Court: District Court, N.D. Mississippi; January 13, 2019; Federal District Court
George Rice died in a work-related accident on August 14, 2014, while operating a dredge at Tronox, LLC's titanium dioxide manufacturing plant in Hamilton, Mississippi. His daughters, Shaquanda Rice Pippen and Angelia Rice, co-administrators of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit against Tronox on August 10, 2017. Tronox has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing it is not liable under Mississippi law, asserting immunity, and claiming that the plaintiffs have not proven the necessary elements of negligence or provided competent evidence for their negligent misrepresentation claims.
At the time of the accident, Rice was using a dredge that capsized due to water infiltration, leading to his drowning. Prior to the incident, the dredge had been taken out of service for repairs due to listing, and was returned to operation on July 26, 2014, less than three weeks before Rice's death. The Court will resolve factual disputes in favor of the plaintiffs, as mandated by the legal standard for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court is tasked with reviewing evidence without making credibility determinations when contradictory facts are presented.
The moving party must initially inform the district court of the grounds for its motion and highlight specific portions of the record that show no genuine issue of material fact. The nonmoving party is then required to provide specific facts that demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, moving beyond mere allegations or speculation. Under Mississippi law, an owner is generally obligated to provide a safe working environment for independent contractors' employees but is not liable for injuries if the contractor was aware of the danger. The Mississippi legislature has codified this principle, relieving owners of liability if the independent contractor knew or should have known about the risks involved. In the case at hand, Tronox asserts that Rice was an independent contractor's employee and that he was aware of the dangers that led to his death. The court must determine if genuine disputes exist regarding Rice’s status as an independent contractor's employee and his knowledge of the danger. It is confirmed that Jimco operated as an independent contractor under a Master Work Agreement with Tronox, with Rice as a Jimco employee. The agreement explicitly states that Jimco functions as an independent contractor, ensuring that neither Jimco nor its employees are considered agents of Tronox for various purposes.
Contractor is obligated to defend, indemnify, and hold the Company harmless from claims made by its employees or subcontractors related to an employee/employer or master/servant relationship, including claims from governmental entities based on similar allegations. In response to Tronox's requests for admission, Plaintiffs admitted that Jimco was aware or should have been aware of the dangerous condition of the H. H mini-dredge on August 14, 2014, which caused Rice's death. Tronox, having control of the site, also had knowledge of the dangerous conditions, thus fulfilling the knowledge-of-danger requirement under MISS. CODE ANN. 11-1-66, leading to Tronox's immunity from liability as established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. Even if section 11-1-66 did not apply, causation issues arise since Rice's death stemmed from the capsizing of the dredge, not from premises liability. The Plaintiffs' claims incorrectly seek to impose liability on Tronox for defects in the independent subcontractor's equipment rather than for hazards related to the premises itself. Previous case law cited by the Plaintiffs involves liability for premises-related dangers, whereas Rice's death resulted from issues with Jimco's equipment, without any allegations of defects in the physical premises contributing to the incident. The Court finds no legal precedent to support imposing liability on a contractor or premises owner for dangers arising from a subcontractor's own equipment.
Holding Tronox liable for premises liability would unjustifiably broaden the liability of premises owners without legal foundation. The Court concludes that the principles of premises liability do not apply in this case. The Plaintiffs argue that Tronox had significant control over the worksite, suggesting de facto control over the dredging operation, and thus liability for Rice's death. Under Mississippi law, premises owners are not obligated to protect independent contractor employees from inherent dangers associated with their work. Liability may arise only if the owner retains substantial control over the work related to the injury. The Plaintiffs contend that Tronox demonstrated substantial control through the assignment of supervisors, safety training, incident reporting, quarterly inspections, and the right to mandate corrections by Jimco. However, Tronox asserts that these actions do not equate to substantial control necessary for liability, as Mississippi law permits a customer to oversee compliance with contractual terms without incurring liability. Previous cases establish that mere oversight, safety program involvement, or the ability to stop work does not suffice to impose liability on a premises owner.
