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Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. United Health Programs of Am., Inc.
Citation: 350 F. Supp. 3d 199Docket: 14-CV-3673 (KAM)(JO)
Court: District Court, E.D. New York; December 27, 2018; Federal District Court
Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) initiated legal proceedings against United Health Programs of America, Inc. and Cost Containment Group, Inc. on behalf of former employees, including claimants Danielle Diaz, Jennifer Honohan, Regina Maldari, Cynthia Pegullo, Elizabeth Safara, Sandra Benedict, and Karen Josey. Additional plaintiff-intervenors, Elizabeth Ontaneda, Francine Pennisi, and Faith Pabon, joined the action seeking relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). Following a jury trial, the jury rendered a mixed verdict, awarding plaintiffs $5,102,060 in compensatory and punitive damages. Currently pending are motions from plaintiffs for injunctive relief, equitable relief, back pay, and attorneys' fees, which the court has granted in part and denied in part. The court assumes familiarity with prior rulings, specifically the summary judgment and motions in limine orders, and provides background only as needed for the current motions. Plaintiffs alleged religious discrimination, reverse religious discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment due to employer-imposed religious beliefs identified as "Onionhead" and "Harnessing Happiness." The court previously ruled that these beliefs qualify as a religion under Title VII. During the three-week trial, the parties agreed that certain practices of the defendants, including religious texts, workplace prayers, and statements from executives indicating employees were "chosen," were indeed religious practices, forming the basis for the claims of hostile work environment and disparate treatment against the claimants. On April 25, 2018, a jury unanimously found in favor of the plaintiffs on their hostile work environment claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL, as well as on plaintiff-intervenor Pabon's wrongful termination claim. The jury ruled against the defendants on other claims, awarding a total of $5,102,060 in damages—$3,011,000 in compensatory damages distributed among various plaintiffs, and $2,091,060 in punitive damages to select plaintiffs. Following this verdict, plaintiffs filed motions on June 8, 2018, seeking injunctive relief, back pay and prejudgment interest for Pabon, a modified damages award, attorney's fees and costs, and EEOC's taxable costs. In discussing the legal standard for injunctive relief under Title VII, it is noted that such relief is appropriate when an employer has intentionally engaged in unlawful employment practices and is not guaranteed by mere success on the merits. Courts have broad discretion to provide relief aimed at preventing discrimination and ensuring future equal employment opportunities. The court weighs the balance of equities and public interest while requiring the moving party to show a credible risk of future violations. Injunctive relief may be granted even if the offending conduct has ceased if there is evidence of past violations and intent to comply with the law. Plaintiffs are requesting permanent injunctions that would require defendants to cease future religious discrimination and harassment, to stop pressuring employees into certain religious practices, and to terminate their relationship with an individual deemed problematic by the court. Plaintiffs are requesting a five-year injunction mandating defendants to implement anti-discrimination and anti-harassment training for employees, revise their EEO policies, retain an outside monitor for compliance and investigation of complaints, adhere to reporting requirements for legal compliance, and notify employees of the action's outcome. Defendants oppose the injunction, arguing that plaintiffs have not met the burden of proof necessary for such relief, specifically claiming that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate intentional creation of a hostile work environment or a threat of recurring violations. Defendants further assert that even if some relief is warranted, the plaintiffs' requests are not narrowly tailored. The court clarifies that Title VII allows for injunctive relief in cases of unlawful employment practices without the necessity of proving intentional discrimination. A violation of Title VII, such as maintaining a hostile work environment, justifies the court's broad authority to impose appropriate relief. The court rejects the defendants' argument that relief is contingent upon a specific legal theory being established by the jury, emphasizing that the jury's findings support the imposition of injunctive relief regardless of how liability was determined. The court's ruling partially grants and partially denies the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. In KarenKim, the jury found the defendants liable for creating a "sexually hostile work environment," although it did not specify the basis for liability—whether the defendants intentionally created, were aware of, or should have been aware of the hostile conditions. The Second Circuit deemed injunctive relief appropriate to protect former employees from further harassment. In the current case, the jury similarly found the defendants liable for maintaining a hostile work environment, allowing the court to potentially grant injunctive relief. Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of recurring Title VII violations, supported by evidence of the defendants' widespread and longstanding misconduct. The jury established that the defendants maintained a hostile work environment for over five years affecting nine claimants and wrongfully terminated plaintiff-intervenor Pabon due to religion. The defendants' attempts to downplay the jury's verdict by focusing solely on the individual findings related to Pabon, and to dismiss the evidence of the hostile work environment claims, were found unpersuasive. Evidence highlighted the severe nature and pervasiveness of the Title VII violations, with high-ranking officials, including CEO Hodes and COO Bourandas, actively enforcing these violations. Denali, who was closely related to Hodes and introduced as a "spiritual advisor" yet understood to wield significant influence over workplace decisions, was implicated in the violative practices. Testimonies confirmed her role in hiring, discipline, and terminations, further solidifying the basis for the court's consideration of injunctive relief. Denali exercised her authority to implement various workplace practices deemed religious, such as altering office décor to include religious symbols (buddhas, angels, Onionhead items), promoting the use of incense and candles, and establishing a meditation room with religious texts. She mandated the use of Onionhead materials, sent spiritual emails, conducted spiritual meetings and prayer sessions, and encouraged employees to express affection and share personal details about their lives. Denali also requested employees to prepare their offices and homes for her visit by engaging in spiritual cleansing rituals. Management, particularly COO Bourandas, actively supported and participated in these practices, which violated Title VII regulations. Bourandas introduced Onionhead initiatives, enforced employee participation in related activities, and held leadership positions within Onionhead. CEO Hodes was aware of these activities and made comments indicating his belief in spiritual concepts, further contributing to the religious environment within the workplace. Hodes' actions reflect those of Denali, with claimants Maldari and Pegullo testifying about Denali's comments regarding "bad energy" at the defendants' office, and Ontaneda noting Denali's description of employees as "chosen." Customer Service Manager April Levine instructed employees to engage in Onionhead meetings and read Denali's spiritual messages. Evidence indicates that high-ranking officials, including Hodes and Bourandas, along with supervisors Levine and Denali, were aware of and perpetuated practices contributing to a hostile work environment. This environment is linked to Pabon's wrongful termination, as she was fired by Denali after refusing to participate in Onionhead activities during a company-sponsored event. Pabon reported that Denali labeled her "an evil person filled with demons" at the time of her termination. The ongoing involvement of the defendants' leadership in maintaining a hostile work environment, coupled with their failure to prevent or correct these issues, suggests a likelihood of recurring violations. Historical practices persisted for years, with employees describing similar experiences of religious coercion and workplace discussions centered on spirituality. Notably, key figures responsible for these practices, including Hodes, Bourandas, and Levine, remain employed, and Denali continues to provide consulting services to the defendants, highlighting a persistent culture that may lead to further violations. Defendants argue that Denali's consulting services are no longer a concern due to their changed nature and her physical absence from the office. However, Denali's role in "customer relations" still allows her substantial influence over the workforce, as she can consult on matters involving customer service representatives and company personnel. Despite residing in California and facing health issues, Denali maintained communication with employees through phone and email, and they were expected to follow her directives. The CEO also primarily works remotely from California without hindering his authority. Furthermore, the defendants' inadequate anti-discrimination practices are highlighted, as their policies were inconsistently disseminated and lacked proper employee training on reporting discrimination or harassment. Previous employee handbooks revealed significant deficiencies, such as requiring reports to supervisors and failing to address workplace harassment. Even with newly strengthened policies introduced just before trial, the court finds minimal reassurance, considering the defendants have known about the discrimination allegations for years. Hodes and Bourandas were informed of employee complaints regarding Denali's practices, including allegations of religious discrimination, but did not take effective corrective action. CEO Hodes acknowledged awareness of these complaints, which were communicated both directly and through