Sanchez v. Enter. Offshore Drilling LLC

Citation: 376 F. Supp. 3d 726Docket: Civil Action No. H-19-110

Court: District Court, S.D. Texas; March 25, 2019; Federal District Court

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Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief United States District Judge, addresses federal subject-matter jurisdiction in a personal-injury case involving Gilbert Sanchez, a Smart Fabricators employee who was injured while working on the Enterprise 263 drilling rig owned by Enterprise Offshore Drilling LLC. Sanchez sustained injuries from tripping on a pipe and subsequently filed a lawsuit in state court against both Enterprise Offshore Drilling and Smart Fabricators, claiming negligence and unseaworthiness, and seeking damages for medical expenses, lost wages, and exemplary damages.

The defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting that federal jurisdiction applied because the injury occurred on the Outer Continental Shelf. Sanchez then dismissed his claims against Enterprise Offshore Drilling and sought to remand the case, arguing that the Jones Act barred federal removal. After reviewing the pleadings and applicable law, the court determined that Sanchez did not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act, thereby denying the motion to remand.

The legal standard for removal from state to federal court requires the removing party to demonstrate that federal jurisdiction exists. The Jones Act typically prohibits removal, but an improperly pleaded claim does not prevent it. The court conducts an analysis similar to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to ascertain whether the plaintiff has any reasonable possibility of success on a Jones Act claim. If the complaint lacks essential facts that would affect the case's outcome, the court may perform a more detailed examination of the facts to determine the appropriateness of jurisdiction. The court has discretion in deciding whether to pierce the pleadings for this purpose.

Determining whether Sanchez qualifies as a "seaman" under the Jones Act is central to this case, as only seamen can claim rights under this statute. Although the Jones Act does not define "seaman," it is generally considered to encompass "masters or members of a crew of any vessel." A two-prong test is applied to ascertain seaman status: first, the employee's duties must contribute to the vessel's function or mission; second, the employee must have a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation concerning both duration and nature. 

Smart Fabricators acknowledges that Sanchez's welding work on the Enterprise 263 likely contributed to its function, fulfilling the first prong. The dispute lies in the second prong—whether Sanchez worked on a vessel in navigation and if his connection to it was substantial. The evaluation of seaman status considers the nature of the employee's service and relationship to the vessel rather than the location of injury. The substantial connection requirement aims to differentiate maritime employees entitled to Jones Act protection from those with only a brief or sporadic link to a vessel.

Sanchez claims that the drilling rigs he worked on qualify as vessels in navigation and asserts through affidavit testimony that his roles in "construction, maintenance, and welding" were essential to the rigs' operations. The Fifth Circuit typically requires that a plaintiff spend at least 30% of their time aboard vessels in navigation to establish seaman status.

Sanchez worked for Smart Fabricators for several months before his injury, primarily on drilling rigs where he also slept and ate. Smart Fabricators contends that out of 67 days of work, only two were on land, with 48 days on the Enterprise WFD 350 rig and 13 days on the Enterprise 263 rig, both of which were undergoing repairs and not operating. They argue that over 70% of Sanchez's work did not expose him to maritime dangers, thus not qualifying him as a Jones Act seaman. An operator from the Enterprise 263 stated that Sanchez's tasks were limited to welding and fitting equipment, without operating or navigating the rig. Due to the limited nature of Sanchez's employment allegations and the evidence submitted by both parties regarding the applicability of the Jones Act, the court is conducting a summary judgment-type inquiry.

The key legal issue is whether the jacked-up drilling rigs were considered "vessels in navigation." Smart Fabricators cites previous circuit court opinions equating jacked-up rigs to fixed platforms, asserting that Sanchez's work was akin to land-based labor, which would not render him a Jones Act seaman. Relevant case law is referenced, including the Supreme Court's clarification on the definitions of "vessel" and "vessel in navigation" under maritime law, emphasizing that a structure's status as a vessel can change based on its operational use and water status. The court discusses how the "in navigation" requirement is integrated into the overall definition of a vessel, underscoring the need for structures to be capable of maritime transportation to qualify under the Jones Act.

Recent rulings from the Fifth Circuit affirm that jack-up drilling platforms qualify as vessels under maritime law. In Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., a drilling rig in a jacked-up state was classified as a vessel, supported by precedent in Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., which summarizes similar findings. The Enterprise rigs involved in this case did not show evidence of being incapable of maritime transportation. Smart Fabricators argued that the rigs were not navigating but were undergoing repairs. The Supreme Court in Chandris established that vessels in repair can still be considered "in navigation," with shorter drydock periods generally not disqualifying them. Smart Fabricators failed to provide evidence regarding the duration and nature of repairs on the Enterprise rigs, making it impossible to conclude that they were no longer vessels in navigation.

Sanchez's work history is considered, showing he worked 67 days, with a significant portion on the Enterprise WFD 350 and Enterprise 263. He met the minimum-duration requirement of working over 30% of his time on these vessels. However, the connection to the vessels was deemed not substantial, as his duties did not require him to operate as a crew member. Testimony indicated he was neither assigned to the vessels nor capable of operating them. His activities, which included eating, sleeping, and performing welding tasks on the rigs, did not constitute crew membership or exposure to maritime perils comparable to those in Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLC, where the plaintiff had a more substantial connection to the vessels.

The district court concluded that the plaintiff in Naquin was not classified as a seaman, as he worked exclusively on liftboats that were either moored, jacked up, or docked. The Fifth Circuit reversed this decision, determining that the plaintiff's primary responsibilities involved performing essential maritime tasks on vessels at anchor, exposing him to maritime risks similar to those of seamen at sea. In contrast, Sanchez, who worked on Enterprise drilling rigs while they were jacked up and not subject to maritime conditions, did not engage in seaman-related duties such as operating or navigating the rig, which included typical land-based work risks. Sanchez's injury, resulting from tripping on a pipe on the rig, aligned more with longshoreman hazards rather than seaman perils. The court found no evidence demonstrating that Sanchez had a significant connection to a vessel in navigation, leading to the conclusion that the Jones Act was inapplicable and that the case was removable. The motion to remand was denied, with Smart Fabricators arguing that Sanchez's work on jacked-up rigs, which can function like fixed platforms, further differentiated his situation from the Naquin case, suggesting reduced exposure to maritime dangers.