Briggs v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

Citation: 353 F. Supp. 3d 641Docket: Case No. 17-14124

Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan; January 30, 2019; Federal District Court

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Eva Bates Briggs, a former flight attendant for Delta Air Lines, filed a lawsuit under Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA) after being terminated on November 25, 2014. Briggs claims Delta refused to make reasonable accommodations for her medical condition, leading to her wrongful termination, which Delta attributed to job abandonment. Delta removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and denied that Briggs qualified as a person with a disability under the PWDCRA. Delta contends her termination was due to her failure to adhere to the return-to-work process.

Briggs, who began her career with Northwest Airlines in 1996 and became a Delta employee following the merger in 2008, had been on approved Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave during parts of 2010 and 2011. Upon her return, she was required to complete specific training but faced delays while awaiting the scheduling of the necessary course. During this period, she developed a medical condition that led to additional medical leave, which was managed through Delta's third-party administrator, Sedgwick. Briggs was on short-term disability leave until December 15, 2012, which was later extended to January 31, 2013, but her request for further extension was denied by Sedgwick effective February 1, 2013. Delta has moved for summary judgment, arguing Briggs has not established a prima facie case for discrimination based on being "regarded as disabled" and that their reasons for denying her appeal are legitimate. The court has granted Delta's motion for summary judgment.

In March or April 2013, Ms. Briggs requested and was granted unpaid medical leave of absence (UMLOA) from Delta Airlines, initially from February 1, 2013, to March 6, 2013, and later extended until May 16, 2013. After this date, she was neither on approved leave nor actively employed. On September 5, 2013, Delta issued a Job Abandonment Notice to Ms. Briggs, indicating that they had been unable to contact her regarding her employment status. Ms. Briggs understood this notice as a warning of possible termination. On September 10, 2013, her sister informed Delta that Ms. Briggs was unable to respond due to her medical condition and recommended that Delta communicate via regular mail. 

Subsequently, on January 8 and January 15, 2014, Delta sent additional Job Abandonment Notices, citing multiple unsuccessful attempts to reach Ms. Briggs. After these notices, Ms. Briggs contacted the Field Service Manager, Chun Qian, who assisted her in obtaining the necessary medical documentation to continue her UMLOA. On May 19, 2014, Sedgwick retroactively approved her UMLOA extension until July 31, 2014, and informed her of the requirement to report any changes in her medical condition. By July 31, 2014, Ms. Briggs' UMLOA ended, and she had not communicated with Sedgwick about extending her leave or returning to work.

On August 8, 2014, after her leave of absence under the UMLOA had expired, Ms. Briggs texted Mr. Qian, indicating she was hopeful for a return to work following a doctor's appointment on August 12. She expressed gratitude for his support but did not notify Sedgwick or anyone else about her appointment. The appointment's medical record did not confirm her clearance to return to work or a request for the doctor to contact Sedgwick. On August 19, Ms. Briggs called Mr. Qian, claiming to have received medical clearance and expecting him to facilitate her return. However, Mr. Qian did not recall this conversation and stated he required formal documentation from Sedgwick to proceed. Ms. Briggs acknowledged she did not remember Mr. Qian explicitly agreeing to handle her return but assumed he would based on past interactions. Following the call, Ms. Briggs took no further action and did not contact Delta for over three months. On November 6, 2014, Christian Gunn sent her a job abandonment letter after multiple attempts to reach her. When she did not respond, he recommended her termination, citing unexcused absence and lack of communication. A subsequent memo from Delta’s Human Resources noted her failure to obtain certification for her absence and lack of response. Ms. Briggs’ employment was ultimately terminated on November 25, 2014.

Ms. Briggs was informed of her termination and her right to appeal, with suggestions to utilize the Delta Conflict Resolution Process or contact the Equal Opportunity and Compliance Office. On December 4, 2014, she spoke with Mr. Gunn, who reiterated her termination and the option to appeal. Ms. Briggs couldn't recall details of the conversation or her prior communication with Mr. Qian about returning to work. On August 22, 2016, she formally appealed her termination, seeking reinstatement or a change to "retired" status, without alleging any discriminatory or illegal actions by Delta or its employees regarding her termination.

Delta assigned James Brimberry to review her appeal, focusing on the appropriateness of the termination and any new information. Brimberry attempted to contact Ms. Briggs multiple times without success and eventually reached her on October 10, 2016. During this call, Ms. Briggs stated she delayed her appeal due to emotional distress from her termination and claimed ignorance of the Conflict Resolution Process. Brimberry informed her that this process was no longer available. Ms. Briggs asserted that she believed she had until February 1, 2015, to return to work and that her attempts to contact the company were evidence of her intent to be reinstated. She also mentioned moving to Texas in June 2014 and claimed that Mr. Gunn's termination letter was sent to her old Michigan address, stating she had updated her contact information with the Employee Service Center. She only received the job abandonment letters through a neighbor.

