Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Gilmore v. Jones
Citation: 370 F. Supp. 3d 630Docket: Case No. 3:18-cv-00017
Court: District Court, W.D. Virginia; March 29, 2019; Federal District Court
Brennan Gilmore, the plaintiff, participated in a protest in Charlottesville, Virginia, on August 12, 2017, against white supremacist groups during the "Unite the Right" rally. While recording the event, he captured James Alex Fields, Jr. driving into a crowd, resulting in the death of Heather Heyer and injuries to approximately thirty-six others. Gilmore later posted his footage on Twitter, which gained significant attention. He alleges that shortly after the incident, the defendants published misinformation portraying him as a "deep state" operative involved in inciting violence for political ends. Gilmore filed a lawsuit against the defendants, claiming defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The defendants moved to dismiss the case on multiple grounds, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim under the relevant rules of civil procedure. The Court determined that it has diversity jurisdiction over the matter and can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over all defendants, except for Allen B. West, who will be dismissed from the case. The Court found that Gilmore sufficiently alleged defamation but did not adequately plead IIED, leading to the conclusion that his defamation claims will proceed while his IIED claims will be dismissed. The document identifies the parties involved, including Gilmore, who is a Foreign Service Officer and business consultant, and several defendants, including Scott Creighton, James Hoft, and Lee Stranahan, each of whom published content related to Gilmore following the Charlottesville events. Stranahan is the sole defendant disputing his domicile outside Virginia. Lee Ann Fleissner, also known as Lee Ann McAdoo, resides in Sarasota, Florida, and works as a contractor for Free Speech Systems, LLC, producing content for InfoWars. On August 15, 2017, she published an article on InfoWars titled "Bombshell Connection Between Charlottesville, Soros, CIA," which included a video featuring her interviewing Stranahan. Alex Jones, owner of InfoWars and domiciled in Austin, Texas, operates InfoWars.com, a Texas LLC presenting itself as a news media outlet funded by dietary supplement sales. Free Speech Systems, also a Texas LLC, is related to InfoWars and operates The Alex Jones Channel on YouTube, with Jones allegedly owning both entities. Gilmore claims these defendants published defamatory statements about him in McAdoo's article and accompanying video, which Jones shared on his YouTube and Twitter. Additionally, Gilmore alleges defamatory content in Jones's video titled "Breaking: State Department/CIA Orchestrated Charlottesville Tragedy," posted on InfoWars and YouTube. Other defendants include Allen B. West, a former congressman domiciled in Dallas, Texas, who allegedly owns a website that published a defamatory article suggesting the Charlottesville events were a set-up, authored by Derrick Wilburn from Colorado Springs, Colorado. Words-N-Ideas, LLC, identified as the purported owner of West's website and allegedly inactive, is managed by Michele Hickford, who is also the editor-in-chief of the site. West asserts he had no role in operating the website or publishing the article. Gilmore, present as a counter-protestor during the Charlottesville rally on August 12, 2017, documented the attack by James Alex Fields, Jr., intending to demonstrate its deliberate nature and discourage public protests. Gilmore received numerous interview requests from various media outlets shortly after sharing footage related to events in Charlottesville, without having solicited these requests. Between August 12 and 13, 2017, he provided eyewitness accounts to several outlets. Following the publication of articles and videos by the defendants from August 13 to August 21, 2017, Gilmore alleges that they falsely portrayed him as a "Deep State operative" involved in the violence. As a result, he faced harassment and threats that jeopardized his safety and that of his family. Incidents included attempted hacks of his online accounts, public exposure of his parents' address, confrontations with strangers, and receiving an unknown chemical substance at his parents' home. These disturbances led to a medical diagnosis affecting his vision and exacerbated his depression. Professionally, Gilmore claims his business suffered from lost clients and potential partnerships, and he may need to withdraw from client-facing roles to protect the company. He expressed concerns regarding his future as a diplomat in the State Department due to reputational damage from defendants' claims and the risk of being ousted by officials who believe those claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the case on three grounds: (1) lack of diversity jurisdiction, asserting that Stranahan is a citizen of Virginia like Gilmore, and that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction over any defendant; and (3) failure to state claims for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The court will examine each argument, particularly focusing on the requirement for complete diversity and the amount in controversy, while generally favoring the plaintiff's allegations in assessing subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdictional facts can be resolved by the district court using evidence beyond the complaint unless they are intertwined with the merits of the dispute. The moving party must prevail if material jurisdictional facts are undisputed and they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. For complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), the citizenship of each plaintiff must differ from that of each defendant, with residency insufficient to establish citizenship. A person is a citizen of a state if they are a U.S. citizen and domiciled there, which requires physical presence and intent to make it a home. Citizenship is assessed at the time the complaint is filed. Factors for determining domicile include voter registration, current residence, property location, bank accounts, club memberships, employment, driver's license status, and tax payments, without any single factor being decisive. Defendants argue that Stranahan is domiciled in Virginia, citing declarations and evidence of his residency since 2017. In contrast, Gilmore presents evidence indicating Stranahan is registered to vote in Texas, has a Texas driver's license, and previously resided in Texas. The Court concludes that Gilmore proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Stranahan was domiciled in Texas when the action was filed, emphasizing that residency alone does not establish citizenship and that Stranahan's self-serving statements about future intent to live in Virginia carry little weight against conflicting evidence. In Manning v. Alamance County, the court emphasized that a party's statements regarding their intended domicile are not definitive and should be viewed skeptically. The primary evidence supporting Stranahan's domicile in Texas