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Leibel v. City of Buckeye
Citation: 364 F. Supp. 3d 1027Docket: No. CV-18-01743-PHX-DWL
Court: District Court, D. Arizona; January 29, 2019; Federal District Court
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which the court granted in part and denied in part. The complaint, initially filed on June 6, 2018, and re-filed on June 7, 2018, involves an incident from July 19, 2017, involving C.L., a 14-year-old boy with autism spectrum disorder, who was playing at a public park in Buckeye, Arizona. C.L. was engaging in "stimming," a common behavior among individuals with developmental disabilities that helps them cope with their environment. Officer David Grossman, a police officer with the Buckeye Police Department, approached C.L. under the mistaken belief that his stimming behavior indicated illegal drug use. Despite C.L. explaining his actions, Officer Grossman escalated the situation by forcefully grabbing C.L., handcuffing him, and pinning him against a tree. C.L. reacted by screaming and expressing distress, which is typical for individuals with autism due to their heightened sensitivity to touch and sound. C.L.'s caregiver, Ms. Craglow, arrived and informed Officer Grossman of C.L.'s autism, but he initially dismissed the information and continued to apply pressure. Eventually, after Ms. Craglow pointed out that C.L.'s hand was turning white, Officer Grossman released him when another officer arrived. Grossman later claimed he detained C.L. due to his backing away during the interaction. C.L. sustained severe injuries from an encounter with Officer Grossman, including facial and body injuries, a significant ankle injury requiring multiple procedures, and emotional damage. Following this incident, C.L.'s parents lodged a complaint with the Buckeye Police Department (BPD), which admitted Officer Grossman's lack of training in dealing with individuals with special needs or mental illness. Despite this acknowledgment, the BPD concluded that Grossman acted lawfully and without negligence, justifying his actions during a press conference by claiming he had reasonable suspicion to detain C.L., who was displaying behavior suggestive of substance influence. The BPD's defense overlooked C.L.'s prior communication of his condition to Grossman and failed to discipline him despite a history of at least four prior misconduct incidents, including illegal arrests and use of excessive force. Officer Grossman's supervisors, Lieutenant Arlak and Chief Hall, reportedly protected him from accountability and minimized his past actions, with Arlak, who is related to Grossman, actively instructing others to shield him from scrutiny. Concerns raised by BPD employees to City Manager Roger Klingler went unaddressed. The complaint names the City of Buckeye, Officer Grossman, Lieutenant Arlak, and Chief Hall as defendants, alleging nine causes of action including false arrest, excessive force, failure to train, wrongful arrest under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and various state law claims of battery and negligence. C.L.'s parents were appointed guardians ad litem, and the defendants have moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, a party must provide sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief. This requires allegations that allow the court to reasonably infer the defendant's liability, with all well-pleaded material facts accepted as true and viewed favorably for the non-moving party. Legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations, however, are not accepted. A court can dismiss a claim if it lacks a cognizable legal theory. Defendants claim qualified immunity for individual capacities in § 1983 claims, arguing Officer Grossman is immune regarding claims of false arrest and excessive force, while Lieutenant Arlak and Chief Hall are immune concerning failure to train and ratification of unconstitutional conduct. Qualified immunity serves as an immunity from suit and should be resolved early in litigation. It protects officials from damages unless the plaintiff shows (1) a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. In the case of false arrest, Defendants assert Grossman acted within legal bounds, claiming he conducted a lawful investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion rather than an arrest. C.L. counters that his liberty was interrupted, constituting an arrest, and argues there was no probable cause for the arrest, as reasonable observation would indicate he was not holding contraband. The court finds that the alleged facts support a plausible claim that Officer Grossman arrested C.L. without probable cause, violating C.L.'s clearly established constitutional rights, thus denying Grossman qualified immunity at this stage. The determination of whether an investigatory stop escalates to an arrest depends on the totality of the circumstances. The Court evaluates the intrusiveness of the police stop by assessing the aggressiveness of the methods used and the extent of liberty restriction on the individual seized. This assessment is made from the perspective of a reasonable innocent person