In October 2016, Mr. Brimberry received emails from Ms. Briggs that included a May Sedgwick letter and screenshots of her text exchanges with Mr. Qian from August 2014. Beverly Hill, who checked HR records, reported that Ms. Bates-Briggs had not submitted an address change, although Ms. Bates-Briggs had contacted the Employee Service Center (ESC) in June 2016 to update her address. Prior to that, her last call was in 2012 regarding benefits. Mr. Brimberry also communicated with Mr. Gunn and Mr. Qian, who agreed to provide a summary of his communications with Ms. Briggs. On October 21, 2016, Brian San Souci from Delta's Equal Opportunity department informed Ms. Briggs that her appeal had been denied, citing her unauthorized absence starting August 1, 2014, failure to extend her leave or initiate the Return to Work (RTW) process, and lack of response to company contact attempts as reasons for her termination. The letter detailed the RTW procedures and noted that Ms. Briggs had access to this information until her suspension on November 6, 2014. Following this, Ms. Briggs initiated the present legal action.

Summary judgment is deemed appropriate when the evidence on file demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact, allowing judgment as a matter of law. Material facts are those that could affect the case outcome. When evaluating a summary judgment motion, the court must view evidence favorably for the non-moving party. The defendant bears the initial burden to show a lack of evidence supporting the plaintiff's claims. Once this burden is met, the plaintiff cannot rely solely on allegations but must present specific facts indicating genuine trial issues.

The Michigan Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA) prohibits employers from terminating employees due to their disabilities. It requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities, as long as these accommodations do not impose an undue hardship on the employer. Discrimination is prohibited when adaptive devices or aids can enable an individual to fulfill job requirements. The PWDCRA, similar to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), protects against discrimination based on physical or mental disabilities that substantially limit major life activities, provided the individual can still perform job duties with or without accommodations. The legal standards and burdens of proof for accommodation claims under the PWDCRA align closely with those under the ADA, as noted in relevant case law.

The PWDCRA protects individuals with a determinable physical or mental characteristic that significantly limits major life activities, as well as those with a history of such characteristics or those perceived as having them. This "regarded as" provision aims to safeguard against employment discrimination based on stereotypes related to disabilities. An employer violates the ADA by making employment decisions based on real or perceived impairments that substantially limit major life activities. 

To establish a "regarded as" claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) they were perceived as having a limiting physical or mental characteristic; (2) this characteristic was viewed as substantially limiting one or more major life activities; and (3) the characteristic was seen as unrelated to their job performance or qualifications. Courts evaluate the characteristic either as it actually existed or as it was perceived during employment.

A successful prima facie case of discrimination under the PWDCRA requires the plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) being regarded as having a significant limiting characteristic unrelated to job performance; (2) being qualified for the essential job functions with or without accommodation; and (3) experiencing an adverse employment action due to being perceived as disabled. Once established, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate reason for their actions. If they do, the burden returns to the plaintiff to show that the employer's rationale is a pretext.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges discrimination by Delta Air Lines based on disability following the upholding of her termination. To establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff claims that Mr. Brimberry regarded her as disabled, that she was qualified to perform essential job functions, and that this perception influenced his decision against her appeal. However, Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient evidence for the first and third prongs of her prima facie case.

For the first prong, regarding being regarded as disabled, Plaintiff asserts Mr. Brimberry was aware she had taken medical leave and likely had access to her medical records. However, mere general knowledge of medical leave does not equate to knowledge of a specific disability. Citing case law, the document emphasizes that a decision-maker must have specific knowledge of an employee's disability for discrimination claims to be valid. Plaintiff presents no evidence indicating that Mr. Brimberry was aware of her specific medical condition, nor did her counsel inquire about this during his deposition. Speculative claims regarding Mr. Brimberry's access to records do not suffice to establish a genuine issue of fact.

For the second prong, Plaintiff asserts she is otherwise qualified to perform her job, which the Defendant does not contest. Thus, Plaintiff satisfies this requirement of her prima facie case.

Plaintiff claims she met the third prong of the prima facie case for adverse employment action due to disability, arguing that the denial of her appeal was based on Mr. Brimberry regarding her as disabled. However, the record lacks evidence showing Mr. Brimberry's knowledge of her medical condition or that his decision was influenced by any perceived disability. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the adverse action was taken because of her disability. The court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, confirming that the discrimination claim pertains only to the appeal process, not to the termination. Additionally, the excerpt references the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, clarifying that being regarded as having an impairment requires evidence of an action taken due to an actual or perceived impairment, while noting that minor and transitory impairments are excluded from this definition. This amendment does not affect the current case.