is his active voter registration there, which he acknowledged but attributed to not having removed himself due to inactivity in voting since 2012. Voter registration is significant in determining domicile, as it suggests citizenship in the voting state, and this presumption can only be overturned by clear evidence of intent to establish domicile elsewhere. Stranahan's voter registration records indicate he remained active in Texas as of December 5, 2017, which implies he could receive mail at the Texas address provided. This contradicts his claims of domicile in Virginia, including his intention to reside there long-term and the withholding of Virginia income taxes by his employer, which were insufficient to counter the Texas domicile presumption. Additional factors supporting Texas domicile include Stranahan's lack of a filed Virginia tax return despite withholding, his use of an inactive Texas LLC for financial transactions, his temporary housing situation in Virginia that suggests a lack of permanence, and ambiguity regarding his family's residence, particularly his wife's voter registration in Texas as recently as 2016. Stranahan's declarations about his family's absence from Texas do not clarify their status in Virginia at the time of the action. Stranahan did not disclose his wife's residence at the time the action was filed, and his counsel was unable to address this issue during oral arguments. The Court determined that Gilmore demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Stranahan was domiciled in Texas when the action commenced, fulfilling the complete diversity requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Regarding the amount in controversy, defendants Creighton, Hoft, Stranahan, Wilburn, Hickford, and Words-N-Ideas contended that Gilmore did not properly allege damages exceeding $75,000. However, under federal law, a plaintiff's good faith allegation suffices unless it is a legal certainty that the claimed amount cannot be recovered. Gilmore alleges defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against the defendants, seeking damages exceeding $75,000 for reputational, emotional, and professional injuries. Defendants criticized Gilmore for including damages related to third-party actions in his claims, arguing Virginia law does not allow such inclusion. They also claimed Gilmore's IIED allegations were insufficient since he did not demonstrate that the defendants incited the third parties' actions. The Court found that the defendants did not meet the heavy burden required to prove the legal impossibility of Gilmore's recovery, as their arguments lacked adequate legal support and were fundamentally flawed. It clarified that Gilmore's allegations were made in good faith and that any First Amendment defenses were premature at this stage. Arguments regarding third-party conduct are more appropriate for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(b)(1). Consequently, the Court will deny the defendants' motions to dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds. Defendants, excluding Stranahan, seek to dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(2), claiming lack of personal jurisdiction. The evaluation of personal jurisdiction varies based on the case's context and evidence. The plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case for jurisdiction through the complaint and supporting affidavits, with the court favoring the plaintiff's allegations and drawing inferences in their favor. For personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two criteria must be met: (1) the state's long-arm statute must permit jurisdiction, and (2) it must align with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements. In Virginia, these criteria converge, allowing jurisdiction if it complies with due process. Due process requires that the defendant has "minimum contacts" with the state, ensuring that requiring defense in Virginia does not violate fair play or justice principles. Jurisdiction can be "specific" if the defendant's contacts are the basis for the suit or "general" if the contacts are unrelated but persistent. To establish general jurisdiction, contacts must be "continuous and systematic." Gilmore fails to argue for general jurisdiction over several defendants, noting no continuous or systematic contacts with Virginia. For Jones, InfoWars, and Free Speech Systems, Gilmore claims they sold dietary supplements to Virginians, generating substantial revenue from these transactions, but this argument does not succeed in establishing general personal jurisdiction. Mere purchases by a nonresident corporation, even if frequent, do not justify a state's in personam jurisdiction over that corporation for unrelated causes of action, as established in Daimler AG v. Bauman. Activities such as reporting on events in Virginia are insufficient for general jurisdiction, which requires a corporation to have continuous and systematic affiliations with the state, rendering it essentially at home there. Specific personal jurisdiction, however, is tied to issues directly related to the controversy and requires purposeful minimum contacts with the forum state, as outlined in Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations. The Fourth Circuit's three-part test for specific jurisdiction examines: 1) the defendant's purposeful availment of activities in the state, 2) whether the plaintiff's claims arise from those activities, and 3) the constitutional reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction. Courts evaluate the totality of the facts, where even a single contact may suffice if it relates to the cause of action without violating fair play and substantial justice principles. The case of Calder v. Jones illustrates this, where a California court exercised jurisdiction over Florida defendants due to the California impact of their conduct, highlighting that the focal point of the harm and the story must be in the forum state for jurisdiction to be proper. The Fourth Circuit's adaptation of the Calder "effects" test for online activities is established through two key cases. In *ALS Scan, Inc. v. Dig. Serv. Consultants, Inc.