Court: District Court, W.D. Michigan; September 28, 2018; Federal District Court
Paul L. Maloney, United States District Judge, addresses the title to a parcel of land known as the "Vanderbilt Parcel," purchased by the Bay Mills Indian Community in August 2010 using funds from a Land Trust under the Michigan Indian Land Claim Settlement Act. Bay Mills asserts that this property is held as "Indian lands are held," seeking a declaration that the State of Michigan lacks authority over it, and that Bay Mills laws apply. The Court concludes that Bay Mills did not acquire the property subject to federal restrictions, affirming that the land is under Michigan's jurisdiction. Consequently, Bay Mills cannot obtain the relief sought, and Defendant Snyder is granted summary judgment. Bay Mills, a federally recognized tribe, historically resided in Michigan's upper and lower peninsulas and ceded much of their land to the U.S. in the 1836 Treaty. Their current reservation is in the northeast Upper Peninsula. After filing claims with the Indian Claims Commission (ICC), Bay Mills secured a monetary judgment in 1948, but Congress's appropriated funds were not distributed. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) of 1988, which establishes the framework for tribal gaming, defines "Indian lands" and mandates that gaming must occur on such lands and in accordance with a Tribal-State compact. In 1993, Bay Mills and Michigan entered a compact allowing Class III gaming on its lands, prohibiting gaming outside this jurisdiction.
In 1996, Bay Mills initiated a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to implement a distribution plan for funds allocated by Congress for the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) judgments. This led to the enactment of the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act (MILCSA) in December 1997, which included provisions for the establishment of a Land Trust by Bay Mills, requiring that 20% of the funds be deposited into this trust. The earnings from the trust were designated solely for improvements on tribal land or for land consolidation. The legal matter at hand involves the title status of the Vanderbilt Parcel, a 27-acre tract in Corwith Township, Michigan, purchased by Bay Mills in August 2010 using Land Trust funds, located approximately 125 miles from the Bay Mills reservation. Following the purchase, Bay Mills opened a Class III gaming facility on the property, prompting a lawsuit from Michigan seeking to close the facility. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that Bay Mills possessed tribal sovereignty, preventing Michigan from suing in federal court. In 2011, Bay Mills filed its current lawsuit, with Defendant Snyder now moving for summary judgment. The standard for summary judgment requires that the evidence presented must demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact exists, with the burden on the moving party to show the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's claims. The court's role is to assess whether genuine issues remain for trial, rather than to weigh evidence or determine factual truths.
The dispute involves the interpretation of an act of Congress, with the United States Supreme Court underscoring that conventional statutory construction principles differ in Indian law cases due to the unique trust relationship between the U.S. and Indian tribes. When faced with ambiguous statutes, courts are guided by a principle favoring Indians, interpreting uncertainties for their benefit. However, if a statute is clear or congressional intent is explicit, this principle does not apply. The court notes that canons of statutory construction are not obligatory and can be countered by other interpretative canons.
In addressing the pending motion, the Defendant seeks to interpret the phrase "held as Indian lands are held" from § 107 of MILCSA. The Defendant contends this phrase does not limit land purchased with Land Trust interest to the three categories defined under IGRA as Indian land, while Bay Mills argues it implies a federal restriction on alienation, categorizing such land as Indian land. The Defendant presents three main arguments: 1) the plain language of MILCSA does not support Bay Mills' interpretation, 2) legislative history contradicts Bay Mills' position, and 3) Congress did not intend to override state gaming laws with MILCSA.
The court agrees with the Defendant that the phrase "held as Indian lands are held" is clear and unambiguous. It concludes that this phrase means Bay Mills can acquire and hold land using Land Trust interest with all possible titles, without being restricted to a specific form of title designated by Congress. Indian tribes, like non-Indians, can hold property under various forms of title.
Indian tribes possess unique property titles, such as fee simple subject to federal alienation restrictions, and the federal government can hold land in trust for tribes. Under the MILCSA, Bay Mills is authorized to purchase land on the open market with specific funds. Typically, tribes obtain fee simple title when buying land from non-Indians outside their reservations, but they may request the land be taken into trust, altering the title. The status of land has historically shaped the federal-tribal relationship, with the U.S. seeking to acquire Indian lands during treaty-making. The Supreme Court acknowledges that tribal sovereignty is closely tied to land ownership.
When Congress enacts land-related legislation, it usually addresses land status, even for fee simple titles. For instance, the Connecticut Indian Land Claims Settlement Act specifies that land acquired outside settlement areas will be held in fee by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe without U.S. trust responsibilities. Land purchased by tribes or individuals outside reservation boundaries may be taken in trust if the purchaser held trust or restricted interests before buying; otherwise, it is owned outright without alienation restrictions.