the EEOC, yet only facilitated a meeting for employees to voice grievances without implementing any solutions. COO Bourandas also received complaints about Denali's practices, such as burning incense and using Onionhead materials, but allowed these to persist. The defendants claimed minimal remedial actions, such as creating sign-up sheets for voluntary Onionhead workshops, but employees testified these workshops were not genuinely voluntary. The defendants' inadequate responses to complaints indicate a likelihood of recurring violations, especially given Hodes' close relationship with Denali. Their refusal to accept responsibility for past actions, even after a jury verdict confirming Title VII violations, strengthens the inference of future misconduct. Although it is unclear whether the offending practices continue, the court finds that the ongoing employment of Hodes and Bourandas, as well as their affiliation with Denali, justifies injunctive relief. Onionhead items are no longer displayed in the office but remain in an employee's office and a locked warehouse, with employees able to obtain these materials upon specific request. Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction requiring defendants to (1) avoid religious discrimination and harassment, (2) refrain from pressuring employees to participate in religious activities, and (3) terminate their professional relationship with Denali Jordan. Defendants do not oppose the first two requests but entirely object to the third. The court notes a general agreement exists on the second request regarding religious practices. The first prong of the proposed injunction specifies that defendants and associated parties are prohibited from (a) engaging in religious harassment that creates a hostile work environment and (b) subjecting employees to religious discrimination, particularly for rejecting imposed religious practices. The court approves this language with a modification to emphasize the rejection of such practices. The second prong of the injunction seeks to prevent defendants from requiring employees to engage with various Onionhead or Harnessing Happiness practices, including reading texts, attending meetings, praying, wearing pins, expressing affection, using Universal Truth Cards, utilizing candles, chanting, and engaging with spirituality-related communications. Additionally, it prohibits discussions about angels or demons, with exceptions for casual remarks. The court grants the plaintiffs' request for permanent injunctive relief against the defendants concerning their professional relationship with Denali Jordan. The injunction prohibits the defendants and associated individuals from (a) employing or compensating Denali in any capacity, (b) allowing her to provide services or engage in activities for the defendants, and (c) permitting her access to the defendants' workplace at 160 Eileen Way, Syosset, New York, and any other business locations. The defendants contend that the injunction is excessively broad and not specifically tailored to the violations at issue, but the court disagrees. It cites precedents, including the case of *KarenKim*, where injunctions were deemed appropriate in similar circumstances to prevent further harassment by individuals found liable for Title VII violations. The court highlights that Denali's close familial relationship with CEO Hodes facilitated unchecked Title VII violations, and the defendants’ failure to terminate her employment indicates a lack of recognition of her role in these violations. The court finds that unlike in *KarenKim*, where the defendant had already fired the harasser, the ongoing employment of Denali necessitates the injunction to prevent further violations. The defendants' comparison of Denali's consulting role to another case is deemed unpersuasive, as Denali’s actions directly contributed to the violations in a manner not confined to specific interactions, thus justifying the broad scope of the injunction. Cabining Denali's professional relationship with the defendants to specific tasks does not guarantee that she will not commit similar violations in the future. Consequently, the court grants the plaintiffs' request to prohibit defendants from maintaining any professional relationship with Denali. The plaintiffs seek both a permanent injunction and term-limited injunctive relief, including mandatory anti-discrimination training for employees, revisions of anti-discrimination policies, the appointment of an outside monitor, compliance with reporting requirements, and employee notification about the lawsuit's outcome. The court grants some of these requests while denying others. Specifically, the plaintiffs propose a five-year term for the injunctive relief, which the court finds appropriate given the jury's findings of a hostile work environment over five years and the uncertainty about whether discriminatory practices have ceased. Regarding the appointment of an outside monitor, the plaintiffs argue for oversight on anti-discrimination training, complaint processing, and compliance monitoring. Defendants oppose this, suggesting that BakerHostetler, their counsel, can handle these tasks. The court rejects this notion, citing potential conflicts of interest due to BakerHostetler's role as