*, the court determined that a state can assert judicial power over an out-of-state individual if (1) they direct electronic activity into the state, (2) with the intent to engage in business or interactions, and (3) this activity generates a potential cause of action for someone within the state. The court ruled that a Maryland court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over a Georgia ISP that merely provided bandwidth for a website involved in trademark infringement, as the ISP did not knowingly transmit infringing content or target Maryland specifically. In *Young v. New Haven Advocate*, the Fourth Circuit refined the test for online content, emphasizing that to establish jurisdiction, courts should consider whether the defendants intended to direct their website content to a Virginia audience. Merely having a website accessible from Virginia is insufficient; there must be a clear intent to target Virginia readers, demonstrated through the content's general thrust. The court found that Connecticut newspapers could not be subject to Virginia's jurisdiction for publishing articles on their website about a Virginia prison, as the content did not specifically aim to engage a Virginia audience. To determine specific personal jurisdiction over defendants, the court will assess (1) whether each defendant intended to direct their website content to a Virginia audience, allowing them to reasonably anticipate being brought into court in Virginia, and (2) whether their activities could create a cause of action under Virginia law. The court will evaluate each of the eleven defendants based on their allegedly tortious publications. As an example, Creighton's article on the American Everyman website discussed the Charlottesville attack and raised questions about the behavior of an individual involved, linking it to broader political contexts in Virginia. Creighton expressed skepticism about the coincidence of Gilmore, a "convenient witness" with connections to Special Ops and the CIA, being present at Fields's attack, indicating he was not inclined to believe in such coincidences. He suggested that both Gilmore and Tom Perriello were motivated to undermine the 'alt-right' ahead of upcoming elections. Gilmore claims Creighton posted a video titled "Charlottesville Attack: Brennan Gilmore: Witness or Accessory" on August 13, 2017, where Creighton alleged that Gilmore's presence at the attack was suspicious, implying foreknowledge of the event. The Court determined that Creighton’s article and video were targeted at a Virginia audience, given their focus on a Virginia event and citizen, thus establishing personal jurisdiction in Virginia. While Creighton’s platforms lack a Virginia-specific focus, the content's relevance to Virginia, particularly mentioning Perriello, a local gubernatorial candidate, supports this jurisdiction. Gilmore also argued that the harm he suffered from Creighton’s statements occurred in Virginia. In contrast to a passive internet service provider, Creighton actively created and published the content, which directly relates to Gilmore's claims. The Court concluded that Creighton intended to direct his content at a Virginia audience, justifying the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over him. Separately, on August 14, 2017, Hoft published an article on The Gateway Pundit, labeling Gilmore as a "deep state shill" linked to George Soros and suggesting State Department involvement in the Charlottesville events. Gilmore, a former Chief of Staff for Virginia Representative Tom Perriello, was the subject of an article by Hoft, which included screenshots from local Virginia news sources. The article suggested that Gilmore, who received substantial funding during his gubernatorial campaign, was involved in the Charlottesville protests and portrayed him as a key figure in a narrative linking him to a broader conspiracy involving the media and a "Deep State." The court determined that Hoft's article was specifically aimed at a Virginia audience, as it focused on a Virginia citizen's involvement in a Virginia event, thus justifying the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Hoft. In a separate instance, McAdoo authored an InfoWars article and video linking the Charlottesville events to George Soros and a supposed "deep state" coup against President Trump. McAdoo's article claimed that civil unrest in the U.S. was akin to a violent coup, drawing parallels between the Charlottesville rally and the Ukrainian coup, which he alleged was funded by Soros and orchestrated by the Obama administration. The court noted that both articles were targeted and relevant to Virginia, emphasizing their impact and the specific audience addressed. McAdoo compared the actions of white nationalists in Charlottesville to paid protestors in Ukraine, citing similarities in slogans and imagery. He claimed that the media was using Charlottesville to label right-wing individuals who do not disavow white nationalists as Nazis or Russian agents. Stranahan referred to Gilmore, who had ties with the U.S. State Department and a Democratic representative, and displayed his Twitter post of a murdered woman labeled as a "martyr." Stranahan suggested that Ukrainian protestors needed martyrs and called for an investigation. Gilmore alleges that Jones posted McAdoo's article and video on August 15, 2017, on YouTube, linking them to ongoing jurisdiction claims over McAdoo, Stranahan, InfoWars, Free Speech Systems, and Jones. The article and video aimed to connect the Charlottesville rally to a "deep state coup" against President Trump, emphasizing the supposed involvement of the same actors from the Ukraine situation. The Court found that the defendants intentionally targeted a Virginia audience through their publications, which included detailed discussions of the rally and its political implications. Unlike a passive role in similar cases, the defendants actively participated in the alleged defamation and dissemination of harmful content. The Court concluded it could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over McAdoo, Stranahan, Jones, InfoWars, and Free Speech Systems based on these publications. On August 21, 2017, Jones released a video titled "Breaking: State Department/CIA Orchestrated Charlottesville Tragedy" on his YouTube channel and InfoWars website, which was accompanied by text suggesting a deep state conspiracy to divide America. In the video, Jones claimed the violence at the Charlottesville event was orchestrated by "known CIA and State Department officials" and the mayor of Charlottesville, labeling them as "cut-outs," a term referring to individuals involved in espionage. The video allegedly included a narration from a Charlottesville police officer asserting that the violence was designed to further elite agendas. It featured commentary about an individual named Gilmore, juxtaposing images of him with George Soros, and questioning the timing and credibility of his media appearances due to his State Department background. The narrator claimed that Gilmore's information was removed from State Department websites following his viral tweet, framing this as a cover-up by elites. The court determined that the video had a specific focus on Virginia due to its emphasis on a Virginia event and individuals, thus justifying the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Jones, InfoWars, and Free Speech Systems. Unlike previous cases, the video was not tangentially related to Virginia; it was exclusively centered on Virginia residents and events. Jones actively produced and posted the video, indicating intent to target a Virginia audience. Additionally, on August 19, 2017, Wilburn and others published an article on the Allen B. West website questioning the legitimacy of the Charlottesville event, further contributing to the discourse surrounding this incident. A Charlottesville police officer alleged in an article by Wilburn that the violent events in Charlottesville were not only condoned by city officials but were intentionally orchestrated, potentially dating back to May. The officer claimed that police were instructed to unite radical left and right groups to incite violence and