The absence of explicit alienation restrictions in MILCSA does not clearly favor either interpretation of the statute. While the defendant argues that the lack of mention implies no restrictions, Bay Mills highlights that Congress did not clarify the absence of restrictions either. Both interpretations are plausible. However, when considering other factors, the defendant's view gains traction, particularly due to the absence of procedural safeguards for tribal land acquisition in MILCSA. Generally, settlement acts specify that acquired land will be held in trust, sometimes detailing procedures in federal regulations.
The settlement act may indicate that federal regulations for taking lands into trust do not apply to certain lands specified in the settlement agreement, as seen in the Washington Indian (Puyallup) Land Claims Settlement. When lands are accepted into trust, the Secretary must follow the authority provided in section 465 and apply the standards in part 151 of Title 25, Code of Federal Regulations. Some settlement acts simply state that lands will be taken into trust without clarifying the applicability of trust regulations, as illustrated by the Connecticut Indian Land Claims Settlement.
The Seneca Nation Land Settlement Claim Act is distinct in permitting land acquisition to be held in fee with restrictions on alienation, alongside a process for state and local authorities to comment, unlike most settlement acts that specify trust status. The Second Circuit highlighted the uniqueness of the Seneca Nation act, noting that typically, restricted fee lands are established through the allotment system, while newly acquired tribal lands are generally held in trust under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
In contrast, the lack of procedural requirements in the MILCSA suggests that Congress intended for the lands acquired by Bay Mills to have no specific status or title. Unlike the one settlement act that imposed restrictions on alienation with a notice and comment procedure, MILCSA does not provide such a mechanism, raising concerns about potential conflicts with state and local governments if Bay Mills acquires land anywhere in Michigan.
The argument that the absence of explicit federal oversight implies unencumbered land acquisition is flawed, as shown by precedent cases, which do not support the idea that restrictions on alienation automatically indicate federal superintendence.
The Court finds that the opinions from the Department of the Interior and the National Indian Gaming Commission regarding the title status of the Vanderbilt Parcel are not entitled to deference. Chevron deference is inapplicable as the disputed phrase is clear and Congress did not grant authority to these agencies for this aspect of MILCSA. MILCSA specifically removes the Secretary of the Interior's oversight on land acquisition using Land Trust funds, meaning no approval from the Secretary is necessary, and he holds no trust responsibility regarding these funds. While the Department may have some authority on Indian gaming, it cannot interpret settlement acts that do not reference gaming. The Court considers the agency opinions as only persuasive.
Regarding legislative history, the Court determines that it does not clarify the statutory interpretation issue, as the statute's meaning is straightforward. Any legislative history is deemed insufficient and raises more questions than it answers. An earlier draft of MILCSA suggested land acquired through the Land Trust would be held in trust, but subsequent communications indicated a desire to clarify the Secretary's discretion, leading to the final version that omitted specific trust language without explanation. Although there is a letter advocating for the removal of a phrase deemed unnecessary, the Court cannot draw any definitive conclusions regarding the retention of the phrase "held as Indian lands are held." The Congressional Budget Office's comments are also deemed irrelevant, as they pertain to a version of the bill that included language about taking land into trust and focus on potential financial impacts on governments rather than providing clarity on the statute itself.
State preemption regarding land acquired under the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act (MILCSA) is analyzed through the lens of federal law and Supreme Court precedents. The Supreme Court has emphasized that preemption should not be assumed lightly, and the absence of explicit preemption language in MILCSA suggests that Congress did not intend for acquired land to be subject to restrictions on alienation.
In cases involving state taxation of Indian lands, the Court has established that state laws can apply on reservations unless they interfere with self-government or federal rights. The power to tax is viewed as a potential threat to tribal sovereignty, and the Court has consistently held that Congress must clearly express its intent to allow state taxation of tribal lands.
Bay Mills asserts that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) explicitly preempts state gaming laws, allowing them to conduct gaming on MILCSA-acquired land without state oversight if it is deemed Indian land. However, this reasoning presents significant issues, as it could circumvent the tribal-state compact negotiations required by the IGRA. The pre-existing gaming compact between Bay Mills and Michigan would not have accounted for the potential for Bay Mills to open a Class III casino on newly acquired land without negotiation.
Moreover, the argument that land with restrictions on alienation qualifies as Indian land under the IGRA does not automatically follow. The Tenth Circuit has warned against conflating the determination of land title with the classification of land for gaming purposes, indicating that these questions should be treated as separate legal inquiries.
