Court: District Court, E.D. Wisconsin; November 8, 2018; Federal District Court
Matthew Schoenecker filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against John Koopman, the principal of Markesan High School, seeking prospective relief for alleged violations of his First Amendment rights. The plaintiff wore two T-shirts to school featuring images of weapons, asserting his support for the Second Amendment and claiming the shirts were non-violent and non-threatening. Despite the school's dress code not explicitly banning weapon imagery at the time, Koopman interpreted the code to prohibit such clothing, leading to disciplinary actions when Schoenecker refused to comply. After the lawsuit was initiated, the school board amended the dress code to explicitly include clothing depicting weapons among the prohibited items. The case raises questions about whether it remains active given the change in the dress code and the cessation of disciplinary actions against the plaintiff. Schoenecker seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to wear the shirts freely at school.
The plaintiff faced enforcement of a revised dress code prohibiting T-shirts depicting weapons in a non-violent manner shortly after the start of the 2018-19 school year. He amended his complaint to challenge this enforcement, specifically regarding his "Celebrate Diversity" and "LOVE" T-shirts. After wearing a third shirt with the text "IF GUNS KILL PEOPLE, I GUESS PENCILS misspell words CARS drive drunk. SPOONS make people fat," he was instructed by Koopman to cover it due to the inclusion of the word "gun." In response, the plaintiff filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction to allow him to wear clothing containing the word "gun" in a non-threatening context.
Koopman opposed the injunction and moved to dismiss the second amended complaint, arguing he was not the appropriate defendant and that the Markesan District Schools should be sued instead. The discussion of mootness indicates that the plaintiff’s request for relief remains relevant due to ongoing enforcement of the dress code, although prior claims related to the old dress code are moot since no damages are sought. Koopman contended that, under federal law, he cannot be sued for relief in his individual or official capacity and that the plaintiff should sue the school district instead. Nonetheless, the plaintiff's action against Koopman in his official capacity effectively constitutes a suit against the Markesan School District, as established by legal precedents.
Koopman's motion to dismiss asserts that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against a municipality must demonstrate that the harm stems from a municipal policy or custom, referencing Monell v. Department of Social Services. The second amended complaint alleges that the Markesan District Schools’ official policy, as outlined in the student handbook, prohibits clothing depicting firearms, regardless of its non-violent nature. This allegation satisfies Monell's requirement, as it indicates that the injury arose from an official municipal policy.
For a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits, potential for irreparable harm without relief, that the balance of equities favors them, and that the injunction serves the public interest. In First Amendment cases, the likelihood of success is often the crucial factor because even brief infringements of First Amendment rights are considered irreparable harm, thus typically favoring preliminary relief when the defendant's actions seem likely unconstitutional.
The defendant argues against considering the plaintiff's second motion for a preliminary injunction regarding the "If guns kill people" shirt, claiming it relates to facts not included in the second amended complaint. However, under federal notice-pleading standards, plaintiffs need only plead claims without detailing all relevant facts. The second amended complaint presents a single claim of constitutional rights violation regarding the prohibition of non-violent shirts expressing beliefs about gun ownership. The facts concerning the third shirt align with this existing claim, so the plaintiff is not required to amend the complaint for the injunction request. Therefore, the court will assess the request for injunctive relief concerning all three shirts.
The next focus is whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that wearing the shirts constitutes protected speech under the First Amendment. For the "If guns kill people" shirt, it is evident that wearing it expresses an opinion on gun ownership, arguing that guns, as inanimate objects, cannot kill unless used by a person. This viewpoint is widely recognized among those opposing gun control, indicating that observers would understand it as a stance against restrictions on private firearm ownership.
The plaintiff's act of wearing a shirt is a form of personal expression regarding a matter of public concern, which is protected under the First Amendment. The defendant argues that other shirts worn by the plaintiff do not convey clear, unambiguous messages and thus lack protection. Specifically, the defendant cites the artist's intent behind the "LOVE" shirt, which was to transform a societal issue into a positive message rather than to advocate for gun ownership. The defendant references case law indicating that conduct, such as flag-burning, is only protected when it is "inherently expressive" and communicates a clear message without additional context. However, the court distinguishes the shirts as pure speech, noting that while their messages may be ambiguous, this ambiguity does not negate First Amendment protection. The court emphasizes that a narrowly defined message is not a prerequisite for constitutional protection, drawing parallels to various forms of artistic expression. In contrast, the defendant's cited case regarding a non-protective T-shirt worn by students involved a shirt devoid of significant expression, unlike the plaintiff's shirts, which convey substantial messages and can be deemed artistic or parodic in nature. Consequently, the court concludes that the plaintiff's wearing of the shirts constitutes protected expression. The parties also debate which Supreme Court "school speech" precedent applies, with the plaintiff favoring Tinker v. Des Moines, which establishes that school authorities can only censor student speech if it would materially disrupt school operations.
The defendant argues that the case is governed by *Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier* rather than *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District*. According to *Kuhlmeier*, a "forum analysis" is required to evaluate restrictions on school speech, but the court finds a relevant Seventh Circuit case, *Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School District*, provides sufficient guidance. In *Nuxoll*, the court upheld a school's restriction on a student's T-shirt expressing disapproval of homosexuality by applying a softened version of *Tinker*’s "substantial disruption" standard. The court determined that it is adequate for the school to demonstrate a reasonable forecast of disruption rather than actual serious consequences.
The defendant cites several reasons to justify the belief that the T-shirts would likely cause substantial disruption: staff expressed discomfort related to school safety following the Parkland shooting, students participated in a walkout against gun violence, class discussions were disrupted by arguments about the shirts, and media presence after the lawsuit led to distractions in class. However, the court notes that the media disruption was not caused by the shirts themselves but by the school’s decision to censor them and the lawsuit that followed. Thus, even if media presence might lead to disruption, it cannot be attributed to the T-shirts, and there is no indication that media attention would persist if the T-shirts were permitted.
The defendant's justification for banning the plaintiff's shirts is weak, as there is no evidence that students felt threatened by them or that they contributed to students' anxiety about school shootings; rather, the anxiety stemmed from the Parkland shooting. Although some staff members expressed discomfort about the shirts, there was no indication that this affected their teaching abilities. The defendant claimed that discussions about the shirts disrupted class, but failed to provide details, making it difficult to assess the significance of these disruptions. Consequently, the defendant did not demonstrate a reasonable belief that the shirts would lead to substantial disruption in the school environment.
The plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim, warranting a preliminary injunction. The deprivation of First Amendment rights is considered irreparable harm, and the balance of equities and public interest favor the plaintiff, as the defendant has not shown that allowing the shirts would cause substantial disruption or harm. Therefore, both of the plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunction are granted, allowing him to wear the specified shirts to school. The defendant's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint is denied, while earlier motions to dismiss and the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint are denied as moot. The plaintiff has sufficiently alleged violations of the district's dress code to satisfy Monell criteria without needing to establish the defendant's final policymaking authority. If necessary, the plaintiff may need to file a supplemental complaint regarding a third shirt mentioned.
