Thomas W. Carroll Robert J. Carroll Michael E. McChesney Emanuel J. Panos Edward J. Priola Craig J. Rucker Robert T. Scmidlin Beth Turkovic Garfunkel Christine McClellan Christopher Sandor Susanne Ziegler v. Donald M. Blinken, in His Capacity as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the State University of New York George L. Collins, Jr. D. Clinton Dominick Judith Lasker Duken Arnold B. Gardner Gurstin D. Goldin John L.S. Holloman, Jr. Nan Johnson Everette Joseph Judith Davidson Moyers Edward v. Mele Victor Marrero Rosemary Salomone Edgar A. Sandman Thomas Van Arsdale Darwin R. Wales, in Their Capacities as Trustees of the State University of New York Jerome Komisar, in His Capacity as Acting Chancellor of the State University of New York Vincent O'Leary Clifford D. Clark Alice Chandler, in His or Her Capacity as President and Chief Administrative Officer Of, Respectively, the State University of New York at Albany, the State University of New York at Binghamton, and the State University of New York at New Pal

Citation: 105 F.3d 79Docket: 95-9153

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; January 14, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

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In the case of Carroll v. Blinken, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed an appeal concerning an award of $25,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, who argued that this amount was insufficient given their minimal success in the litigation. The court affirmed the fee award, reasoning that a higher amount was not warranted due to the limited relief obtained by the appellants. Additionally, the appellants contested the district court's determination that officials of the State University of New York (SUNY) could not be held jointly and severally liable for the fees. The appellate court determined that SUNY could be liable and remanded the case for further proceedings to allocate liability between SUNY and the New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG).

The appeal stemmed from a prior action where SUNY students claimed that NYPIRG and SUNY infringed upon their First Amendment rights by mandatorily collecting student fees for NYPIRG. The district court had dismissed the initial action, but the appellate court previously ruled that while the use of mandatory fees was constitutional if NYPIRG’s expenditures matched the fees collected, such fees could not be required if all students were deemed automatic members. Following this, the district court initially denied attorney's fees based on the plaintiffs' lack of "prevailing" status but later recognized that they had prevailed on the automatic membership issue, leading to the current appeal regarding the reasonable attorney's fees for that claim.

Appellants requested a fee award of $558,156.25 but the district court granted only $25,000, citing the appellants' failure to separate hours spent on compensable and noncompensable claims. The appellate court disagreed with the district court's reasoning, noting considerable overlap between the claims related to the legality of government conduct concerning political activity. However, the appellate court upheld the $25,000 award as reasonable due to the minimal relief attained by the appellants. Following the precedent set in Pino v. Locascio, the court emphasized that the degree of success is crucial in assessing fee reasonableness. The appellants achieved minimal relief, primarily conditioning NYPIRG's fee collection practices without any damage awards or significant systemic impact. While they obtained some relief, it was largely a judicial pronouncement rather than a substantial judgment. The ruling on expenditures had no practical effect, as actual spending already exceeded collected fees. Ultimately, despite achieving more than nominal relief, the practical significance was minimal, justifying the limited fee award.

Appellants received minimal relief, making the district court's $25,000 fee award reasonable. However, the court's conclusion that the fee award applies only to NYPIRG, excluding SUNY, is contested. The students prevailed against both SUNY and NYPIRG on the membership claim, as SUNY was deemed a "joint participant" in the unlawful actions related to the collection and distribution of mandatory fees, which supported the appellants' Section 1983 claims concerning NYPIRG's by-laws. SUNY could have opted out of the fees and maintained its by-laws independently. Consequently, both SUNY and NYPIRG may be liable for the attorney's fees, but the distribution of that liability is left to the district court's discretion. The case is remanded for the district court to decide how to allocate liability for the fee award between the two parties, considering the minimal impact on SUNY. The decision of the panel, with one judge recused, results in an affirmation in part and a reversal and remand in part.