Garden State Islamic Ctr. v. City of Vineland

Citation: 358 F. Supp. 3d 377Docket: Civil Action No. 17-1209

Court: District Court, D. New Jersey; December 11, 2018; Federal District Court

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Joseph H. Rodriguez, United States District Judge, ruled on a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Carmen Di Giorgio, Dale Jones, Gary Lugiano, and the City of Vineland under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States filed a Statement of Interest on September 5, 2017, and the Court subsequently postponed the motion and established a briefing schedule, with oral arguments held on March 14, 2018. The Court denied the Defendants' motion based on the reasons articulated during the oral argument and in the written decision.

The Garden State Islamic Center (GSIC), a New Jersey not-for-profit corporation, has claimed that the Defendants engaged in discriminatory practices that hindered its ability to operate and serve the community, particularly in the context of constructing a mosque. The Complaint details actions by the Defendants, such as withholding necessary permits and a final certificate of occupancy, and improperly assessing tax liens despite GSIC’s tax-exempt status as a religious institution. The City’s refusal to issue the Certificate of Occupancy is tied to allegations that GSIC's building design exceeded the approved septic system capacity, necessitating a flow determination from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) due to increased water flow from additional building uses.

Currently, GSIC operates under a temporary certificate of occupancy while facing unpaid tax bills, despite the City not actively collecting these taxes. The Plaintiffs allege violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. A central issue raised by the City pertains to the ripeness of the case, arguing that GSIC has not exhausted its administrative remedies with the NJDEP.

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint can be dismissed for failing to state a claim. Courts must accept all factual allegations as true and evaluate whether the plaintiff may be entitled to relief based on a reasonable interpretation of the complaint.

Factual allegations in a complaint must elevate a right to relief beyond mere speculation, as established in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Courts are not required to accept legal conclusions as true, and complaints must substantiate claims of entitlement to relief with factual evidence, following Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) aims to protect religious liberty broadly, prohibiting government actions that impose substantial burdens on religious exercise unless justified by a compelling governmental interest and using the least restrictive means. The plaintiff, GSIC, bears the initial burden to demonstrate that a land use regulation imposes a substantial burden on their religious exercise, shifting the burden to the City to prove the regulation's justification. Although RLUIPA does not define "substantial burden," its purpose is to address subtle discrimination by land use authorities. A substantial burden claim does not necessitate proof of discriminatory intent, as it protects against both discriminatory and non-discriminatory conduct that significantly impacts religious exercise. To establish such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a regulation or its application causes a hardship affecting their religious rights. RLUIPA does not exempt religious assemblies from zoning regulations. Claims under RLUIPA are distinctly categorized into substantial burdens and discrimination/exclusion provisions, highlighting the clear legal framework governing these issues.

The Substantial Burdens section of RLUIPA includes a strict scrutiny requirement, indicating that the "disparate exclusion" noted is intentional by Congress, not an oversight. The first section prohibits land use regulations that significantly burden religious exercise unless they meet strict scrutiny standards, as outlined in 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1, 2). The second section prohibits discrimination against religious assemblies, defining three types of impermissible regulations: (1) unequal treatment of religious versus nonreligious assemblies (Equal Terms Provision), (2) direct discrimination against religious assemblies (Nondiscrimination Provision), and (3) total exclusion or unreasonable limitations on religious assemblies (Exclusions and Limits Provision) under 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(b)(1, 3). The plaintiff's motion relates to the Nondiscrimination Provision. The court finds the case ripe for adjudication, as the plaintiff alleges discrimination through land use regulations that substantially burden religious exercise, violating RLUIPA and various state and constitutional laws. The court first addresses the ripeness of claims, which requires a concrete dispute between parties with adverse interests, ruling out hypothetical situations. The ripeness doctrine ensures that judicial intervention occurs only when an administrative decision has been formalized and its impacts felt concretely. The plaintiff must demonstrate specific present harm or the threat of future harm to establish ripeness, as claims based on uncertain future events are not ripe.

Plaintiff must demonstrate an "injury in fact," which requires showing an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, rather than conjectural. The ripeness argument is linked to the cognizability of Plaintiffs' claims under RLUIPA. The court finds the claims ripe, as the sewage permitting issue suggests that the permit "issue" serves as a pretext for discrimination. The absence of a final decision regarding the water flow and sewage permit, currently under EPA review, does not make the discriminatory use of this process unripe; rather, it is central to the claim that the City intended to undermine GSIC's existence.

In a comparable case, the court determined that claims under RLUIPA were ripe despite the lack of a final permit decision for the Islamic Center of Culpeper (ICC). The town board had not approved the permit due to alleged insufficiencies but had previously stated that the ICC's application met all requirements. The court highlighted various factors indicating potential discrimination, such as the historically high approval rates for similar applications and the unusual delays faced by the ICC. The court concluded that the process affected ICC's ability to build a mosque and imposed significant delays and expenses, stemming from what appeared to be anti-Muslim prejudice.

GSIC's complaint presents a situation similar to that of the ICC in Culpeper, supporting its ripeness argument.

Vineland has imposed unique regulatory requirements on GSIC that have not been applied to other secular or religious groups, including specific water flow calculations and the unilateral rescission of an approved septic permit following construction, without due process. Additionally, GSIC's certificate of occupancy has been withheld in a manner not experienced by other groups. The water flow calculation demands are characterized as a novel and discriminatory use of land use regulation aimed at undermining GSIC's ability to operate legally. 