In *Chisolm v. Mississippi Department of Transportation*, the court ruled that an owner's right to ensure contractor compliance with specifications does not equate to control over the contractor's work, thereby absolving the owner from liability for the contractor's actions. It was established that periodic inspections by the owner do not constitute sufficient control to impose liability. The Master Work Agreement between Tronox and Jimco explicitly defines Jimco as an independent contractor, emphasizing that no employer-employee relationship exists for tax or benefits purposes, and obligating Jimco to indemnify Tronox against claims arising from such alleged relationships.
The Work Order specified Jimco's responsibilities for providing, operating, and maintaining dredging equipment necessary for operations, confirming that Jimco bore sole responsibility for these duties. Plaintiffs failed to present competent evidence to challenge this finding.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs argued that Tronox's post-accident implementation of stricter safety standards indicated substantial control over the work and supported liability for the accident. Tronox acknowledged the introduction of new safety policies, such as requiring Jimco to develop a safety plan, ensuring additional safety boats, and enhancing equipment inspections. However, the court likened these subsequent remedial measures to those in *Lee II*, where similar post-accident actions were deemed insufficient to demonstrate de facto control, thereby further supporting the dismissal of liability claims against Tronox.
The Court determined that the safety measures implemented by Tronox were legitimate and within its rights under the Master Work Agreement, and these measures did not create any genuine dispute regarding Tronox's control over the dredging process. The Plaintiffs sought to hold Tronox liable for Rice's death under the OSHA multi-employer doctrine, but both parties acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit's precedent indicates an employer is not liable under this doctrine if its employees are not exposed to the hazard in question. The Fifth Circuit's ruling in Acosta v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. clarified that the Secretary of Labor can issue citations to controlling employers for OSHA violations but did not expand employers' common law duties or liabilities. The Court agreed that Tronox's liability under the multi-employer doctrine could not extend based on the Acosta decision, especially since OSHA regulations are not admissible to prove negligence under Mississippi law. Additionally, no evidence suggested that OSHA issued any citations related to Rice's death. Consequently, the Court found no genuine disputes regarding the Plaintiffs' negligence claim against Tronox, granting summary judgment in favor of Tronox.
Plaintiffs assert a negligent misrepresentation claim against Tronox, alleging that Tronox misrepresented the safety and control standards of its worksite, leading Rice to rely on these representations despite the actual unsafe conditions. The Plaintiffs claim Tronox conducted safety inspections, which Rice depended upon for the dredge's safety. Tronox counters that the Plaintiffs failed to provide factual evidence supporting their claim, arguing that their own admission indicates that Jimco and Rice were aware of the dangers, undermining any reliance on Tronox's alleged misrepresentations. To establish a negligent misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a misrepresentation of material fact and reasonable reliance to their detriment. Tronox's inspections were general and infrequent, lacking the specific assurance that the dredge was safe. As a result, the Plaintiffs did not present competent evidence to substantiate their claim, leading to the grant of summary judgment in favor of Tronox.
Additionally, Tronox filed two motions in limine to exclude expert testimony from the Plaintiffs’ experts, relating to OSHA regulations and dredge stability. However, since the court's summary judgment decision was based on legal questions rather than factual disputes, it found these motions moot and denied them without prejudice. Consequently, Tronox's motion for summary judgment on all claims is granted.
Tronox is dismissed from the case with prejudice as of January 14, 2019. The Court addresses Tronox's Motions in Limine and notes that the Plaintiffs have brought similar claims against Allen Blasting and Coating, Inc., which are under a separate Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court finds the Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the applicability of previous case holdings, particularly the Brooks case, to be misleading and bordering on misrepresentation. The Plaintiffs cite Lee v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co. to argue that Tronox's subsequent remedial measures indicate substantial control over the dredging operation, which the Court also deems misleading. The Fifth Circuit's remand in Lee I highlighted improper exclusion of evidence regarding subsequent remedial measures, but in Lee II, it affirmed that these measures did not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Defendant's control at the time of the injury. Furthermore, while some dredges at Tronox are now operated remotely, the Plaintiffs' assertion that Tronox participated in this decision lacks supporting evidence in the record.
