Court: District Court, D. Idaho; February 24, 2019; Federal District Court
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, claiming that the Court cannot hear Tugaw Ranches, LLC's challenge regarding the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service's failure to submit land use plan amendments for the Greater Sage Grouse to Congress as required by the Congressional Review Act (CRA). The Court held oral arguments on November 29, 2018, and subsequently denied the motion.
Tugaw Ranches, a cattle ranching operation operating on lands affected by the amended rules, argues that the BLM and the Forest Service violated the CRA. The CRA mandates that agency rules must be submitted to Congress for review before taking effect, and it includes a provision (5 U.S.C. 805) stating that no actions or omissions under the CRA are subject to judicial review. While Defendants acknowledge their failure to submit the amendments, they assert that this provision bars the Court from addressing the issue. Conversely, Tugaw Ranches contends that the overall framework of the CRA, its legislative history, and the general presumption of judicial review over agency actions indicate that the Court should have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court's analysis emphasized that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction in such motions.
When interpreting a statute, a court first evaluates whether the language is plain and unambiguous. If the language is clear, the inquiry concludes there. If not, further examination of the statute's intent and application is necessary. In this case, the language of 5 U.S.C. 805 does not definitively indicate that judicial review is unavailable for claims related to an agency's failure to submit a proposed rule to Congress. The defendants argue that the statute's wording, which states "no omission under this chapter shall be subject to judicial review," applies universally. They assert that their omission in failing to submit proposed changes to Congress falls under this provision, implying judicial review is precluded.
Defendants reference past cases to support their claim that 805 does not allow for judicial review of any actions or omissions under the chapter, including those not strictly by Congress. However, the cited cases do not specify the extent of the non-review provision. They also invoke the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to argue that since Congress and the President are not agencies, their actions are not subject to review, implying that agencies are likewise exempt under 805.
Conversely, Tugaw Ranches contends that the absence of explicit mention of agencies in 805 suggests they are not exempt from judicial review. They acknowledge the immunity of Congress and the President under the CRA but argue that actions by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) should also be considered non-reviewable since these entities are referenced in the CRA.
The Court finds the matter ambiguous, rejecting both parties' claims regarding the clarity of the statute. The absence of detail in Section 805 does not justify limiting non-reviewability solely to "agency" actions, as the law lists various exempt parties. The Court emphasizes that it cannot definitively ascertain whose actions are subject to judicial review based on the statute alone. Concerns arise from the Eastern District of Texas's interpretation that suggests no judicial review for anyone's actions, potentially conflicting with other CRA provisions, such as the prohibition against agencies adopting substantially similar rules after Congressional disapproval. The Court argues that without judicial review, agencies would lack a legal obligation to comply with the CRA, raising issues for affected third parties like Tugaw Ranches. Defendants' assertion that Congress can ensure compliance without judicial oversight is questioned, as it leaves third parties without recourse if agencies fail to submit plans. The Court acknowledges that while actions of Congress and the President may not be reviewable, it remains unclear whether similar deference applies to agencies. Given these ambiguities, further inquiry into other Court interpretations of Section 805 is warranted.
The Court emphasizes that the cases cited by the Defendants are merely persuasive and not binding, as they originate from outside the relevant District or Circuit and often lack thorough analysis or are factually distinct. Defendants particularly rely on the D.C. Circuit case Montanans For Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, which offers a brief analysis of Section 805, concluding that it denies courts the authority to invalidate rules based on agency noncompliance with the Act. The Court reinforces that the language of Section 805 is clear and prevents judicial review of the claim, regardless of whether the plan amendments are considered rules under the Act.
Subsequent District Courts in the D.C. Circuit have echoed this conclusion, adhering to the findings in Montanans For Multiple Use. Several other courts across different Circuits have similarly interpreted Section 805 as barring judicial review. The Congressional Review Act explicitly states that judicial review of an agency's compliance is not permitted. Various cases have interpreted Section 805's language as a jurisdictional barrier to review, while questioning if the challenged actions fall under the Act's purview. The Court notes that many referenced cases reached their conclusions based on a straightforward reading of the statute but also considered other significant factors, such as whether the rule in question was covered by the CRA. Additionally, some mentions of Section 805 were cursory or lacked detailed analysis, leading the Court to conclude that these factors do not establish a definitive precedent for its current decision.
Several Circuit and District Courts have determined that 5 U.S.C. § 805 does not prohibit judicial review of agency actions, contrasting with some cases suggesting otherwise. Notable rulings include Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham, which examined a rule's effective date under the Congressional Review Act (CRA), and Liesegang v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, which similarly addressed judicial review. In Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, the court found that judicial review was available for alleged violations of the CRA by the Department of the Interior. Other cases noted that failures to submit rules to Congress under the CRA could be used as defenses against enforcement actions, and that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) may also apply.
While some courts have discussed the complexities of § 805, many did not delve into its intricacies. It appears that a number of courts have concluded that agency actions are generally reviewable. The case of S. Indiana Gas & Elec. Co. provides the most thorough analysis of § 805, although it is unpublished and considered persuasive rather than binding. The interpretation of § 805 itself is debated, with two plausible meanings: one suggests that Congress intended to eliminate all judicial review of agency compliance with the CRA, while the other posits that only Congressional actions after a rule submission are non-reviewable.