subsequently "stand down" to instigate a race riot. This assertion raises implications for Mayor Signer and other city officials regarding their responsibility in a citizen's death. The article also discussed Gilmore, suggesting he was involved in a conspiracy and had ties to the State Department. The Court determined that Wilburn's article targeted a Virginia audience, justifying specific personal jurisdiction over Wilburn, Hickford, and Words-N-Ideas, given its focus on a Virginia event and local political figures. In contrast, the Court found it could not exercise jurisdiction over West, as Gilmore did not prove West's direct involvement in the article's content or publication. Although Gilmore alleged West owned the website and shared a link to the article, he failed to provide sufficient evidence of West's editorial control or contribution to the article. The amended complaint lacks plausible allegations against Words-N-Ideas and its members due to conflicting claims about ownership and management of the Allen B. West website. Specifically, the court finds Gilmore's assertion that West owned the website unpersuasive, which undermines claims that Wilburn acted as West's agent or employee in writing a tortious article. As there are no concrete factual allegations linking West directly to the article's creation or publication, the court concludes it cannot assert personal jurisdiction over him, leading to his dismissal from the case. The court confirms it retains diversity jurisdiction and can exercise specific jurisdiction over all defendants except West. Consequently, West's motion to dismiss is granted, while the remaining defendants' motions to dismiss are denied. Regarding the Communications Decency Act (CDA) immunity, defendants Hoft, Wilburn, Hickford, and Words-N-Ideas claim protection under Section 230, which shields providers of interactive computer services from liability for user-generated content. The CDA allows for liability against individuals who create or develop unlawful content but not against those who merely facilitate its online posting. An interactive computer service is defined broadly to include any service enabling access to the Internet. However, immunity only applies if the provider is not also considered an "information content provider" for the content in question. Courts assess whether a party has engaged in activities beyond standard editorial functions to determine their liability status. If a party merely displays third-party content without modification, they are protected under the CDA; however, if they contribute significantly to the content, immunity may not apply. Section 230 provides immunity to "interactive computer services," such as Yelp and AOL, from liability for defamatory content posted by third parties. In this case, defendants Hoft, Wilburn, Hickford, and Words-N-Ideas are involved with interactive computer services as they either used or provided access to a website relevant to the disputed publications. Courts generally recognize websites as interactive computer services, and operators are typically considered providers under this definition. The critical issue is whether the complaint sufficiently alleges that any actions taken by the defendants exceeded the traditional editorial functions of a website operator, thereby categorizing them as information content providers. Gilmore claims that Hoft and Wilburn authored their articles, a point they conceded in sworn declarations. Although Hoft included content from a Reddit thread, he added substantial original material that suggested a conspiracy involving the State Department. Similarly, Wilburn quoted another article but supplemented it with original commentary implying a broader conspiracy. Gilmore asserts that Hoft and Wilburn not only facilitated the posting of third-party content but also contributed to the defamatory nature of the statements made in their articles. Section 230 does not protect content that a defendant created or significantly modified from third-party sources. Hickford and Words-N-Ideas could also bear liability for Wilburn's article if they are found to be the creators or developers of that content. Gilmore's allegations that Hickford was the editor-in-chief and president of Words-N-Ideas, which owned the website, suggest their involvement in the development or endorsement of Wilburn's article, challenging their claim to immunity under Section 230. The Court, making all reasonable factual inferences in favor of Gilmore, concludes that Hickford and Words-N-Ideas are considered information content providers and are not immune from suit under Section 230. In addressing the defendants' motion to dismiss Gilmore's claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court emphasizes the standard of review, which requires accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and disregarding legal conclusions or formulaic recitations of elements. The Court finds that Gilmore has adequately alleged facts to support a defamation claim against each defendant, but has failed to sufficiently plead IIED, resulting in the dismissal of those claims. Regarding choice of law, the Court determines that Virginia law applies to all defendants, despite some arguing for Texas law based on the publication location of articles and videos. As this is a diversity action, Virginia's choice of law principles govern. Under Virginia's doctrine of lex loci delicti, the substantive rights in tort actions are governed by the law of the state where the wrongful act occurred, defined as the state of publication for allegedly tortious publications, such as defamation claims. Publication of allegedly tortious content occurs when it is communicated to a third party in a manner that allows them to hear and understand it, as established in Katz v. Odin, Feldman, Pittleman, P.C. The Supreme Court of Virginia has not defined "the place of the wrong" for cases involving defamatory content published across multiple jurisdictions, such as on global websites. In Kylin Network (Beijing) Movie, the court noted the absence of guidance from Virginia courts regarding the lex loci rule in multistate defamation cases. Given this gap, the court must predict how Virginia's highest court would apply lex loci delicti in a multi-defendant, multi-state Internet tort situation. It concludes that the Supreme Court of Virginia would likely define "the place of the wrong" as the state where the plaintiff suffers injury from the tortious content, rather than where the publication occurs. This approach promotes uniformity and predictability in legal applications, avoiding the complexities of navigating multiple state laws in such cases. Defining the "place of the wrong" as the location of publication presents challenges, especially with online content, which can be disseminated simultaneously across many jurisdictions. Traditional assumptions about geographic publication do not easily apply to the Internet, where content can be accessed worldwide. Consequently, courts in the circuit have reached differing interpretations of publication in online contexts, further complicating the application of the traditional lex loci delicti rule. The Supreme