Land status and land title are distinct concepts in Indian law, as established in Kansas v. United States, 249 F.3d 1213, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001). A determination of whether land qualifies as "Indian land" under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) does not impact land title. Bay Mills has failed to demonstrate that IGRA defines "Indian land" appropriately since Congress has defined this term variably across different statutes. While some definitions in statutes like the Indian Health Care Improvement Act align with IGRA's definition, others refer to "Indian country," as outlined in 18 U.S.C. 1151, including definitions in the Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act and the Native American Business Development, Trade Promotion, and Tourism Act.
Bay Mills presents two arguments in its defense: first, that "held as Indian lands are held" is a legal term denoting tribal ownership and authority, and second, that all lands held by Indian tribes are subject to restrictions on alienation under the Indian Non-Intercourse Act. However, neither argument is convincing. Bay Mills cites the Treaty with the Wyandot (1795) to support its interpretation of tribal authority over land. It emphasizes that the treaty clarifies the rights of tribes to enjoy their lands and restricts sales to the United States. Bay Mills argues that this treaty reflects an understanding of tribal landholding, suggesting that similar terminology in subsequent treaties indicates congressional intent regarding "Indian land." However, the treaties cited by Bay Mills, which span from 1832 to 1854, do not involve the Bay Mills tribe specifically.
Bay Mills cites Supreme Court opinions from the 1800s to assert tribal authority over tribal land, specifically referencing the phrase "held as Indian lands are held" in the context of the Indian Land Consolidation Act (MILCSA). However, the Court rejects this interpretation, stating that this phrase is not a term of art from historical treaties. The Supreme Court emphasizes that Indian law is shaped by treaties and Congressional legislation, which must be interpreted in their historical context and with consideration of the intent behind them. Over time, U.S. policy toward Native Americans has evolved from treaties and reservations to a focus on self-determination. The congressional understanding of Indian lands has changed since the 1700s and 1800s, indicating that distinctions between ownership and jurisdiction were not previously acknowledged. The cases cited by Bay Mills primarily address tribal land obtained through treaties and do not pertain to land purchased on the open market. Furthermore, the opinions do not clarify the usage of the disputed phrase, nor does the record support the assertion that Congress intended the phrase in MILCSA to reflect a historical understanding from 150 years prior. Bay Mills' reliance on a declaration by Robert Clinton, a law professor, is insufficient as it does not account for the contemporary legislative intent at the time MILCSA was enacted. Overall, the evidence does not establish that the phrase "held as Indian lands are held" was intended by Congress in 1997 to carry the same meaning as it did in the past.
In the 1800s, the disputed phrase was not associated with open-market land purchases. The situations surrounding treaties and the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act (MILCSA) are fundamentally different; the treaty with the Wyandot aimed to end a war, while MILCSA focused on fairly distributing judgment funds. Treaties involved the federal government recognizing tribal land ownership, whereas MILCSA authorized funds for Bay Mills to buy land in the open market. Historical evidence shows that Congress did not differentiate between tribal property acquisition and jurisdiction in the 1800s, and Bay Mills has not provided any evidence suggesting that tribes purchasing land and asserting jurisdiction over it was ever contemplated.
Current taxation cases illustrate that tribes can acquire land subject to state laws. Reacquiring allotment lands does not restore state taxation prohibitions. More recent Indian statutes demonstrate Congress’s understanding of different land holdings and its intent to specify titles when necessary.
Bay Mills claims that the Indian Nonintercourse Act governs the issue and imposes restrictions on alienation of the Vanderbilt Parcel. Enacted in 1834, with origins dating back to 1790, the Nonintercourse Act mandates that any land purchase from Indian tribes must occur through treaties to be valid. The Second Circuit ruled that this Act applies nationwide, rejecting limitations to original states. However, the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on whether open-market tribal land purchases fall under the Nonintercourse Act's protections. The Court has indicated that the Act codifies the requirement for sovereign consent to extinguish aboriginal title, rendering unauthorized conveyances void.