counsel. The court also finds that hiring a new human resources director is inadequate, given the existing management's influence. Thus, the court grants the plaintiffs' request for an outside monitor. Finally, the plaintiffs request revisions to the defendants' Equal Employment Opportunity policies concerning religious discrimination, which defendants claim are unnecessary, citing their existing robust policy established in December 2017. The court acknowledges these objections but does not detail the specific revisions contested by the defendants. The court mandates several revisions to the defendants' Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) policies to address inadequacies in handling religious discrimination complaints. Key requirements include: 1. A detailed explanation of religious discrimination with specific examples from the current case. 2. A definition of a hostile work environment along with relevant examples. 3. Provision for an anonymous complaint mechanism for employees. 4. Inclusion of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) contact information. 5. A rewritten complaint procedure that outlines multiple reporting avenues, allowing employees to bypass supervisors and clarifying that complaints can be either formal or informal. 6. Removal of the section titled "False Accusation and Information" from the current EEO policy. The court finds the defendants' argument that their policies sufficiently informed employees about discrimination and harassment prohibitions unpersuasive, as evidence indicates a lack of awareness among employees regarding existing policies. Testimonies reveal that several employees were unaware of any anti-discrimination policies despite their existence. Moreover, the defendants failed to consistently distribute employee handbooks, which contributed to employees' unfamiliarity with the procedures for reporting discrimination. The court critiques the defendants' rationale that the absence of complaints suggests their policies are adequate, noting that employees may have felt reporting would be futile or were simply unaware of the mechanisms available. Given the unique nature of the reverse religious discrimination in this case, the court emphasizes the necessity of incorporating relevant examples into the EEO policies to enhance clarity and effectiveness. The court mandates that defendants revise their Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) policies to include a clear definition of a hostile work environment, specifically addressing religious harassment, and providing relevant examples. The court finds defendants' argument that such definitions could deter employee complaints unconvincing, particularly in light of required policy changes. The existing policy inadequately addresses religion-based harassment, which is overshadowed by a more extensive discussion on sexual harassment. The court also requires defendants to implement an anonymous reporting system for complaints, despite their claim that the company's small size makes this impractical. The intimate nature of the workplace, which includes family and friends, supports the need for such a system, and the court emphasizes that innovative solutions should be pursued rather than denying the request. Additionally, the court dismisses defendants' objection to including EEOC contact information in their policies, clarifying that prior awareness of ongoing investigations does not negate the utility of providing employees with this information. Finally, plaintiffs' request for a clearly-defined complaint process that allows employees to bypass immediate supervisors and access external support is granted, ensuring multiple avenues for complaints are available. Defendants assert that their policy, revised on December 14, 2017, meets the necessary requirements, which the court acknowledges, denying plaintiffs' request except for an amendment to Section 3.3 of the employee handbook. This amendment will clarify that employees can report complaints about supervisors, managers, contractors, and third-party consultants, including issues related to religious discrimination or harassment, to the Outside Monitor. Plaintiffs object to a subsection titled "False Accusations and Information," arguing it could deter employees from reporting discrimination. The court agrees, noting ambiguity around who determines the accuracy of claims, especially given the context of alleged Title VII violations by upper management. Consequently, the court orders the removal of this subsection. Additionally, plaintiffs seek an injunction mandating defendants to conduct religious discrimination and harassment training at their expense, facilitated by the Outside Monitor or an EEOC-approved third party. The training will cover employee rights under Title VII and the NYSHRL, detailed explanations of discrimination, the revised anti-discrimination policy, complaint investigation procedures, protections against retaliation, and the court's injunctive relief order. Defendants must provide this training to current supervisory and management personnel within 30 days and to new employees within 30 days of their hiring or promotion, with annual refreshers thereafter. Defendants are required to provide all non-management and non-supervisory