Court of Virginia extends the lex loci delicti principle to online tort cases, defining the "place of the wrong" as the state where the plaintiff experiences primary injury. In this case, Gilmore claims that he suffered significant personal and professional harm in Virginia due to the Defendants' online publications. Consequently, Virginia law will govern Gilmore's claims against the Defendants. Regarding Gilmore's defamation claims, the Defendants argue, under Rule 12(b)(6), that he has not adequately stated a claim. Virginia law outlines three elements for defamation: publication, an actionable statement, and the requisite intent. It is undisputed that the statements were published online. The Court's focus is on whether the statements are actionable and if the Defendants acted with the necessary intent. The required intent varies based on whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure. Private figures must show that the defendant acted with negligence or knowledge of falsity, while public figures must prove "actual malice." The Court presumes Gilmore is a private individual unless the Defendants demonstrate he is a public official or limited-purpose public figure. The Defendants argue he qualifies as a limited-purpose public figure, which requires establishing that a public controversy led to the defamatory statements and that Gilmore's involvement in that controversy positioned him as a public figure. The Defendants must prove Gilmore had access to effective communication channels. The plaintiff, Gilmore, is determined to be a limited-purpose public figure within the context of the public controversy surrounding the Unite the Right rally and associated counter-protests. The court identifies five key factors to establish this status: (1) Gilmore voluntarily assumed a special role in the public controversy; (2) he sought to influence the controversy’s resolution; (3) the controversy existed prior to the alleged defamatory statements; (4) he maintained public-figure status at the time of the defamation; and (5) the controversy must be a real dispute that has garnered public attention. Gilmore's participation included uploading a video of an attack during the rally to Twitter, engaging with multiple news outlets, and writing an editorial for Politico, which reflects his access to effective communication channels. Although he argued that he only responded as a "witness to history," his proactive engagement and commentary indicate a deeper involvement in the controversy, thus meeting the criteria for public figure status. The court finds that the broader public controversy regarding the meaning of the rally and counter-protests justified the defendants' statements, even if not all specific claims made by the defendants were part of a genuine public controversy. Gilmore's media appearances and commentary following the August 12, 2017 rally positioned him as a limited public figure regarding the controversy surrounding the event and its ideological implications. His statements, including a CNN appearance and a Politico editorial, went beyond mere eyewitness accounts and aimed to impact public perception, particularly in response to media narratives suggesting that a violent incident was misrepresented. Gilmore's intent to clarify the nature of the attack on counter-protesters indicates he sought to engage in the public debate over the rally's meaning. The Court determined that since the controversy predated the publication of the defendants' articles and videos, and given that Gilmore maintained public prominence throughout this period, he must demonstrate that the defendants acted with actual malice in publishing defamatory statements. Under Virginia law, actionable statements must be both false and defamatory, directly relating to the plaintiff, and capable of being proven false. To oppose the defendants' motion to dismiss, Gilmore must plausibly allege these elements in his claims. Defamatory statements harm an individual's reputation, lowering their standing in the community or discouraging others from associating with them. Such statements can be made directly or implied through inference or insinuation. The First Amendment protects statements that cannot be reasonably interpreted as factual and includes rhetorical hyperbole or figurative language. However, if a reasonable factfinder could conclude that a statement implies a factual assertion, it may not be protected. Defamation-by-implication requires a rigorous showing, particularly when the expressed facts are literally true, and the implication must be clear from the natural meaning of the words used. In evaluating defamation claims, courts must resolve all fair inferences in favor of the plaintiff and cannot extend the meaning of words beyond common understanding. Opinion statements are generally not actionable unless they imply an assertion of objective fact. The courts will determine whether a statement is actionable based on its entirety, considering context and tenor rather than isolating parts. When a defamation suit is dismissed due to a lack of actionable statements, the court must accept the plaintiff's allegations of factual falsity. Finally, as a limited-purpose public figure, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants acted with actual malice in publishing their statements. A statement is considered published with actual malice if the defendant knows it is false or acts with reckless disregard for its truth. Relevant factors in determining actual malice include a defendant's failure to investigate, reliance on unreliable sources, and the repetition of known false statements. Evidence of a preconceived narrative that is manipulated to fit the story can also contribute to establishing actual malice. Although circumstantial evidence can demonstrate a defendant's state of mind, mere conclusory allegations are insufficient. In assessing whether the statements made about Gilmore in Creighton's August 13, 2017 article are actionable, it is alleged that the article falsely suggests Gilmore had prior knowledge of an attack and implies his participation by framing his presence as suspicious. Specific quotes from the article point to coincidences surrounding Gilmore's actions, raising questions about his motives and connections. The court will evaluate if these allegations plausibly infer actual malice. Creighton made statements in an August 13, 2017 video suggesting that Gilmore filmed a violent incident with prior knowledge and for political motives, specifically to discredit President Trump and the "alt-right." He implied that Gilmore's presence and actions were suspiciously coincidental, linking him to various government entities and individuals. Gilmore alleges that these statements are false, defamatory, and made with actual malice, arguing that they convey a defamatory innuendo suggesting he had foreknowledge of the attack and intended to manipulate the situation politically. The court finds that Creighton's assertions are not mere opinions but capable of being proven true or false, thus supporting Gilmore's claims of defamation. The insinuation that Gilmore filmed the event for ulterior motives harms his reputation, deterring