in similar circumstances. Additionally, the Court examines the justification for the police's actions, specifically whether the officer had a sufficient basis to fear for his safety that warranted the level of intrusiveness. These considerations are fact-specific and often determined by a jury. In this case, the allegations suggest that Officer Grossman's actions were significantly intrusive, as he forcibly restrained C.L. by grabbing his wrist, handcuffing him, and pinning him to the ground with his full body weight. Such actions indicate a moderate to significant restriction of C.L.'s liberty, suggesting that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Furthermore, the lack of justification for the level of force employed by Officer Grossman supports the finding of an arrest. Grossman acted on a suspicion of drug influence without any indication that C.L. was armed or had committed a violent crime. C.L. demonstrated to Officer Grossman that he was simply playing with a piece of string, which undermines the justification for the use of force. Consequently, C.L. has plausibly alleged that Officer Grossman lacked probable cause for the arrest, thereby precluding Grossman from claiming qualified immunity, as an arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. Regarding the claim of excessive force, the defendants argue that Officer Grossman was justified in using force to prevent C.L. from leaving during the investigation. However, C.L. contends that the force used was not objectively reasonable, emphasizing that his actions were harmless and did not warrant such a significant intrusion on his Fourth Amendment rights. Determining whether a use of force violates the Fourth Amendment hinges on whether the force was "objectively reasonable" in relation to the circumstances faced by the officers, as established in Blankenhorn v. City of Orange. The assessment of reasonableness involves examining (1) the severity of the crime, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat, and (3) if the suspect is resisting arrest or fleeing, as noted in Kisela v. Hughes. The Ninth Circuit further stipulates that if officers recognize an individual as emotionally disturbed or mentally ill, this consideration is crucial in evaluating the force used (Deorle v. Rutherford). Since reasonableness is generally a jury question, the case for excessive force by Officer Grossman presents sufficient grounds to withstand a motion to dismiss. In this instance, the first two factors—the minor nature of the suspected crime and the lack of immediate threat from C.L., who was merely standing in a park—favor C.L. despite the last factor potentially supporting the Defendants, as C.L. only turned to leave and did not resist or flee. Given that C.L. was 14 years old and the use of force included handcuffing, slamming against a tree, and pinning him down, a jury could reasonably find the actions excessive. As the right to be free from excessive force is well-established, Officer Grossman is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. Regarding the claim of failure to train or supervise against Lieutenant Arlak and Chief Hall, the Defendants argue that liability requires evidence of deliberate indifference and a pattern of constitutional violations by untrained employees. They assert that there are no allegations of direct supervision or training responsibility for Officer Grossman. However, C.L. contends that the complaint outlines Grossman's history of misconduct and suggests that Arlak and Hall actively concealed this behavior. To establish a § 1983 claim against them, C.L. must demonstrate each defendant's personal participation in the alleged misconduct. C.L. alleges that Lieutenant Arlak and Chief Hall neglected their duty to train and supervise Officer Grossman, which could establish liability under § 1983 if it reflects a 'policy or custom' showing deliberate indifference to the rights of individuals that officers may encounter. For such claims to be actionable, there must be a clear causal link between the alleged failure and the plaintiff’s injury. C.L. fails to demonstrate this link, as he has not shown that Lieutenant Arlak and Chief Hall should have foreseen Grossman's constitutional violations. A pattern of similar violations is typically required to prove deliberate indifference, and C.L. has not identified any such pattern, particularly concerning mistreatment of individuals with disabilities. Only one allegation pertains to excessive force, and since Grossman was admonished for that instance, it does not support a failure to train claim. Thus, the court finds that C.L. has not established a claim against Lieutenant Arlak and Chief Hall, leading to their entitlement to qualified immunity. Regarding the City’s liability, C.L. claims a failure to provide adequate training for interactions with disabled individuals but fails to cite any instances of rights violations by the City. Without evidence of a pattern of violations, the failure to train claim against the City is also dismissed. In terms of ratification of unconstitutional conduct (Cause IV), defendants argue that this theory applies primarily to