employees, including consultants and independent contractors, with at least two hours of live training on employee rights and employer obligations under Title VII and the NYSHRL, focusing on religious discrimination and harassment, workplace hostility based on religion, and procedures for addressing such conduct. The training must cover the content of the defendants' revised anti-discrimination policy, internal complaint procedures, and external complaint processes, including those involving the EEOC and other agencies. Employees' rights to engage in protected activities without retaliation and the court's injunctive order requirements must also be included. Defendants must submit proposed training materials and outlines to the EEOC for approval within 14 days of the first training session and confirm that approved training was conducted, providing attendance records within 14 days after each session. If the EEOC disapproves of the training materials, it will collaborate with an Outside Monitor to create suitable content. Defendants contend that the training requirement is overly broad since the case only involves religious discrimination. However, the court disagrees, emphasizing that training must include information on all protected classes under Title VII and the NYSHRL, not limited to religion. The court grants the plaintiffs' request for comprehensive training on these rights. Additionally, while defendants argue for shorter training durations—1.5 hours for managerial employees and 1 hour for non-managerial employees—the court finds the proposed lengths to be excessive. Defendants are mandated to provide specific training to their personnel: at least two hours of live training for supervisory, management, and human resources staff, and at least one hour for non-management and non-supervisory employees, including consultants and independent contractors. The court cites a prior case, E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co. LLC, for precedent on required training duration. Defendants must submit anti-religious-discrimination training materials to the EEOC 14 days before training, which must occur within 60 days of this order, despite defendants' request for a 30-day timeline. The court emphasizes that timely training for new employees is essential, requiring that they receive similar training within 30 days of hire, countering defendants' argument for annual training sufficiency. Additionally, defendants must comply with notice requirements, including providing a Notice Letter to employees within 14 days of this order or upon hiring new employees. This letter must inform them of the action, the verdict, the order's provisions, and contact details for the Outside Monitor and EEOC, signed by the CEO or COO. Employees must acknowledge receipt of this letter, with records maintained for the order's duration. Furthermore, a Posted Notice detailing the same information must be displayed in the workplace for the order's duration, printed on EEOC letterhead and laminated, ensuring visibility to all employees. Plaintiffs assert that posting requirements are essential for educating employees about their rights, informing them of complaint mechanisms, emphasizing the duty to maintain a discrimination-free workplace, and ensuring compliance with the court order. Defendants counter that such notices are unnecessary as only upper management was implicated in Title VII violations, and that anti-discrimination training suffices. They further argue that including jury awards in the notices is inappropriate due to statutory caps and would not aid in preventing future violations. The court deems both the Notice Letter and Posted Notice appropriate, as defendants still employ individuals linked to prior violations. The court highlights that including the jury award in the notice would be misleading, especially since the damages are subject to statutory limits and defendants plan to seek remittitur. Defendants must comply with the notice requirements within thirty days. Additionally, plaintiffs request the court to impose reporting requirements on defendants, including biannual certification of compliance with the court's order, a detailed employee record spreadsheet, and retention of all relevant documents. Defendants object to these reporting stipulations. Plaintiffs' proposed reporting requirements are deemed appropriate by the court, leading to their full adoption. The court addresses the issue of back pay and prejudgment interest for plaintiff-intervenor Faith Pabon, establishing her entitlement under Title VII and the NYSHRL due to wrongful termination. Back pay aims to restore an employee's status had the discriminatory actions not occurred. Pabon is entitled to back pay from March 19, 2012, her termination date, until September 2013, when she ceased working due to illness, with an agreed minimum amount of $39,101.47. This amount includes $46,311.66 for lost salary and $839.65 for gym membership, alongside other benefits, minus $8,389.50 for interim earnings. The court identifies two points of contention regarding back pay: whether Pabon should receive compensation for lost raises and the valuation of her 401k benefits. Plaintiffs advocate for including a 10% annual salary raise in the calculation, citing testimonies