United States v. Weber

Citation: 346 F. Supp. 3d 1335Docket: CR. 17-50033-JLV

Court: United States District Court; October 15, 2018; Federal District Court

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Defendant Stanley Patrick Weber filed a motion to suppress physical evidence obtained through a search warrant, which was referred to Magistrate Judge Wollmann for a report and recommendation. Following an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate recommended denying the motion to suppress, a recommendation that Weber subsequently objected to, claiming improper legal application by the magistrate. He argued that the magistrate's statement regarding the law's "questionable state" contradicted relevant case law and asserted that a warrant deemed constitutionally invalid on its face cannot be validated by the precedent set in *United States v. Leon*. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the district court is required to conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's findings when objections are filed. The court found no factual inaccuracies in the magistrate's report and adopted the findings in full. A summary of factual findings was provided, detailing that on February 22, 2017, a grand jury indicted Weber for sex crimes committed during his employment as a physician. Special Agent Curt Muller investigated these allegations and sought a search warrant for Weber's residence, supported by a detailed 30-page affidavit and five attachments specifying the property to be searched.

The legal document outlines the details surrounding a search warrant application prepared by Special Agent (SA) Muller regarding the search of a property linked to potential violations of Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2241, 2242, 2243 (sex abuse) and 2423(b) (international sex travel). The warrant aimed to seize various items including vehicles, outbuildings, electronic devices, and evidence related to the suspected crimes. Attachment B included a detailed three-page list of specific items to be seized, categorized as evidence of criminal offenses, contraband, or property related to the crimes.

The application for the search warrant described the property to be searched, mirroring the affidavit's description, and identified the basis for the search as evidence of a crime, contraband, and items illegally possessed. SA Muller prepared the warrant, which contained similar descriptions as those in the application but lacked explicit identification of the statutes violated.

SA Muller did not initially incorporate his application or affidavit into the search warrant as required. Following the preparation of the warrant, it was e-mailed to Magistrate Judge Wollmann for review. On February 24, 2017, SA Muller and Assistant U.S. Attorney Sarah Collins presented the warrant packet to Judge Wollmann, where SA Muller signed the affidavit and application under oath. The judge reviewed and subsequently signed the search warrant, dated February 24, 2017, at 10:25 a.m. SA Muller believed in good faith that the warrant was appropriate at the time of filing.

SA Muller found the search warrant for Dr. Weber unremarkable compared to previous warrants. On February 27, 2017, Muller briefed the Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) task force on Dr. Weber's case, distributing copies of the search warrant and related documents. The following day, Muller conducted another briefing with ICAC members, Spearfish Police Department, and the Department of Health and Human Services, reiterating the search objectives for evidence of sexual abuse and sex travel. The warrant was executed on February 28, 2017, at 9 a.m., with Dr. Weber present at his home. Muller maintained all documents related to the warrant as a single bundle and directed the search, which resulted in the seizure of less than one banker box of various documents and electronic devices. The agents provided a copy of the warrant and a detailed inventory of seized items to Dr. Weber, but he did not receive copies of the affidavit or attachments A and B. The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants must be specific, and any failure to meet this particularity renders the warrant unconstitutional. While cross-referencing supporting documents is permissible, the warrant must independently describe the search's scope and items sought, and the supporting documents must be available to the person being searched.

The Supreme Court's decision in Groh addressed a Bivens claim against federal defendants and a § 1983 action against county law enforcement officers, determining the entitlement to qualified immunity regarding a search warrant issued by a Magistrate Judge. The court ruled that the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment because it did not incorporate necessary documents or adequately describe the items to be seized, stating that the description of the premises was nonsensical. It emphasized that the mere issuance of a warrant by a magistrate does not confirm the appropriateness of the search's scope, and noted that the agents' restraint during the search was self-imposed rather than judicially mandated. 