municipal liability, not individual supervisor liability. They contend that C.L.'s claims do not show that Lieutenant Arlak or Chief Hall actively endorsed any unconstitutional actions, as mere failure to discipline Officer Grossman does not constitute ratification. C.L. counters that subsequent approval of Grossman's actions and protective measures taken by the supervisors can signify ratification. The court notes that ratification can potentially apply to both municipal and individual liability under § 1983. The Ninth Circuit in Larez found no plain error in holding a police chief individually liable under § 1983 for 'ratifying' an employee's conduct, but such liability applies only in limited circumstances where the supervisor previously set in motion actions that led to constitutional injuries. In this case, Lieutenant Arlak and Chief Hall could not be accused of instigating the constitutional violations allegedly committed by Officer Grossman against C.L., as there were no prior allegations of mistreatment of individuals with disabilities or policies encouraging unlawful conduct. Their failure to discipline Officer Grossman and their defense of him post-incident did not establish liability under a ratification theory. Additionally, Sheriff Clark's supportive statements regarding his department's investigations did not constitute individual liability by acquiescence. Regarding Cause V, the complaint asserts an ADA wrongful arrest claim against Officer Grossman and the City. Defendants argue for the dismissal of Officer Grossman, asserting he is not a proper defendant under the ADA as an individual officer. They also claim C.L. has not sufficiently pleaded his disability and argue that the use of force cannot be challenged under the ADA if it results from the individual's justified actions. C.L. contends that by suing Officer Grossman in his official capacity, the claim equates to a public entity claim under the ADA and argues that he has sufficiently detailed his disability. However, the Court agrees with the Defendants that the claim against Officer Grossman should be dismissed, as the ADA's definition of 'public entity' excludes individuals, and C.L.'s official-capacity claim is duplicative of his claim against the City. Coles is permitted to assert his ADA claim directly against the Department of Correctional Services, and there is no basis for claims against individual defendants in their official capacity. The Court finds that C.L. has sufficiently pled his disability under the ADA, specifically identifying his autism spectrum disorder and detailing its effects on communication and behavior. These allegations meet the requirement for factual specificity in disability claims. C.L. has also presented a plausible case for wrongful arrest under Title II of the ADA, which applies to arrests. To succeed, he must demonstrate that he was disabled, that Officer Grossman was aware or should have been aware of this disability, and that the arrest was due to conduct related to his disability. C.L. satisfies the first element by establishing his disability and the second by indicating he informed Officer Grossman about his stimming behavior. A reasonable jury could find that Officer Grossman misinterpreted C.L.'s stimming as criminal activity, leading to the arrest. This situation contrasts with the Bates case, where the arrest was based on objectively verifiable misconduct rather than disability. Additionally, C.L. asserts a failure to accommodate claim against Officer Grossman and the City, but the defendants argue for Grossman’s dismissal and claim the actions taken were consistent with responses for similarly situated arrestees. C.L. argues that Officer Grossman violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by not accommodating C.L.'s autism during an arrest, which involved excessive physical force. However, the Court finds that C.L. has not established a plausible failure-to-accommodate claim and will dismiss this claim (Cause VI). The Court emphasizes that Causes V and VI are alternative claims, with Cause V being wrongful arrest. Under Ninth Circuit law, a failure-to-accommodate claim can only arise if the arrest was lawful. The Court must assume Officer Grossman's arrest decision was lawful, allowing him to use necessary physical force. C.L.'s sensitivity to force does not impose a requirement on officers to refrain from using force upon learning of a suspect's autism. This case is differentiated from precedents like Sheehan, where officers failed to accommodate a person's mental illness under different circumstances. In C.L.’s case, after the caregiver arrived and explained the situation, C.L. was released, indicating that any injuries resulted from the lawful arrest, not from a failure to accommodate afterward. Additionally, under Arizona law, a notice of claim must be filed within 180 days against public employees or entities for a claim to be valid, as outlined in A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Failure to comply with this requirement bars the claim. Actual notice and substantial compliance do not relieve parties from meeting the statutory requirements set forth in