that support Pabon’s consistent performance and past raises. Conversely, defendants argue against the inclusion of the raise due to Pabon receiving a raise shortly before her termination and the lack of guaranteed annual raises. The court ultimately determines that Pabon is entitled to a back pay award that reflects a 10% annual salary raise. Ms. Pabon testified to receiving consistent annual raises of 10% during her employment, while other employees also received raises between 6% and 20%, sometimes more than once a year. The court found her claim for a 10% annual salary raise credible and awarded her $4,631.17 for back pay. Regarding her 401k, plaintiffs argued she was entitled to a 6% match based on her contributions, while defendants contended she should receive only what she contributed, which was 5.76% of her salary. The court ruled in Ms. Pabon's favor, awarding her $2,639.76 for lost 401k benefits. Consequently, her total back pay award is $46,372.40. The court confirmed that pre-judgment interest on back pay is necessary for complete compensation, calculated based on the federal interest rate and compounded annually. Both parties agreed on this methodology, and the Clerk of Court is instructed to apply it for calculating interest on the back pay award. The Clerk of Court is instructed to allocate a back pay award of $46,372.40 from March 19, 2012, to the judgment date, using the average annual United States Treasury bill interest rate from 2012 to 2018, compounded annually. Under Title VII, compensatory and punitive damages are capped based on the employer's size; with the defendants having 14 to 100 employees, the cap is set at $50,000 per claimant. The New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) has no cap on compensatory damages but does not allow punitive damages. Plaintiff-intervenors Ontaneda, Pabon, and Pennisi, who brought claims under both Title VII and NYSHRL, can receive uncapped compensatory damages but are limited to $50,000 in punitive damages. The remaining claimants—Benedict, Diaz, Honohan, Josey, Maldari, Pegullo, and Safara—only pursued Title VII claims and are capped at $50,000 for combined damages. The agreed judgment amounts are: Ontaneda $640,000 ($590,000 compensatory, $50,000 punitive), Pennisi $298,000 ($248,000 compensatory, $50,000 punitive), Pabon $490,000 ($440,000 compensatory, $50,000 punitive), Diaz $50,000 ($40,000 compensatory, $10,000 punitive), Pegullo $50,000 ($40,000 compensatory, $10,000 punitive), and $50,000 each for Benedict, Honohan, Josey, Maldari, and Safara, all as compensatory damages. The court will enter judgment without prejudice to the defendants' right to seek remittitur. Regarding attorney's fees for plaintiff-intervenor counsel Anthony Mango, while the defendants acknowledge entitlement, they contest the hourly rate as excessive and the total amount due to partial claims success. The court grants the motion in part and denies it in part, discussing the standards for reasonable fees under Title VII, where a "prevailing party" is defined as one who has succeeded on any significant issue in litigation. The excerpt focuses on the prevailing party standard under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and the related attorney's fee provisions that mirror those in Title VII. It establishes that a prevailing plaintiff is generally entitled to attorney's fees unless specific circumstances dictate otherwise, referencing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC. The fees are calculated using the lodestar method, which involves multiplying the reasonable number of attorney hours by a reasonable hourly rate. The burden of proof lies with the party requesting fees to substantiate the hours worked, the nature of the work, and the rates claimed, as outlined in Blum v. Stenson and supported by other cases. The concept of a "presumptively reasonable fee" is introduced, defined as what a reasonable client would be willing to pay to effectively litigate the case. The "forum rule" indicates that courts should typically use local hourly rates when determining this fee. Factors such as the case type, litigation nature, firm size, and attorney expertise may also influence the reasonableness of the fee. In the application section, the court confirms that the plaintiff-intervenors are the prevailing party and entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. They claim compensation for 466.5 hours worked by their attorney, Mr. Mango, which is deemed reasonable by both parties. However, the defendants contest the hourly rate of $475 requested by Mr. Mango as unreasonable, a position with which the court agrees. A reasonable hourly rate for legal services typically aligns with rates established in the district where the court is located, with courts in the Eastern District of New York awarding rates between $200 and $450 for partners. The prevailing rate for partners is generally between $300 and $400, although rates can exceed $450 in special circumstances for highly experienced attorneys or subject matter experts. Notably, hourly rates above $350 are typically reserved for exceptional cases, including those involving expert litigators. Recent cases have set rates for top-tier trial attorneys at $400 to $450 per hour. In a specific instance, a