Federal jurisdiction is examined in relation to claims of possession derived from federal land grants versus claims protected by federal law regarding tribal lands, independent of state law. The court clarifies that a tribe cannot restore its sovereignty by purchasing land from current titleholders, referencing *City of Sherrill, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York*. The interpretation of the Nonintercourse Act requires a historical understanding of Congress's views in the 1830s. The Nonintercourse Act does not define "lands," but some courts have affirmed its application to tribal land purchases. Congressional intent in the 1830s recognized tribal ownership and authority over their lands as coextensive, aiming to preserve tribes' rights to historic lands. The Act codified that Indian nations held aboriginal title to their ancestral lands while recognizing the discovering nations' fee title, subject to Indian occupancy rights. Tribal acquisitions of land through open-market purchases do not confer occupancy rights protected under the Nonintercourse Act, which safeguards aboriginal title, not all possessory claims. The extinguishment of Indian title requires U.S. consent, as established in *Oneida I*. The Nonintercourse Act does not protect possessory interests beyond aboriginal title because it was not designed for tribes to hold land in fee simple. This interpretation aligns with the Ninth Circuit's ruling in *Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County*, where open-market purchases by the Lummi Tribe did not fall under the Act's protections.
Four parcels of land were deemed alienable by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior, which were purchased by the Lummi Tribe in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1989, the Lummi Tribe filed a lawsuit against Whatcom County, asserting that the property tax imposed violated federal law. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the alienable land was taxable, affirming that the method of rendering the land alienable—whether by treaty or the General Allotment Act—did not affect its taxability. The court clarified that once Congress lifts restrictions on alienation, the land remains alienable regardless of ownership, including reacquisition by an Indian tribe.
Bay Mills' situation regarding the Vanderbilt Parcel parallels that of Lummi. Bay Mills has not claimed the Vanderbilt Parcel as part of its restricted land holdings and ceded its claims to lands in Michigan's lower peninsula to the United States in 1836, relinquishing any aboriginal title. The court referenced Bates v. Clark, emphasizing that land ceases to be considered Indian country once the Indian title is extinguished. Consequently, Bay Mills' reacquisition of ceded land does not restore protections under the Nonintercourse Act, and the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act (MILCSA) does not reinstate restrictions on alienability.
The court highlighted potential practical implications of Bay Mills' interpretation, noting that it could allow the Tribe to assert sovereign control over land across Michigan, leading to a "checkerboard" jurisdictional landscape impacting neighboring landowners and potentially inviting further litigation against local zoning and regulatory measures. The court noted that Congress has established a mechanism for tribal land acquisition that considers the interests of other stakeholders and that MILCSA permits Bay Mills to acquire land in various forms of title, including fee simple, without implying restrictions on alienation or state authority.
The procedural protections for communities impacted by land purchases indicate that Congress did not intend for Bay Mills to acquire land under tribal authority with restrictions on alienation. The absence of clear preemptive language in the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act (MILCSA) supports the defendant's view. The court is tasked with interpreting MILCSA as Congress would have in 1997, rather than based on historical meanings from the early 1800s. There is no evidence that the phrase in question was used in the same context in 1997, especially considering that Congress had not anticipated tribes engaging in open-market land purchases at that time. Additionally, the Nonintercourse Act, which restricts alienation of lands with aboriginal or Indian title, does not apply to lands acquired through open-market transactions.
The court has granted Defendant Rick Snyder's motion for summary judgment. The Vanderbilt Parcel is located in Vanderbilt, Michigan, and was acquired using accrued interest from a federal appropriation, a fact that the defendant is prepared to dispute if the motion is denied. A related lawsuit from 2010 remains pending, now involving individual tribal leaders, and a stipulation has been made to stay the case until the current motion and its appeals are resolved. The court did not address additional provisions regarding the Land Trust's earnings, which are meant for tribal land improvements. Bay Mills does not claim that the Vanderbilt Parcel is part of its reservation or has been taken into trust. The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, which governs land acquisition, has been reclassified in the U.S. Code. Bay Mills argues that the Seneca Nation statute is distinct due to its specific context, though the Second Circuit did not recognize these reasons as unique. The definition of "Indian country" encompasses various types of land related to Indian tribes and their holdings.
The treaty concluded hostilities between the United States and several Indian tribes, not limited to the Wyandots. The treaty text is accessible online. Legal scholarship has debated the applicability of the Nonintercourse Act concerning tribes' open market land purchases, as noted in various law review articles. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards affirmed that the Nonintercourse Act protects tribal land interests based on aboriginal rights, purchases, or state transfers, although the reference to purchases was deemed dictum since the case did not involve such a transaction. The case was dismissed because the Tonkawas lacked a vested interest in the land under the 1866 act by the Texas provisional government. The Alonzo case involved a dispute over over 75,000 acres held by the Pueblo Indians, with only 480 acres from a purchase contested. The court acknowledged potential weaknesses in its reasoning regarding the Nonintercourse Act’s application to purchased land, subsequently referencing different federal laws specific to Pueblo land that impose additional restrictions.