In a subsequent case, Messerschmidt, the court distinguished its ruling from Groh, finding that any deficiencies in the warrant were not apparent at first glance and required a closer examination of the application and affidavit. The officers in Messerschmidt had their application reviewed by a superior officer and a deputy district attorney, and since no concerns were raised about its validity, the error was not deemed obvious. The case underscored that qualifying for immunity requires a clear recognition of error by any reasonable officer, and in this instance, the officers could not be deemed "plainly incompetent" for relying on the magistrate’s approval, even if the warrant were ultimately invalid.

The magistrate judge determined that a warrant lacking explicit identification of items can still meet the particularity requirement by incorporating supporting documents, as established by the Eighth Circuit. This court has developed two lines of case law regarding incorporation: one requires supporting documents to accompany and be incorporated into the warrant, while the other allows for documents to provide necessary particularity if they are incorporated, attached, or present during the search. The judge analyzed relevant case law, including *Hamilton* and *Baranski*, finding them persuasive in this context. Unlike the invalid warrant in *Groh*, the magistrate signed the warrant, application, and affidavit, indicating a thorough review, which confirmed probable cause for the items listed. Thus, the warrant complied with the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause.

The defendant objected to this reasoning, arguing that *Nieman* and *Gamboa* misapplied *Rickert* and overlooked *Curry*, which emphasizes the need for an affidavit to be incorporated into the warrant for it to be valid. In *Gamboa*, the warrant was deemed valid because it explicitly referenced an attachment detailing the items to be seized, distinguishing it from *Groh*. In *Nieman*, the challenge was based on alleged overbreadth, but the court found the warrant provided specific limitations. The defendant's arguments referencing *Nieman* and *Gamboa* were deemed unmeritorious.

The R. R did not adopt the decisions from referenced cases but cited them to show that the Eighth Circuit applies varying requirements for constitutional validity of search warrants based on specific factual scenarios. The defendant objects to the R. R's reliance on the case Hamilton, arguing it reaffirmed the precedent set in Curry, which allows an affidavit to provide particularity to a search warrant only if it is adequately incorporated with the warrant. Additionally, the defendant contests the R. R's reliance on Baranski v. Fifteen Agents, which indicated that, consistent with Groh, most appellate courts allow warrants to reference supporting affidavits to meet the particularity requirement, provided these documents are incorporated at the time of issuance.

The defendant argues that the R. R's assertion of the law being in a "questionable state" contradicts cases that have directly addressed the issue. He overlooks the relationship between Hamilton, Baranski v. Fifteen Agents, and other cases. Baranski elaborated on Groh and Gamboa, noting that unlike Groh, the warrant in Baranski clearly showed neutral magistrate approval with reference to the incorporated affidavit. The en banc court differentiated Groh, indicating it did not set a strict rule requiring an incorporated affidavit to accompany a warrant during the search.

Hamilton analyzed Groh, Curry, Gamboa, and Baranski, concluding that there is ambiguity in the law regarding the necessity of an incorporated affidavit with a search warrant for the particularity requirement. Despite recognizing potential failures in meeting this requirement, the Hamilton court avoided a definitive ruling due to the facts of the case not supporting the exclusionary rule. The magistrate judge acknowledged the complexity of the law in the Eighth Circuit regarding the incorporation of documents in search warrants, asserting it is both "questionable" and "thorny," though this complexity is largely irrelevant to the case at hand. Key questions raised include the application of federal law enforcement officer language, the specific affidavit referenced in the warrant, and whether the description of seized property as "evidence of a crime" meets Fourth Amendment requirements.

SA Muller prepared a 30-page affidavit, along with its five attachments, an application, and a search warrant simultaneously. The application referenced the affidavit, identifying the property to be seized. SA Muller presented this documentation to Magistrate Judge Wollmann, who witnessed his signatures and reviewed the materials, ultimately finding probable cause to issue the warrant. The Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Szczerba clarified that a search warrant's authorization to search a person instead of specified property does not invalidate it, as long as a reasonable officer would interpret the warrant to cover the described property. Although the warrant's language identifying the property to be seized as "evidence of a crime" was deemed vague and overbroad, the application incorporated SA Muller's affidavit and attachments, which were considered by the magistrate judge. The judge's review confirmed her understanding of the search's scope, validating the warrant. Additionally, SA Muller provided the search warrant and its attachments to law enforcement during briefings, ensuring officers were aware of the items and locations involved in the search. The documentation accompanied him during the supervised search, supporting the warrant's legitimacy.

