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Stafne v. Zilly
Citation: 337 F. Supp. 3d 1079Docket: Case No. 2:17-cv-01692-MHS
Court: District Court, W.D. Washington; October 9, 2018; Federal District Court
Scott E. Stafne, a Washington attorney, has filed a lawsuit against three senior federal judges and a county sheriff, challenging the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 371(b)(1), which allows judges to elect senior status. Stafne claims that once the judges elected senior status, they became 'judicial volunteers' lacking lawful federal jurisdiction over him or any litigants he represents without consent. He alleges that the judges made erroneous jurisdictional decisions in other cases and seeks several forms of relief, including declarations that their prior orders are void, an injunction against their participation in cases involving him, and monetary damages. He also seeks declaratory relief from Sheriff Trenary concerning compliance with a previous order from Judge Zilly. The Federal Judge Defendants and Sheriff Trenary have moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The excerpt emphasizes that there are established procedures for appealing federal court decisions, and challenges outside these procedures are generally improper, as they undermine the orderly legal process. Additionally, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity further discourages collateral attacks and supports the use of appellate procedures for correcting judicial errors. Stafne's lawsuit is characterized as an attempt to bypass these established processes, making it subject to dismissal. The district judge cannot grant the requested relief, as it would effectively be a writ of mandamus against a superior court, and equitable relief is not appropriate when a legal remedy exists. Stafne has adequate legal remedies available through direct appeal or mandamus for addressing claims of injury to himself or his clients, making those the appropriate channels for his arguments. His monetary claims against the Federal Judge Defendants are barred by absolute judicial immunity, which is not negated by his assertion that the 'senior federal judge' position violates the Appointments Clause. Additionally, claims against Sheriff Trenary must be dismissed as they represent a collateral attack on another district court's order, and any claim for money damages is premature since the court order has not been executed. Consequently, the motions to dismiss by the Federal Judge Defendants and Sheriff Trenary are granted with prejudice. Federal courts operate under limited jurisdiction, presuming that cases lie outside this jurisdiction unless proven otherwise by the asserting party. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is never forfeited and can be raised by any party or the court at any time. Cases must be dismissed if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted only when there is no valid legal theory or insufficient factual allegations for a plausible claim. The court must accept all well-pleaded material facts as true and construe them favorably for the non-moving party. Complaints must provide sufficient facts to give fair notice and allow for a defense, without merely reciting elements of a cause of action. Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations need not be credited. A claim achieves facial plausibility when it provides enough factual content to suggest a reasonable inference of the defendant's liability. Stafne, an attorney licensed in multiple federal courts, has previously engaged in litigation both as a representative and as a self-represented litigant. He is involved in two cases against Federal Judge Defendants: Stafne v. Burnside, alleging unfair debt collection and currently stayed, and Bank of New York Mellon v. Stafne, concerning a foreclosure action on his Snohomish County property. In the BNYM case, Stafne challenged jurisdiction and sought abstention, but his motions were denied, leading to a summary judgment favoring the Bank of New York Mellon, which he appealed. While that appeal was pending, the bank sought to amend the judgment to comply with Washington foreclosure law. Judge Zilly indicated that any amendments required Ninth Circuit approval due to the pending appeal. Following a remand from the Ninth Circuit, Stafne's brother, a co-defendant, died, and substitution was permitted. Stafne then moved for Judge Zilly's recusal, citing improper appointment and bias, but this request was denied by both Judge Zilly and the Chief District Judge. The motion to amend the judgment was continued, and during this period, Stafne initiated another legal action. Judge Zilly stayed the BNYM case based on Stafne's new lawsuit. Stafne claims that the American judicial system is biased towards financially powerful parties, unfairly discriminating against pro se litigants and attorneys from smaller law firms. He alleges that federal courts often issue decisions without proper jurisdictional explanations, particularly in foreclosure cases, which has harmed him and others involved in such disputes in the Ninth Circuit. Stafne cites specific cases, including those where he represented clients, to illustrate this behavior. He contends that his exercise of free speech and his client representation have resulted in retaliation and unfair treatment from judges. Stafne argues that the creation of the 'senior judge' position violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution and cites a law review article by Stras and Scott to support his claim that Federal Judge Defendants lack valid judicial power under Article III, functioning instead as 'judicial volunteers.' He points out that while litigants can consent to cases being heard