Entities' theatre are deemed incidental to his comedic work, similar to the benefits received by the Hughes plaintiff from appearances on Fox channels. The Second Circuit's decision in York is relevant, where a volunteer's Title VII claim was dismissed because the benefits she received—clerical assistance, tax deductions, and networking opportunities—were considered merely incidental and not substantial enough to meet the remuneration standard. The court cautioned against classifying all volunteer activities as employment under Title VII, emphasizing that even more valuable benefits than those Glaser received (like tax deductions) were insufficient for establishing employee status. The free drinks, admission tickets, and professional growth opportunities Glaser received are compared unfavorably to the volunteer's benefits in York. Further, a review of cases like Pietras and City of New York reveals that substantial non-financial benefits necessary for Title VII employee status include retirement pensions and cash payments equating to minimum wage, which Glaser's situation lacks. Consequently, Glaser has not sufficiently alleged that his compensation from UCB LLC qualifies him as an employee, leading to the dismissal of all his Title VII claims.

Glaser's Title IX claims are inadequate because he was neither a student nor an employee of the Defendants as of August 2016, the time of the alleged gender discrimination. He explicitly stated that his status as a student at UCB ended years prior to the alleged discriminatory actions. In response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Glaser argues that he should be able to sue under Title IX based on disciplinary actions taken against him after his student status, but this argument is flawed. The crux of his claims relates to the Defendants' disciplinary measures, not to any alleged misconduct he committed while still a student.

Title IX prohibits gender discrimination in federally funded educational programs and has been interpreted to require that a plaintiff be a student of the educational institution at the time of the alleged discrimination. Courts have consistently held that Title IX claims predicated on sexual harassment require the plaintiff to establish their status as a student. Since Glaser has acknowledged that he was no longer a student during the period of the alleged discrimination, he cannot assert a Title IX claim. The law stipulates that the discrimination must have a systemic effect of denying equal access to educational programs. As Glaser was not enrolled in Defendants' educational programs at the time of the purported discrimination, he lacks a plausible basis for his Title IX claims.

Glaser cannot claim to have experienced discrimination under Title IX, as defined by 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), because he has not alleged that he was denied equal access to any educational programs or activities on the basis of gender. While non-students can potentially bring Title IX lawsuits, such as prospective applicants, Glaser's status as a former student does not meet the statute's criteria. Furthermore, his assertion that he can sue as an "employee" of a Title IX entity is unavailing, as he has not provided sufficient facts to establish that he was an employee at the relevant time. Consequently, his claims of employment discrimination under Title IX must be dismissed due to inadequate pleading of his employment status.

With all federal claims dismissed, the Court evaluated whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Glaser's remaining city- and state-law claims. Under 28 U.S.C. 1367(a), a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction, particularly when all original jurisdiction claims are dismissed. Given the early stage of this litigation and the dismissal of all federal claims, the Court chooses not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, leading to their dismissal as well.

The California Entities, Hale, and 5419 Sunset have filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff's claims based on improper service and lack of personal jurisdiction, citing Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5). In cases involving multiple defendants, courts may first assess the merits of the plaintiff's claims before addressing jurisdictional matters. Here, the Court has decided to dismiss all claims against these defendants based on their merits-based challenges, negating the need to consider their jurisdictional defenses. Consequently, the motions to dismiss are granted, allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to replead consistent with the Court's opinion, with a deadline set for April 18, 2019. If the Plaintiff opts not to replead but wishes to appeal, a letter must be submitted by the same date to facilitate final judgment. The Clerk is instructed to close the motions associated with specified docket numbers. 

Additionally, Glaser’s Title VII claims are directed solely against UCB LLC. The document references various factors from Reid for determining employment relationships. Glaser fails to substantiate a claim under Title IX regarding discriminatory conduct post-participation in an educational program, as no case supports the notion that former students can sue for unrelated discriminatory actions. The cited case, Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., focuses on the scope of educational programs under Title IX but does not affirm a right for former participants to bring claims for post-participation discrimination. Glaser does not argue that his continued involvement in educational programs after being a student grants him standing under Title IX, nor could he based on the allegations in his First Amended Complaint.

Glaser's assertion of having volunteered to perform at the New York Entities' classes multiple times during his tenure lacks the necessary specificity to demonstrate ongoing participation in their educational program as of August 2016. His tenure is defined as a six-year period from 2010 to 2016. Additionally, the claim that the curricula of the New York and California Entities are closely linked to performances does not substantiate his entitlement to sue under Title IX. Other than vague references to assisting with classes after being a student, Glaser fails to provide concrete facts regarding his involvement in the educational program, undermining any claim that he experienced discrimination in violation of Title IX based on the alleged conduct in August 2016. Furthermore, Glaser acknowledges that his employment discrimination claim under Title IX is subject to the same analysis as his Title VII claims and offers no distinct definition of "employee" for either statute. This aligns with precedent where the Second Circuit has applied Title VII frameworks to Title IX claims, establishing that identical standards govern employment discrimination claims under both statutes.