The search warrant's specificity was deemed adequate because the relevant attachment was present at the search site, allowing SA Muller to limit the search to items listed in the warrant packet. The Szczerba court did not consider the officer's possession of the warrant and supporting affidavit during the search, which could have influenced its analysis. The defendant argued that the good-faith exception under Leon, which protects officers relying on a warrant later found invalid, should not apply due to the warrant's alleged facial deficiencies. The Supreme Court's ruling in Leon allows for the exclusionary rule to be bypassed if law enforcement acts on a warrant that they reasonably believed to be valid. However, if a warrant is so deficient that no reasonable officer could presume it valid, this protection does not apply. 

The magistrate judge concluded that, despite potential issues with the warrant's particularity, the circumstances did not warrant suppression of evidence under the good-faith exception. Factors supporting this conclusion included SA Muller maintaining the warrant and attachments as a cohesive unit, a neutral magistrate reviewing the entire packet before signing it, and SA Muller briefing law enforcement on the search parameters. Additionally, a typographical error in the application was attributed to clerical oversight rather than bad faith. The magistrate judged SA Muller's actions as objectively reasonable, determining that the warrant was not "so obviously deficient" as to invalidate its presumed legitimacy.

Several factors support the court's finding of good faith regarding the search warrant issued in this case: 

1. The application and warrant forms were prepared by the Administrative Offices of the Judiciary, which a reasonable law enforcement officer would assume were proper.
2. SA Muller received guidance from Assistant U.S. Attorney Sarah Collins during the preparation of the documents, leading to the expectation that any errors would have been corrected before submission to the magistrate judge.
3. The United States Attorney's Office determined that the search warrant packet adhered to the Fourth Amendment.
4. The warrant packet was emailed to Magistrate Judge Wollmann for review prior to formal presentation, and a reasonable officer would expect the judge to address any errors before SA Muller’s execution of the warrant.
5. A reasonable officer would anticipate that the magistrate would reject the warrant or suggest corrections if deficiencies were found before witnessing the execution.
6. Based on his training and experience, SA Muller believed the warrant was legally valid.

The court concluded that it was reasonable for SA Muller to rely on the warrant as including the items to be seized as outlined in the affidavit. The decision referenced previous case law emphasizing the relevance of an officer's knowledge and actions in assessing good faith. The court noted that the warrant was not so deficient that a reasonable officer would recognize it as constitutionally invalid. SA Muller executed the warrant, seizing only the items listed. Even if the warrant lacked particularity, his belief in its validity was objectively reasonable, and his conduct did not demonstrate the kind of disregard for the Fourth Amendment that the exclusionary rule is designed to deter. Law enforcement acted under the assumption that the limitations of the supporting documents were part of the warrant, avoiding any characteristics of a general search.

The court affirms the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, determining it effectively applies the law to the facts from the suppression hearing. The defendant's objections are overruled, and the report is adopted. Consequently, the defendant's motion to suppress is denied. A scheduling order will follow, referencing factual details from the report without further citation. Dr. Weber's objections do not dispute the facts in SA Muller's affidavit. The application for a search warrant contained a typographical error regarding citation "2242," which should have been corrected, and an additional necessary citation for international sex travel was omitted. SA Muller, a credible witness, testified without recorded support to the magistrate, has been a certified law enforcement officer since approximately 1990, and has extensive training and experience in obtaining search warrants. A noted typographical error indicated a meeting date of "February 28, 2018," rather than February 28, 2017, when Dr. Weber acknowledged receiving an inventory of seized items. The defendant does not contest the specificity of the property identified for seizure in Attachment B.