by U.S. Magistrate or Bankruptcy Judges, there is no similar requirement for senior judges, who he claims receive insufficient oversight from active judges in the Western District of Washington. Stafne asserts that senior judges are either incompetent due to age or biased because they are unpaid. Specifically regarding the BNYM case, Stafne alleges collusion between the Western District of Washington and the Davis Wright Tremaine law firm in assigning Judge Zilly, claiming bias against him favoring the law firm. He accuses Judge Zilly of retaliating against him and asserts that he improperly authorized foreclosure of his property without establishing necessary facts and disregarded his due process rights. Stafne further claims that the actions of Judge Zilly and Senior Circuit Judge Silverman led to his brother Todd Stafne suffering a fatal stress-related heart attack. In the Burnside case, Stafne contends that Judge Coughenour failed to inform him that he was acting as a 'judicial volunteer' and that he had the right to withhold consent for a senior judge to preside over that case, which he did not grant. Stafne seeks various forms of relief, including preventing senior judges from presiding over cases involving him as a litigant or attorney without unanimous consent from parties. He requests an order mandating senior federal judges to justify their jurisdiction in contested cases. In the BNYM case, he aims to disqualify Judge Zilly and have all of Zilly's prior orders declared ultra vires due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Stafne also seeks the disqualification of Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Silverman from the BNYM appeal and requests the Ninth Circuit to rescind its remand order. In the Burnside case, he seeks to disqualify Judge Coughenour. Stafne brings claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against Judges Zilly and Silverman, alleging they acted without jurisdiction and retaliated against him for his criticism of the federal courts, infringing on his First Amendment rights and causing him physical, psychological, and financial harm. He seeks contingent relief against Defendant Trenary regarding potential sale of his property under Judge Zilly's order. In response, the Federal Judge Defendants move to dismiss Stafne's claims, arguing they are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 because they did not act under color of state law. They assert Stafne's claims constitute an improper collateral attack on other litigation and that he has adequate legal remedies for his grievances. They also claim absolute judicial immunity against claims for monetary damages. Stafne's claims under § 1983 fail since it only applies to individuals acting under state law, and his § 1985 claim fails due to lack of required racial or class-based animus. Stafne's Section 1983 claim against the Federal Judge Defendants, if construed as a Bivens action, would fail because the Supreme Court has only recognized the Bivens remedy in limited contexts: for violations of the Fourth Amendment (Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents) and extensions under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments (Davis v. Passman and Carlson v. Green). The Supreme Court has established that expanding Bivens is now a 'disfavored' judicial activity, with no court recognizing a Bivens claim similar to Stafne's situation. Stafne seeks to declare void all orders from Judge Zilly in the BNYM lawsuit and to direct the Ninth Circuit to rescind its order of remand. Additionally, Stafne requests that these cases not be used for claim or issue preclusion in any future lawsuits. However, the collateral attack doctrine prohibits such relief, as it prevents litigants from challenging the judgments of other courts. The authority to determine the validity of court orders lies with the original court and can only be reviewed through established appellate processes. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to overturn decisions made by the Ninth Circuit or any district court in separate lawsuits. Stafne requests injunctive relief against federal judges, aiming to prevent them from presiding over cases involving him without his consent and requiring judges to justify their subject matter jurisdiction in challenged cases. However, the court lacks jurisdiction to grant such relief, as it cannot issue a writ of mandamus to another district court or the Ninth Circuit. This would effectively allow a "horizontal appeal" between district courts, which is not permissible. Furthermore, Stafne lacks standing to pursue the requested equitable relief, which is crucial for establishing subject matter jurisdiction. To demonstrate standing for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show ongoing adverse effects from past conduct or a likelihood of future harm, as well as an inadequate legal remedy and significant risk of irreparable harm. The Supreme Court's ruling in O'Shea v. Littleton illustrates that without an actual injury or a substantial likelihood of injury, claims for injunctive relief fail to establish a valid case or controversy. Additionally, previous claims by Stafne do not meet the necessary criteria for standing, as he has not shown an injury related to the alleged misconduct of the judges. Should the plaintiffs face prosecution or improper sentencing in the future, they have access to state and federal procedures for relief from the alleged wrongful conduct. The Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims should not proceed due to the lack of an existing case or controversy and the burden that the requested injunctive relief would impose. Stafne lacks standing to seek equitable relief as he cannot demonstrate