community associations and casting doubt on his integrity. Under Virginia law, these statements are considered defamatory per se, as they could prejudice Gilmore in his profession, particularly given his background in diplomacy. Furthermore, Gilmore's allegations suggest a "plausible inference" that Creighton acted with actual malice in making these statements. Gilmore alleges that Creighton has a history of publishing articles that accuse individuals and government entities of staging controversial events, suggesting that Creighton fabricated a narrative about the events in Charlottesville to align his false statements about Gilmore with that storyline. Gilmore claims that Creighton violated basic journalistic standards by failing to confirm details with him prior to publication. These specific allegations, alongside Gilmore's personal knowledge of Creighton's actions, support a plausible inference of actual malice in Creighton's statements, making them actionable. Consequently, the court will deny Creighton's motion to dismiss Gilmore's defamation claim. Regarding Hoft's article on Gateway Pundit, Gilmore contends that it falsely brands him as a "deep state shill" involved in a conspiracy related to Charlottesville. Hoft's article presents misleading assertions about Gilmore’s role and the State Department's involvement in instigating violence, which Gilmore argues are defamatory and made with actual malice. The article's claims are deemed to have a provably false factual basis and are not protected expressions of opinion, as they can be substantiated or disproven. Thus, Gilmore's allegations against Hoft also support a viable defamation claim. The Court determines that Hoft's statements are capable of conveying the false implications alleged by Gilmore, which are deemed defamatory. Hoft's insinuation that Gilmore's presence at a rally was linked to a "deep state" conspiracy to incite riots could harm Gilmore's reputation and discourage third parties from associating with him. Gilmore argues that this insinuation prejudices his professional standing as a diplomat by questioning his honesty and integrity. Furthermore, Gilmore claims that Hoft acted with actual malice, as he did not seek comment from Gilmore and relied solely on dubious online sources for his information. Gilmore cites prior articles by Hoft that suggest a conspiracy against President Trump, arguing that Hoft fabricated a damaging narrative about him. Consequently, Gilmore's allegations sufficiently establish a plausible inference of actual malice, leading the Court to deny Hoft's motion to dismiss the defamation claim. In relation to McAdoo's InfoWars article and video, Gilmore alleges that they falsely imply his involvement in orchestrated violence during the Charlottesville incident. McAdoo's article suggests a civil war is brewing, citing Soros-funded NGOs as instigators of regime changes, and connects these claims to the Unite the Right rally. The video features commentary linking Gilmore to violent imagery and suggests he is part of a broader conspiracy involving a coup. Stranahan makes explicit connections between Gilmore and the events in Ukraine, labeling him as a "martyr." This portrayal, combined with visual depictions of violence, contributes to Gilmore's assertion of defamation. Gilmore alleges that statements made by Stranahan and McAdoo were false, defamatory, and published with actual malice. Their comments suggested that Gilmore was involved in a Ukrainian coup and was using the Unite the Right rally to frame Heather Heyer as a martyr, implying a nefarious purpose behind his presence in Charlottesville. The court finds that these statements are capable of conveying defamatory innuendo, which could harm Gilmore's reputation and hinder his professional dealings as a diplomat. Additionally, the court concludes that Gilmore has sufficiently alleged actual malice, as neither defendant sought comment or confirmation from him and instead attempted to fit him into a preexisting narrative. Gilmore referenced previous claims made by InfoWars and its affiliates regarding national tragedies, which supports the plausibility of his allegations regarding actual malice. Consequently, Gilmore has established claims for defamation against McAdoo, Stranahan, Jones, InfoWars, and Free Speech Systems. Defendants' motions to dismiss are denied. Gilmore claims that Jones's August 21, 2017, InfoWars video falsely asserts that he participated in a State Department/CIA operation to stage violence during the Charlottesville events. Jones allegedly claimed to have conducted research verifying the involvement of CIA and State Department officials, asserting that a specific individual was paid $320,000 by George Soros and was involved in media narratives. The video includes an anonymous Charlottesville police officer's testimony suggesting the violent clashes were orchestrated for elite agendas, with images of Gilmore and Soros juxtaposed. Gilmore argues that these statements, made by both Jones and a narrator in the video, are false, defamatory, and published with actual malice. The video implies that the State Department and CIA orchestrated the Charlottesville tragedy and that Gilmore was an "actor" in this scheme. Gilmore also contends that the claim he was paid $320,000 by Soros is false. Considering Jones's assertions of conducting "deep research," the statements are viewed as assertions of actual fact rather than opinions. Gilmore adequately alleges that these statements are defamatory, as they could lower his reputation in the community and deter professional relations. The insinuation that he was involved in orchestrating violence is particularly damaging, potentially prejudicing his career and integrity in government service, qualifying as defamation per se. Gilmore claims that Jones, InfoWars, and Free Speech Systems published a video about him with actual malice, failing to seek his comment or confirmation. He alleges they distorted his personal and professional background to support a false narrative that the Charlottesville events were orchestrated by George Soros and others. Gilmore references four InfoWars articles preceding the video that propagate this narrative. His allegations suggest the defendants acted with knowledge of the statements' falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth, making his defamation claims viable. Additionally, Gilmore contends that Wilburn's article implies he was involved in a conspiracy regarding the Charlottesville violence, quoting an officer who suggested the events were intentional. Wilburn's article, while noting the need for verification, aligns with statements made in Jones's video, implying Gilmore was an "actor" in a "set-up event." The court finds Gilmore's allegations about Wilburn's article sufficiently demonstrate false and defamatory implications, supporting his claims of actual malice. The article in question suggests that the events in Charlottesville were orchestrated, framing readers to expect a truthful narrative about the rally's underlying conspiracies. Wilburn's introduction of an alleged officer's statements implies that Gilmore was involved in a deeper conspiracy, portraying