Notably, a similarly situated Christian congregation received more favorable treatment; the Cumberland County Department of Health approved their septic system based on a lower water usage calculation, allowing them to avoid state oversight. In contrast, GSIC was assessed to have a significantly higher water usage requirement despite having fewer occupants and lesser facilities.

GSIC alleges that these actions by the Defendants are discriminatory and violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions. The complaint asserts that the City has altered septic system requirements for discriminatory reasons and that the case is ripe for judicial consideration. The Court acknowledges that the sewage permit process constitutes a "land use" regulation under RLUIPA, which limits GSIC's use of its property, thereby qualifying the complaint as cognizable under the statute.

GSIC faced significant procedural challenges in attempting to build a mosque in the City, similar to the case of Cnty. of Culpeper, Va. Initially, the City's Planning Board rejected GSIC's site plan, prompting GSIC to file a lawsuit that ultimately led to a settlement and the approval of a major site plan on January 12, 2022. The approved plan included a three-level, 61,540 square foot facility with various prayer and meeting spaces, capable of seating 220 persons. Prior to construction, GSIC modified the plans, eliminating the basement and significantly reducing the overall square footage to 8,393 square feet under the 2012 Amended Site Plan Approval.

The Complaint alleges that the City created a septic system issue to hinder GSIC's operation. The original septic permit allowed for a maximum flow of 3,000 gallons per day, while GSIC estimated the current building's flow at 1,500 gallons per day. In late 2012, the City approved the septic system after inspections. However, when GSIC sought permits for a second floor addition with similar uses to the original plan, the City mistakenly believed the original septic system was designed for a 500-seat mosque and included showers in the proposed addition. Consequently, the City required GSIC to obtain a "flow determination" from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, which has prevented GSIC from securing a final Certificate of Occupancy. GSIC has made multiple attempts to counter the City's flow determinations, providing evidence that the septic system’s capacity does not exceed permitted levels.

GSIC and its contractors demonstrated that the building's flow values were within acceptable limits, negating the need for State review. However, the City held meetings regarding this issue without GSIC's representation and misrepresented key facts about the building's usage and the previously approved plans from 2011. David Manders, GSIC's project architect, highlighted discrepancies in the City’s assessment in a letter to the Vineland City Health Department, clarifying that the building is a two-story structure with a finished first floor and an unfinished second floor, seeking approval only for the latter. Manders emphasized that the proposed construction does not align with the significantly larger building referenced in a prior email and noted that any future construction would require new permits and potential septic system upgrades. Despite this clarification, the City persisted in using incorrect data to justify requiring State review, leading GSIC to argue that the City’s actions constituted discrimination under RLUIPA. GSIC claimed they were held to unjustifiably higher standards regarding the septic system, which hindered their expansion efforts and caused unnecessary costs and delays. GSIC contended that the City’s approach to the septic system permit process was discriminatory and burdensome, aimed at obstructing their lawful growth.

The sewage regulation in question, incorporated into the City's Land Use Ordinance, qualifies as a zoning law under RLUIPA. Not recognizing it as such would prioritize form over function. The case references the County of Culpeper, where a routine permit was previously approved, and a denial raised concerns of religious hostility. The district court's ruling emphasized RLUIPA's text, relevant case precedents, and the County's laws, noting that the permit process may have been misused to restrict religious property rights. 

In contrast, the Third Circuit's ruling in Second Baptist Church of Leechburg v. Gilpin Township determined that a mandatory sewer tap ordinance did not constitute a zoning law under RLUIPA because it was not enacted for zoning purposes. The court finds the City's application of this precedent unpersuasive, arguing that the sewage permit in the current case is similar to the Culpeper case and involves zoning considerations, thus falling under RLUIPA protections. 

The court denies the City's motion to dismiss the RLUIPA claim, affirming that the sewage permitting process imposes a "substantial burden" on the Plaintiffs. Additionally, the court denies the motion to dismiss the remaining constitutional claims, including those under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which mandates equal treatment for individuals in similar circumstances.

The Complaint presents sufficient facts indicating that GSIC experienced differential treatment compared to other Christian buildings in the city, suggesting potential discriminatory intent by the Defendants. The court references case law, including Village of Arlington Heights and Washington v. Davis, to support its findings. The motions to dismiss the Equal Protection Claim and the First Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion claim are denied, as the RLUIPA provides stronger protections for religious liberty. The Defendants' motions to dismiss the due process claims and the unlawful taxation claim are also denied. The Complaint alleges that the Defendants failed to provide notice and a hearing before revoking the permit, and it challenges the improper assessment of taxes against GSIC as a religious institution. Specifically, it states that the Defendants' insistence on requiring NJDEP review is a pretext for discrimination and for the revocation of the permit. Furthermore, the Complaint argues that taxes were assessed for 2015 without notice, deeming the structure "completed" under state law, despite the Defendants withholding a final Certificate of Occupancy. The Plaintiffs assert that their application for tax-exempt status as a religious organization went unacknowledged by the Defendants, who were aware of GSIC's religious affiliation prior to the tax assessment. The inconsistency in the Defendants’ actions—claiming the structure was "complete" for tax purposes while not issuing the Certificate of Occupancy—demonstrates discriminatory practices. Ultimately, the court denies all motions to dismiss, with an appropriate order to follow. Additionally, the Complaint notes that a flow of 2,000 gallons necessitates State review.