Davison v. Facebook, Inc.

Citation: 370 F. Supp. 3d 621Docket: Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-1125 (AJT/TCB)

Court: District Court, E.D. Virginia; February 25, 2019; Federal District Court

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Anthony J. Trenga, United States District Judge, addressed a pro se lawsuit filed by Plaintiff Brian C. Davison against Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and the Loudoun County School Board, alleging violations of First Amendment and Due Process rights. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were granted. 

The Plaintiff claims interest in free speech within public forums and asserts that each social media platform enforces terms of service prohibiting content based on viewpoint, notably banning "hate speech" and enforcing content moderation policies. The Plaintiff contends that by creating social media pages and agreeing to these terms, the School Board is complicit in viewpoint-based moderation, thus becoming entwined with the social media companies in managing user comments. 

The Plaintiff alleges that the social media companies act as state actors regarding the School Board's social media pages, as they retain authority to moderate content and ban users. He claims his First Amendment and Due Process rights were violated when his critical comments on the School Board's posts were deleted, asserting that officials denied responsibility for the removals. Similar incidents occurred in the past, with Facebook previously acknowledging improper deletions of comments. The narrative outlines a pattern of censorship that the Plaintiff argues chills free speech on public forums managed by the School Board and its associated social media platforms.

Facebook's counsel confirmed the deletion of comments by its systems and despite assurances against future deletions, the platform continues to remove comments on government social media pages without notifying users. The Plaintiff claims that Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter enforce terms of service requiring users to consent to litigate disputes in California, exempting government users from this requirement. The Plaintiff argues that these terms inhibit free speech and create an unreasonable prior restraint on public discourse regarding governmental matters. The Amended Complaint includes five counts against all four Defendants: (1) Violation of Free Speech Rights via Viewpoint Discrimination (Count I); (2) Violation of Free Speech and Due Process Rights via Unconstitutional Prior Restraints (Count II); (3) Deletion of comments violating Davison's Free Speech Rights as Applied (Count III); (4) Deletion of comments without notice violating Davison's Due Process Rights as Applied (Count IV); and (5) Defendants' Terms of Service as an Unconstitutional Prior Restraint on Government Social Media Pages (Count V). The Plaintiff seeks several declarations regarding the unconstitutionality of the Defendants' policies, the status of the School Board's social media pages as public forums, and an injunction for the restoration of his deleted comments. To withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint must present sufficient factual matter to establish a plausible claim for relief, adhering to proper pleading standards even if filed by a pro se party.

Pro se complaints are afforded special consideration by district courts; however, this does not relieve the court from the responsibility of being an impartial adjudicator. Courts are not required to construct comprehensive claims from vague allegations. To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) an "injury in fact"; (2) that this injury is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's actions; and (3) that a favorable ruling is likely to redress the injury. An "injury in fact" must be concrete, particularized, actual, or imminent, not merely hypothetical.

The Loudoun County School Board seeks dismissal of the case, arguing that the plaintiff lacks standing due to the absence of a concrete injury caused by the Board. The plaintiff's claims against social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, are similarly challenged on the grounds that these entities are not state actors and that the plaintiff has not demonstrated any injury to support his claims.

Specifically, the School Board contends that the plaintiff fails to establish injury in Counts I, II, and V, as he does not identify a personal injury resulting from their actions. While the plaintiff claims to have suffered specific injuries in Counts III and IV, he concedes that these injuries are not traceable to the School Board, which is not named as a defendant in those counts. Additionally, the plaintiff acknowledges that the deletion of his comments was attributed to social media platforms, not the School Board. Thus, the plaintiff lacks standing for the claims presented against these defendants due to the failure to establish the requisite injury in fact.

The Amended Complaint indicates that Facebook acknowledged deleting comments from October 2018, but implies that all three sets of comments were deleted, without alleging involvement from the School Board in these deletions. Consequently, the Plaintiff has not established standing to sue the School Board. Regarding Defendants YouTube and Twitter, the Plaintiff claims that the School Board's accounts on these platforms serve as limited public forums and that these companies act as state actors due to their authority to moderate content. The Plaintiff alleges that their terms of service create viewpoint discrimination, violating the First Amendment, and impose an unreasonable prior restraint by requiring disputes to be litigated in California. However, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated personal harm from YouTube or Twitter, as there are no allegations of account creation or comment deletions on these platforms. Thus, the Plaintiff lacks standing against YouTube and Twitter. While he claims to have suffered injury from Facebook’s actions, he fails to state a constitutional claim because he does not provide facts supporting that Facebook acted as a state actor. His arguments suggest that Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are state actors due to their moderation authority over the School Board's social media pages, but these assertions do not establish a direct link to his alleged injuries.

The social media Defendants are private companies and, therefore, only subject to constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they are acting as de facto state actors. This determination hinges on whether the state has so dominated the private activity that it can be deemed state action, which requires more than mere approval or acquiescence from the state. The Fourth Circuit recognizes four specific circumstances where a private party can be considered a state actor: (1) state coercion of a private actor to commit an unconstitutional act; (2) state delegation of a clear constitutional duty to a private actor; (3) state delegation of a traditionally public function to a private actor; or (4) state involvement in an unconstitutional act while enforcing a private citizen's rights. The allegations in the Amended Complaint do not indicate that Facebook's relationship with the School Board meets any of these criteria, as there is no evidence of coercion or delegation of functions. The Plaintiff's claims suggest that the School Board retains the ability to manage its social media pages independently, further supporting that Facebook is not a state actor. Consequently, Facebook, as a private entity, maintains the right to regulate content on its platform, consistent with its First Amendment rights. The Fourth Circuit has previously ruled that a private party remains a non-state actor even when closely intertwined with state actors, as is the case here with Facebook.

In DeBauche, the Court determined that a gubernatorial candidate's claim under § 1983 against a privately employed debate moderator and private television broadcasters was insufficient. The candidate alleged exclusion from a debate at Virginia Commonwealth University, claiming that these private parties acted as state actors by coordinating with the public university. The Court rejected this argument, asserting that the organization and moderation of the debate by private entities do not constitute actions exclusive to governmental authority. It emphasized that these private parties possess First Amendment rights to determine the content of their hosted debates, indicating their actions were independent rather than state-driven.

Similarly, in United Auto Workers v. Gaston Festivals, the Fourth Circuit found that a private entity organizing a public festival on public property, partially funded by public money, did not qualify as a state actor. Consequently, the Plaintiff could not establish that Facebook is a state actor subject to constitutional guarantees.

The Court granted the Loudoun County School Board's motion to dismiss, along with the joint motion to dismiss by Facebook, Inc., YouTube, LLC, and Twitter, Inc., resulting in the dismissal of the action. The Plaintiff's motions for a preliminary injunction and to file reply briefs were deemed moot. The order is a final decision for appeal purposes, requiring the Plaintiff to file a notice of appeal within thirty days. Notably, the Plaintiff initiated this action on September 5, 2018, with defendants filing their motions to dismiss on November 2, 2018, and the Plaintiff subsequently amending the complaint and filing a motion for a preliminary injunction in early January 2019.