him as an "actor" in a "set-up event." The court finds these statements capable of conveying defamatory innuendo as claimed by Gilmore. Despite Wilburn's disclaimers that the officer's account was "his version" and unverified, he undermined these claims by presenting them as evidence of a significant conspiracy involving political figures. Virginia law does not require that a defendant's words explicitly convey defamatory intent to be actionable; thus, careful wording does not protect against defamation claims if the overall context is defamatory. The article is concluded to convey a "provably false factual connotation" about Gilmore, supporting his allegations of defamation per se. Furthermore, Gilmore plausibly claims that Wilburn and his associates acted with actual malice by failing to verify the officer's account or contact him for comment, indicating a disregard for journalistic standards and reliance on potentially false information. Allegations against the defendants create a "plausible inference" of actual malice necessary for Gilmore's defamation claims, leading to the denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss these claims. For intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Virginia law, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) intentional or reckless conduct, (2) outrageous and intolerable behavior, (3) a causal link between the conduct and emotional distress, and (4) severe distress. The court acknowledges that Gilmore sufficiently alleges the defendants acted intentionally or recklessly. However, the defendants contend that Gilmore fails to adequately show that their conduct was outrageous and intolerable, establish a causal connection to his distress, and demonstrate the severity of his emotional distress. The court finds that the defendants' portrayal of Gilmore as part of a "deep state" conspiracy parallels conduct deemed extreme and outrageous in prior case law. Consequently, Gilmore plausibly alleges that the defendants' behavior was outrageous and that it proximately caused his emotional distress, despite some distress stemming from third-party harassment linked to the defendants' publications. However, the court concludes that Gilmore has not met the high threshold for severe emotional distress required for IIED claims under Virginia law, as the distress alleged does not rise to a level that no reasonable person could endure. Gilmore's claims of emotional distress, including stress, anxiety, and depression, have been deemed insufficiently severe according to precedent set by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Previous cases, such as Harris v. Kreutzer and Russo, indicate that symptoms like nightmares and sleeplessness do not meet the threshold for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Furthermore, although Gilmore states he has reduced social activities and may limit client-facing work, he has not demonstrated that he is unable to fulfill his work or family responsibilities, as clarified in Almy v. Virginia. The amended complaint reveals that Gilmore continues to work and engage socially, albeit with some personal and professional inhibitions. Much of Gilmore's distress appears speculative; for instance, he suggests he "may" need to withdraw from client interactions and expresses concerns about potential difficulties if he returns to the State Department, yet does not assert that he has attempted to return and been denied. His fears regarding government officials seeking to harm his career are similarly speculative. Consequently, the court finds that Gilmore has not sufficiently alleged the severity of distress necessary to support IIED claims, leading to their dismissal. As for the defendants' motions for immunity and attorneys' fees under Va. Code § 8.01-223.2, these motions are denied. The statute provides immunity for defamation claims relating to public concern unless the statements were made with actual malice. Since Gilmore has plausibly alleged defamation with actual malice against all defendants except West, who is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, immunity does not apply. The request for attorneys' fees is also denied, as the court may only award fees when a suit is dismissed under this provision. The Court has determined it possesses subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) and can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over all defendants except for West, who is to be dismissed without prejudice. Gilmore's defamation claims against the remaining defendants are adequately pleaded and will proceed, while his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Virginia law are insufficiently pleaded and will be dismissed without prejudice. Motions by the defendants for immunity and attorneys' fees, based on Va. Code 8.01-223.2, are denied. The document references an amended complaint filed by Gilmore, noting that links he provided to the American Everyman website and The Alex Jones Channel are no longer functional due to suspensions, and the link to Allen B. West's website is inactive due to construction. West's motion to dismiss based on lack of complete diversity is also mentioned. Gilmore has established Stranahan's domicile in Texas as of the dates relevant to the lawsuit, despite affidavits presented by Stranahan that do not affect the domicile determination. The Court finds no need to consider the skip tracing report provided by Gilmore. The defendants' challenges regarding the authentication of records are dismissed, as the documents in question are deemed admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 902(1) and 803(8). The Court notes precedent in the circuit that emphasizes the significance of voter registration in establishing domicile. In Texas, renewal certificates for voter registration are mailed to the address listed on the application during designated periods. The certificate related to voter registration is non-transferable and will be returned to the registrar if the recipient is no longer at the registered address, leading to the voter being placed on a "suspense list." Registrars are required to monthly request address classification updates from the U.S. Postal Service. Such records are admissible as public records under FRE 803(8). Stranahan's address was verified, and his declarations were signed in 2017, a year prior to the current action, raising confusion regarding his domicile, especially since Stranahan's counsel was unaware of his wife's residence in Texas despite previously stating Stranahan had no family there. The Court determined Stranahan was domiciled in Texas without needing to consider additional evidence about him or his wife's voter registration. Defendants' arguments against Gilmore's defamation claims relied on outdated legal opinions, failing to prove that damages could not exceed $75,000. Stranahan did not challenge personal jurisdiction, effectively waiving that defense, but the Court found specific personal jurisdiction over him appropriate. The analysis of jurisdiction also applied to other defendants, like McAdoo and Words-N-Ideas. Regarding Jones, while the Court expressed skepticism about his connections