The first interpretation could allow agencies to avoid CRA compliance by not reporting rules, undermining the CRA's purpose of ensuring Congressional oversight over administrative rulemaking. The CRA lacks an enforcement mechanism, and interpreting § 805 to preclude judicial review of whether an agency rule is effective would render it ineffective. The statutory language indicates that judicial review is barred only concerning Congress' determinations and actions made after a rule is submitted, not regarding whether an agency rule that should have been reported is in effect.
The Court has thoroughly examined all relevant cases regarding Section 805 but finds a lack of clarity, with most cases leaning towards non-reviewability based on two Circuits and a few District Courts, none of which are binding. Conversely, there is at least one Circuit and several District Courts suggesting some form of judicial review under the Congressional Review Act (CRA). The law surrounding 805 remains unsettled, necessitating further exploration of legislative history due to its ambiguity.
Legislative history is critical when statute text is unclear. The CRA, enacted in 1996, included a joint statement from bipartisan sponsors in the Congressional Record clarifying that the CRA was not intended to prevent judicial review of an agency's non-submission of rules to Congress. This statement indicates that while major rule determinations by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs are non-reviewable, courts can review the legal effect of a disapproval resolution and determine if a rule is in effect. The statement suggests Congress anticipated courts might recognize rules as having no legal effect under specific subsections of the CRA.
Defendants challenge the relevance of this joint statement as "post-enactment legislative history," suggesting it lacks credibility since it was issued 20 days after the CRA's enactment. However, the Court finds the timing insignificant, asserting that even if deemed post-enactment, it can still be given appropriate weight. Previous rulings support considering such statements if they are persuasive, reinforcing the notion that legislative intent can still be gleaned from them.
The "post-enactment" statement regarding the Congressional Review Act (CRA) was an intended aspect of its legislative strategy, as articulated by one of its sponsors. During the CRA's consideration, it was noted that enacting it as an amendment would prevent a conference report or managers' statement prior to passage. However, the sponsors planned to create a statement for the Congressional Record to serve as a substitute. This joint statement was meant to confirm their mutual understanding of the CRA and clarify that the bill resulted from negotiations with the Senate without undergoing the committee process, leaving minimal legislative history beyond brief debate comments. The sponsors aimed for this statement to guide agencies and courts in interpreting the act's terms.
On the CRA's tenth anniversary, the House Judicial Committee examined whether the CRA limits judicial review. Despite the joint statement being issued post-enactment, the Committee acknowledged it as the most authoritative contemporary understanding of the law, given the lack of extensive legislative commentary. They concluded that the joint statement should be closely considered by reviewing courts as a detailed expression of the intent of the law's principal sponsors. Although defendants contest the relevance of this decade-later statement, it remains clear that both at the time of enactment and years later, the consensus was that the joint statement would serve as authoritative guidance for addressing CRA-related questions. The Court finds the legislative history compelling, indicating that while some actions under the CRA may not be reviewable, agency actions are indeed subject to judicial review.
Policy concerns arise regarding the defendants' interpretation of statute 805 in light of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Congressional Review Act (CRA), which emphasize accountability. The APA aims to enhance judicial review of agency actions by removing the defense of sovereign immunity. Established legal precedents indicate a strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative actions, which can only be overridden if a statute explicitly precludes such review or if an action is committed to agency discretion by law. This presumption is crucial to prevent agencies from unilaterally determining compliance with the law without consequences. The defendants argue that the language of 805 supports their claim of preclusion of review, but the court finds this interpretation unclear. Denying judicial review would undermine the foundational purpose of the CRA as a check on agency action, granting agencies undue power contrary to legislative intent. The court expresses discomfort with allowing agencies to bypass requirements for congressional submission of rule changes. Acknowledging that the absence of judicial review could enable agencies to act unlawfully without repercussions, the court maintains that without a clear exception in 805, it cannot accept an interpretation that negates the act's purpose and leaves affected parties without remedies.
The language of 805 is ambiguous regarding its prohibition on judicial review of actions taken under the CRA. While it initially seems to impose a blanket prohibition, this interpretation contradicts the act's purpose, legislative history, and leaves third parties without legal remedies. The scant available case law on 805 is conflicting and lacks depth, providing only persuasive authority. The text of 805 states that "no determination, finding, action, or omission under [the CRA] shall be subject to judicial review," but does not clarify whose actions are included, leading to varying interpretations about which parties are affected. The court concludes that 805 does not categorically prevent judicial review of agency actions under the CRA, thus retaining jurisdiction over the claims in the case. The court denies the defendants' motion to dismiss, emphasizing the necessity of judicial oversight to ensure compliance with the statute. It references several cases where courts found authority to review actions under related statutes, underscoring that the broad term "action" in 805 likely encompasses all agency processes under the CRA. Furthermore, while some circuits have addressed 805, they did not specifically analyze its provisions, limiting the applicability of those decisions. The case law indicates that judicial review remains essential for enforcing statutory compliance.