request for a $475 hourly fee for attorney Mango is supported by his 24 years of experience and extensive litigation background, but the plaintiffs fail to convincingly justify this rate, citing cases from the Southern District that do not apply to their argument. The court determines a reasonable hourly fee for Mr. Mango at $400 based on his professional experience and role in the litigation. Factors supporting the higher fee include Mango's status as a law firm partner, 24 years of experience (including in employment law), and participation in CLE panels and federal court cases. However, Mango's limited trial role—where he only conducted direct examinations of two plaintiff-intervenors and did not cross-examine or deliver opening/closing statements—diminishes the justification for a higher fee. Additionally, while Mango has a diverse practice that includes various areas of law beyond employment law, he has only handled fifteen actions in the Eastern District over his career. Comparisons to other cases show that attorneys with similar or greater experience and specialized focus have received higher rates, yet given Mango’s experience and role, a fee of $400 is deemed reasonable. The court also notes that after establishing a lodestar figure, it may adjust the fee based on the prevailing party's success level, with the burden of proof on the party seeking the adjustment. The Supreme Court's framework from Hensley outlines how courts should assess whether a plaintiff's partial success in a lawsuit necessitates a reduction in attorney fees calculated from the lodestar figure. Initially, courts exclude hours spent on claims that are entirely unrelated to successful claims. Next, if unsuccessful claims are interrelated with successful claims, courts evaluate whether the degree of success justifies a fee reduction. The Supreme Court emphasized that there is no strict formula for adjusting the lodestar amount based on limited success but rather a focus on the overall relief obtained relative to the hours reasonably spent. It noted that if a plaintiff achieves "excellent results," fees should not be reduced. In the current case, all claims by the plaintiff-intervenors were interrelated, leading the court to bypass the first step of the Hensley framework. The defendants argued for a fee reduction based on the plaintiff-intervenors' partial success, citing that ten out of eighteen claims were dismissed or withdrawn, while only three were successful at trial. However, the court disagreed, highlighting that the plaintiff-intervenors secured a significant jury award of $2,809,000 in damages and received injunctive relief. The court found that the withdrawal of one claim and the rejection of others did not warrant a reduction of the lodestar amount, especially since the claims were presented in good faith and based on substantial evidence. The court clarified that it was not endorsing a rule that automatically reduces fees when claims are abandoned before a merits decision and maintained that good faith litigants may pursue multiple legal theories without penalty to their fee awards. Ultimately, the plaintiff-intervenors succeeded on claims central to the case, justifying the full lodestar amount despite the partial success. The court reduced the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees by 40% due to a lack of material evidence supporting several causes of action, with the claims presented to the jury being factually distinguishable. This decision referenced Hine v. Mineta, where a 60% reduction was applied for limited success on claims. However, the current case is seen as distinct, leading the court to deny the defendants' request for a 50% reduction based on partial success, ultimately awarding Mango $186,600 in attorney's fees. Regarding costs, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), the prevailing party is entitled to recover costs unless directed otherwise by the court. Relevant statutes and local rules outline what's taxable. The prevailing party bears the burden of proving that costs are justified, with inadequate documentation potentially leading to denial or reduction of costs. Once the party demonstrates the amount and category of costs, a presumption for awarding those costs arises. The EEOC seeks $50,345.696 in costs, including fees for transcripts, printing, witness fees, and exemplification, while Mango requests $400 for Clerk fees, which the court grants. Defendants contest specific costs, including $16,154.40 for daily transcripts and $6,043.79 for witness fees. The court will evaluate these contested costs individually. Defendants contest plaintiffs' request for the recovery of real-time transcript costs, arguing that such costs are non-recoverable and that the court did not mandate the ordering of pre-trial or daily trial transcripts. The court denies plaintiffs' request for $256.20 for real-time transcripts due to a lack of supporting case law demonstrating that these costs qualify as taxable under relevant statutes, citing precedents where similar requests were denied. Furthermore, the court finds that the real-time transcripts were not essential for voir dire, given the involvement of multiple attorneys. Conversely, the court grants plaintiffs' request for costs associated with the