an inadequate remedy at law. Any grievances regarding judgments from BNYM, Burnside, or other cases should be addressed through appellate review, including the possibility of presenting constitutional challenges to Ninth Circuit judges, seeking en banc review, or petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari. Furthermore, the Federal Judge Defendants assert absolute judicial immunity in response to Stafne's claims for monetary damages. Although Stafne seeks nominal damages from Judges Zilly and Silverman, judicial officers are protected from civil actions for their judicial acts, even if those acts exceed their jurisdiction or are alleged to be malicious. Judicial immunity is a complete immunity from suit, not just a defense against damages, and is not negated by claims of bad faith or malice. Such immunity applies regardless of the correctness or consequences of the judicial actions. There are only two exceptions: a judge is not immune for nonjudicial actions or for judicial actions taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction. The determination of whether an action is judicial depends on the nature of the act and the expectations of the parties involved. In Mireles, the Supreme Court addressed judicial immunity, clarifying that a judge's mistake or excess of authority does not negate immunity if the act performed falls within the nature and function typically associated with judicial duties. The Court emphasized that scrutiny should focus on the general function of the act rather than the specific action itself. In Stump, the Court illustrated that a judge acts in a clear absence of jurisdiction when engaging in matters outside their defined authority (e.g., a probate judge trying a criminal case). Conversely, a judge exceeding their jurisdiction but still operating within general judicial functions retains immunity. In the current case involving the Federal Judge Defendants, all actions taken by Judges Zilly, Silverman, and Coughenour in their respective cases were identified as typical judicial functions, such as reviewing legal documents, hearing arguments, and making rulings. The plaintiff, Stafne, contended that these judges lost their judicial authority upon electing senior status, but did not explicitly argue that they ceased to be judges. He acknowledged that they could still decide federal cases with consent from all parties, indicating they remained judges under the framework of judicial immunity. Consequently, the actions in question were judicial acts, and the first exception to immunity did not apply. Regarding the second exception, the analysis of a clear lack of subject matter jurisdiction remains pertinent. In *Stump v. Sparkman*, the Supreme Court established that a judge does not act in clear absence of jurisdiction when exercising authority granted by state law, even when the actions may be controversial, such as authorizing sterilization. The Court highlighted that a judge exceeding jurisdiction can still claim immunity, whereas acting without any jurisdiction does not afford such protection. The scope of a judge's jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly concerning immunity. The document addresses whether the actions of the Federal Judge Defendants, specifically Judges Zilly, Silverman, and Coughenour, are typical judicial functions. Stafne contends that these judges, having elected senior status, no longer hold their Article III judicial authority; however, he does not dispute that their actions—such as reviewing legal documents, hearing arguments, and issuing rulings—are standard judicial activities. Stafne implicitly acknowledges that the judges can still adjudicate federal cases with party consent. Furthermore, Stafne argues that there was a "clear lack" of subject matter jurisdiction in the BNYM lawsuit due to unmet diversity jurisdiction requirements. This line of reasoning constitutes his challenge to the judges' jurisdiction in that specific case. Overall, the actions in question are classified as judicial acts, thus the first exception to judicial immunity does not apply. Stafne contends that the Federal Judge Defendants lacked subject matter jurisdiction because, as senior judges, they did not constitutionally maintain their federal judicial office after electing senior status without the consent of all parties. He specifically argues that Judge Zilly acted without jurisdiction in the case involving the Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM) since the plaintiff failed to adequately plead facts necessary to establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Stafne claims that the Bank did not specify the state of its principal office, which is crucial for determining its citizenship. However, the Bank did assert that it is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, fulfilling the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. Stafne's assertions appear to lack merit, as the issue is more appropriately addressed within the BNYM lawsuit itself. Additionally, Stafne raised concerns that the Bank was not the real party in interest and questioned the court's jurisdiction on the grounds of "prior exclusive jurisdiction." He also challenged the Bank's standing and authority to file the lawsuit. Judge Zilly dismissed all these arguments, and while Stafne may address them in his appeal, he has not demonstrated a "clear lack" of subject matter jurisdiction. The legal standard for overcoming judicial immunity requires evidence that a judge's actions were "manifestly or palpably beyond" their authority. The Ninth Circuit case Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa supports that erroneous assertions of jurisdiction do not negate judicial immunity. In the BNYM case, the