to Virginia, it could still exercise specific personal jurisdiction over him. Defendants' dismissal of the Calder case as outdated was deemed misguided. Calder serves as a binding Supreme Court precedent relevant to online activities, as confirmed by ALS Scan and Young, which both reference Calder. The Supreme Court continues to cite Calder, as seen in Walden v. Fiore. Defendants argue that the absence of advertisements targeting a Virginia audience was decisive in Young; however, the ruling indicates that specific personal jurisdiction may exist in Virginia if the state is the focal point of the articles, irrespective of targeted advertisements. Gilmore claims that Creighton republished an article on various websites, such as BeforeItsNews.com and Sott.net, which generally cover national events but can also particularly impact state citizens. The Calder case illustrates that nationwide publications can still be subject to personal jurisdiction in specific states. Defendants' assertion that their content was not aimed at a Virginia audience is countered by the argument that events of national interest, like the Unite the Right rally, resonate most in the states where they occur. Courts have found specific personal jurisdiction based on online content that affects local citizens, as demonstrated in Gubarev v. Buzzfeed, where harm experienced in Florida supported jurisdiction. Gilmore alleges similar harm from the defendants' publications occurring in Virginia, fulfilling the requirements of the ALS Scan test. The court will not reiterate its analysis for each publication or defendant involved. Defendants reference three court decisions where online publications were found not to target an audience in the forum state, based on minimal references to that state. In those cases—FireClean, LLC v. Tuohy, KMLLC Media, LLC v. Telemetry, Inc., and Fertel v. Davidson—the courts held that the publications lacked focus on Virginia. In contrast, Defendants' publications are primarily focused on Virginia. Regarding Jones's alleged republication of content on YouTube, the republication rule establishes equal liability for the repeater and the original defamer. Although the video is no longer accessible, the Court must assume the truth of Gilmore's allegations about its content. Gilmore does not sufficiently claim that West's sharing of a link on Twitter constitutes publication or republication, nor does it demonstrate West's intent to target a Virginia audience. The Court finds that simply sharing a link does not establish jurisdiction under Virginia law or the Communications Decency Act. Consequently, West’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) is granted, rendering his Rule 12(b)(6) motion moot. The Court will evaluate whether exercising jurisdiction over the remaining defendants is constitutionally reasonable, considering factors such as the burden on the defendants, the interests of the Commonwealth, and the plaintiff's interest in seeking relief. Defendants did not challenge the constitutional reasonableness of litigating in Virginia, and the Court determined that proceeding in this jurisdiction would not impose a severe disadvantage on any defendant. The potential inequity of being compelled to defend in Virginia is alleviated by the foreseeability that Defendants could face lawsuits there, particularly as their alleged tortious actions targeted a Virginia audience. Gilmore provided evidence of this targeting through links to a Facebook post and a video, both indicating Hickford’s role as editor-in-chief of the Allen B. West website. The Court interprets the defendants' lack of argument and their reference to Virginia law as implicit consent to apply that law to Gilmore's claims. There was no need to explore choice-of-law issues further as the parties agreed to the application of Maryland law. While the Court does not assert that Virginia's Supreme Court would adopt the "most significant relationship" test from the Second Restatement for defamation cases, it noted that the defendants misrepresented Gilmore's argument, which actually advocated for a variant of the lex loci delicti doctrine focusing on the location of the plaintiff's injury. The Court clarified that had Gilmore requested the adoption of the "most significant relationship" test, it would have been unable to grant that request due to Virginia's rejection of such a standard. The excerpt also discusses various interpretations of the "place of publication" in relation to defamatory online content, contrasting different cases to illustrate the complexity of jurisdictional considerations in internet-related defamation. The place of publication in a defamation case involving email correspondence is defined as the location where the email is opened and read. The defendants claim that Gilmore is a public official due to his leave from the U.S. State Department, but the court expresses doubt about this classification. Instead, it determines that Gilmore qualifies as a limited-purpose public figure, which subjects him to the same actual malice standard as public officials. The court can consider facts and documents subject to judicial notice without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, including public records and articles discussing the case's subject matter. Judicial notice is taken of a CNN transcript and a Politico editorial, with the materials interpreted favorably toward Gilmore and not used to contradict his complaint. Gilmore's statements in the media reflect a public controversy stemming from a rally, aligning him with other recognized limited-purpose public figures. The rapid development of this controversy, exacerbated by social media and the 24-hour news cycle, is acknowledged, with Gilmore's media appearances beginning shortly after the rally in question. Gilmore has plausibly alleged actual malice against Creighton, which is a higher standard than required for private figures, allowing him to claim defamation even if he was not a limited public figure at the time of Creighton's publication. The Court acknowledges Gilmore's media appearances on PBS Newshour and NPR, which he did not dispute, and takes judicial notice of the transcripts from those broadcasts. Gilmore's allegations extend to all defendants' publications. He asserts that Hoft used the term "shill" in a derogatory context, while Jones allegedly republished defamatory content on his YouTube channel, making him equally liable under the republication rule. The defendants argue that Jones's statements are merely hyperbole; however, Gilmore contends that Jones's characterization of his video as containing "shocking revelations" implies the communication of factual information. Titles of the articles suggest the defendants had a pre-established narrative about the Unite the Right rally. Gilmore also references similar narratives pushed by Jones and associated entities regarding other national tragedies, claiming they were government fabrications. Finally, the Court clarifies that immunity under 8.01-223.2 does not apply to intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims, and thus cannot grant immunity or legal fees based on the dismissal of those claims.