final pre-trial conference and daily trial transcripts. It affirms its discretion to award costs for transcripts deemed necessary for case use under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). The court evaluates necessity based on whether transcripts provide more than mere convenience, considering factors such as trial length, complexity, and the importance of witness credibility. In this case, the trial spanned nearly three weeks with over twenty witnesses and involved multiple claims, necessitating daily transcripts for effective litigation. Although the court did not specifically order these transcripts, it concludes that their use was justified. Consequently, it awards plaintiffs $34,114.24 in transcript fees. Plaintiffs request a total of $9,931.46 in costs: $1,596.85 for printing and $8,334.61 for copying, which includes expenses for exhibits and deposition transcripts. Defendants object to these costs, particularly the copying fees, but their objection lacks clarity. The court grants plaintiffs' request based on their documentation. Additionally, plaintiffs seek $6,043.79 for witness fees, which includes $5,023.82 for subsistence and $1,019.97 for mileage related to seven EEOC claimants. Defendants argue against the costs for these claimants, asserting they were previously deemed parties under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, but the court finds this interpretation unpersuasive. The EEOC is not considered a proxy for the employees, and the claimants are not classified as parties. Thus, plaintiffs can recover costs for their testimony. Defendants specifically challenge subsistence costs for certain claimants living within 90 minutes of the courthouse, as well as for others living outside the tri-state area, claiming these amounts exceed permissible rates and lack adequate documentation. Per 28 U.S.C. § 1821, subsistence allowances are only granted if an overnight stay is required due to distance from residence, with specific maximum rates established for lodging and meals. In April 2018, the per diem lodging rate was $253, with designated meal allowances varying based on travel circumstances. Witnesses traveling by common carrier must use the most economical rate and provide receipts as evidence of costs, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1). Those using privately owned vehicles receive a mileage allowance per 5 U.S.C. § 5704, and are reimbursed for taxi fares, normal travel expenses, and parking fees, contingent upon valid receipts (28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)). As of April 2018, the mileage rate was $0.545 per mile. The court denied subsistence costs for claimants Honohan, Diaz, Benedict, Pegullo, and Maldari due to their residences being close to the courthouse, stating that an overnight stay was unnecessary. The court found no objections from defendants regarding mileage costs for Honohan, Diaz, Benedict, and Maldari, leading to the awarding of specific mileage costs: $40.11 for Honohan, $41.86 for Benedict, and $64.53 for Maldari, while denying costs for Diaz. Claimants Safara and Josey, who traveled from Texas and Virginia, were awarded subsistence and travel costs within statutory limits due to sufficient documentation. Specifically, Safara received $253 for lodging and $20.38 for mileage, while Josey received $506 for lodging and $19.08 for mileage. Other requested costs, including parking, airfare, taxis, and meals, were denied due to insufficient documentation, as plaintiffs provided only general cost summaries without itemized receipts, violating the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1) and § 1821(c)(3). Case precedents were cited to support the denial of undocumented travel expenses. Costs have been awarded by the court as follows: $44,991.11 to the EEOC, $400 to Mango, and the plaintiffs' request for travel costs for Diaz and subsistence and travel costs for Safara and Josey has been denied. The court has granted the plaintiffs' request for printing and copying costs. The court's conclusions include: 1) Granting injunctive relief as previously stated. 2) Awarding plaintiff-intervenor Pabon $46,372.40 in back pay with prejudgment interest. 3) Entering judgment for compensatory and punitive damages against defendants for the claimants, allowing defendants the right to seek remittitur. 4) Awarding Mango $186,600 in attorney's fees and $400 in costs, with the EEOC receiving $44,991.11 in costs. The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter judgment accordingly. The case involves the programs Onionhead and Harnessing Happiness, with Onionhead having transitioned from a for-profit entity to a 501(c)(3) non-profit. The court acknowledges concessions made by plaintiffs regarding compliance deadlines for the defendants. Disputes exist regarding whether Safara and Denali received employee handbooks, but defendants’ arguments minimizing these failures are deemed insufficient. Initially, plaintiffs sought $52,201.14 in costs, later revised to $50,345.68, which the court recognizes. A previously requested $759 for Mango’s lodging costs was withdrawn. Witness-related costs have been grouped into a single category. Additionally, the residences of key individuals involved during the relevant period are noted.