record does not indicate that Judge Zilly acted outside his authority. Regarding Judge Silverman, Stafne's argument is limited to the assertion that Silverman remanded Zilly's order without confirming the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction over that appeal. However, he does not claim that the Ninth Circuit had a "clear lack" of jurisdiction, which is generally established under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 for appeals from district court decisions. Judge Silverman, part of a Ninth Circuit panel, affirmed that he acted within jurisdiction when ordering a limited remand to Judge Zilly in BNYM. Stafne’s argument challenging the constitutional validity of federal senior status under the Appointments Clause is rejected for multiple reasons. First, jurisdiction pertains solely to a court's authority to adjudicate, encompassing subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has articulated that subject matter jurisdiction defines a court's power to hear specific categories of cases, not based on the individual qualifications of judges. Therefore, even if Stafne's assertion about federal judges losing constitutional authority after assuming senior status were accurate, it would not negate the subject matter jurisdiction of cases decided by senior judges. Second, the Supreme Court has classified Appointments Clause challenges as nonjurisdictional. In Freytag v. C.I.R., the Court noted that such challenges, even if not raised in lower courts, could still be considered on appeal due to their nonjurisdictional nature. This reflects a broader principle that Appointments Clause issues, while significant to separation of powers, do not affect the jurisdictional authority of the courts. Thus, the court retains discretion to address these challenges despite procedural default. An Appointments Clause challenge is deemed nonjurisdictional and not subject to waiver, as established in Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd. The Supreme Court in Nguyen v. United States exercised supervisory powers to hear a challenge regarding a Court of Appeals panel's composition, despite the petitioners' prior lack of objection. Absolute judicial immunity applies, with only two recognized exceptions that do not pertain to this case; hence, the Federal Judge Defendants are granted absolute immunity against Stafne's money damages claim. Stafne argues that under 28 U.S.C. § 371, judges who elect senior status cease to be Article III judges. However, it is acknowledged that these judges were constitutionally appointed and remain in office until resignation, impeachment, or death, as per Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The judges argue that opting for senior status allows them to retain their judicial office, with the statute indicating that they merely shift from active service without losing their position. The interpretation of "retain the office" suggests continuity rather than a change in status, a view supported by Judge Stras and Professor Scott, who analyze the historical context and legislative intent behind the 1948 amendments to judicial retirement laws. The Court does not find support in case law for the conclusions proposed by Judge Stras and Professor Scott. While acknowledging the significance of the Appointments Clause in maintaining the separation of powers, the Court emphasizes that this lawsuit is not the appropriate venue for Stafne to challenge the senior status of the Federal Judge Defendants. The Supreme Court's ruling in Ryder v. United States establishes that challenges to the constitutional validity of an officer's appointment must be addressed in the proper context, and personal damages against public officials are not a valid remedy for such claims. Stafne's contingent claim against Defendant Sheriff Trenary, which asserts liability for potential damages if Trenary were to sell Stafne's property under a judicial foreclosure order, is dismissed. Trenary claims quasi-judicial immunity and argues that the lawsuit constitutes an improper collateral attack on an existing court order. Stafne's assertion that Judge Zilly's order is void due to constitutional authority has already been adjudicated and rejected in a prior case. A ruling in Stafne's favor would necessitate invalidating another district judge's order, a power the Court does not possess. Additionally, Stafne's claims regarding damages related to a foreclosure that has not yet occurred are deemed unripe, as the foreclosure process is currently stayed. Consequently, Stafne's claims against Sheriff Trenary are dismissed. The Court has granted motions to dismiss from both the Federal Judge Defendants (Judges Silverman, Zilly, and Coughenour) and Sheriff Trenary, resulting in the dismissal of the lawsuit with prejudice. The plaintiff, Stafne, sued the Federal Judge Defendants in their individual capacities and Sheriff Trenary in both individual and official capacities. The Court acknowledged the statutory provisions regarding the retention and retirement of federal judges, as well as the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. It took judicial notice of records from two other federal cases involving Stafne, as requested by the parties. Stafne's argument claiming that senior federal judges lack subject matter jurisdiction without full consent from all parties was found to contradict established legal principles, which state that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited. The Court referenced several precedents, including Arbaugh v. Y. H Corp. and Gonzalez v. Thaler, emphasizing the importance of maintaining clear distinctions regarding jurisdiction and the implications of the Appointments Clause in relation to the separation of powers.