A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). The Defendants assert that C.L.'s state-law claims against the City should be dismissed based on two points: (1) C.L. attempted to serve his notice of claim by mail without obtaining necessary judicial approval, which is not allowed under Arizona law, and (2) there is no proof that the City received this mailing. In response, C.L. cites Lee v. State, 218 Ariz. 235, 182 P.3d 1169 (2008), which he argues permits service by mail to governmental entities. He has provided receipts indicating that notices were sent via certified mail. The Court rejects the Defendants' narrow interpretation of Lee, clarifying that the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that mailing does not violate service rules for governmental entities. Consequently, C.L. was permitted to serve his notice of claim by mail. Additionally, the City cannot dismiss the claim based on alleged non-receipt of the mailing because, per Lee, when a claimant presents proof of proper mailing, it is up to the factfinder to determine if the claim was received within the statutory timeframe. C.L. has submitted a certified mail receipt, indicating proper mailing to the City Clerk on January 9, 2018. In regard to Cause VII: Battery, Defendants argue that the complaint fails to demonstrate that Officer Grossman's use of force constituted prohibited police conduct. C.L. contends that the complaint illustrates that Officer Grossman's actions did not reflect proper law enforcement response. The Court finds that C.L. has plausibly alleged a battery claim, as he outlines intentional actions by Officer Grossman resulting in harmful contact, including being handcuffed, slammed against a tree, tackled, and forcefully pinned down. C.L. also asserts that he suffered injuries due to this force. In Cause VIII: Negligence, the complaint claims that Officer Grossman and the City had a duty to exercise reasonable care while interacting with individuals with autism and in assessing reasonable suspicion or probable cause for detaining such individuals. An arrest involving an individual with autism should avoid unnecessary and excessive force, and the continued use of force after detaining a disabled person is also prohibited. The complaint alleges that Officer Grossman and the City failed to uphold their duty of care to C.L., resulting in physical pain, mental anguish, humiliation, and financial loss. Defendants argue for dismissal, claiming that Officer Grossman's actions were appropriate law enforcement responses and that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate negligent conduct. However, C.L. contends that the allegations sufficiently support a negligence claim. The Arizona Supreme Court's ruling in Ryan v. Napier established that "negligent use of intentionally inflicted force" is not a valid claim, rendering the negligence component of Cause VIII nonviable since it pertains solely to Officer Grossman's intentional actions. Thus, Cause VIII is dismissed. Cause IX, which addresses negligent training and supervision against the City, Lieutenant Arlak, and Chief Hall, remains viable. Defendants' argument for dismissal, based on the assertion that if Officer Grossman acted properly, there could be no negligence in training or supervision, is rejected. Under Arizona law, an employer's liability for negligent supervision requires a finding that the employee committed a tort. The Court has determined that the complaint contains plausible allegations of Officer Grossman's improper conduct, which supports the negligent training and supervision claim. The Court's order grants the motion to dismiss in part and denies it in part, dismissing Causes III, IV, VI, and VIII, and dismissing Cause V concerning Officer Grossman. The request for oral argument is denied as the issues have been adequately briefed. The original complaint had procedural issues, including the improper naming of a minor and the dismissal of a fifth defendant, the BPD, by stipulation. The Court notes that the circumstances do not suggest a blatant lack of training that would render a municipality liable under Section 1983 without evidence of a pattern of violations. Defendants do not seek dismissal of state-law claims against Officer Grossman, Lieutenant Arlak, or Chief Hall. The City of Buckeye requires strict compliance with the notice of claim statute, and dismissal is warranted if the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate compliance. In their reply, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not argued that Officer Grossman's lawful actions resulted from negligent training and supervision. This argument was not presented in the initial motion and is not based on any new case law, leading the Court to disregard it according to Zamani v. Carnes, which states that the district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. Once an underlying tort is established, an employer may be liable not merely due to the relationship with the employee but because the employer had prior knowledge of an undue risk of harm associated with the employment, as referenced in Quinonez v. Andersen and the Restatement (Second) of Agency.